Administration foiled by own Iraq goals
The failure to prod Baghdad with a list of benchmarks has aided foes of the war in Congress and enemies in the field, officials say.
By Paul Richter
Times Staff Writer
July 12, 2007
WASHINGTON — The Bush administration's decision to set benchmarks for measuring the progress of the Iraq mission is now seen by some U.S. officials as a costly blunder that has only aided the White House's critics in Congress and its foes in Iraq.
When they began publicizing the benchmarks a year ago, administration officials saw them as realistic goals that would prod the Iraqi government toward reconciliation, while helping sustain political support for the effort at home. The yardsticks include steps vital to Iraq's stability: passage of a law to divide oil revenue among the key communities, reforms to allow more members of Saddam Hussein's party back into the government, and elections to divide power in the provinces.
Yet now, with the major goals still out of reach, the administration is playing down their importance. With an interim report on the U.S. effort due out today, administration officials instead are emphasizing other goals — some of which are less ambitious but have been attained.
Ryan Crocker, the U.S. ambassador to Iraq, recently told reporters that while the benchmarks remain important, "We have to look on a wider scale than the benchmarks themselves."
In private, many officials were more scathing in their critique, saying that defining the goals in such a way galvanized resistance in Iraq and gave war critics a way to argue that the U.S. mission was falling short.
"You better believe it was a mistake," said a Pentagon official who spoke on condition of anonymity when criticizing administration policy. "In any armed conflict, trying to predict the future is folly…. You are setting up some degree of failure."
President Bush turned to benchmarks amid intensifying criticism from Congress and plummeting public support. Benchmarks offered a way to counter congressional demands for timetables and to dampen the midterm election rage that ultimately cost his party control of Congress.
Some officials now believe that setting benchmarks stirred resentment among proud Iraqi leaders and spelled out for anti-American groups in Iraq precisely the things they should try to obstruct.
The administration decided to make the goals public last summer, after the elected government of Prime Minister Nouri Maliki took power. U.S. officials quickly realized that the fractious government would need a spur; at the same time, Iraq's leadership was under pressure from the United States to provide signs of progress to justify continuation of the war effort.
Senior U.S. officials — while acknowledging at the time that brokering these deals would be tough — voiced repeated public optimism that the goals would be met. At times, they seemed to threaten that if the Iraqis didn't move, there would be adverse consequences.
Bush, in a Jan. 10 speech laying out his troop "surge" strategy, outlined five of the major benchmarks and said: "America will hold the Iraqi government to the benchmarks it has announced."
A senior administration official, briefing reporters that same day, said Iraq's leadership was "talking about, in a fairly short period of time" moving on the key reforms. He said U.S. officials would quickly acquire "the ability to judge" whether the Iraqis were living up to their promises.
But the effort bogged down.
By February, U.S. officials had grown deeply pessimistic about the prospects for easing of the so-called de-Baathification law to allow former low-ranking members of the deposed Baath Party to return to government.
The same month, U.S. officials announced that a new oil law had made it through Maliki's Cabinet and seemed on a path to enactment. But its progress soon ground to a halt, and the measure continues to languish.
The Maliki government, in laying out benchmarks for itself last year, had called for the completion of many by the first quarter of this year. But officials failed to make the deadlines.
The Bush administration has not penalized the Iraqis for these failures. U.S. officials said they understood that the central government was weak and couldn't force consensus if it wanted to.
But the delays did have a consequence — stirring louder and more sharply focused criticism of the Baghdad government in Congress, among Republicans and Democrats. The criticism played a pivotal role in persuading many lawmakers to split with the White House over the war.
This spring, Congress wrote 18 benchmarks for political, security and economic reforms into the 2007 emergency war-spending bill. The yardsticks were based on pledges of action that the Maliki government had made in January, when Bush agreed to send in more U.S. troops. Bush signed that measure, endorsing the 18 goals.
Some U.S. officials insist that the benchmarks remain important, and emphasize that the Iraqis had made some progress.
Sean McCormack, the chief State Department spokesman, told reporters this week that the Iraqis have taken important steps on the oil law and other key measures. But, he said, the benchmarks don't measure other signs of progress, such as the willingness of tribal leaders in Al Anbar province to work against militants in that area. "Unless you have a set of benchmarks that looks like the New York City phonebook, it's very difficult to measure," he said.
One administration official, who declined to be identified because of the sensitivity of the subject, said senior officials misjudged the difficulty of taking these steps toward Iraqi reconciliation. He said setting out the goals created expectations that could not be met.
"There is a rush to declare failure if an expectation is not met," the official said. "But it doesn't mean failure is imminent. It is up to everyone to step back and look at the reasons" the benchmarks were not met.
Daniel P. Serwer of the U.S. Institute for Peace said it was likely that Islamic radicals and Saddamists in Iraq had been closely watching how the administration was trying to reshape Iraq's government, and had done what they could to block it.
"The enemy is rational. They know what we're trying to do, and they want to stop it," he said.
--
Begin text of infobox
Iraqi benchmarks
Here are the 18 benchmarks written into law by Congress. Considered to be among the most important are those dealing with the distribution of oil profits, de-Baathification, provincial elections and the constitutional review, none of which have been met.
• Forming a constitutional review committee and completing the constitutional review.
• Enacting and implementing legislation on de-Baathification.
• Enacting and implementing legislation to ensure the equitable distribution of oil revenue.
• Enacting and implementing legislation on procedures to form semiautonomous regions.
• Enacting and implementing legislation to hold provincial elections.
• Enacting and implementing legislation that addresses amnesty.
• Enacting and implementing legislation to disarm militias.
• Establishing political, media, economic and services committees in support of the Baghdad security plan.
• Providing three trained, ready Iraqi brigades to support Baghdad operations.
• Providing Iraqi commanders with authority to pursue all extremists, including Sunni insurgents and Shiite militias, without political intervention.
• Ensuring that the Iraqi security forces are providing evenhanded enforcement of the law.
• Ensuring that the Baghdad security plan will not result in havens for militias or insurgents.
• Reducing the level of sectarian violence and eliminating militia control of local security.
• Establishing planned joint-security stations in neighborhoods across Baghdad.
• Increasing the number of Iraqi security forces units capable of operating independently.
• Ensuring that the rights of minority political parties in the Iraqi legislature are protected.
• Allocating and spending $10 billion in Iraqi revenue for reconstruction projects — including delivery of essential services — on an equitable basis.
• Ensuring that Iraq's political authorities are not undermining or making false accusations against members of the Iraqi security forces.
Friday, September 07, 2007
Al-Qa'eda 'has been able to rebuild'
Last Updated: 2:15am BST 13/07/2007
telegraph.co.uk
The Bush administration is to be warned today that al-Qa'eda has rebuilt its operating capability to a level not seen since 2001, it was reported last night.
A new counter-terrorism study concludes that despite nearly six years of war, bombings and other tactics aimed at crippling its capability, the group has been able to rebuild to an "extent not seen" since around the time of the September 11 attacks.
The assessment by US intelligence analysts is to be discussed at the White House today as part of a broader meeting on an upcoming National Intelligence Estimate.
A counter-terrorism official who had seen a five-page summary of the report called it a stark appraisal of the threat the organisation poses.
Al-Qa'eda is "considerably operationally stronger than a year ago" and has "regrouped to an extent not seen since 2001", the official said, paraphrasing the report's conclusions. "They are showing greater and greater ability to plan attacks in Europe and the United States."
The document, titled Al-Qa'eda Better Positioned to Strike the West, pays special heed to the terror group's safe haven in the lawless tribal regions of Pakistan and makes a range of observations about the threat posed to the United States and its allies, officials said.
The group also has created "the most robust training programme since 2001, with an interest in using European operatives," the official quoted the report as saying.
At the same time, this official said, the report speaks of "significant gaps in intelligence" so US authorities may be ignorant of potential or planned attacks.
John Kringen, who heads the CIA's analysis directorate, echoed the concerns about al-Qa'eda's resurgence to the House Armed Services Committee hearing yesterday.
"They seem to be fairly well settled into the safe haven and the ungoverned spaces of Pakistan," Kringen testified. "We see more training. We see more money. We see more communications. We see that activity rising."
Counter-terrorism officials have been increasingly concerned about al-Qa'eda's recent operations. This week, the Homeland Security Secretary, Michael Chertoff, said he had a "gut feeling" that the United States faced a heightened risk of attack this summer.
However, numerous government officials say they know of no specific, credible threat of a new attack.
Last Updated: 2:15am BST 13/07/2007
telegraph.co.uk
The Bush administration is to be warned today that al-Qa'eda has rebuilt its operating capability to a level not seen since 2001, it was reported last night.
A new counter-terrorism study concludes that despite nearly six years of war, bombings and other tactics aimed at crippling its capability, the group has been able to rebuild to an "extent not seen" since around the time of the September 11 attacks.
The assessment by US intelligence analysts is to be discussed at the White House today as part of a broader meeting on an upcoming National Intelligence Estimate.
A counter-terrorism official who had seen a five-page summary of the report called it a stark appraisal of the threat the organisation poses.
Al-Qa'eda is "considerably operationally stronger than a year ago" and has "regrouped to an extent not seen since 2001", the official said, paraphrasing the report's conclusions. "They are showing greater and greater ability to plan attacks in Europe and the United States."
The document, titled Al-Qa'eda Better Positioned to Strike the West, pays special heed to the terror group's safe haven in the lawless tribal regions of Pakistan and makes a range of observations about the threat posed to the United States and its allies, officials said.
The group also has created "the most robust training programme since 2001, with an interest in using European operatives," the official quoted the report as saying.
At the same time, this official said, the report speaks of "significant gaps in intelligence" so US authorities may be ignorant of potential or planned attacks.
John Kringen, who heads the CIA's analysis directorate, echoed the concerns about al-Qa'eda's resurgence to the House Armed Services Committee hearing yesterday.
"They seem to be fairly well settled into the safe haven and the ungoverned spaces of Pakistan," Kringen testified. "We see more training. We see more money. We see more communications. We see that activity rising."
Counter-terrorism officials have been increasingly concerned about al-Qa'eda's recent operations. This week, the Homeland Security Secretary, Michael Chertoff, said he had a "gut feeling" that the United States faced a heightened risk of attack this summer.
However, numerous government officials say they know of no specific, credible threat of a new attack.
Iraq: Go Deep or Get Out
By Stephen Biddle
Wednesday, July 11, 2007; A15
The president's shaky political consensus for the surge in Iraq is in danger of collapsing after the recent defections of prominent Senate Republicans such as Richard Lugar (Ind.), Pete Domenici (N.M.) and George Voinovich (Ohio). But this growing opposition to the surge has not yet translated into support for outright withdrawal -- few lawmakers are comfortable with abandoning Iraq or admitting defeat. The result has been a search for some kind of politically moderate "Plan B" that would split the difference between surge and withdrawal.
The problem is that these politics do not fit the military reality of Iraq. Many would like to reduce the U.S. commitment to something like half of today's troop presence there. But it is much harder to find a mission for the remaining 60,000 to 80,000 soldiers that makes any sense militarily.
Perhaps the most popular centrist option today is drawn from the Baker-Hamilton commission recommendations of last December. This would withdraw U.S. combat brigades, shift the American mission to one of training and supporting the Iraqi security forces, and cut total U.S. troop levels in the country by about half. This idea is at the heart of the proposed legislative effort that Domenici threw his support behind last week, and support is growing on both sides of the aisle on Capitol Hill.
The politics make sense, but the compromise leaves us with an untenable military mission. Without a major U.S. combat effort to keep the violence down, the American training effort would face challenges even bigger than those our troops are confronting today. An ineffective training effort would leave tens of thousands of American trainers, advisers and supporting troops exposed to that violence in the meantime. The net result is likely to be continued U.S. casualties with little positive effect on Iraq's ongoing civil war.
The American combat presence in Iraq is insufficient to end the violence but does cap its intensity. If we draw down that combat presence, violence will rise accordingly. To be effective, embedded trainers and advisers must live and operate with the Iraqi soldiers they mentor -- they are not lecturers sequestered in some safe classroom. The greater the violence, the riskier their jobs and the heavier their losses.
That violence reduces their ability to succeed as trainers. There are many barriers to an effective Iraqi security force. But the toughest is sectarian factionalism. Iraq is in the midst of a civil war in which all Iraqis are increasingly forced to take sides for their own survival. Iraq's security forces are necessarily drawn from the same populations that are being pulled apart into factions. No military can be hermetically sealed off from its society -- the more severe the sectarian violence, the deeper the divisions in Iraqi society become and the harder it is for Americans to create the kind of disinterested nationalist security force that could stabilize Iraq. Under the best conditions, it is unrealistic to expect a satisfactory Iraqi security force anytime soon, and the more severe the violence, the worse the prospects.
The result is a vicious cycle. The more we shift out of combat missions and into training, the harder we make the trainers' job and the more exposed they become. It is unrealistic to expect that we can pull back to some safe yet productive mission of training but not fighting -- this would be neither safe nor productive.
If the surge is unacceptable, the better option is to cut our losses and withdraw altogether. In fact, the substantive case for either extreme -- surge or outright withdrawal -- is stronger than for any policy between. The surge is a long-shot gamble. But middle-ground options leave us with the worst of both worlds: continuing casualties but even less chance of stability in exchange. Moderation and centrism are normally the right instincts in American politics, and many lawmakers in both parties desperately want to find a workable middle ground on Iraq. But while the politics are right, the military logic is not.
The writer, who was in Iraq in March and April, is senior fellow for defense policy at the Council on Foreign Relations.
By Stephen Biddle
Wednesday, July 11, 2007; A15
The president's shaky political consensus for the surge in Iraq is in danger of collapsing after the recent defections of prominent Senate Republicans such as Richard Lugar (Ind.), Pete Domenici (N.M.) and George Voinovich (Ohio). But this growing opposition to the surge has not yet translated into support for outright withdrawal -- few lawmakers are comfortable with abandoning Iraq or admitting defeat. The result has been a search for some kind of politically moderate "Plan B" that would split the difference between surge and withdrawal.
The problem is that these politics do not fit the military reality of Iraq. Many would like to reduce the U.S. commitment to something like half of today's troop presence there. But it is much harder to find a mission for the remaining 60,000 to 80,000 soldiers that makes any sense militarily.
Perhaps the most popular centrist option today is drawn from the Baker-Hamilton commission recommendations of last December. This would withdraw U.S. combat brigades, shift the American mission to one of training and supporting the Iraqi security forces, and cut total U.S. troop levels in the country by about half. This idea is at the heart of the proposed legislative effort that Domenici threw his support behind last week, and support is growing on both sides of the aisle on Capitol Hill.
The politics make sense, but the compromise leaves us with an untenable military mission. Without a major U.S. combat effort to keep the violence down, the American training effort would face challenges even bigger than those our troops are confronting today. An ineffective training effort would leave tens of thousands of American trainers, advisers and supporting troops exposed to that violence in the meantime. The net result is likely to be continued U.S. casualties with little positive effect on Iraq's ongoing civil war.
The American combat presence in Iraq is insufficient to end the violence but does cap its intensity. If we draw down that combat presence, violence will rise accordingly. To be effective, embedded trainers and advisers must live and operate with the Iraqi soldiers they mentor -- they are not lecturers sequestered in some safe classroom. The greater the violence, the riskier their jobs and the heavier their losses.
That violence reduces their ability to succeed as trainers. There are many barriers to an effective Iraqi security force. But the toughest is sectarian factionalism. Iraq is in the midst of a civil war in which all Iraqis are increasingly forced to take sides for their own survival. Iraq's security forces are necessarily drawn from the same populations that are being pulled apart into factions. No military can be hermetically sealed off from its society -- the more severe the sectarian violence, the deeper the divisions in Iraqi society become and the harder it is for Americans to create the kind of disinterested nationalist security force that could stabilize Iraq. Under the best conditions, it is unrealistic to expect a satisfactory Iraqi security force anytime soon, and the more severe the violence, the worse the prospects.
The result is a vicious cycle. The more we shift out of combat missions and into training, the harder we make the trainers' job and the more exposed they become. It is unrealistic to expect that we can pull back to some safe yet productive mission of training but not fighting -- this would be neither safe nor productive.
If the surge is unacceptable, the better option is to cut our losses and withdraw altogether. In fact, the substantive case for either extreme -- surge or outright withdrawal -- is stronger than for any policy between. The surge is a long-shot gamble. But middle-ground options leave us with the worst of both worlds: continuing casualties but even less chance of stability in exchange. Moderation and centrism are normally the right instincts in American politics, and many lawmakers in both parties desperately want to find a workable middle ground on Iraq. But while the politics are right, the military logic is not.
The writer, who was in Iraq in March and April, is senior fellow for defense policy at the Council on Foreign Relations.
Disorder in the court
The 9th Circuit is overturned more than any other appeals court. Its size may be a factor.
By Brian T. Fitzpatrick
BRIAN T. FITZPATRICK, a professor at Vanderbilt Law School, was a clerk on the 9th Circuit and the U.S. Supreme Court.
July 11, 2007
ANOTHER Supreme Court term has come to a close, and, while many things changed in the law, one thing stayed the same: The justices spent much of their time reversing the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals.
The 9th Circuit, which hears appeals in federal cases in the Western United States, is the largest of the 13 such courts, with 28 active judges and more than 20 part-time senior judges. The 9th Circuit is almost three times the size of an average court of appeals, and its jurisdiction stretches from Alaska to Arizona, an area comprising nearly one-fifth of the American population.
The 9th Circuit also has a long-running streak as the most overturned, which went unbroken this year. The Supreme Court reviewed 22 cases from the 9th Circuit last term, and it reversed or vacated 19 times. By comparison, the Supreme Court reviewed only five cases, vacating or reversing four, from the next-busiest court of appeals, the 5th Circuit based in New Orleans.
In other words, although the 9th Circuit decided only one-third more appeals on the merits than the 5th Circuit, it was reversed nearly five times more often.
These numbers suggest that the 9th Circuit is not doing a very good job. I am not the first to point this out. For many years, lawyers, judges and legal scholars have argued that the 9th Circuit is so large and unwieldy that it should be split. Indeed, before the 2006 midterm elections, Congress came very close to doing just that. Legislation passed the House but was never acted on in the Senate.
Proponents of splitting the 9th Circuit largely have been unable, however, to connect the colossal court's size to its high rate of reversal. But there is a connection. Indeed, it can be shown mathematically that, as a court grows larger, it is increasingly likely to issue extreme decisions.
We know that all judges are not created equal. Some are more ideologically extreme, more willing to push the law in a liberal or conservative direction, to find ways around precedents they do not like. Such extreme jurists are a minority on any federal court of appeals, but these courts don't typically decide cases by a majority vote of their entire memberships. Rather, cases are heard by panels of three judges selected at random. So, despite their small overall numbers, extreme judges will occasionally make up a 2-1 majority.
So what are the chances that a circuit court will draw a panel with two judges who hold extreme views? It depends first on how many such judges you have, but also on how big the court is.
Consider a hypothetical court of 28 judges (the number of active judges currently on the 9th Circuit), in which six of the judges are extreme. The probability of such a court randomly selecting a panel with at least two extreme judges is almost 11%. But if it were divided into two courts — each with 14 judges, three of whom are extreme — that probability falls to 9%.
A difference of 1% or 2% may not seem like much, but the 9th Circuit decides more than 6,000 cases every year. This means that if the 9th Circuit is anything like my hypothetical court, splitting it in half would save 60 to 120 appeals a year from being decided by panels with a majority of extreme judges.
If a majority of the full court believes a panel's decision is too far out of step, the full membership can rehear a case. But that is such a cumbersome process that it's used very rarely. The 9th Circuit used it only 22 times last year. And even then, the court is so large that it uses a randomly selected panel of 15 judges instead of the full 28.
Of course, mathematics cannot prove that one of the reasons the 9th Circuit is so frequently reversed by the Supreme Court is because it renders more extreme decisions. But we have other evidence to go on. Of the 19 9th Circuit cases reversed by the Supreme Court last term, eight of them were unanimous — that is, the 9th Circuit's view in these cases did not win the support of a single justice, from the liberal John Paul Stevens to the conservative Clarence Thomas. All the other 12 circuit courts combined were unanimously reversed only nine times.
In other words, it is no coincidence that, when you hear about a bizarre ruling issued by a federal court of appeals, it very likely came from the 9th Circuit. That court was, after all, the one that held a few years ago that it was unconstitutional to voluntarily recite the Pledge of Allegiance in a public school. It also has ruled that tenants in public housing could not be evicted even though their apartments were being used as drug dens. Both of these decisions were, not surprisingly, unanimously reversed by the Supreme Court.
As long as the 9th Circuit stays as large as it is, it is likely to disproportionately continue to issue rulings like these, and it is likely to continue being disproportionately reversed by the Supreme Court.
Over the last six years, many members of the Senate have expressed their desire to reduce the number of "extreme" (as opposed to "mainstream") judicial decisions. If they mean what they say, they should also want to complete the work of the last Congress and split the 9th Circuit.
The 9th Circuit is overturned more than any other appeals court. Its size may be a factor.
By Brian T. Fitzpatrick
BRIAN T. FITZPATRICK, a professor at Vanderbilt Law School, was a clerk on the 9th Circuit and the U.S. Supreme Court.
July 11, 2007
ANOTHER Supreme Court term has come to a close, and, while many things changed in the law, one thing stayed the same: The justices spent much of their time reversing the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals.
The 9th Circuit, which hears appeals in federal cases in the Western United States, is the largest of the 13 such courts, with 28 active judges and more than 20 part-time senior judges. The 9th Circuit is almost three times the size of an average court of appeals, and its jurisdiction stretches from Alaska to Arizona, an area comprising nearly one-fifth of the American population.
The 9th Circuit also has a long-running streak as the most overturned, which went unbroken this year. The Supreme Court reviewed 22 cases from the 9th Circuit last term, and it reversed or vacated 19 times. By comparison, the Supreme Court reviewed only five cases, vacating or reversing four, from the next-busiest court of appeals, the 5th Circuit based in New Orleans.
In other words, although the 9th Circuit decided only one-third more appeals on the merits than the 5th Circuit, it was reversed nearly five times more often.
These numbers suggest that the 9th Circuit is not doing a very good job. I am not the first to point this out. For many years, lawyers, judges and legal scholars have argued that the 9th Circuit is so large and unwieldy that it should be split. Indeed, before the 2006 midterm elections, Congress came very close to doing just that. Legislation passed the House but was never acted on in the Senate.
Proponents of splitting the 9th Circuit largely have been unable, however, to connect the colossal court's size to its high rate of reversal. But there is a connection. Indeed, it can be shown mathematically that, as a court grows larger, it is increasingly likely to issue extreme decisions.
We know that all judges are not created equal. Some are more ideologically extreme, more willing to push the law in a liberal or conservative direction, to find ways around precedents they do not like. Such extreme jurists are a minority on any federal court of appeals, but these courts don't typically decide cases by a majority vote of their entire memberships. Rather, cases are heard by panels of three judges selected at random. So, despite their small overall numbers, extreme judges will occasionally make up a 2-1 majority.
So what are the chances that a circuit court will draw a panel with two judges who hold extreme views? It depends first on how many such judges you have, but also on how big the court is.
Consider a hypothetical court of 28 judges (the number of active judges currently on the 9th Circuit), in which six of the judges are extreme. The probability of such a court randomly selecting a panel with at least two extreme judges is almost 11%. But if it were divided into two courts — each with 14 judges, three of whom are extreme — that probability falls to 9%.
A difference of 1% or 2% may not seem like much, but the 9th Circuit decides more than 6,000 cases every year. This means that if the 9th Circuit is anything like my hypothetical court, splitting it in half would save 60 to 120 appeals a year from being decided by panels with a majority of extreme judges.
If a majority of the full court believes a panel's decision is too far out of step, the full membership can rehear a case. But that is such a cumbersome process that it's used very rarely. The 9th Circuit used it only 22 times last year. And even then, the court is so large that it uses a randomly selected panel of 15 judges instead of the full 28.
Of course, mathematics cannot prove that one of the reasons the 9th Circuit is so frequently reversed by the Supreme Court is because it renders more extreme decisions. But we have other evidence to go on. Of the 19 9th Circuit cases reversed by the Supreme Court last term, eight of them were unanimous — that is, the 9th Circuit's view in these cases did not win the support of a single justice, from the liberal John Paul Stevens to the conservative Clarence Thomas. All the other 12 circuit courts combined were unanimously reversed only nine times.
In other words, it is no coincidence that, when you hear about a bizarre ruling issued by a federal court of appeals, it very likely came from the 9th Circuit. That court was, after all, the one that held a few years ago that it was unconstitutional to voluntarily recite the Pledge of Allegiance in a public school. It also has ruled that tenants in public housing could not be evicted even though their apartments were being used as drug dens. Both of these decisions were, not surprisingly, unanimously reversed by the Supreme Court.
As long as the 9th Circuit stays as large as it is, it is likely to disproportionately continue to issue rulings like these, and it is likely to continue being disproportionately reversed by the Supreme Court.
Over the last six years, many members of the Senate have expressed their desire to reduce the number of "extreme" (as opposed to "mainstream") judicial decisions. If they mean what they say, they should also want to complete the work of the last Congress and split the 9th Circuit.
Mexican oil, gas pipelines attacked
Leftist guerrillas claim responsibility for the bombings. Officials take steps to tighten security.
By Héctor Tobar and Marla Dickerson
Times Staff Writers
July 11, 2007
MEXICO CITY — A leftist guerrilla group claimed responsibility Tuesday for a series of bombings of pipelines operated by Pemex, Mexico's national oil company, and authorities moved quickly to protect the nation's oil and gas industry from further attacks.
The Popular Revolutionary Army, or EPR, said in a communique that it would continue its bombing campaign until the government disclosed the whereabouts of two EPR members said to have disappeared last year in the southern state of Oaxaca.
A spokesman for President Felipe Calderon said the government would "punish those responsible" for the attacks that began Thursday. Founded a decade ago, the EPR is a small group based largely in the southern state of Guerrero.
Officials were taking steps to increase security at the country's "strategic installations," Calderon's office said in a statement.
Explosions sent flames nearly 1,000 feet into the air before dawn Tuesday outside the city of Corregidora, in the central state of Queretaro, where several pipelines were severed, including a 36-inch pipe that transported natural gas to local distributors and a 16-inch line that supplied a local refinery with crude oil.
Officials said no one was injured in the attacks.
The EPR statement said the group carried out "surgical harassment actions" at 1 a.m. Tuesday and had done so at the same hour Thursday, striking a total of four locations in central Mexico.
Pemex officials initially said that one of two pipeline explosions Thursday was of suspicious origin but that the other could have been caused by aging pipes.
On Tuesday, with more pipeline explosions reported and Mexican media speculating that "terrorist" cells might be responsible, authorities confirmed that all the explosions were the result of deliberate attacks.
"This criminal conduct aims to weaken our democratic institutions, the patrimony of all Mexicans and the security of their families," the Interior Ministry said in a statement.
The attacks come as Pemex is reeling from an 11% drop this year in exports from its aging oil wells in the Gulf of Mexico. Declining oil revenue looms over the country's budget calculations, and a continued drop in output could set off a national fiscal crisis.
Oil and gas pipelines around the world have become attractive targets for radical groups seeking to wreak havoc on a nation's economy by disrupting energy supplies. Colombia has had hundreds of pipeline bombings in its four decades of civil war. Some analysts said Mexico would do well to take heed.
"Mexico has been slipping toward some sort of Colombia situation where you have narcos and guerrillas around because you have a government that isn't fighting poverty," said Mexico City energy analyst David Shields. "So I would not be sure that this is the end of it."
Analysts said it was too early to assess the impact of the attacks, which appeared to be focused on internal distribution networks and not the infrastructure Mexico uses to export 1.7 million barrels of oil a day, the country's main source of foreign revenue.
The EPR communique said explosions had been set off by "three mixed platoons made up of urban and rural units."
The rebels said they set off a total of eight explosives charges on three pipelines and at a cutoff valve at locations in the central state of Guanajuato and adjacent Queretaro.
"The order to begin the national campaign of harassment against the interests of the oligarchy and this illegitimate government has been launched," the statement said.
Officials and analysts say the EPR is one of at least six guerrilla groups that trace their roots to another group of the same name founded in Guerrero state in 1994.
The EPR's first public action was in 1996, when about 100 men and women armed with semiautomatic weapons entered the town of Aguas Blancas in Guerrero. The EPR attacked several police stations and army barracks that year before splitting into factions.
"Together, these groups are the most important armed rebel groups operating in Mexico next to the Zapatistas," said Jorge Lofredo of the Spain-based Center for the Documentation of Armed Groups, which received the EPR's communique about the Pemex attacks via e-mail Tuesday.
In November, one branch of the EPR known as the Democratic Revolutionary Tendency of the EPR claimed responsibility for three bombings in Mexico City that targeted a bank, election officials and offices of the Revolutionary Institutional Party.
Lofredo said little was known about the two EPR members from Oaxaca the group named in its Tuesday statement. Oaxaca state officials have said they do not have the men in custody.
In previous statements, the EPR has said the men were kidnapped by a right-wing paramilitary group and blamed beleaguered Oaxaca Gov. Ulises Ruiz for their disappearance.
"They have been warning for months that they would launch attacks if the men were not produced," Lofredo said of the EPR rebels.
Mexico is the world's sixth-largest oil producer and the 10th-largest exporter. It is also a major supplier of petroleum to the United States.
More than half of Pemex's $104 billion in revenue last year went toward government spending on schools, healthcare and other programs. That has left precious little for investment in exploration and development, or even maintenance of Pemex's distribution network.
Production is declining rapidly at the aging Cantarell field in the gulf, which supplies more than half of the nation's oil. Only about a decade's worth of proven reserves remain.
"The financial markets are already a bit worried about Pemex because of its high debt load and falling production," Shields said. "This is another element that could cause unease."
As of late Tuesday, the fire caused by the explosions continued to burn outside Corregidora. Authorities said that although the blaze was under control, the fuel inside the damaged pipelines would continue to burn for at least three days.
Leftist guerrillas claim responsibility for the bombings. Officials take steps to tighten security.
By Héctor Tobar and Marla Dickerson
Times Staff Writers
July 11, 2007
MEXICO CITY — A leftist guerrilla group claimed responsibility Tuesday for a series of bombings of pipelines operated by Pemex, Mexico's national oil company, and authorities moved quickly to protect the nation's oil and gas industry from further attacks.
The Popular Revolutionary Army, or EPR, said in a communique that it would continue its bombing campaign until the government disclosed the whereabouts of two EPR members said to have disappeared last year in the southern state of Oaxaca.
A spokesman for President Felipe Calderon said the government would "punish those responsible" for the attacks that began Thursday. Founded a decade ago, the EPR is a small group based largely in the southern state of Guerrero.
Officials were taking steps to increase security at the country's "strategic installations," Calderon's office said in a statement.
Explosions sent flames nearly 1,000 feet into the air before dawn Tuesday outside the city of Corregidora, in the central state of Queretaro, where several pipelines were severed, including a 36-inch pipe that transported natural gas to local distributors and a 16-inch line that supplied a local refinery with crude oil.
Officials said no one was injured in the attacks.
The EPR statement said the group carried out "surgical harassment actions" at 1 a.m. Tuesday and had done so at the same hour Thursday, striking a total of four locations in central Mexico.
Pemex officials initially said that one of two pipeline explosions Thursday was of suspicious origin but that the other could have been caused by aging pipes.
On Tuesday, with more pipeline explosions reported and Mexican media speculating that "terrorist" cells might be responsible, authorities confirmed that all the explosions were the result of deliberate attacks.
"This criminal conduct aims to weaken our democratic institutions, the patrimony of all Mexicans and the security of their families," the Interior Ministry said in a statement.
The attacks come as Pemex is reeling from an 11% drop this year in exports from its aging oil wells in the Gulf of Mexico. Declining oil revenue looms over the country's budget calculations, and a continued drop in output could set off a national fiscal crisis.
Oil and gas pipelines around the world have become attractive targets for radical groups seeking to wreak havoc on a nation's economy by disrupting energy supplies. Colombia has had hundreds of pipeline bombings in its four decades of civil war. Some analysts said Mexico would do well to take heed.
"Mexico has been slipping toward some sort of Colombia situation where you have narcos and guerrillas around because you have a government that isn't fighting poverty," said Mexico City energy analyst David Shields. "So I would not be sure that this is the end of it."
Analysts said it was too early to assess the impact of the attacks, which appeared to be focused on internal distribution networks and not the infrastructure Mexico uses to export 1.7 million barrels of oil a day, the country's main source of foreign revenue.
The EPR communique said explosions had been set off by "three mixed platoons made up of urban and rural units."
The rebels said they set off a total of eight explosives charges on three pipelines and at a cutoff valve at locations in the central state of Guanajuato and adjacent Queretaro.
"The order to begin the national campaign of harassment against the interests of the oligarchy and this illegitimate government has been launched," the statement said.
Officials and analysts say the EPR is one of at least six guerrilla groups that trace their roots to another group of the same name founded in Guerrero state in 1994.
The EPR's first public action was in 1996, when about 100 men and women armed with semiautomatic weapons entered the town of Aguas Blancas in Guerrero. The EPR attacked several police stations and army barracks that year before splitting into factions.
"Together, these groups are the most important armed rebel groups operating in Mexico next to the Zapatistas," said Jorge Lofredo of the Spain-based Center for the Documentation of Armed Groups, which received the EPR's communique about the Pemex attacks via e-mail Tuesday.
In November, one branch of the EPR known as the Democratic Revolutionary Tendency of the EPR claimed responsibility for three bombings in Mexico City that targeted a bank, election officials and offices of the Revolutionary Institutional Party.
Lofredo said little was known about the two EPR members from Oaxaca the group named in its Tuesday statement. Oaxaca state officials have said they do not have the men in custody.
In previous statements, the EPR has said the men were kidnapped by a right-wing paramilitary group and blamed beleaguered Oaxaca Gov. Ulises Ruiz for their disappearance.
"They have been warning for months that they would launch attacks if the men were not produced," Lofredo said of the EPR rebels.
Mexico is the world's sixth-largest oil producer and the 10th-largest exporter. It is also a major supplier of petroleum to the United States.
More than half of Pemex's $104 billion in revenue last year went toward government spending on schools, healthcare and other programs. That has left precious little for investment in exploration and development, or even maintenance of Pemex's distribution network.
Production is declining rapidly at the aging Cantarell field in the gulf, which supplies more than half of the nation's oil. Only about a decade's worth of proven reserves remain.
"The financial markets are already a bit worried about Pemex because of its high debt load and falling production," Shields said. "This is another element that could cause unease."
As of late Tuesday, the fire caused by the explosions continued to burn outside Corregidora. Authorities said that although the blaze was under control, the fuel inside the damaged pipelines would continue to burn for at least three days.
U.S. troop buildup in Iraq falling short
Amid 'surge,' forces have been unable to establish security, even for themselves. Military leaders say they just need more time.
By Julian E. Barnes and Ned Parker
Times Staff Writers
July 11, 2007
BAGHDAD — In the Ubaidi neighborhood in the eastern part of this city, American soldiers hired a local Iraqi to clean the Porta-Potties at their combat outpost. Before the man could start, members of the local Shiite militia threatened to kill him.
Today, the Porta-Potties are roped off, and the U.S. soldiers, who could not promise to protect their sewage man, are forced to burn their waste.
As part of the Bush administration's troop "surge" strategy, the U.S. unit here had moved into an abandoned potato chip factory hoping to push out the militia, protect existing jobs and provide stability for economic growth. Instead, militia members stymied development projects, cut off the water supply and executed two young Iraqi women seen talking to U.S. soldiers, sending a powerful message about who really controls Ubaidi's streets.
In the next few days, the Bush administration is scheduled to release a preliminary assessment of its overall Iraq strategy. Officials may point to signs of progress scattered across the country: a reduction in death-squad killings in Baghdad, agreements with tribal leaders in Al Anbar province, offensives north and south of the capital.
President Bush defended his strategy Tuesday, demanding Congress give his administration more time and insisting that America can "win this fight in Iraq." To underscore his request, Bush sent top aides to lobby lawmakers on Capitol Hill.
But as the experience of the troops in Ubaidi indicates, U.S. forces so far have been unable to establish security, even for themselves. Iraqis continue to flee their homes, leaving mixed areas and seeking safety in religiously segregated neighborhoods. About 32,000 families fled in June alone, according to figures compiled by the United Nations and the Iraqi government that are due to be released next week.
U.S. forces have staged offensives to push insurgents out of some safe havens. But many of the insurgents have escaped to new areas of the country, launching attacks where the U.S. presence is lighter.
And there has been no sign of any of the crucial political progress the administration had hoped to see in Iraq.
U.S. commanders are painfully aware that they are running out of time to change those realities. Army Gen. David H. Petraeus, the top American commander in Iraq, has made several efforts to slow the clock in Washington. Each time, it has sped up.
The full complement of the "surge" arrived in Iraq last month, bringing the total to 28,500 additional troops. Military officers originally hoped to have until 2008 before they had to render a verdict on the strategy. Then the Washington timeframe shrank to September. Now, it is shrinking further, with Congress demanding answers even sooner.
Supporters of the troop buildup insist that small steps could grow into larger and more long-term successes if lawmakers are patient.
"Right now we are three weeks into this. It's not like flipping a light switch," said a military officer in Baghdad, expressing the frustration of many commanders. "Time has to be given for things to work."
Commanders point to Ramadi, the capital of Al Anbar province, as a showcase for the kind of results the military wants from the current strategy. Once a battlefield, the city is now largely peaceful, calm enough that in March, Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri Maliki was able to pay his first official visit.
But military officers stress that it took about nine months of sustained effort to make Ramadi a relatively pacified city. And with its volatile mix of Sunni and Shiite Muslims, Baghdad presents a far more complex challenge than all-Sunni Ramadi.
The interim progress report that Bush promised to release this week is likely to emphasize the success the military has had in killing Sunni militants in the "Baghdad belts," the cities and towns that dot the major rivers and highways leading to the capital. In recent weeks, the newly arrived U.S. forces have been focused on fighting members of Al Qaeda in Iraq, a militant Sunni group made up of Iraqis and foreign fighters.
Top generals say the strategy is crucial to securing Baghdad. Only by controlling the routes into the capital, and denying militants safe havens, can the U.S. and Iraqi militaries keep out the car bombs that stoke sectarian violence inside the capital.
But leading Iraqis are less sure of the strategy.
Mahmoud Othman, a Kurdish member of the Iraqi parliament, said the U.S. approach may be successful at weakening Al Qaeda in Iraq. But he said Americans would not be able to solve Iraq's sectarian conflict or stop clashes between armed groups in Baghdad neighborhoods.
"The surge has an important effect in fighting Al Qaeda," the independent politician said. "On the Sunni-Shiite conflict, it hasn't had any effect…. Extremist Shiites and Sunnis are fighting each other. The Americans can't stop this."
U.S. officials have made little, if any, progress with their persistent calls for Iraqi officials to take steps toward reconciliation between Shiites and Sunnis.
Key administration officials, most prominently Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates and Vice President Dick Cheney, have visited Iraq to push for passage of an oil-revenue sharing law, provincial elections and reform of rules barring members of the former ruling Baath Party from government jobs.
But the Iraqi government is bogged down by fighting among Shiite, Sunni and Kurdish parties. It is unclear whether the oil law, the one piece of benchmark legislation still given hopes for passage before September, will reach a vote any time soon.
The number of death-squad killings in the capital, one sign of sectarian divisions, is down from earlier this year. But the number remains roughly at the level seen after the 2006 bombing of Samarra's Golden Mosque, which served as a catalyst for the extreme sectarian violence.
In Baghdad, the number of bodies found dumped in the streets dropped to 540 last month from 830 in January. Some American officers say those numbers could rise again. And others say that the decline may simply represent the depressing reality that most Baghdad neighborhoods are now segregated, meaning there are fewer people left for death squads to kill.
Maj. Gen. Joseph Fil Jr., the commander of U.S. forces in Baghdad, said that American troops at the end of June controlled about 42% of the city's neighborhoods, up from 19% in April.
But to many Iraqis, that is little comfort.
"The Americans do not make me feel safe," said Amin Sadiq, a 30-year-old Shiite worker in the Ghadeer neighborhood of east Baghdad. "When you hear the speeches of the top U.S. military leaders, you think that everything is ideal and perfect and Iraq will be better. But when you see how the U.S. soldiers behave, I really feel I should not trust the leaders."
The American military has helped bring a tense truce in some areas, but has not re-integrated once-mixed neighborhoods.
The western Baghdad neighborhood of Ghazaliya, once a prosperous mixed middle-class area, was riven by sectarian violence in 2006. It is now divided between Shiites in the northern end and Sunnis in the south, with the U.S. military stuck in the middle, trying to keep the peace.
"Last year, things were bad. This year is worse than before," said a man in his 50s who identified himself as Qais Qaisi.
The presence of Iraqi and American security forces means that Sunnis cannot fight back against the Shiite militias, which have the tacit support of the Iraqi army unit in the area, Qaisi said. But he nevertheless voiced concern about a possible American pullout.
"If the multinational forces withdraw, there will be very bloody sectarian battles," he said.
Military officers routinely say that improving the economy is a prerequisite to improving security. And U.S. forces, by putting up barriers and controlling traffic, have been able to reopen some marketplaces that had been targeted by suicide bombers. Although that has allowed some neighborhood commerce, success with other projects has proved more elusive.
The Pentagon is working to reopen state-owned factories and has identified several dozen that can be renovated and restarted. But that work is slow, and many residents say they see few improvements in their neighborhoods.
Although U.S. forces have been able to overcome militia threats and start small neighborhood projects such as installing streetlights, they are not able to initiate larger undertakings.
"We aren't doing anything meaningful," said one mid-level noncommissioned officer. "Where are the real projects? We aren't offering these people enough safety, or money, or jobs."
Amid the political setbacks and continuing violence, however, there are signs of relative calm in some areas.
Earlier this year, the streets of Baghdad were desolate at sunset. Now, in places, there are signs of life.
In Yarmouk, a neighborhood in west Baghdad, 18-year-old Ahmed Shakir used to see bodies on the street every day. Snipers fired from hidden perches and gunmen clashed with U.S. and Iraqi soldiers. But last month, after weeks of U.S. patrols, his neighborhood started to feel safe — safe enough for Shakir to stay outside on the basketball court until 8:30 p.m.
"It is usually me and three of my friends, we always go play basketball," he said. "Now we have U.S. and Iraqi patrols roaming the streets every day. If they continued doing this, things will remain better. If not, then it will get worse for sure."
Amid 'surge,' forces have been unable to establish security, even for themselves. Military leaders say they just need more time.
By Julian E. Barnes and Ned Parker
Times Staff Writers
July 11, 2007
BAGHDAD — In the Ubaidi neighborhood in the eastern part of this city, American soldiers hired a local Iraqi to clean the Porta-Potties at their combat outpost. Before the man could start, members of the local Shiite militia threatened to kill him.
Today, the Porta-Potties are roped off, and the U.S. soldiers, who could not promise to protect their sewage man, are forced to burn their waste.
As part of the Bush administration's troop "surge" strategy, the U.S. unit here had moved into an abandoned potato chip factory hoping to push out the militia, protect existing jobs and provide stability for economic growth. Instead, militia members stymied development projects, cut off the water supply and executed two young Iraqi women seen talking to U.S. soldiers, sending a powerful message about who really controls Ubaidi's streets.
In the next few days, the Bush administration is scheduled to release a preliminary assessment of its overall Iraq strategy. Officials may point to signs of progress scattered across the country: a reduction in death-squad killings in Baghdad, agreements with tribal leaders in Al Anbar province, offensives north and south of the capital.
President Bush defended his strategy Tuesday, demanding Congress give his administration more time and insisting that America can "win this fight in Iraq." To underscore his request, Bush sent top aides to lobby lawmakers on Capitol Hill.
But as the experience of the troops in Ubaidi indicates, U.S. forces so far have been unable to establish security, even for themselves. Iraqis continue to flee their homes, leaving mixed areas and seeking safety in religiously segregated neighborhoods. About 32,000 families fled in June alone, according to figures compiled by the United Nations and the Iraqi government that are due to be released next week.
U.S. forces have staged offensives to push insurgents out of some safe havens. But many of the insurgents have escaped to new areas of the country, launching attacks where the U.S. presence is lighter.
And there has been no sign of any of the crucial political progress the administration had hoped to see in Iraq.
U.S. commanders are painfully aware that they are running out of time to change those realities. Army Gen. David H. Petraeus, the top American commander in Iraq, has made several efforts to slow the clock in Washington. Each time, it has sped up.
The full complement of the "surge" arrived in Iraq last month, bringing the total to 28,500 additional troops. Military officers originally hoped to have until 2008 before they had to render a verdict on the strategy. Then the Washington timeframe shrank to September. Now, it is shrinking further, with Congress demanding answers even sooner.
Supporters of the troop buildup insist that small steps could grow into larger and more long-term successes if lawmakers are patient.
"Right now we are three weeks into this. It's not like flipping a light switch," said a military officer in Baghdad, expressing the frustration of many commanders. "Time has to be given for things to work."
Commanders point to Ramadi, the capital of Al Anbar province, as a showcase for the kind of results the military wants from the current strategy. Once a battlefield, the city is now largely peaceful, calm enough that in March, Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri Maliki was able to pay his first official visit.
But military officers stress that it took about nine months of sustained effort to make Ramadi a relatively pacified city. And with its volatile mix of Sunni and Shiite Muslims, Baghdad presents a far more complex challenge than all-Sunni Ramadi.
The interim progress report that Bush promised to release this week is likely to emphasize the success the military has had in killing Sunni militants in the "Baghdad belts," the cities and towns that dot the major rivers and highways leading to the capital. In recent weeks, the newly arrived U.S. forces have been focused on fighting members of Al Qaeda in Iraq, a militant Sunni group made up of Iraqis and foreign fighters.
Top generals say the strategy is crucial to securing Baghdad. Only by controlling the routes into the capital, and denying militants safe havens, can the U.S. and Iraqi militaries keep out the car bombs that stoke sectarian violence inside the capital.
But leading Iraqis are less sure of the strategy.
Mahmoud Othman, a Kurdish member of the Iraqi parliament, said the U.S. approach may be successful at weakening Al Qaeda in Iraq. But he said Americans would not be able to solve Iraq's sectarian conflict or stop clashes between armed groups in Baghdad neighborhoods.
"The surge has an important effect in fighting Al Qaeda," the independent politician said. "On the Sunni-Shiite conflict, it hasn't had any effect…. Extremist Shiites and Sunnis are fighting each other. The Americans can't stop this."
U.S. officials have made little, if any, progress with their persistent calls for Iraqi officials to take steps toward reconciliation between Shiites and Sunnis.
Key administration officials, most prominently Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates and Vice President Dick Cheney, have visited Iraq to push for passage of an oil-revenue sharing law, provincial elections and reform of rules barring members of the former ruling Baath Party from government jobs.
But the Iraqi government is bogged down by fighting among Shiite, Sunni and Kurdish parties. It is unclear whether the oil law, the one piece of benchmark legislation still given hopes for passage before September, will reach a vote any time soon.
The number of death-squad killings in the capital, one sign of sectarian divisions, is down from earlier this year. But the number remains roughly at the level seen after the 2006 bombing of Samarra's Golden Mosque, which served as a catalyst for the extreme sectarian violence.
In Baghdad, the number of bodies found dumped in the streets dropped to 540 last month from 830 in January. Some American officers say those numbers could rise again. And others say that the decline may simply represent the depressing reality that most Baghdad neighborhoods are now segregated, meaning there are fewer people left for death squads to kill.
Maj. Gen. Joseph Fil Jr., the commander of U.S. forces in Baghdad, said that American troops at the end of June controlled about 42% of the city's neighborhoods, up from 19% in April.
But to many Iraqis, that is little comfort.
"The Americans do not make me feel safe," said Amin Sadiq, a 30-year-old Shiite worker in the Ghadeer neighborhood of east Baghdad. "When you hear the speeches of the top U.S. military leaders, you think that everything is ideal and perfect and Iraq will be better. But when you see how the U.S. soldiers behave, I really feel I should not trust the leaders."
The American military has helped bring a tense truce in some areas, but has not re-integrated once-mixed neighborhoods.
The western Baghdad neighborhood of Ghazaliya, once a prosperous mixed middle-class area, was riven by sectarian violence in 2006. It is now divided between Shiites in the northern end and Sunnis in the south, with the U.S. military stuck in the middle, trying to keep the peace.
"Last year, things were bad. This year is worse than before," said a man in his 50s who identified himself as Qais Qaisi.
The presence of Iraqi and American security forces means that Sunnis cannot fight back against the Shiite militias, which have the tacit support of the Iraqi army unit in the area, Qaisi said. But he nevertheless voiced concern about a possible American pullout.
"If the multinational forces withdraw, there will be very bloody sectarian battles," he said.
Military officers routinely say that improving the economy is a prerequisite to improving security. And U.S. forces, by putting up barriers and controlling traffic, have been able to reopen some marketplaces that had been targeted by suicide bombers. Although that has allowed some neighborhood commerce, success with other projects has proved more elusive.
The Pentagon is working to reopen state-owned factories and has identified several dozen that can be renovated and restarted. But that work is slow, and many residents say they see few improvements in their neighborhoods.
Although U.S. forces have been able to overcome militia threats and start small neighborhood projects such as installing streetlights, they are not able to initiate larger undertakings.
"We aren't doing anything meaningful," said one mid-level noncommissioned officer. "Where are the real projects? We aren't offering these people enough safety, or money, or jobs."
Amid the political setbacks and continuing violence, however, there are signs of relative calm in some areas.
Earlier this year, the streets of Baghdad were desolate at sunset. Now, in places, there are signs of life.
In Yarmouk, a neighborhood in west Baghdad, 18-year-old Ahmed Shakir used to see bodies on the street every day. Snipers fired from hidden perches and gunmen clashed with U.S. and Iraqi soldiers. But last month, after weeks of U.S. patrols, his neighborhood started to feel safe — safe enough for Shakir to stay outside on the basketball court until 8:30 p.m.
"It is usually me and three of my friends, we always go play basketball," he said. "Now we have U.S. and Iraqi patrols roaming the streets every day. If they continued doing this, things will remain better. If not, then it will get worse for sure."
Goldman eyes up £4bn for water firm
By Ben Harrington
Last Updated: 1:50am BST 11/07/2007
telegraph.co.uk
The investment bank Goldman Sachs is preparing to submit a £4bn bid for Southern Water, which supplies more than two million customers in Kent, Sussex and Hampshire.
Goldman Sachs, which has its own infrastructure investment fund, has been in talks with a number of parties about forming a consortium to submit a joint offer according to sources familiar with the matter.
Prudential's Infracapital investment fund, a co-investor with the bank in its £2.8bn takeover of Associated British Ports last year, is believed to be one of the parties that has discussed with Goldman Sachs making a joint offer for the water company.
Earlier this year, Royal Bank of Scotland's private equity arm, which bought Southern Water with the French environmental services group Veolia in a £2bn deal in 2003, appointed Deutsche Bank to sell the water company.
Last year the French group sold its 25pc interest in Southern to RBS in a deal that brought in a number of hedge funds as investors. RBS now owns nearly half of the shares in Southern but controls nearly 94pc of the company under a complex ownership structure. The American hedge funds Perry Capital and DE Shaw are the next largest shareholders.
Information memorandums on Southern, which has about 2,000 staff and assets valued at £2.9bn, are due in a couple of weeks and first round bids are scheduled to be due in late August.
Banking sources said several other parties have also been preparing offers for the business, including the American industrial conglomerate GE. Henderson and Babcock and Brown.
Other investment banks with infrastructure funds, such as Morgan Stanley, have also been tipped as possible bidders for Southern. Investment banks have been looking to diversify their earnings streams through their newly launched infrastructure funds and investors are demanding more access to these types of assets as they provide high and stable long-term cashflows.
International pension funds have also been attracted to the high yields available, helping them meet their long-dated liabilities.
As a result Britain's water sector has experienced an intense period of takeover activity, with infrastructure funds willing to pay large premiums to buy companies with dependable cashflows.
Osprey Acquisitions, a consortium led by 3i and Canadian and Australian pension funds, bought Anglian Water in November for £2.25bn, a 25pc premium to its regulatory asset base, the value put on the assets by the regulator Ofwat.
Recently the Australian investment group Macquarie beat the Qatar Investment Authority and Terra Firma to win the £8bn auction for Thames Water, the UK's largest water company.
Analysts say there is a high possibility all of the UK's listed water companies could attract takeover bids by December 2008.
Goldman Sachs declined to comment.
By Ben Harrington
Last Updated: 1:50am BST 11/07/2007
telegraph.co.uk
The investment bank Goldman Sachs is preparing to submit a £4bn bid for Southern Water, which supplies more than two million customers in Kent, Sussex and Hampshire.
Goldman Sachs, which has its own infrastructure investment fund, has been in talks with a number of parties about forming a consortium to submit a joint offer according to sources familiar with the matter.
Prudential's Infracapital investment fund, a co-investor with the bank in its £2.8bn takeover of Associated British Ports last year, is believed to be one of the parties that has discussed with Goldman Sachs making a joint offer for the water company.
Earlier this year, Royal Bank of Scotland's private equity arm, which bought Southern Water with the French environmental services group Veolia in a £2bn deal in 2003, appointed Deutsche Bank to sell the water company.
Last year the French group sold its 25pc interest in Southern to RBS in a deal that brought in a number of hedge funds as investors. RBS now owns nearly half of the shares in Southern but controls nearly 94pc of the company under a complex ownership structure. The American hedge funds Perry Capital and DE Shaw are the next largest shareholders.
Information memorandums on Southern, which has about 2,000 staff and assets valued at £2.9bn, are due in a couple of weeks and first round bids are scheduled to be due in late August.
Banking sources said several other parties have also been preparing offers for the business, including the American industrial conglomerate GE. Henderson and Babcock and Brown.
Other investment banks with infrastructure funds, such as Morgan Stanley, have also been tipped as possible bidders for Southern. Investment banks have been looking to diversify their earnings streams through their newly launched infrastructure funds and investors are demanding more access to these types of assets as they provide high and stable long-term cashflows.
International pension funds have also been attracted to the high yields available, helping them meet their long-dated liabilities.
As a result Britain's water sector has experienced an intense period of takeover activity, with infrastructure funds willing to pay large premiums to buy companies with dependable cashflows.
Osprey Acquisitions, a consortium led by 3i and Canadian and Australian pension funds, bought Anglian Water in November for £2.25bn, a 25pc premium to its regulatory asset base, the value put on the assets by the regulator Ofwat.
Recently the Australian investment group Macquarie beat the Qatar Investment Authority and Terra Firma to win the £8bn auction for Thames Water, the UK's largest water company.
Analysts say there is a high possibility all of the UK's listed water companies could attract takeover bids by December 2008.
Goldman Sachs declined to comment.
Iraqi Politicians Warn Against Pullout
Foreign Minister Asserts 140,000 Turkish Troops Are Poised Along Border
By Sudarsan Raghavan
Washington Post Foreign Service
Tuesday, July 10, 2007; A08
BAGHDAD, July 9 -- Politicians from Iraq's major parties and ethnic groups said Monday that Iraq's government could collapse, plunging the nation into full-blown civil war and sparking regional conflict, if the United States were to begin withdrawing troops too quickly.
The warnings were issued as Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari also asserted that Turkey has massed 140,000 troops along its border with Iraq to stage a possible cross-border assault against Kurdish separatists.
If true, the Turkish buildup would raise fears of another front opening up in a country already facing myriad conflicts. But State Department officials in Washington were skeptical about the assertion.
Zebari told reporters in Baghdad that Iraqi officials "understand the huge pressure" building in the United States for a troop withdrawal. But "the dangers could be a civil war, dividing the country, regional wars and the collapse of the state," Zebari said. "We have held discussion with members of Congress and explained to them the dangers of a quick pullout and leaving a security vacuum."
Zebari, a Kurd, declared that until Iraqi forces were ready to provide security, the United States had a responsibility to support the government. Iraq's Kurdish leaders are among the strongest supporters of the U.S. presence in Iraq.
The issue of a U.S. troop withdrawal anytime soon provokes rare unity among Iraqi leaders largely divided along sectarian and religious lines. All of Iraq's major warring parties view the U.S. military presence, at least for the time being, as essential to their pursuit of power and position.
An early withdrawal, Sunnis worry, would allow Iraq's Shiite majority to dominate them and Shiite Iran's influence to grow in Iraq and the region. Shiites, roiled by their own internal rivalries, are concerned that Iraq's authoritarian Sunni neighbors would undermine any democratic Shiite government, especially a weak one, by backing Sunni insurgents. Kurds are worried about, among other things, a Turkish invasion to stop separatist Kurdish rebels staging attacks into Turkey from northern Iraq.
If the Americans withdraw, said Hassan al-Suneid, a Shiite legislator and adviser to Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, "the militias and the armed groups will attack each other, and that means a sure civil war."
"What concerns me really is that U.S. troops might submit to the Democrats' decision and withdraw without thinking about Iraq's situation and what will happen to the Iraqi people," Suneid said.
Mithal al-Alusi, an independent Sunni politician, said he could not comprehend the growing pressure for a troop withdrawal at a time when signs of progress are emerging. He cited Sunni tribal leaders turning against al-Qaeda in Iraq, a Sunni group that claims allegiance to the organization led by Osama bin Laden.
"If a withdrawal happens, there won't be any trust in the Middle East of American foreign policy," Alusi said. "We will not only have a war inside Iraq, but an official Iranian invasion into Iraq. Who is going to the fill the vacuum? Al-Qaeda, Iran and the internal war."
Like Zebari, Suneid and Alusi said U.S. troops should withdraw only after Iraqi forces are properly trained. In recent months, even politicians loyal to Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr, who has long called for a U.S. withdrawal, have said that a pullout should take place once Iraq's police and army are capable of protecting Iraq.
On Monday, Zebari said Iraq's government cannot dispatch troops to secure the border with Turkey because they were already stretched by fighting the insurgency in Baghdad and nearby Diyala province.
"Our military forces are over-occupied with securing the streets," he said, "and we do not have forces enough to open a new front."
For 23 years, Turkey has been fighting separatist Kurdish rebels belonging to the Kurdistan Workers' Party, a group that the United States has designated as a terrorist organization. The Turkish government has long complained that Iraq's Kurdish authorities have done little to stop the separatist fighters. In recent months, the Turkish government has said it would stage cross-border incursions if needed.
Zebari said that Turkey's "fears are legitimate" but that "the perfect solution is the withdrawal of the Turkish forces from the borders," followed by diplomatic negotiations involving the United States, Iraq and Turkey.
State Department spokesman Sean McCormack said there was "a substantial presence of Turkish troops that are engaged in counterterrorism operations" in southeast Turkey. Such a deployment, he said, was not unusual because the Kurdistan Workers' Party typically stages attacks in the spring. He expressed skepticism about Zebari's 140,000 figure.
"I would steer you away from that number of troops being immediately along the border," McCormack said.
Also Monday, a car bomb exploded near a restaurant in the Harithiya district of central Baghdad, killing eight people and injuring five, police said.
In Balad, about 50 miles north of the capital, a roadside bomb exploded near an Iraqi army patrol, followed by an assault by gunmen, police said. The clashes claimed the lives of nine soldiers and wounded 21. Across Baghdad on Monday, police said they found 17 unidentified corpses, most blindfolded and shot in the head and chest.
Foreign Minister Asserts 140,000 Turkish Troops Are Poised Along Border
By Sudarsan Raghavan
Washington Post Foreign Service
Tuesday, July 10, 2007; A08
BAGHDAD, July 9 -- Politicians from Iraq's major parties and ethnic groups said Monday that Iraq's government could collapse, plunging the nation into full-blown civil war and sparking regional conflict, if the United States were to begin withdrawing troops too quickly.
The warnings were issued as Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari also asserted that Turkey has massed 140,000 troops along its border with Iraq to stage a possible cross-border assault against Kurdish separatists.
If true, the Turkish buildup would raise fears of another front opening up in a country already facing myriad conflicts. But State Department officials in Washington were skeptical about the assertion.
Zebari told reporters in Baghdad that Iraqi officials "understand the huge pressure" building in the United States for a troop withdrawal. But "the dangers could be a civil war, dividing the country, regional wars and the collapse of the state," Zebari said. "We have held discussion with members of Congress and explained to them the dangers of a quick pullout and leaving a security vacuum."
Zebari, a Kurd, declared that until Iraqi forces were ready to provide security, the United States had a responsibility to support the government. Iraq's Kurdish leaders are among the strongest supporters of the U.S. presence in Iraq.
The issue of a U.S. troop withdrawal anytime soon provokes rare unity among Iraqi leaders largely divided along sectarian and religious lines. All of Iraq's major warring parties view the U.S. military presence, at least for the time being, as essential to their pursuit of power and position.
An early withdrawal, Sunnis worry, would allow Iraq's Shiite majority to dominate them and Shiite Iran's influence to grow in Iraq and the region. Shiites, roiled by their own internal rivalries, are concerned that Iraq's authoritarian Sunni neighbors would undermine any democratic Shiite government, especially a weak one, by backing Sunni insurgents. Kurds are worried about, among other things, a Turkish invasion to stop separatist Kurdish rebels staging attacks into Turkey from northern Iraq.
If the Americans withdraw, said Hassan al-Suneid, a Shiite legislator and adviser to Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, "the militias and the armed groups will attack each other, and that means a sure civil war."
"What concerns me really is that U.S. troops might submit to the Democrats' decision and withdraw without thinking about Iraq's situation and what will happen to the Iraqi people," Suneid said.
Mithal al-Alusi, an independent Sunni politician, said he could not comprehend the growing pressure for a troop withdrawal at a time when signs of progress are emerging. He cited Sunni tribal leaders turning against al-Qaeda in Iraq, a Sunni group that claims allegiance to the organization led by Osama bin Laden.
"If a withdrawal happens, there won't be any trust in the Middle East of American foreign policy," Alusi said. "We will not only have a war inside Iraq, but an official Iranian invasion into Iraq. Who is going to the fill the vacuum? Al-Qaeda, Iran and the internal war."
Like Zebari, Suneid and Alusi said U.S. troops should withdraw only after Iraqi forces are properly trained. In recent months, even politicians loyal to Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr, who has long called for a U.S. withdrawal, have said that a pullout should take place once Iraq's police and army are capable of protecting Iraq.
On Monday, Zebari said Iraq's government cannot dispatch troops to secure the border with Turkey because they were already stretched by fighting the insurgency in Baghdad and nearby Diyala province.
"Our military forces are over-occupied with securing the streets," he said, "and we do not have forces enough to open a new front."
For 23 years, Turkey has been fighting separatist Kurdish rebels belonging to the Kurdistan Workers' Party, a group that the United States has designated as a terrorist organization. The Turkish government has long complained that Iraq's Kurdish authorities have done little to stop the separatist fighters. In recent months, the Turkish government has said it would stage cross-border incursions if needed.
Zebari said that Turkey's "fears are legitimate" but that "the perfect solution is the withdrawal of the Turkish forces from the borders," followed by diplomatic negotiations involving the United States, Iraq and Turkey.
State Department spokesman Sean McCormack said there was "a substantial presence of Turkish troops that are engaged in counterterrorism operations" in southeast Turkey. Such a deployment, he said, was not unusual because the Kurdistan Workers' Party typically stages attacks in the spring. He expressed skepticism about Zebari's 140,000 figure.
"I would steer you away from that number of troops being immediately along the border," McCormack said.
Also Monday, a car bomb exploded near a restaurant in the Harithiya district of central Baghdad, killing eight people and injuring five, police said.
In Balad, about 50 miles north of the capital, a roadside bomb exploded near an Iraqi army patrol, followed by an assault by gunmen, police said. The clashes claimed the lives of nine soldiers and wounded 21. Across Baghdad on Monday, police said they found 17 unidentified corpses, most blindfolded and shot in the head and chest.
Scores Killed As Pakistani Commandos Storm Mosque
By Griff Witte
Washington Post Foreign Service
Tuesday, July 10, 2007; A01
ISLAMABAD, Pakistan, July 10 -- Pakistani commandos stormed the Red Mosque at dawn Tuesday after last-minute negotiations broke down and President Pervez Musharraf gave the go-ahead for an operation aimed at ending the eight-day siege. At least 43 people were killed and the death toll was expected to climb.
Loud explosions could be heard around the mosque and a thick plume of smoke rose above the site as extremists who had sequestered themselves in the compound's basement used automatic weapons, rocket launchers and grenades to try to fend off the assault from the elite government troops.
Commandos breached the compound within an hour of the operation's start and were fighting the radicals from inside as they attempted to take over the mosque complex.
By 9 a.m., at least three commandos had been killed and 15 members of the security forces had been wounded, according to a military spokesman, Maj. Gen. Waheed Arshad. Forty radicals in the compound had been killed and scores more were wounded or captured, Arshad said. A source at a hospital that was treating civilians said the staff was handling dozens of casualties, some of them women. Security forces picked up 20 children who fled as the fighting began, while ambulances raced to and from the scene.
Seventy percent of the complex had been cleared of extremists as of 9 a.m., and commandos, sweeping room by room, were approaching an area where women and children were thought to be held, Arshad said.
"It will take some more time," he said over the noise of sporadic explosions and gunfire. "The militants were fully prepared. They were well armed and well trained."
Hundreds of people were believed to be in the complex at the time of the raid. The government said the fighters were holding woman and children inside.
"They are using the children as human shields," Arshad said.
The raid came a day after Musharraf's government sent a high-level delegation to hold talks with the mosque's radical cleric, Abdul Rashid Ghazi, despite earlier pronouncements that negotiations were not an option.
Ghazi spoke with a Pakistani television station as the raid began and blamed the government for the breakdown of the negotiations. "I'm about to die," he said, "but I will fight until my last."
When another TV station later reached Ghazi by telephone, he shouted that commandos were entering his room and then hung up, the station reported.
Ghazi's whereabouts were unknown. Arshad said he had no information on whether Ghazi had been killed or captured and noted that he could be hiding in the part of the complex that remained unsearched.
The mosque was damaged in the raid, but Arshad said it remained structurally intact.
The government and the mosque's pro-Taliban leadership had been locked in a standoff for months, as students from a madrassa, or religious school, affiliated with the mosque abducted alleged prostitutes and threatened music store owners. The tension erupted last Tuesday with a deadly street clash. At least 24 people had been killed before the raid, though the toll might have been far higher because it was unclear how many inside the mosque compound had died.
Musharraf, who also heads the army, had held off on authorizing a full-fledged assault on the mosque because of concerns that such an operation could result in mass casualties. While most Pakistanis do not sympathize with Ghazi and his followers, there seemed to be little public appetite for a bloody final confrontation.
Monday morning, security forces stood ready to launch a raid after a top commando was shot dead by the radicals over the weekend. But guns fell silent later in the day, as the delegation of government officials and religious leaders spoke with Ghazi first by loudspeaker and then by cellphone. The talks continued late into the night. After the talks ended, a top government official headed to Musharraf's house to brief him on the negotiations.
Earlier in the evening, Information Minister Mohammad Ali Durrani said the government was speaking with Ghazi for "humanitarian" reasons to try to get as many women and children out of the mosque as possible.
Ghazi had said that he wanted to be martyred and that he would not surrender without a guarantee of safe passage from the mosque and immunity from prosecution. Asked Monday night whether Ghazi's demands were being considered, Durrani said, "We're discussing all possible options."
Top government officials had been asserting for days that Ghazi and his followers would have to surrender unconditionally to avoid a military assault by the thousands of security troops who had surrounded the mosque. On Sunday, the government reported that internationally known terrorists were hiding in the mosque and that talks were out of the question.
But by midday Monday, the government had softened its stance. During a meeting, religious leaders warned Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz that there was a potential for civil war in Pakistan if the siege was not resolved peacefully. Some of those leaders were later appointed to join the delegation that spoke with Ghazi for several hours Monday night. The government refused to let the delegates enter the mosque because it said parents who had gone in earlier to retrieve their children had been taken hostage.
On the streets near the mosque Monday, sentiment was divided. Residents of the area -- a mix of upscale private homes and run-down public housing -- had been living in a war zone for a week. Firing raged around them day and night. When they tried to leave their homes, soldiers wielding assault rifles barked at them to get back inside. Electricity and gas had been cut off for much of the time, and the residents had been given only brief breaks in the curfew to buy food and medicine.
But Waqar Ahmed, 25, a student who lives in the area, said he would welcome potentially prolonged negotiations if that was what it would take to end the crisis peacefully. "Islam is a religion that is spread with peace, not by force," he said. "Both sides have to realize there has to be negotiation so the problem is resolved. The whole world is looking at this."
A few blocks closer to the mosque, Sajid Hussain Malik was in no mood for the standoff to continue. His family of four, he said, had not been able to sleep for a week because the intense firing rattled the windows and kept them awake.
"The government should attack at once. Let's finish it," said Malik, a government worker. "We're suffering too much."
By Griff Witte
Washington Post Foreign Service
Tuesday, July 10, 2007; A01
ISLAMABAD, Pakistan, July 10 -- Pakistani commandos stormed the Red Mosque at dawn Tuesday after last-minute negotiations broke down and President Pervez Musharraf gave the go-ahead for an operation aimed at ending the eight-day siege. At least 43 people were killed and the death toll was expected to climb.
Loud explosions could be heard around the mosque and a thick plume of smoke rose above the site as extremists who had sequestered themselves in the compound's basement used automatic weapons, rocket launchers and grenades to try to fend off the assault from the elite government troops.
Commandos breached the compound within an hour of the operation's start and were fighting the radicals from inside as they attempted to take over the mosque complex.
By 9 a.m., at least three commandos had been killed and 15 members of the security forces had been wounded, according to a military spokesman, Maj. Gen. Waheed Arshad. Forty radicals in the compound had been killed and scores more were wounded or captured, Arshad said. A source at a hospital that was treating civilians said the staff was handling dozens of casualties, some of them women. Security forces picked up 20 children who fled as the fighting began, while ambulances raced to and from the scene.
Seventy percent of the complex had been cleared of extremists as of 9 a.m., and commandos, sweeping room by room, were approaching an area where women and children were thought to be held, Arshad said.
"It will take some more time," he said over the noise of sporadic explosions and gunfire. "The militants were fully prepared. They were well armed and well trained."
Hundreds of people were believed to be in the complex at the time of the raid. The government said the fighters were holding woman and children inside.
"They are using the children as human shields," Arshad said.
The raid came a day after Musharraf's government sent a high-level delegation to hold talks with the mosque's radical cleric, Abdul Rashid Ghazi, despite earlier pronouncements that negotiations were not an option.
Ghazi spoke with a Pakistani television station as the raid began and blamed the government for the breakdown of the negotiations. "I'm about to die," he said, "but I will fight until my last."
When another TV station later reached Ghazi by telephone, he shouted that commandos were entering his room and then hung up, the station reported.
Ghazi's whereabouts were unknown. Arshad said he had no information on whether Ghazi had been killed or captured and noted that he could be hiding in the part of the complex that remained unsearched.
The mosque was damaged in the raid, but Arshad said it remained structurally intact.
The government and the mosque's pro-Taliban leadership had been locked in a standoff for months, as students from a madrassa, or religious school, affiliated with the mosque abducted alleged prostitutes and threatened music store owners. The tension erupted last Tuesday with a deadly street clash. At least 24 people had been killed before the raid, though the toll might have been far higher because it was unclear how many inside the mosque compound had died.
Musharraf, who also heads the army, had held off on authorizing a full-fledged assault on the mosque because of concerns that such an operation could result in mass casualties. While most Pakistanis do not sympathize with Ghazi and his followers, there seemed to be little public appetite for a bloody final confrontation.
Monday morning, security forces stood ready to launch a raid after a top commando was shot dead by the radicals over the weekend. But guns fell silent later in the day, as the delegation of government officials and religious leaders spoke with Ghazi first by loudspeaker and then by cellphone. The talks continued late into the night. After the talks ended, a top government official headed to Musharraf's house to brief him on the negotiations.
Earlier in the evening, Information Minister Mohammad Ali Durrani said the government was speaking with Ghazi for "humanitarian" reasons to try to get as many women and children out of the mosque as possible.
Ghazi had said that he wanted to be martyred and that he would not surrender without a guarantee of safe passage from the mosque and immunity from prosecution. Asked Monday night whether Ghazi's demands were being considered, Durrani said, "We're discussing all possible options."
Top government officials had been asserting for days that Ghazi and his followers would have to surrender unconditionally to avoid a military assault by the thousands of security troops who had surrounded the mosque. On Sunday, the government reported that internationally known terrorists were hiding in the mosque and that talks were out of the question.
But by midday Monday, the government had softened its stance. During a meeting, religious leaders warned Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz that there was a potential for civil war in Pakistan if the siege was not resolved peacefully. Some of those leaders were later appointed to join the delegation that spoke with Ghazi for several hours Monday night. The government refused to let the delegates enter the mosque because it said parents who had gone in earlier to retrieve their children had been taken hostage.
On the streets near the mosque Monday, sentiment was divided. Residents of the area -- a mix of upscale private homes and run-down public housing -- had been living in a war zone for a week. Firing raged around them day and night. When they tried to leave their homes, soldiers wielding assault rifles barked at them to get back inside. Electricity and gas had been cut off for much of the time, and the residents had been given only brief breaks in the curfew to buy food and medicine.
But Waqar Ahmed, 25, a student who lives in the area, said he would welcome potentially prolonged negotiations if that was what it would take to end the crisis peacefully. "Islam is a religion that is spread with peace, not by force," he said. "Both sides have to realize there has to be negotiation so the problem is resolved. The whole world is looking at this."
A few blocks closer to the mosque, Sajid Hussain Malik was in no mood for the standoff to continue. His family of four, he said, had not been able to sleep for a week because the intense firing rattled the windows and kept them awake.
"The government should attack at once. Let's finish it," said Malik, a government worker. "We're suffering too much."
Bush Plans To Stress Next Phase In Iraq War
GOP Dissent Spurs Change In Message but Not Course
By Peter Baker and Karen DeYoung
Washington Post Staff Writers
Tuesday, July 10, 2007; A01
President Bush, facing a growing Republican revolt against his Iraq policy, has rejected calls to change course but will launch a campaign emphasizing his intent to draw down U.S. forces next year and move toward a more limited mission if security conditions improve, senior officials said yesterday.
Top administration officials have begun talking with key Senate Republicans to walk them through his view of the next phase in the war, beyond the troop increase he announced six months ago today. Bush plans to lay out what an aide called "his vision for the post-surge" starting in Cleveland today to assure the nation that he, too, wants to begin bringing troops home eventually.
The White House devised the political strategy after days of intense internal discussions about how to respond to several prominent Republican senators who have broken with Bush's war policy recently. Bush decided against heeding their proposal to begin redeploying U.S. troops as early as this summer, but he and his team concluded that he needed to shift his message to show that he shares the goals of his increasingly restless Republican caucus and the broader public.
"Look, the president understands the American people are frustrated," said a senior official who spoke on the condition of anonymity to avoid upstaging Bush. "We've been at this a long time. We've sacrificed some of our best and brightest. . . . But they want to see that we have a vision for success that will allow us to gradually downsize our role and reduce our footprint. The president needs to and wants to remind everybody that he shares that frustration."
To do that, Bush intends to argue that Congress and the public should look past this week's scheduled status report on Iraq and wait for the fuller assessment due in September. A drawdown, administration officials said, must be the result of the troop increase, not in place of it. "The drawdown is an effect," the official said. "It's not a cause."
Yet key Republican senators have indicated that they would not be satisfied with a change in political spin over a real change in strategy. In a speech on the Senate floor after a White House meeting yesterday, John W. Warner (R-Va.) set the tone, declaring this "a time in our history unlike any I have ever witnessed before." Warner recalled that Congress has voted to require Bush to demonstrate progress in Iraq or detail how he will alter his strategy, adding that he warned the White House to take it seriously.
"I was asked by the press whether I thought they'd brush it off," Warner said of the White House, "and I resoundingly replied, 'No.' "
The current political challenge comes at a time when Bush has been talking increasingly with advisers about what situation he will leave behind in Iraq for his successor. Although he said in 2005 that "I will settle for nothing less than complete victory," Bush has concluded, with just 18 months left in office, that he will have to settle for less.
So the president has mapped out a best-case scenario for Iraq on Jan. 20, 2009, that would still see considerable numbers of U.S. troops on the ground, but in a different role. If events work out as Bush hopes, aides said, U.S. forces by then will have sharply reduced their mission, pulling out of sectarian combat and focusing instead on fighting al-Qaeda, guarding Iraq's borders and supporting Iraqi troops. Instead of operating under a U.N. mandate, the United States would negotiate an agreement with the Iraqi government for a smaller, long-term presence.
Such a reduced mandate would resemble the vision advanced in December by the Iraq Study Group, led by former secretary of state James A. Baker III and former congressman Lee H. Hamilton (D-Ind.). A Pentagon study last year concluded that even the more limited mission would require about 120,000 U.S. troops, compared with about 160,000 today, according to administration officials. But officials said it could be done with 60,000 to 100,000 troops.
Bush hopes the net result would be a situation stable enough that the next president -- even a Democrat with an antiwar platform -- would feel confident enough to sustain some form of U.S. mission despite domestic pressure to pull out altogether. But Bush aides said they are acutely aware that every forecast they have made for Iraq over the past four years has proved wildly optimistic.
Moreover, they recognize that their options will be limited unless they first stop the political erosion at home. The defections of prominent Republican Sens. Richard G. Lugar (Ind.), George V. Voinovich (Ohio) and Pete V. Domenici (N.M.) caught the White House off guard and prompted furious discussions about what to do, forcing national security adviser Stephen J. Hadley to cut short a family visit to return to Washington and Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates to scrub a trip to Latin America.
Hadley and Lt. Gen. Douglas E. Lute, the president's new Iraq war coordinator, met yesterday with Warner, a skeptic of the president's war policy who will manage the Republican side of debates over Iraq proposals. Afterward, Warner said he would defer making his own proposals until he hears the president report publicly this week.
War-funding legislation passed in May mandated two progress reports from the White House, the first due on Sunday and the second Sept. 15. The July report originally was seen as a midterm assessment, with the real stakes lying in the fall report by Gen. David H. Petraeus and Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker, the top military and civilian officials in Iraq, who will testify before Congress.
But the absence of much visible progress in Iraq and a rise in public and congressional opposition mean that "July has become the new September," in the words of one official. Virtually the entire national security bureaucracy on Iraq -- including the intelligence agencies, State Department, Pentagon and National Security Council -- is involved in putting together this week's report and Bush's statement on it, which should be released by Friday.
Senior administration and military officials closely involved in Iraq policy have indicated that the Iraqis are unlikely to meet any of the security and political goals Bush set for them when he announced his new strategy Jan. 10. Those goals, including provincial elections, new power-sharing arrangements among Shiite, Sunni and Kurdish groups and increased responsibility for Iraqi security forces, were incorporated as mandatory benchmarks in the war-funding legislation.
One of the intellectual authors of Bush's troop increase dismissed the importance of such goals. "I always thought those were unreasonable benchmarks," Frederick W. Kagan, a military historian at the American Enterprise Institute, said at a forum yesterday. "I always thought it was a mistake for the administration to go down that road."
Kagan and another surge supporter, retired Army Gen. John Keane, said the extra troops, the last of whom arrived just weeks ago, are having an impact and should be allowed to stay long enough to make it last. "In my judgment, the security situation is making steady, deliberate progress," Keane said. But he said that to succeed, "the operation has to continue into '08."
Although it initially envisioned a troop increase lasting six to eight months, the administration lately has anticipated keeping the extra troops in place until next spring and then beginning to pull them back, one brigade at a time. Logistically, senior military officials have said, it would be extremely difficult to sustain such a force in Iraq beyond March or April. Bush has said he wanted to then shift to a more limited mission and presence. But amid all the debate, said one aide, "the argument has been lost of late," which is why the president plans to make a new sustained effort to talk about it this week.
"What the president has said all along is, of course, we're going to draw down," White House press secretary Tony Snow said. "But you have to draw down when it makes sense to do so. And furthermore, what he said is, 'Everybody, take a look first at what's going on.' "
GOP Dissent Spurs Change In Message but Not Course
By Peter Baker and Karen DeYoung
Washington Post Staff Writers
Tuesday, July 10, 2007; A01
President Bush, facing a growing Republican revolt against his Iraq policy, has rejected calls to change course but will launch a campaign emphasizing his intent to draw down U.S. forces next year and move toward a more limited mission if security conditions improve, senior officials said yesterday.
Top administration officials have begun talking with key Senate Republicans to walk them through his view of the next phase in the war, beyond the troop increase he announced six months ago today. Bush plans to lay out what an aide called "his vision for the post-surge" starting in Cleveland today to assure the nation that he, too, wants to begin bringing troops home eventually.
The White House devised the political strategy after days of intense internal discussions about how to respond to several prominent Republican senators who have broken with Bush's war policy recently. Bush decided against heeding their proposal to begin redeploying U.S. troops as early as this summer, but he and his team concluded that he needed to shift his message to show that he shares the goals of his increasingly restless Republican caucus and the broader public.
"Look, the president understands the American people are frustrated," said a senior official who spoke on the condition of anonymity to avoid upstaging Bush. "We've been at this a long time. We've sacrificed some of our best and brightest. . . . But they want to see that we have a vision for success that will allow us to gradually downsize our role and reduce our footprint. The president needs to and wants to remind everybody that he shares that frustration."
To do that, Bush intends to argue that Congress and the public should look past this week's scheduled status report on Iraq and wait for the fuller assessment due in September. A drawdown, administration officials said, must be the result of the troop increase, not in place of it. "The drawdown is an effect," the official said. "It's not a cause."
Yet key Republican senators have indicated that they would not be satisfied with a change in political spin over a real change in strategy. In a speech on the Senate floor after a White House meeting yesterday, John W. Warner (R-Va.) set the tone, declaring this "a time in our history unlike any I have ever witnessed before." Warner recalled that Congress has voted to require Bush to demonstrate progress in Iraq or detail how he will alter his strategy, adding that he warned the White House to take it seriously.
"I was asked by the press whether I thought they'd brush it off," Warner said of the White House, "and I resoundingly replied, 'No.' "
The current political challenge comes at a time when Bush has been talking increasingly with advisers about what situation he will leave behind in Iraq for his successor. Although he said in 2005 that "I will settle for nothing less than complete victory," Bush has concluded, with just 18 months left in office, that he will have to settle for less.
So the president has mapped out a best-case scenario for Iraq on Jan. 20, 2009, that would still see considerable numbers of U.S. troops on the ground, but in a different role. If events work out as Bush hopes, aides said, U.S. forces by then will have sharply reduced their mission, pulling out of sectarian combat and focusing instead on fighting al-Qaeda, guarding Iraq's borders and supporting Iraqi troops. Instead of operating under a U.N. mandate, the United States would negotiate an agreement with the Iraqi government for a smaller, long-term presence.
Such a reduced mandate would resemble the vision advanced in December by the Iraq Study Group, led by former secretary of state James A. Baker III and former congressman Lee H. Hamilton (D-Ind.). A Pentagon study last year concluded that even the more limited mission would require about 120,000 U.S. troops, compared with about 160,000 today, according to administration officials. But officials said it could be done with 60,000 to 100,000 troops.
Bush hopes the net result would be a situation stable enough that the next president -- even a Democrat with an antiwar platform -- would feel confident enough to sustain some form of U.S. mission despite domestic pressure to pull out altogether. But Bush aides said they are acutely aware that every forecast they have made for Iraq over the past four years has proved wildly optimistic.
Moreover, they recognize that their options will be limited unless they first stop the political erosion at home. The defections of prominent Republican Sens. Richard G. Lugar (Ind.), George V. Voinovich (Ohio) and Pete V. Domenici (N.M.) caught the White House off guard and prompted furious discussions about what to do, forcing national security adviser Stephen J. Hadley to cut short a family visit to return to Washington and Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates to scrub a trip to Latin America.
Hadley and Lt. Gen. Douglas E. Lute, the president's new Iraq war coordinator, met yesterday with Warner, a skeptic of the president's war policy who will manage the Republican side of debates over Iraq proposals. Afterward, Warner said he would defer making his own proposals until he hears the president report publicly this week.
War-funding legislation passed in May mandated two progress reports from the White House, the first due on Sunday and the second Sept. 15. The July report originally was seen as a midterm assessment, with the real stakes lying in the fall report by Gen. David H. Petraeus and Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker, the top military and civilian officials in Iraq, who will testify before Congress.
But the absence of much visible progress in Iraq and a rise in public and congressional opposition mean that "July has become the new September," in the words of one official. Virtually the entire national security bureaucracy on Iraq -- including the intelligence agencies, State Department, Pentagon and National Security Council -- is involved in putting together this week's report and Bush's statement on it, which should be released by Friday.
Senior administration and military officials closely involved in Iraq policy have indicated that the Iraqis are unlikely to meet any of the security and political goals Bush set for them when he announced his new strategy Jan. 10. Those goals, including provincial elections, new power-sharing arrangements among Shiite, Sunni and Kurdish groups and increased responsibility for Iraqi security forces, were incorporated as mandatory benchmarks in the war-funding legislation.
One of the intellectual authors of Bush's troop increase dismissed the importance of such goals. "I always thought those were unreasonable benchmarks," Frederick W. Kagan, a military historian at the American Enterprise Institute, said at a forum yesterday. "I always thought it was a mistake for the administration to go down that road."
Kagan and another surge supporter, retired Army Gen. John Keane, said the extra troops, the last of whom arrived just weeks ago, are having an impact and should be allowed to stay long enough to make it last. "In my judgment, the security situation is making steady, deliberate progress," Keane said. But he said that to succeed, "the operation has to continue into '08."
Although it initially envisioned a troop increase lasting six to eight months, the administration lately has anticipated keeping the extra troops in place until next spring and then beginning to pull them back, one brigade at a time. Logistically, senior military officials have said, it would be extremely difficult to sustain such a force in Iraq beyond March or April. Bush has said he wanted to then shift to a more limited mission and presence. But amid all the debate, said one aide, "the argument has been lost of late," which is why the president plans to make a new sustained effort to talk about it this week.
"What the president has said all along is, of course, we're going to draw down," White House press secretary Tony Snow said. "But you have to draw down when it makes sense to do so. And furthermore, what he said is, 'Everybody, take a look first at what's going on.' "
Oil experts see supply crisis in five years
By David Litterick in Chicago
Last Updated: 1:26am BST 10/07/2007
telegraph.co.uk
The International Energy Agency has predicted a supply crunch in the world's oil markets that could send prices soaring and place a severe dent in global growth.
In a report that painted a bleak outlook for the global economy, the IEA said spare capacity in oil production would dry up over the next five years, even as demand continues to jump significantly.
"Oil and gas price pressures look set to remain in the coming years," the report said. "Slower-than-expected GDP growth may provide a breathing space, but it is abundantly clear that if the path of demand does not change on its own, it may well be driven to change by higher prices."
The gloomy prognosis puts consumers on warning for higher petrol prices at the pump, soaring utility bills and increased food prices as suppliers bear additional costs for bringing goods to market.
The price of oil is already closing in on record levels above $75 a barrel amid geo-political tensions, and shows no sign of declining.
"Despite four years of high oil prices, this report sees increasing market tightness beyond 2010," the IEA said. "It is possible that the supply crunch could be deferred, but not by much."
The IEA, which acts as an energy watchdog for industrialised nations, said Opec would be unable to increase production in line with demand, while the rate of growth in supplies of oil from other producing nations is also set to slow.
In addition, the gas market will face a supply crunch of its own at the turn of the decade, limiting governments' ability to turn to different sources of fuel. Although the production of biofuels is set to double over the next few years, it will remain a marginal source of energy, the IEA said.
Lawrence Eagles, head of the IEA's oil industry and markets division, said: "The results of our analysis are quite strong. Either we need to have more supplies coming on stream or we need to have lower demand growth."
But with forecasts of world economic growth of 4.5pc a year, the report argued that oil demand was likely to soar to 95.8m barrels a day in 2012 from 81.6m barrels this year.
At the same time it predicted production from the international oil cartel Opec would fall, slipping by 2m barrels a day in 2009, and it also cut supply forecasts for non-Opec countries by 800,000 barrels.
Some analysts say the agency is being alarmist and that its warnings about supplies are actually leading to higher prices. They claim that the world economy has changed so much since the oil crises of the 1970s that companies and consumers are better able to deal with high oil prices.
However, Mr Eagles said: "The simple thing is we are there to project the market as we see it. The price response is due to fundamentals. We are simply pointing out the fundamentals - that's our job."
The IEA has also given warning about the effect of "energy nationalism", as governments use high oil prices to strengthen their control of domestic production. It said that could result in less investment than was necessary, for instance in Russia and Venezuela.
The agency also pointed to the "curious contrast" between higher cash return to energy company shareholders and "essentially unchanged exploration and production efforts". While refining capacity would improve, the Paris-based organisation predicted, it too would grow slower than had been anticipated.
By David Litterick in Chicago
Last Updated: 1:26am BST 10/07/2007
telegraph.co.uk
The International Energy Agency has predicted a supply crunch in the world's oil markets that could send prices soaring and place a severe dent in global growth.
In a report that painted a bleak outlook for the global economy, the IEA said spare capacity in oil production would dry up over the next five years, even as demand continues to jump significantly.
"Oil and gas price pressures look set to remain in the coming years," the report said. "Slower-than-expected GDP growth may provide a breathing space, but it is abundantly clear that if the path of demand does not change on its own, it may well be driven to change by higher prices."
The gloomy prognosis puts consumers on warning for higher petrol prices at the pump, soaring utility bills and increased food prices as suppliers bear additional costs for bringing goods to market.
The price of oil is already closing in on record levels above $75 a barrel amid geo-political tensions, and shows no sign of declining.
"Despite four years of high oil prices, this report sees increasing market tightness beyond 2010," the IEA said. "It is possible that the supply crunch could be deferred, but not by much."
The IEA, which acts as an energy watchdog for industrialised nations, said Opec would be unable to increase production in line with demand, while the rate of growth in supplies of oil from other producing nations is also set to slow.
In addition, the gas market will face a supply crunch of its own at the turn of the decade, limiting governments' ability to turn to different sources of fuel. Although the production of biofuels is set to double over the next few years, it will remain a marginal source of energy, the IEA said.
Lawrence Eagles, head of the IEA's oil industry and markets division, said: "The results of our analysis are quite strong. Either we need to have more supplies coming on stream or we need to have lower demand growth."
But with forecasts of world economic growth of 4.5pc a year, the report argued that oil demand was likely to soar to 95.8m barrels a day in 2012 from 81.6m barrels this year.
At the same time it predicted production from the international oil cartel Opec would fall, slipping by 2m barrels a day in 2009, and it also cut supply forecasts for non-Opec countries by 800,000 barrels.
Some analysts say the agency is being alarmist and that its warnings about supplies are actually leading to higher prices. They claim that the world economy has changed so much since the oil crises of the 1970s that companies and consumers are better able to deal with high oil prices.
However, Mr Eagles said: "The simple thing is we are there to project the market as we see it. The price response is due to fundamentals. We are simply pointing out the fundamentals - that's our job."
The IEA has also given warning about the effect of "energy nationalism", as governments use high oil prices to strengthen their control of domestic production. It said that could result in less investment than was necessary, for instance in Russia and Venezuela.
The agency also pointed to the "curious contrast" between higher cash return to energy company shareholders and "essentially unchanged exploration and production efforts". While refining capacity would improve, the Paris-based organisation predicted, it too would grow slower than had been anticipated.
Mexican cartels outgun towns
Ill-prepared and often corrupt, rural and border city police and officials are the weakest link in the war on drugs.
By Héctor Tobar and Carlos Martínez
Times Staff Writers
July 9, 2007
NACO, MEXICO — The message came on police emergency radio: An army of drug traffickers with machine guns mounted on their pickup trucks was headed toward this town of 5,000 people on the Arizona-Mexico border.
Like a sheriff in a western, police chief and part-time schoolteacher Juan Bracamontes gritted his teeth and assembled his 15 officers, who had nothing better than old .38-caliber revolvers to face off against the enemy.
"Those who want to leave can leave," the chief said. "Those who want to stay and fight, line up behind me and we'll give it to them good."
One officer quit on the spot. The others deployed around the town, but not before taking off their uniforms and abandoning their patrol cars for unmarked vehicles.
In other Mexican towns, local authorities have not shown as much courage in the face of threats from cash-rich drug traffickers. Underarmed, under-prepared and often corrupt, small-town officials and police are the Achilles' heel of President Felipe Calderon's offensive against the nation's drug traffickers.
Calderon has made the battle to rein in Mexico's drug cartels the centerpiece of his presidency, committing large portions of the army and much of the federal police force to the effort.
The cartels have been fighting one another for control of smuggling routes to the United States. The resulting violence claimed more than 2,000 lives last year, and the killings this year have been on a pace to exceed that toll.
In the rural and border areas where smugglers operate, police frequently find themselves on the front line of the drug wars. Arresting a cartel operative might mean death. Even those who agree to protect one band of traffickers risk being attacked by rival gunmen.
Municipal officers account for 60% of the police force in Mexico, with state and federal police making up the rest. Mexican officials and analysts say city police and city officials receive a big share of the estimated $3 billion that drug traffickers pay in bribes each year.
Officials at Mexico's Public Safety Secretariat estimate that traffickers pay police an average monthly bribe of $500 to $600, roughly equal to a starting officer's monthly salary in towns such as Naco and neighboring Cananea.
"The training these officers receive is very precarious, as is their pay," said Raul Benitez, a professor at American University in Washington and a specialist in Mexican security issues. In many towns, Benitez said, the only requirement for becoming a police officer is being a friend of the mayor: The police force is a prime political plum.
These undertrained officers face an increasingly sophisticated enemy, as Mexico's drug cartels form small armies in which many of the "troops" have at least some military-style training.
Two days before the report of a "caravan of death" headed for Naco, as many as 50 armed men attacked Cananea. Five municipal officers were kidnapped and killed in the May 16 incident. Within hours, half of the 48-officer Cananea police force had turned in their guns and quit.
"We have no protection," several Cananea officers told reporters gathered around the town's police station. With allegations of links to traffickers swirling around the force, eight officers were fired, as was the police chief.
"On the one side organized crime is killing police officers, and on the other side the government is investigating and firing them," said Jose Arturo Yanez, a researcher at the Professional Police Training Institute in Mexico City. "No one is protecting them."
Security officials have resigned or been fired en masse in at least 18 states in nearly every region of Mexico.
Dozens have walked away from their jobs. A few have fled in the face of arrest warrants. Others, such as Orlando Valencia of Cananea, disappear from their offices.
Valencia was both the mayor's spokesman and the city emergency coordinator. In late May, he disappeared, and officials announced that they were seeking his arrest on suspicion of aiding drug traffickers in their escape after the attack on Cananea.
Even for those brave enough to serve in the country's most dangerous towns, discretion is usually the better part of valor. One high-ranking police official in a town in Zacatecas state explained the advice he gives his officers to keep them safe:
"I told them that if they see something suspicious, they should withdraw," said the official, who asked not to be named. "It doesn't matter what it is, just withdraw…. These people are well-armed and we just have the basics."
After an encounter with suspected cartel hit men, many officers in his town received telephone death threats. A good chunk of the force resigned.
"I don't know why they quit," the official said. "And you know what? I don't care."
The estimated 50 cartel hit men who descended on Cananea had attended a two-month camp to prepare for their assault, said Sonora state authorities, who interviewed the surviving hit men. The training was led by a former member of the Hermosillo city police department. And federal officials said at least four of the gunmen were army veterans.
The hit men were working on behalf of a drug-trade organization allied with a local trafficker, Francisco Hernandez Garcia, also known as "The Two Thousand."
The Two Thousand had agreements with local police chiefs to protect his shipments, according to news reports. Such agreements are called compromisos here, a Spanish word meaning commitments or obligations.
But the pacts were broken, setting off a series of violent incidents that climaxed with the raid on Cananea.
Home to 30,000 people, Cananea is famous for a 1906 miners' strike that helped spark the Mexican Revolution. Set amid the dun hills of the Sonoran Desert, it is a place where the daily routine of police work rarely involves anything more violent than a domestic dispute or drunken fight at a party.
All that changed early on the morning of May 16. Cananea police received word that a pair of officers had been attacked and beaten at a checkpoint outside town. Five officers were dispatched to assist them.
The five set off with shotguns and .223-caliber rifles recently provided by state authorities, though the bulletproof vests promised by the state had not yet arrived, officials said. When the officers reached the scene, they encountered four dozen cartel hit men: The officers surrendered without firing a shot; they were later tortured and executed.
The mayor summoned help. State and federal officers tracked the gunmen to a remote mountain settlement. In the ensuing gunfight, 15 suspected cartel hit men were killed.
"There hadn't been a battle like that here since the revolution," said Martin Ballesteros Rios, now Cananea's acting chief of police.
Gabriel Hurtado, the police chief at the time, was fired five days later; sources say he had abandoned his post. Although he faces no charges, there are rumors. He hasn't been seen in the town since he left, officials said.
Ballesteros Rios stepped in.
The acting chief says he isn't worried about what might happen to him, despite warnings from friends and relatives.
"My conscience is clean, because I don't have any compromisos with anyone," he said.
Thirty miles away in Naco, Mayor Jose Lorenzo Villegas has fired six police chiefs during his two terms in office. He fired Chief Roberto Tacho in January; weeks later, U.S. officials arrested the former lawman as he allegedly tried to smuggle about 60 pounds of marijuana into the United States.
Tacho and his brother Ramon were part of a small circle that until recently controlled the police in three neighboring towns — Naco, Cananea and Agua Prieta. Ramon Tacho, the police chief of Agua Prieta, was assassinated outside his office in February by suspected cartel hit men.
In Naco, a windblown town of squat buildings hugging the U.S. border, there is a growing sense that the community is being drawn into a larger conflict.
On the day the drug traffickers' army was reported to be headed their way, town residents responded as though war had broken out.
Businesses and schools shut down. City Hall was evacuated, and some officials fled to the United States.
U.S. Border Patrol agents with machine guns took up positions on the roof of the border-crossing station in Naco, Ariz., which overlooks the Mexican Naco's small downtown.
Mayor Villegas was in Hermosillo, Sonora's state capital, picking up new 9-millimeter pistols and AR-15 rifles issued to his police force.
"We lived some very ugly moments that day," the 34-year-old mayor said. "By phone, people were telling me I should declare a state of siege."
But the report of the "caravan of death" headed for Naco turned out to be a false alarm.
At the end of the day, after the crisis had passed, Villegas arrived in Naco with boxes of pistols and rifles.
"Look at this beautiful thing," Police Chief Bracamontes said, taking one of the new pistols from its holster. "And this one too," he said, raising a sleek, black AR-15 rifle that was propped up against the wall of his office.
Like most of the new weapons, it still hasn't been fired.
Ill-prepared and often corrupt, rural and border city police and officials are the weakest link in the war on drugs.
By Héctor Tobar and Carlos Martínez
Times Staff Writers
July 9, 2007
NACO, MEXICO — The message came on police emergency radio: An army of drug traffickers with machine guns mounted on their pickup trucks was headed toward this town of 5,000 people on the Arizona-Mexico border.
Like a sheriff in a western, police chief and part-time schoolteacher Juan Bracamontes gritted his teeth and assembled his 15 officers, who had nothing better than old .38-caliber revolvers to face off against the enemy.
"Those who want to leave can leave," the chief said. "Those who want to stay and fight, line up behind me and we'll give it to them good."
One officer quit on the spot. The others deployed around the town, but not before taking off their uniforms and abandoning their patrol cars for unmarked vehicles.
In other Mexican towns, local authorities have not shown as much courage in the face of threats from cash-rich drug traffickers. Underarmed, under-prepared and often corrupt, small-town officials and police are the Achilles' heel of President Felipe Calderon's offensive against the nation's drug traffickers.
Calderon has made the battle to rein in Mexico's drug cartels the centerpiece of his presidency, committing large portions of the army and much of the federal police force to the effort.
The cartels have been fighting one another for control of smuggling routes to the United States. The resulting violence claimed more than 2,000 lives last year, and the killings this year have been on a pace to exceed that toll.
In the rural and border areas where smugglers operate, police frequently find themselves on the front line of the drug wars. Arresting a cartel operative might mean death. Even those who agree to protect one band of traffickers risk being attacked by rival gunmen.
Municipal officers account for 60% of the police force in Mexico, with state and federal police making up the rest. Mexican officials and analysts say city police and city officials receive a big share of the estimated $3 billion that drug traffickers pay in bribes each year.
Officials at Mexico's Public Safety Secretariat estimate that traffickers pay police an average monthly bribe of $500 to $600, roughly equal to a starting officer's monthly salary in towns such as Naco and neighboring Cananea.
"The training these officers receive is very precarious, as is their pay," said Raul Benitez, a professor at American University in Washington and a specialist in Mexican security issues. In many towns, Benitez said, the only requirement for becoming a police officer is being a friend of the mayor: The police force is a prime political plum.
These undertrained officers face an increasingly sophisticated enemy, as Mexico's drug cartels form small armies in which many of the "troops" have at least some military-style training.
Two days before the report of a "caravan of death" headed for Naco, as many as 50 armed men attacked Cananea. Five municipal officers were kidnapped and killed in the May 16 incident. Within hours, half of the 48-officer Cananea police force had turned in their guns and quit.
"We have no protection," several Cananea officers told reporters gathered around the town's police station. With allegations of links to traffickers swirling around the force, eight officers were fired, as was the police chief.
"On the one side organized crime is killing police officers, and on the other side the government is investigating and firing them," said Jose Arturo Yanez, a researcher at the Professional Police Training Institute in Mexico City. "No one is protecting them."
Security officials have resigned or been fired en masse in at least 18 states in nearly every region of Mexico.
Dozens have walked away from their jobs. A few have fled in the face of arrest warrants. Others, such as Orlando Valencia of Cananea, disappear from their offices.
Valencia was both the mayor's spokesman and the city emergency coordinator. In late May, he disappeared, and officials announced that they were seeking his arrest on suspicion of aiding drug traffickers in their escape after the attack on Cananea.
Even for those brave enough to serve in the country's most dangerous towns, discretion is usually the better part of valor. One high-ranking police official in a town in Zacatecas state explained the advice he gives his officers to keep them safe:
"I told them that if they see something suspicious, they should withdraw," said the official, who asked not to be named. "It doesn't matter what it is, just withdraw…. These people are well-armed and we just have the basics."
After an encounter with suspected cartel hit men, many officers in his town received telephone death threats. A good chunk of the force resigned.
"I don't know why they quit," the official said. "And you know what? I don't care."
The estimated 50 cartel hit men who descended on Cananea had attended a two-month camp to prepare for their assault, said Sonora state authorities, who interviewed the surviving hit men. The training was led by a former member of the Hermosillo city police department. And federal officials said at least four of the gunmen were army veterans.
The hit men were working on behalf of a drug-trade organization allied with a local trafficker, Francisco Hernandez Garcia, also known as "The Two Thousand."
The Two Thousand had agreements with local police chiefs to protect his shipments, according to news reports. Such agreements are called compromisos here, a Spanish word meaning commitments or obligations.
But the pacts were broken, setting off a series of violent incidents that climaxed with the raid on Cananea.
Home to 30,000 people, Cananea is famous for a 1906 miners' strike that helped spark the Mexican Revolution. Set amid the dun hills of the Sonoran Desert, it is a place where the daily routine of police work rarely involves anything more violent than a domestic dispute or drunken fight at a party.
All that changed early on the morning of May 16. Cananea police received word that a pair of officers had been attacked and beaten at a checkpoint outside town. Five officers were dispatched to assist them.
The five set off with shotguns and .223-caliber rifles recently provided by state authorities, though the bulletproof vests promised by the state had not yet arrived, officials said. When the officers reached the scene, they encountered four dozen cartel hit men: The officers surrendered without firing a shot; they were later tortured and executed.
The mayor summoned help. State and federal officers tracked the gunmen to a remote mountain settlement. In the ensuing gunfight, 15 suspected cartel hit men were killed.
"There hadn't been a battle like that here since the revolution," said Martin Ballesteros Rios, now Cananea's acting chief of police.
Gabriel Hurtado, the police chief at the time, was fired five days later; sources say he had abandoned his post. Although he faces no charges, there are rumors. He hasn't been seen in the town since he left, officials said.
Ballesteros Rios stepped in.
The acting chief says he isn't worried about what might happen to him, despite warnings from friends and relatives.
"My conscience is clean, because I don't have any compromisos with anyone," he said.
Thirty miles away in Naco, Mayor Jose Lorenzo Villegas has fired six police chiefs during his two terms in office. He fired Chief Roberto Tacho in January; weeks later, U.S. officials arrested the former lawman as he allegedly tried to smuggle about 60 pounds of marijuana into the United States.
Tacho and his brother Ramon were part of a small circle that until recently controlled the police in three neighboring towns — Naco, Cananea and Agua Prieta. Ramon Tacho, the police chief of Agua Prieta, was assassinated outside his office in February by suspected cartel hit men.
In Naco, a windblown town of squat buildings hugging the U.S. border, there is a growing sense that the community is being drawn into a larger conflict.
On the day the drug traffickers' army was reported to be headed their way, town residents responded as though war had broken out.
Businesses and schools shut down. City Hall was evacuated, and some officials fled to the United States.
U.S. Border Patrol agents with machine guns took up positions on the roof of the border-crossing station in Naco, Ariz., which overlooks the Mexican Naco's small downtown.
Mayor Villegas was in Hermosillo, Sonora's state capital, picking up new 9-millimeter pistols and AR-15 rifles issued to his police force.
"We lived some very ugly moments that day," the 34-year-old mayor said. "By phone, people were telling me I should declare a state of siege."
But the report of the "caravan of death" headed for Naco turned out to be a false alarm.
At the end of the day, after the crisis had passed, Villegas arrived in Naco with boxes of pistols and rifles.
"Look at this beautiful thing," Police Chief Bracamontes said, taking one of the new pistols from its holster. "And this one too," he said, raising a sleek, black AR-15 rifle that was propped up against the wall of his office.
Like most of the new weapons, it still hasn't been fired.
For Carlyle, a Deal on Demographics
By Thomas Heath and Michael S. Rosenwald
Washington Post Staff Writers
Monday, July 9, 2007; D01
Private-equity firms have been picking off companies faster than bankers can draw up the papers. The targets are varied: Clear Channel Communications, Equity Office Properties, Harrah's Entertainment, the Hilton Hotel chain.
And now, nursing homes.
Carlyle Group's $6.3 billion purchase last week of HCR Manor Care has turned a few heads, with some wondering why one of the world's top private-equity firms is following up a major deal for part of Home Depot by hooking up with the infirm and elderly.
The answer, Carlyle Group's strategists say, is baby boomers, particularly the more than 60 million boomers preparing to retire.
"You are taking advantage of the favorable demographics," said Karen H. Bechtel, a Carlyle Group managing director who heads its health-care practice. "We believe this is really coming. You are going to serve more patients and have the capability to serve more patients and improve your business."
District-based Carlyle is particularly interested in expanding the company's offerings to help people who don't necessarily need or want to move into a nursing home, but who do need to recover from heart attacks or from injuring their knees on the ski trip they probably shouldn't have taken. Medical advances may keep us alive longer and let us do things our grandparents didn't do at their age, but it won't always be comfortable.
"This is an operations play," Bechtel said. "Our mission to maximize long-term value is best accomplished by . . . investing in, and growing the number of facilities, and adding personnel to serve patients."
The idea is to spend hundreds of millions of dollars expanding the company's offerings, with the hope that the investments will translate into steep revenue increases.
Analysts and Carlyle Group officials said they targeted Manor Care because it owns all its real estate. That allows Carlyle to borrow against the company's 340 facilities at favorable rates and then put money into building more homes, hiring more highly trained nurses and upgrading facilities, whether that means installing new treadmills or setting up Internet cafes.
Steven R. Howard, a New York lawyer who specializes in private equity, said Manor Care should position itself like Ritz-Carlton has in the hotel industry.
"If you can distinguish yourself as the national chain that provides high-quality care -- the Ritz of elder care, you've got a lock on a huge market," Howard said. "You emphasize service, top facilities and first-class care. They have got to do it quickly. You get rid of facilities you think will never be profitable in your low-population centers but enhance the profitability in those urban and suburban centers that make sense. Then you go out and tell your story."
Turning profits in health care, however, is not easy. The hurdles that patients sometimes have to jump to get insurance companies to pay for treatment are nearly cliché, and many doctors have decided to forgo accepting insurance altogether. Payments to providers can take a while. Also, private-equity companies are known for bringing operational efficiencies to the companies they acquire, but it is easier to be efficient when dealing with Dunkin' Donuts or Hertz than with elderly care.
Also, Howard, the private-equity lawyer, cautioned that if interest rates go up sharply and if Carlyle cannot control costs, the plan to create a high-quality national chain could go awry.
"While the baby-boomer retirement population is increasing significantly, the expectations for quality care are also rising," Howard said. "If the costs of satisfying those rising expectations are higher than projected, then the plan of establishing a national brand of high-quality elder-care service may be put in jeopardy. Also, rising interest rates, which raises cost of borrowing, could derail the plans."
If operations sputter, Carlyle could fall back on Manor Care's real estate holdings.
"We have seen several [private-equity firms] take private transactions in the skilled nursing-care space, mostly structured as real estate deals whereby the company is split into an operating company and a property company after closing to maximize the real estate value," said John K. Delaney, who once ran a health-care finance firm and is now chief executive of CapitalSource, a Chevy Chase business finance company.
Health care is one of seven investments in which Carlyle specializes, but it historically has not had the same level of expertise as the company's experience in aerospace, defense and telecommunications. The health-care team, based in New York, has seven people, administering its growing portfolio, and Carlyle says it will expand to 11 next month.
Bechtel, a veteran in the health-care investing field, was recruited from Morgan Stanley two years ago. The private-equity firm recently completed two large health-care deals, including last year's purchase of MultiPlan, the nation's oldest and largest independent preferred provider organization network. PPOs are among the most common form of health insurance.
The Manor Care acquisition is Carlyle's second deal in the acute-care sector. The first was in 2005, when it bought LifeCare Holdings, the operator of about 20 acute-care hospitals.
Manor Care has a reputation as one of the nation's best nursing home chains, according to several experts. The key for Carlyle is to maintain that reputation without straining resources.
Carlyle must also invest wisely.
"You have to invest and pay for more skilled nurses," Bechtel said. "We have to make the investment in the physical plant, rehabilitation equipment, gyms, even Internet cafes. We have to make that investment and make a return, and we have to hire higher-quality people to provide that care. But if we can treat enough patients in that higher-quality mix, we can make an attractive return."
Bechtel said Carlyle is likely to hold on to Manor Care for at least five years.
If the company performs well, Howard said, "you sell it to the guys in Dubai, who will pay a fortune for it."
By Thomas Heath and Michael S. Rosenwald
Washington Post Staff Writers
Monday, July 9, 2007; D01
Private-equity firms have been picking off companies faster than bankers can draw up the papers. The targets are varied: Clear Channel Communications, Equity Office Properties, Harrah's Entertainment, the Hilton Hotel chain.
And now, nursing homes.
Carlyle Group's $6.3 billion purchase last week of HCR Manor Care has turned a few heads, with some wondering why one of the world's top private-equity firms is following up a major deal for part of Home Depot by hooking up with the infirm and elderly.
The answer, Carlyle Group's strategists say, is baby boomers, particularly the more than 60 million boomers preparing to retire.
"You are taking advantage of the favorable demographics," said Karen H. Bechtel, a Carlyle Group managing director who heads its health-care practice. "We believe this is really coming. You are going to serve more patients and have the capability to serve more patients and improve your business."
District-based Carlyle is particularly interested in expanding the company's offerings to help people who don't necessarily need or want to move into a nursing home, but who do need to recover from heart attacks or from injuring their knees on the ski trip they probably shouldn't have taken. Medical advances may keep us alive longer and let us do things our grandparents didn't do at their age, but it won't always be comfortable.
"This is an operations play," Bechtel said. "Our mission to maximize long-term value is best accomplished by . . . investing in, and growing the number of facilities, and adding personnel to serve patients."
The idea is to spend hundreds of millions of dollars expanding the company's offerings, with the hope that the investments will translate into steep revenue increases.
Analysts and Carlyle Group officials said they targeted Manor Care because it owns all its real estate. That allows Carlyle to borrow against the company's 340 facilities at favorable rates and then put money into building more homes, hiring more highly trained nurses and upgrading facilities, whether that means installing new treadmills or setting up Internet cafes.
Steven R. Howard, a New York lawyer who specializes in private equity, said Manor Care should position itself like Ritz-Carlton has in the hotel industry.
"If you can distinguish yourself as the national chain that provides high-quality care -- the Ritz of elder care, you've got a lock on a huge market," Howard said. "You emphasize service, top facilities and first-class care. They have got to do it quickly. You get rid of facilities you think will never be profitable in your low-population centers but enhance the profitability in those urban and suburban centers that make sense. Then you go out and tell your story."
Turning profits in health care, however, is not easy. The hurdles that patients sometimes have to jump to get insurance companies to pay for treatment are nearly cliché, and many doctors have decided to forgo accepting insurance altogether. Payments to providers can take a while. Also, private-equity companies are known for bringing operational efficiencies to the companies they acquire, but it is easier to be efficient when dealing with Dunkin' Donuts or Hertz than with elderly care.
Also, Howard, the private-equity lawyer, cautioned that if interest rates go up sharply and if Carlyle cannot control costs, the plan to create a high-quality national chain could go awry.
"While the baby-boomer retirement population is increasing significantly, the expectations for quality care are also rising," Howard said. "If the costs of satisfying those rising expectations are higher than projected, then the plan of establishing a national brand of high-quality elder-care service may be put in jeopardy. Also, rising interest rates, which raises cost of borrowing, could derail the plans."
If operations sputter, Carlyle could fall back on Manor Care's real estate holdings.
"We have seen several [private-equity firms] take private transactions in the skilled nursing-care space, mostly structured as real estate deals whereby the company is split into an operating company and a property company after closing to maximize the real estate value," said John K. Delaney, who once ran a health-care finance firm and is now chief executive of CapitalSource, a Chevy Chase business finance company.
Health care is one of seven investments in which Carlyle specializes, but it historically has not had the same level of expertise as the company's experience in aerospace, defense and telecommunications. The health-care team, based in New York, has seven people, administering its growing portfolio, and Carlyle says it will expand to 11 next month.
Bechtel, a veteran in the health-care investing field, was recruited from Morgan Stanley two years ago. The private-equity firm recently completed two large health-care deals, including last year's purchase of MultiPlan, the nation's oldest and largest independent preferred provider organization network. PPOs are among the most common form of health insurance.
The Manor Care acquisition is Carlyle's second deal in the acute-care sector. The first was in 2005, when it bought LifeCare Holdings, the operator of about 20 acute-care hospitals.
Manor Care has a reputation as one of the nation's best nursing home chains, according to several experts. The key for Carlyle is to maintain that reputation without straining resources.
Carlyle must also invest wisely.
"You have to invest and pay for more skilled nurses," Bechtel said. "We have to make the investment in the physical plant, rehabilitation equipment, gyms, even Internet cafes. We have to make that investment and make a return, and we have to hire higher-quality people to provide that care. But if we can treat enough patients in that higher-quality mix, we can make an attractive return."
Bechtel said Carlyle is likely to hold on to Manor Care for at least five years.
If the company performs well, Howard said, "you sell it to the guys in Dubai, who will pay a fortune for it."
Tunneling Near Iranian Nuclear Site Stirs Worry
By Joby Warrick
Washington Post Staff Writer
Monday, July 9, 2007; A01
The sudden flurry of digging seen in recent satellite photos of a mountainside in central Iran might have passed for ordinary road tunneling. But the site is the back yard of Iran's most ambitious and controversial nuclear facility, leading U.S. officials and independent experts to reach another conclusion: It appears to be the start of a major tunnel complex inside the mountain.
The question is, why? Worries have been stoked by the presence nearby of fortified buildings where uranium is being processed. Those structures in turn are now being connected by roads to Iran's nuclear site at Natanz, where the country recently started production of enriched uranium in defiance of international protests.
As a result, photos of the site are being studied by governments, intelligence agencies and nuclear experts, all asking the same question: Is Iran attempting to thwart future military strikes against its nuclear facility by placing key parts of it in underground bunkers?
The construction has raised concerns at the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Vienna-based U.N. watchdog that monitors Iran's nuclear program. On Friday, an IAEA spokeswoman confirmed that the agency has broached the subject with Iranian officials. "We have been in contact with the Iranian authorities about this, and we have received clarifications," said Melissa Fleming, the spokeswoman. She declined to elaborate.
Calls to Iran's U.N. mission in Vienna were not returned. IAEA officials plan to press the issue further in a previously scheduled visit to Tehran later this week, according to informed sources.
"The tunnel complex certainly appears to be related to Natanz," said David Albright, a former U.N. weapons inspector and president of the Institute for Science and International Security, a Washington-based nonprofit group that provided copies of the photos to The Washington Post. "We think it is probably for storage of nuclear items."
U.S. officials at several military and intelligence-gathering agencies said they are aware of the construction and are watching it closely, though none would comment publicly or speculate on the purpose of the tunnels.
A tunnel complex would reduce options for a preemptive military strike to knock out Iran's nuclear program, according to U.S. officials who closely follow Iran's nuclear activities. It also could further heighten tensions between the Bush administration and the government of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who has said he is committed to pursuing a peaceful use of nuclear power.
In response to suggestions by Vice President Cheney and others that the United States might consider using force to halt Iran's nuclear ambitions, Ahmadinejad has shrouded the program in additional secrecy and threatened to suspend cooperation with international nuclear inspectors.
Iran has been enriching uranium at Natanz on a small scale for more than four years, creating a less-enriched product that can be used for generating electricity. With further enrichment, the uranium could be used in making weapons.
The commercial satellite photos, taken on June 11 by the firm DigitalGlobe, show two new roads leading to a construction site on the side of a mountain closest to the nuclear site's southern boundary. Although tunnel entrances are not directly visible, the photos show rocks and debris in large piles near the dig sites. There are no signs of construction in similar photos taken of the area six months ago.
In a report analyzing the photos, officials of the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) compared the new Natanz construction with a tunnel built by Iran inside a mountain near another key nuclear site. That site, located about 80 miles to the south and known as Esfahan, is home to a major nuclear research center and a factory that converts uranium to a form that can be enriched at Natanz.
Iran began the work at Esfahan quietly in 2004, digging a large, two-entrance mountain tunnel that it later acknowledged was meant for nuclear storage. Iran eventually allowed IAEA inspectors to visit the then-empty tunnel. Having separate underground bunkers near both sites would allow Iranian officials to rapidly evacuate sensitive materials to safe storage if an attack were believed to be imminent, Albright, the ISIS president, said.
The intended use of the Natanz tunnel cannot be ascertained from the photos. But "such a tunnel inside a mountain would offer excellent protection from an aerial attack," said the report by ISIS, which produces technical assessments of nuclear programs. "This new facility would be ideal for safely storing" natural and enriched uranium and the specialized equipment needed to make it, ISIS said.
A less likely possibility, according to the ISIS report, is that Iran might seek to use the tunnels to house centrifuges used in uranium enrichment. Iran's existing centrifuges at Natanz are in heavily fortified buildings built partly underground. Iran has acknowledged plans to expand its uranium enrichment, requiring tens of thousands of fast-spinning centrifuges.
In April, Iran unilaterally withdrew from an international treaty that would have required it to publicly disclose design plans for any new nuclear-related construction. The ISIS report said that Iran nonetheless "should disclose to the [IAEA] any activity in this area related to its efforts at the nearby Natanz site or another nuclear purpose."
By Joby Warrick
Washington Post Staff Writer
Monday, July 9, 2007; A01
The sudden flurry of digging seen in recent satellite photos of a mountainside in central Iran might have passed for ordinary road tunneling. But the site is the back yard of Iran's most ambitious and controversial nuclear facility, leading U.S. officials and independent experts to reach another conclusion: It appears to be the start of a major tunnel complex inside the mountain.
The question is, why? Worries have been stoked by the presence nearby of fortified buildings where uranium is being processed. Those structures in turn are now being connected by roads to Iran's nuclear site at Natanz, where the country recently started production of enriched uranium in defiance of international protests.
As a result, photos of the site are being studied by governments, intelligence agencies and nuclear experts, all asking the same question: Is Iran attempting to thwart future military strikes against its nuclear facility by placing key parts of it in underground bunkers?
The construction has raised concerns at the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Vienna-based U.N. watchdog that monitors Iran's nuclear program. On Friday, an IAEA spokeswoman confirmed that the agency has broached the subject with Iranian officials. "We have been in contact with the Iranian authorities about this, and we have received clarifications," said Melissa Fleming, the spokeswoman. She declined to elaborate.
Calls to Iran's U.N. mission in Vienna were not returned. IAEA officials plan to press the issue further in a previously scheduled visit to Tehran later this week, according to informed sources.
"The tunnel complex certainly appears to be related to Natanz," said David Albright, a former U.N. weapons inspector and president of the Institute for Science and International Security, a Washington-based nonprofit group that provided copies of the photos to The Washington Post. "We think it is probably for storage of nuclear items."
U.S. officials at several military and intelligence-gathering agencies said they are aware of the construction and are watching it closely, though none would comment publicly or speculate on the purpose of the tunnels.
A tunnel complex would reduce options for a preemptive military strike to knock out Iran's nuclear program, according to U.S. officials who closely follow Iran's nuclear activities. It also could further heighten tensions between the Bush administration and the government of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who has said he is committed to pursuing a peaceful use of nuclear power.
In response to suggestions by Vice President Cheney and others that the United States might consider using force to halt Iran's nuclear ambitions, Ahmadinejad has shrouded the program in additional secrecy and threatened to suspend cooperation with international nuclear inspectors.
Iran has been enriching uranium at Natanz on a small scale for more than four years, creating a less-enriched product that can be used for generating electricity. With further enrichment, the uranium could be used in making weapons.
The commercial satellite photos, taken on June 11 by the firm DigitalGlobe, show two new roads leading to a construction site on the side of a mountain closest to the nuclear site's southern boundary. Although tunnel entrances are not directly visible, the photos show rocks and debris in large piles near the dig sites. There are no signs of construction in similar photos taken of the area six months ago.
In a report analyzing the photos, officials of the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) compared the new Natanz construction with a tunnel built by Iran inside a mountain near another key nuclear site. That site, located about 80 miles to the south and known as Esfahan, is home to a major nuclear research center and a factory that converts uranium to a form that can be enriched at Natanz.
Iran began the work at Esfahan quietly in 2004, digging a large, two-entrance mountain tunnel that it later acknowledged was meant for nuclear storage. Iran eventually allowed IAEA inspectors to visit the then-empty tunnel. Having separate underground bunkers near both sites would allow Iranian officials to rapidly evacuate sensitive materials to safe storage if an attack were believed to be imminent, Albright, the ISIS president, said.
The intended use of the Natanz tunnel cannot be ascertained from the photos. But "such a tunnel inside a mountain would offer excellent protection from an aerial attack," said the report by ISIS, which produces technical assessments of nuclear programs. "This new facility would be ideal for safely storing" natural and enriched uranium and the specialized equipment needed to make it, ISIS said.
A less likely possibility, according to the ISIS report, is that Iran might seek to use the tunnels to house centrifuges used in uranium enrichment. Iran's existing centrifuges at Natanz are in heavily fortified buildings built partly underground. Iran has acknowledged plans to expand its uranium enrichment, requiring tens of thousands of fast-spinning centrifuges.
In April, Iran unilaterally withdrew from an international treaty that would have required it to publicly disclose design plans for any new nuclear-related construction. The ISIS report said that Iran nonetheless "should disclose to the [IAEA] any activity in this area related to its efforts at the nearby Natanz site or another nuclear purpose."
Robert Mugabe critic 'raped'
By Sebastien Berger in Johannesburg
Last Updated: 2:04am BST 10/07/2007
telegraph.co.uk
In Robert Mugabe’s Zimbabwe, terror is so endemic not even the daughter of a former prime minister known as a supporter of black rights is immune from rape.
Judith Todd’s father Sir Garfield Todd was Rhodesia’s last liberal leader and she was imprisoned, force-fed and exiled under Ian Smith’s rule for her efforts to promote black majority rule.
After independence she returned to head a development agency working particularly with the war veterans who had fought for Zimbabwe.
But when she criticised Mr Mugabe’s regime she was detained and raped by a senior army officer, she revealed yesterday.
It was, she said — both for her and her attacker — an example of the culture of fear used to preserve Mr Mugabe’s rule.
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The assault came a day after she told the then army commander and another senior officer that the North Korean-trained 5 Brigade was massacring civilians in a campaign of atrocities in Matabeleland.
The next morning a senior officer picked her up in a car and drove to a house she believes was in the Chikurubi prison complex.
“A servant let us in, not looking at us,” she wrote in a newly- published memoir, Through the Darkness: A life in Zimbabwe, in which she names the man.
“The (senior officer) led me into a bedroom, opened a bottle of beer for each of us, unstrapped his firearm in its holster, laid it on the bedside table next to my head and proceeded.
“I did not resist.”
In her first interview on the subject, she told The Daily Telegraph: “It was rape. I was in a state of complete terror.
“Now and again you have to face destiny. I had just been reading these documents which were full of rape, terror, mass murder.
“I knew something was going to happen when that car came. What happened was actually a relief because I thought I was going to be killed. At least I was alive.”
A quietly spoken woman now in her sixties and living in Bulawayo, she bears no animosity towards her attacker, no desire for vengeance.
Instead, having stayed in Zimbabwe for many years afterwards, even after being stripped of her citizenship in 2003, she sees him as a victim in the same way she was.
“I have no reason to believe he wanted to do what he did, quite the opposite.
“It’s so complex because he was obviously so troubled and so unhappy. I just regard him as a fellow victim.....maybe someone was watching him. That’s what has happened to so many people in Zimbabwe.”
Mr Mugabe — who was once a teacher in the Dadaya network of rural schools set up by her parents - has entrenched himself in power through both money and fear, she said.
Although 24 years ago, the rape was typical, she added, citing an incident earlier this year when police beat up protesting lawyers outside the high court in Harare.
The officers had been ordered to assault the group, she was told.
“They knew there were people watching them and that if they didn’t beat them properly they themselves would be beaten,” she said.
“That’s Zimbabwe now.
“Zanu-PF is the instrument of evil in Zimbabwe. For the future well-being of Zimbabwe Zanu-PF must be eliminated. We need to be cleansed.”
Sir Garfield Todd’s last comment on Mr Mugabe was: “What I cannot forgive is how many people he has corrupted”, and while some of Mr Mugabe’s closest lieutenants have become multi-millionaires, others “know what Mugabe is capable of”, she said.
The home affairs minister Kembo Mohadi was tortured and blackmailed before joining the government, she explained, while Augustine Chihuri, the chief of police, was savagely terrorised in Mozambique before independence.
“Mugabe has been able to manipulate the people who have power one way or another.”
She described a “very chilling” incident a few years ago, when after a funeral in Bulawayo she saw Mr Mugabe wander through the cemetery and stop to address a grave.
“He said: 'So this is what it feels like being dead.’ I have observed how much he likes burying people at Heroes Acre and how humiliated they have been there.
“That’s Mugabe’s final triumph, 'here I am, I’m burying you’. He’s saying to Zimbabwe right now, 'I’m going to bury you’.
“For me he is the antithesis of that part of the Lord’s Prayer where it says 'Lead us not into temptation but deliver us from evil’. He leads people into temptation and then when they fall he delivers them unto evil. He loves watching people suffer.”
Now in the throes of hyperinflation, there is no doubt that the people of Zimbabwe are suffering. “There’s no food, there’s no fuel, there’s no electricity,” said Ms Todd.
“I feel terribly that Mugabe is unwittingly removing himself and putting chaos in his place.
“I think he is very angry at being mortal and if he has to die he has to pull the whole temple down with him.”
Ms Todd’s alleged attacker went on to have a distinguished diplomatic career. He could not be reached for comment yesterday, and calls to Zimbabwe government spokesmen went unanswered.
• Judith Todd has signed a declaration waiving her right to anonymity as a rape victim for this interview. Through the Darkness: A life in Zimbabwe is available on www.amazon.co.uk
By Sebastien Berger in Johannesburg
Last Updated: 2:04am BST 10/07/2007
telegraph.co.uk
In Robert Mugabe’s Zimbabwe, terror is so endemic not even the daughter of a former prime minister known as a supporter of black rights is immune from rape.
Judith Todd’s father Sir Garfield Todd was Rhodesia’s last liberal leader and she was imprisoned, force-fed and exiled under Ian Smith’s rule for her efforts to promote black majority rule.
After independence she returned to head a development agency working particularly with the war veterans who had fought for Zimbabwe.
But when she criticised Mr Mugabe’s regime she was detained and raped by a senior army officer, she revealed yesterday.
It was, she said — both for her and her attacker — an example of the culture of fear used to preserve Mr Mugabe’s rule.
advertisement
The assault came a day after she told the then army commander and another senior officer that the North Korean-trained 5 Brigade was massacring civilians in a campaign of atrocities in Matabeleland.
The next morning a senior officer picked her up in a car and drove to a house she believes was in the Chikurubi prison complex.
“A servant let us in, not looking at us,” she wrote in a newly- published memoir, Through the Darkness: A life in Zimbabwe, in which she names the man.
“The (senior officer) led me into a bedroom, opened a bottle of beer for each of us, unstrapped his firearm in its holster, laid it on the bedside table next to my head and proceeded.
“I did not resist.”
In her first interview on the subject, she told The Daily Telegraph: “It was rape. I was in a state of complete terror.
“Now and again you have to face destiny. I had just been reading these documents which were full of rape, terror, mass murder.
“I knew something was going to happen when that car came. What happened was actually a relief because I thought I was going to be killed. At least I was alive.”
A quietly spoken woman now in her sixties and living in Bulawayo, she bears no animosity towards her attacker, no desire for vengeance.
Instead, having stayed in Zimbabwe for many years afterwards, even after being stripped of her citizenship in 2003, she sees him as a victim in the same way she was.
“I have no reason to believe he wanted to do what he did, quite the opposite.
“It’s so complex because he was obviously so troubled and so unhappy. I just regard him as a fellow victim.....maybe someone was watching him. That’s what has happened to so many people in Zimbabwe.”
Mr Mugabe — who was once a teacher in the Dadaya network of rural schools set up by her parents - has entrenched himself in power through both money and fear, she said.
Although 24 years ago, the rape was typical, she added, citing an incident earlier this year when police beat up protesting lawyers outside the high court in Harare.
The officers had been ordered to assault the group, she was told.
“They knew there were people watching them and that if they didn’t beat them properly they themselves would be beaten,” she said.
“That’s Zimbabwe now.
“Zanu-PF is the instrument of evil in Zimbabwe. For the future well-being of Zimbabwe Zanu-PF must be eliminated. We need to be cleansed.”
Sir Garfield Todd’s last comment on Mr Mugabe was: “What I cannot forgive is how many people he has corrupted”, and while some of Mr Mugabe’s closest lieutenants have become multi-millionaires, others “know what Mugabe is capable of”, she said.
The home affairs minister Kembo Mohadi was tortured and blackmailed before joining the government, she explained, while Augustine Chihuri, the chief of police, was savagely terrorised in Mozambique before independence.
“Mugabe has been able to manipulate the people who have power one way or another.”
She described a “very chilling” incident a few years ago, when after a funeral in Bulawayo she saw Mr Mugabe wander through the cemetery and stop to address a grave.
“He said: 'So this is what it feels like being dead.’ I have observed how much he likes burying people at Heroes Acre and how humiliated they have been there.
“That’s Mugabe’s final triumph, 'here I am, I’m burying you’. He’s saying to Zimbabwe right now, 'I’m going to bury you’.
“For me he is the antithesis of that part of the Lord’s Prayer where it says 'Lead us not into temptation but deliver us from evil’. He leads people into temptation and then when they fall he delivers them unto evil. He loves watching people suffer.”
Now in the throes of hyperinflation, there is no doubt that the people of Zimbabwe are suffering. “There’s no food, there’s no fuel, there’s no electricity,” said Ms Todd.
“I feel terribly that Mugabe is unwittingly removing himself and putting chaos in his place.
“I think he is very angry at being mortal and if he has to die he has to pull the whole temple down with him.”
Ms Todd’s alleged attacker went on to have a distinguished diplomatic career. He could not be reached for comment yesterday, and calls to Zimbabwe government spokesmen went unanswered.
• Judith Todd has signed a declaration waiving her right to anonymity as a rape victim for this interview. Through the Darkness: A life in Zimbabwe is available on www.amazon.co.uk
Fatah Gunmen Assert Authority in West Bank
Territory Becomes Mirror Opposite of Gaza
By Scott Wilson
Washington Post Foreign Service
Sunday, July 8, 2007; A12
NABLUS, West Bank -- The anonymous call on Hafez Shaheen's mobile phone came as an impolite reminder.
"You were at city hall today," the voice warned. "You are not to go back again."
Shaheen is the acting mayor of this West Bank city, elected two years ago on a ticket sponsored by Hamas. The armed Islamic movement trounced forces from the rival secular Fatah party on June 14 to take control of the Gaza Strip, and the reverberations were felt instantly here by Shaheen and his 12 Hamas colleagues on the 15-seat city council.
The next day, scores of Fatah gunmen arrived at city hall with a simple order: Hamas officials should leave and not return. But Shaheen, a bespectacled engineering professor, was back at his office within days and continues to ignore subsequent telephoned threats by Fatah's armed wing.
"I didn't take it very seriously," he said Thursday between signing papers, taking calls from a German development bank and entertaining a visiting U.N. delegation. "But I can't tell the others to come back. I can't take that responsibility because I don't control the street."
The Hamas military conquest of Gaza politically severed the two territories, which are envisioned as cornerstones of a future Palestinian state. Since then, the West Bank has emerged as a mirror opposite of Gaza. Here Fatah militiamen have asserted themselves in the streets, and Hamas has moved into the shadows.
Yet increasingly in Nablus and across the West Bank there are signs, at least at the local level, that the initial fears of broad factional violence are fading. Political life is slowly returning to something like normal. From Bethlehem to Qalqilyah to this most populous West Bank city, Hamas-affiliated local council members such as Shaheen are returning cautiously to the city halls they had abandoned, in some cases defying death threats to do so.
The Palestinian Authority's Ministry of Local Government Affairs sent out a letter in late June ordering all elected council members to return to work, and many Hamas officials are treating the written demand as tacit protection from the Fatah-dominated ministry.
The threat of factional strife remains, however. Many Palestinians believe new elections are the only way to resolve the dispute. But elections have not yet been called. Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas, a Fatah leader, first suggested new elections in December as a way to end the political crisis with Hamas.
Fatah's electoral prospects are highly uncertain, in part because of enduring divisions within the party between Abbas's founding generation and a disaffected younger one clamoring for power. Hamas has slipped in most opinion polls since winning January 2006 parliamentary elections, which gave it day-to-day control of the Palestinian Authority, but its support has been consistently underestimated in past surveys.
"A vote may make things worse, and it may make things better," said Victor Batarseh, 72, the Christian mayor of Bethlehem who is not aligned with Hamas or Fatah. "But we should always go to the ballot instead of bullets."
The day after Hamas seized total control of Gaza in June, some Fatah gunmen came for Khaled Saada. Saada, a Bethlehem councilman elected from the Hamas-sponsored candidate list known as Change and Reform, was not at home. The men searched his house and detained two of his brothers, one of whom belongs to Fatah. The brothers were released unharmed a few days later.
"I'm against importing or exporting tribal disputes from one place to another," said Saada, 50, a widower with a sweeping comb-over. "If my brother is beaten in one area and I take revenge in another, it is not civilized."
Saada returned to Bethlehem's city hall on Manger Square eight days later. Today four of the council's five Hamas members are back at work; the fifth is in an Israeli jail.
A family mediator by profession, Saada said the Palestinians' most pressing problem is the lack of fresh leadership. He said "new blood" would help curtail corruption and dispel old partisan animosities, such as those that flared in Gaza last month.
For a model, he draws on the years he spent in Israeli and Palestinian jails for belonging to an illegal group. Every four months, he said, there were elections for prison leadership. Consecutive terms were prohibited.
"Leadership in our country is like a mattress -- you get one and sleep on it forever," Saada said. "We need change."
Founded in Gaza two decades ago with a charter calling for Israel's destruction, Hamas has always operated more cautiously in the West Bank, where a more religiously diverse and prosperous population has proved less supportive of its message than the strip's poorer, predominantly refugee population. In addition to a military wing, Hamas operates a network of Islamic schools, charities and sports clubs, which have won over many in Gaza and recently became targets of Fatah militias in the West Bank.
Israel ended its permanent presence in Gaza in August 2005. But the Israeli army still pursues Hamas members aggressively in the West Bank, forcing them to keep a low profile or lie about their party affiliation.
Thirty-nine Hamas members of the 132-seat Palestinian parliament are now in Israeli jails, all of them from the West Bank. So are numerous local elected officials, including the mayor and two council members from Nablus.
But the Fatah threat to Shaheen and his council colleagues is new. In their view, it amounts to something like a local coup.
In addition to ordering Hamas council members to go home, Fatah gunmen torched Islamic charities and schools, kidnapped local imams, and raised party banners over government buildings, just as Hamas had done with its green flags in Gaza. Shaheen and other Hamas-affiliated council members agreed to appoint Yahya Arafat, one of two Fatah council members, to manage the city's day-to-day affairs.
"Everyone knew there would be a reaction here after what happened in Gaza," said Arafat, 48, a portly civil engineer. "Sometimes we all meet here, and sometimes we meet someplace private. But I tell them to come back, that by the law, they must come back."
Shaheen, harried and rumpled, is now defying the Fatah militia, known as the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, for several reasons. He is a well-known professor at an-Najah National University who is also from a well-known family. And he is not an official member of Hamas, although he also was elected on its Change and Reform list.
But there are still dangers. On Wednesday, Ghassan Johari, a Hamas council member, returned to his city hall office for the first time. Fearing trouble, Shaheen left immediately. Within an hour, Fatah gunmen arrived for Johari, who had left ahead of them.
The emergency government Abbas appointed last month has pledged to disarm all party militias, including the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades. There is no sign that is happening.
"The government has ordered us all back to work, but the street rejects this letter," Shaheen said. "I'm not frightened or worried, but I must take care. It's still not easy here."
After Abbas fired the Hamas-led government, international donors and Israel freed up hundreds of millions of dollars in aid and frozen tax revenue to help him politically. On Wednesday, drawing on those funds, Abbas paid about 160,000 civil servants and security-service officers, some of whom had not received full salaries in 17 months. The Palestinian Authority is not paying the salaries of an additional 31,000 employees who were hired on contracts over the past 20 months, most of them from Hamas. Fatah officials say these workers were hired illegally, although the decision is threatening to exacerbate the parties' divisions.
"Hamas will try to make use of it," said Bassem Barhoum, a spokesman for the Palestinian parliament. "But when most of them see how this works, and some get their salaries, it will probably be okay."
The markets of Nablus buzzed the day after government employees received their pay. Music filled the streets. Several shoppers and store owners said much of the pay would flow into banks, which have been lending money over the past year and a half to keep families afloat.
"We have not seen the results of the salaries yet," said Abdelrahman al-Nouri, 41, whose corner grocery store was empty despite heavy foot-traffic outside. "Some of them owe us a lot of money, and I hope they come in soon."
Mohammed Ishtayeh, 36, held a handful of shopping bags containing shoes, slacks and a dress shirt.
The middle school Arabic teacher received only half his monthly salary the previous day, despite government promises of the full amount. To buy clothes for his sister's wedding, he added to the $1,500 debt he has accumulated over the past year.
"The government owes me more than $3,000 in back pay," Ishtayeh said. "But this money was better than nothing."
Territory Becomes Mirror Opposite of Gaza
By Scott Wilson
Washington Post Foreign Service
Sunday, July 8, 2007; A12
NABLUS, West Bank -- The anonymous call on Hafez Shaheen's mobile phone came as an impolite reminder.
"You were at city hall today," the voice warned. "You are not to go back again."
Shaheen is the acting mayor of this West Bank city, elected two years ago on a ticket sponsored by Hamas. The armed Islamic movement trounced forces from the rival secular Fatah party on June 14 to take control of the Gaza Strip, and the reverberations were felt instantly here by Shaheen and his 12 Hamas colleagues on the 15-seat city council.
The next day, scores of Fatah gunmen arrived at city hall with a simple order: Hamas officials should leave and not return. But Shaheen, a bespectacled engineering professor, was back at his office within days and continues to ignore subsequent telephoned threats by Fatah's armed wing.
"I didn't take it very seriously," he said Thursday between signing papers, taking calls from a German development bank and entertaining a visiting U.N. delegation. "But I can't tell the others to come back. I can't take that responsibility because I don't control the street."
The Hamas military conquest of Gaza politically severed the two territories, which are envisioned as cornerstones of a future Palestinian state. Since then, the West Bank has emerged as a mirror opposite of Gaza. Here Fatah militiamen have asserted themselves in the streets, and Hamas has moved into the shadows.
Yet increasingly in Nablus and across the West Bank there are signs, at least at the local level, that the initial fears of broad factional violence are fading. Political life is slowly returning to something like normal. From Bethlehem to Qalqilyah to this most populous West Bank city, Hamas-affiliated local council members such as Shaheen are returning cautiously to the city halls they had abandoned, in some cases defying death threats to do so.
The Palestinian Authority's Ministry of Local Government Affairs sent out a letter in late June ordering all elected council members to return to work, and many Hamas officials are treating the written demand as tacit protection from the Fatah-dominated ministry.
The threat of factional strife remains, however. Many Palestinians believe new elections are the only way to resolve the dispute. But elections have not yet been called. Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas, a Fatah leader, first suggested new elections in December as a way to end the political crisis with Hamas.
Fatah's electoral prospects are highly uncertain, in part because of enduring divisions within the party between Abbas's founding generation and a disaffected younger one clamoring for power. Hamas has slipped in most opinion polls since winning January 2006 parliamentary elections, which gave it day-to-day control of the Palestinian Authority, but its support has been consistently underestimated in past surveys.
"A vote may make things worse, and it may make things better," said Victor Batarseh, 72, the Christian mayor of Bethlehem who is not aligned with Hamas or Fatah. "But we should always go to the ballot instead of bullets."
The day after Hamas seized total control of Gaza in June, some Fatah gunmen came for Khaled Saada. Saada, a Bethlehem councilman elected from the Hamas-sponsored candidate list known as Change and Reform, was not at home. The men searched his house and detained two of his brothers, one of whom belongs to Fatah. The brothers were released unharmed a few days later.
"I'm against importing or exporting tribal disputes from one place to another," said Saada, 50, a widower with a sweeping comb-over. "If my brother is beaten in one area and I take revenge in another, it is not civilized."
Saada returned to Bethlehem's city hall on Manger Square eight days later. Today four of the council's five Hamas members are back at work; the fifth is in an Israeli jail.
A family mediator by profession, Saada said the Palestinians' most pressing problem is the lack of fresh leadership. He said "new blood" would help curtail corruption and dispel old partisan animosities, such as those that flared in Gaza last month.
For a model, he draws on the years he spent in Israeli and Palestinian jails for belonging to an illegal group. Every four months, he said, there were elections for prison leadership. Consecutive terms were prohibited.
"Leadership in our country is like a mattress -- you get one and sleep on it forever," Saada said. "We need change."
Founded in Gaza two decades ago with a charter calling for Israel's destruction, Hamas has always operated more cautiously in the West Bank, where a more religiously diverse and prosperous population has proved less supportive of its message than the strip's poorer, predominantly refugee population. In addition to a military wing, Hamas operates a network of Islamic schools, charities and sports clubs, which have won over many in Gaza and recently became targets of Fatah militias in the West Bank.
Israel ended its permanent presence in Gaza in August 2005. But the Israeli army still pursues Hamas members aggressively in the West Bank, forcing them to keep a low profile or lie about their party affiliation.
Thirty-nine Hamas members of the 132-seat Palestinian parliament are now in Israeli jails, all of them from the West Bank. So are numerous local elected officials, including the mayor and two council members from Nablus.
But the Fatah threat to Shaheen and his council colleagues is new. In their view, it amounts to something like a local coup.
In addition to ordering Hamas council members to go home, Fatah gunmen torched Islamic charities and schools, kidnapped local imams, and raised party banners over government buildings, just as Hamas had done with its green flags in Gaza. Shaheen and other Hamas-affiliated council members agreed to appoint Yahya Arafat, one of two Fatah council members, to manage the city's day-to-day affairs.
"Everyone knew there would be a reaction here after what happened in Gaza," said Arafat, 48, a portly civil engineer. "Sometimes we all meet here, and sometimes we meet someplace private. But I tell them to come back, that by the law, they must come back."
Shaheen, harried and rumpled, is now defying the Fatah militia, known as the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, for several reasons. He is a well-known professor at an-Najah National University who is also from a well-known family. And he is not an official member of Hamas, although he also was elected on its Change and Reform list.
But there are still dangers. On Wednesday, Ghassan Johari, a Hamas council member, returned to his city hall office for the first time. Fearing trouble, Shaheen left immediately. Within an hour, Fatah gunmen arrived for Johari, who had left ahead of them.
The emergency government Abbas appointed last month has pledged to disarm all party militias, including the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades. There is no sign that is happening.
"The government has ordered us all back to work, but the street rejects this letter," Shaheen said. "I'm not frightened or worried, but I must take care. It's still not easy here."
After Abbas fired the Hamas-led government, international donors and Israel freed up hundreds of millions of dollars in aid and frozen tax revenue to help him politically. On Wednesday, drawing on those funds, Abbas paid about 160,000 civil servants and security-service officers, some of whom had not received full salaries in 17 months. The Palestinian Authority is not paying the salaries of an additional 31,000 employees who were hired on contracts over the past 20 months, most of them from Hamas. Fatah officials say these workers were hired illegally, although the decision is threatening to exacerbate the parties' divisions.
"Hamas will try to make use of it," said Bassem Barhoum, a spokesman for the Palestinian parliament. "But when most of them see how this works, and some get their salaries, it will probably be okay."
The markets of Nablus buzzed the day after government employees received their pay. Music filled the streets. Several shoppers and store owners said much of the pay would flow into banks, which have been lending money over the past year and a half to keep families afloat.
"We have not seen the results of the salaries yet," said Abdelrahman al-Nouri, 41, whose corner grocery store was empty despite heavy foot-traffic outside. "Some of them owe us a lot of money, and I hope they come in soon."
Mohammed Ishtayeh, 36, held a handful of shopping bags containing shoes, slacks and a dress shirt.
The middle school Arabic teacher received only half his monthly salary the previous day, despite government promises of the full amount. To buy clothes for his sister's wedding, he added to the $1,500 debt he has accumulated over the past year.
"The government owes me more than $3,000 in back pay," Ishtayeh said. "But this money was better than nothing."
Pakistani Leader Calls on Radicals To Surrender
Fifth Day of Mosque Standoff Punctuated by Heavy Gunfire
By Griff Witte
Washington Post Foreign Service
Sunday, July 8, 2007; A15
ISLAMABAD, Pakistan, July 8 -- Positions hardened in the standoff at the pro-Taliban Red Mosque on Saturday, as a peace effort collapsed amid a hail of gunfire and President Pervez Musharraf called on Islamic radicals hunkered down inside to surrender or face death.
The siege entered its fifth day Saturday, and there was no resolution in sight. Heavy exchanges of gunfire continued throughout the day, and the radicals appeared determined to continue fighting rather than lay down their weapons. The government, meanwhile, has refused to negotiate and has said it will accept nothing less than unconditional surrender.
"If they don't surrender, I'm saying it here, they will be killed," Musharraf told reporters in his first public comments on the siege.
Musharraf, who also is head of the army, said he believed the government had "shown great patience because we don't want people to be killed. We could have done everything. The government has the power, but there are women and children."
Abdul Rashid Ghazi, 43, a cleric who took over leadership of the mosque after the arrest of his brother earlier in the week, has said he and his followers want to be martyred. "I prefer to fight and prefer death instead of surrendering," Ghazi said in an interview with the BBC. "Islamabad will become like Baghdad if the government commits aggression against the Red Mosque and kills me."
In a separate interview with a local television station, Ghazi said more than 70 of his followers had already been killed, an assertion that could not be independently confirmed.
Early Sunday morning, the army said that a senior commando had been killed and another officer injured during intense fighting overnight. The commandos had been blasting holes in the perimeter wall to the compound to allow women and children inside a chance to escape.
The mosque is surrounded by several thousand heavily armed government commandos and rangers. The siege began Tuesday, after a vicious gun battle that left 19 people dead. Clerics at the Red Mosque, in a residential neighborhood in the heart of the normally tranquil capital, had been provoking the government for months with operations aimed at stamping out vice. Students from a madrassa, or religious school, affiliated with the mosque abducted police officers and alleged prostitutes, and they threatened music store owners with attacks.
The mosque standoff comes as Pakistan faces a growing threat from religious extremists, who have been moving eastward from the Afghan border in recent years.
Only several dozen of those inside are believed to be hard-core radicals. Government officials say they believe that hundreds inside are being held hostage.
A delegation from a hard-line religious party attempted to enter the mosque Saturday with hopes of mediating, but the politicians got caught in crossfire between security forces and radicals and were forced to withdraw. One of the politicians was later detained for allegedly trying to take food and water inside the mosque compound.
The politicians accused the government of deliberately sabotaging the peacemaking effort. "The government started firing. It was not from inside," said Maulana Abdul Majeed Hazarvi, a politician who has been involved in mediation initiatives.
But government officials said gunmen in the mosque had opened fire first, and they accused the delegation of trying to politicize the conflict.
Fifth Day of Mosque Standoff Punctuated by Heavy Gunfire
By Griff Witte
Washington Post Foreign Service
Sunday, July 8, 2007; A15
ISLAMABAD, Pakistan, July 8 -- Positions hardened in the standoff at the pro-Taliban Red Mosque on Saturday, as a peace effort collapsed amid a hail of gunfire and President Pervez Musharraf called on Islamic radicals hunkered down inside to surrender or face death.
The siege entered its fifth day Saturday, and there was no resolution in sight. Heavy exchanges of gunfire continued throughout the day, and the radicals appeared determined to continue fighting rather than lay down their weapons. The government, meanwhile, has refused to negotiate and has said it will accept nothing less than unconditional surrender.
"If they don't surrender, I'm saying it here, they will be killed," Musharraf told reporters in his first public comments on the siege.
Musharraf, who also is head of the army, said he believed the government had "shown great patience because we don't want people to be killed. We could have done everything. The government has the power, but there are women and children."
Abdul Rashid Ghazi, 43, a cleric who took over leadership of the mosque after the arrest of his brother earlier in the week, has said he and his followers want to be martyred. "I prefer to fight and prefer death instead of surrendering," Ghazi said in an interview with the BBC. "Islamabad will become like Baghdad if the government commits aggression against the Red Mosque and kills me."
In a separate interview with a local television station, Ghazi said more than 70 of his followers had already been killed, an assertion that could not be independently confirmed.
Early Sunday morning, the army said that a senior commando had been killed and another officer injured during intense fighting overnight. The commandos had been blasting holes in the perimeter wall to the compound to allow women and children inside a chance to escape.
The mosque is surrounded by several thousand heavily armed government commandos and rangers. The siege began Tuesday, after a vicious gun battle that left 19 people dead. Clerics at the Red Mosque, in a residential neighborhood in the heart of the normally tranquil capital, had been provoking the government for months with operations aimed at stamping out vice. Students from a madrassa, or religious school, affiliated with the mosque abducted police officers and alleged prostitutes, and they threatened music store owners with attacks.
The mosque standoff comes as Pakistan faces a growing threat from religious extremists, who have been moving eastward from the Afghan border in recent years.
Only several dozen of those inside are believed to be hard-core radicals. Government officials say they believe that hundreds inside are being held hostage.
A delegation from a hard-line religious party attempted to enter the mosque Saturday with hopes of mediating, but the politicians got caught in crossfire between security forces and radicals and were forced to withdraw. One of the politicians was later detained for allegedly trying to take food and water inside the mosque compound.
The politicians accused the government of deliberately sabotaging the peacemaking effort. "The government started firing. It was not from inside," said Maulana Abdul Majeed Hazarvi, a politician who has been involved in mediation initiatives.
But government officials said gunmen in the mosque had opened fire first, and they accused the delegation of trying to politicize the conflict.
Calderón's Offensive Against Drug Cartels
Use of Mexican Military Increasingly Criticized
By Manuel Roig-Franzia
Washington Post Foreign Service
Sunday, July 8, 2007; A15
MEXICO CITY -- Every Monday morning, President Felipe Calderón settles in at the head of the table in the presidential library at Los Pinos, Mexico's fortresslike chief executive's compound.
Calderón presides over strategy sessions with the leaders of Mexico's army and navy, key players in the centerpiece initiative of his seven-month-old presidency: a military assault against drug cartels. No Mexican president in recent history has convened his security council with such regularity, but few of his modern-day predecessors have faced such a daunting security crisis.
Calderón is betting his presidency on a surge of Mexican troops -- one of the country's largest deployments of the military in a crime-fighting role -- to wage street-by-street battles with drug cartels that are blamed for more than 3,000 execution-style killings in the past year and a half. Sending more than 20,000 federal troops and police officers to nine Mexican states has made Calderón extremely popular; his latest approval ratings hit 65 percent.
But as the campaign drags into its eighth month and the death toll mounts, Calderón is facing a growing cadre of critics, including the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights representative in Mexico, who opposes the use of the military in policing. Calderón is also contending with foes in Mexico's Congress who want to strip him of the authority to dispatch troops without congressional approval. The Washington Office on Latin America, a human rights organization, has faulted him as quick to use the military but slow to reform Mexico's corrupt police.
All this is familiar territory for Calderón, a former congressman and energy secretary who appears comfortable in the role of political scrapper.
Pundits predicted he would struggle in office after collecting barely more than a third of the vote in last July's election and being forced into a two-month legal battle -- twice as long as the Bush-Gore electoral crisis in 2000 -- before being declared president by Mexico's Supreme Electoral Tribunal.
But Calderón has not only pounced on the drug violence. He also has pushed through a controversial reform of Mexico's corrupt and antiquated pension system, and he is gaining momentum for a massive fiscal initiative aimed at reducing the country's dependence on oil revenue.
"This seems to be his political destiny," wrote Ramón Alberto Garza, editor of the weekly Indigo. "To sail with the wind against him, a storm on the horizon, with a mutinous crew but to finish the journey safe in port."
Calderón inherited Mexico's drug problem, which was beginning to rival in scope and savagery the 1980s drug wars in Colombia. Drug lords, who make their riches trafficking in cocaine, but also methamphetamines and marijuana, were beheading rivals and killing police officers, municipal officials and journalists who got in their way. Some municipal governments and police forces were so infiltrated by organized crime that they essentially ceased to function as public service entities and became virtual arms of the cartels.
A War Over 'Plaza'
As far back as mid-July 2006, with the election outcome still in doubt, Calderón began laying the groundwork for the military campaign, Mexico's attorney general, Eduardo Medina Mora, said in an interview. With corruption raging throughout local governments and only 27,000 federal police officers available, Medina Mora said, the military seemed to be the only viable option.
"The size of the problem was large enough to understand that using the full federal deployment of police was not enough," Medina Mora said as a Beethoven piano sonata played in the background at his high-rise headquarters in Mexico City.
By the time Calderón took office in December, Mexico's two most powerful drug organizations -- the Sinaloa and Gulf cartels -- were deep into a war over "plaza," as Mexicans call drug territory. Carnage led the news almost every night. It was then that Calderón, a careful, wonkish public speaker not known for soaring rhetoric, started hitting verbal home runs.
"My hand won't tremble" in acting firmly to stop the crime that is holding Mexicans hostage, Calderón said repeatedly.
On Dec. 11, 10 days after taking office, Calderón launched the first of six military operations, sending more than 6,000 federal troops and police officers to his home state of Michoacan. The next day, a cousin of first lady Margarita Zavala was found murdered in the trunk of a car outside Mexico City -- a killing that some suspect was retribution by drug gangs. Undaunted, Calderón sent a force of 3,000 to Tijuana three weeks later.
The day after the Tijuana raid became a signal moment in Calderón's drug war. He donned a khaki hat and military uniform to review his troops in the city of Apatzingan, purportedly the first time in a century that a Mexican president had dressed in military attire. Columnists fretted that he would turn Mexico into a military state. Others mocked the hang of a baggy uniform on the diminutive, unathletic Calderón.
"He looked pathetic," Sen. Graco Ramírez -- a Calderón nemesis who is the son, grandson and brother of Mexican army generals -- sniffed during a recent interview at Mexico's legislative palace.
Ramírez is more than a fashion critic; he and other members of the Democratic Revolutionary Party are among the leaders of a push to declare the use of the military in drug raids unconstitutional. Medina Mora counters that under the Mexican constitution, the armed forces "have not only the power but the duty to preserve internal order."
Calderón dismissed the criticisms. In February, he announced a 45 percent pay increase for the army, a move that contrasted neatly with a decision to lower his own salary by 10 percent and abolish pensions for Mexican presidents.
Admirers in the U.S.
In the six months since he first appeared in a military uniform, Calderón has sent thousands of troops to the infamous drug zones of Sinaloa, Durango and Chihuahua, known as the Golden Triangle, and to Acapulco, Veracruz and the states of Tamaulipas and Nuevo Leon, home to Mexico's industrial capital, Monterrey. The soldiers operate roadblocks, cordon off urban areas for house-to-house searches and often engage heavily armed drug dealers in gun battles.
The troops have arrested more than 580 people, according to the government, though only one would qualify as a major figure. Since the military campaign began, 19 troops and 168 police officers have been killed; more than 1,080 civilian deaths have been recorded, though most of those were the result of infighting among cartels.
Analysts say it is too soon to tell whether the military operations will have a long-term effect. Execution-style killings have decreased somewhat in recent weeks, but some news reports attribute that to what they call a truce between warring cartels; Medina Mora credits the military and said there was no evidence of such a truce.
None of the deaths has resonated like five that occurred mistakenly June 2, when soldiers shot two unarmed women and three children at a roadblock in the northern state of Sonora. The killings set off fierce criticism in Mexico, but Calderón has kept to his military strategy.
The approach has won admirers in the United States, where law enforcement agencies have long pushed for Mexico to confront drug cartels more aggressively.
That positive reception comes at a potentially critical moment in U.S.-Mexico talks to dramatically increase American aid.
News accounts originally compared the Mexican initiative to the multibillion-dollar Plan Colombia, an extensive aid package designed to eradicate coca and erode support for Marxist rebels. Mexican diplomats scrambled to note that their proposal differed in one key way: It does not contemplate a U.S. military presence similar to the one in Colombia. Any hint that U.S. troops would operate in Mexico is wildly inflammatory here; people still bear historical wounds from the Mexican-American War of 1846-48.
María Eugenia Campos Galván, chairwoman of the Foreign Relations Committee in the lower house of Mexico's Congress, said in an interview that Mexican authorities have considered asking for as much as $1 billion. U.S. Rep. Silvestre Reyes (D-Tex.), chairman of the House intelligence committee, is pushing for a major commitment of U.S. dollars.
"If we're smart, it'll be very high," Reyes said in an interview.
Mexican authorities say they've demonstrated cooperation by sharply increasing extraditions -- already in 2007 breaking Mexico's annual record with 63 extraditions in the first six months of the year. They are hoping the United States will reciprocate by paying for additional training and equipment, including technology that would allow for instant transfer of information between law enforcement officials on each side of the border. Calderón, in particular, is suggesting that the United States has an obligation to help with Mexico's law enforcement costs because of the extent of Americans' illegal drug use.
The talks have been complicated by sensitivities in the United States related to Mexico as Capitol Hill lawmakers were debating immigration proposals.
"When there was a school shooting over in Russia, I got e-mails saying, 'That's why we need a wall on the Mexican border,' " Reyes said. "Regardless of what we do, there are going to be those who try to politicize it."
Mexican authorities are well aware that political tensions could delay or scuttle proposals for more U.S. aid. For now, they are preparing for months, maybe years, of military battles with drug leaders without more help from the United States and for long Monday mornings in the presidential library.
Use of Mexican Military Increasingly Criticized
By Manuel Roig-Franzia
Washington Post Foreign Service
Sunday, July 8, 2007; A15
MEXICO CITY -- Every Monday morning, President Felipe Calderón settles in at the head of the table in the presidential library at Los Pinos, Mexico's fortresslike chief executive's compound.
Calderón presides over strategy sessions with the leaders of Mexico's army and navy, key players in the centerpiece initiative of his seven-month-old presidency: a military assault against drug cartels. No Mexican president in recent history has convened his security council with such regularity, but few of his modern-day predecessors have faced such a daunting security crisis.
Calderón is betting his presidency on a surge of Mexican troops -- one of the country's largest deployments of the military in a crime-fighting role -- to wage street-by-street battles with drug cartels that are blamed for more than 3,000 execution-style killings in the past year and a half. Sending more than 20,000 federal troops and police officers to nine Mexican states has made Calderón extremely popular; his latest approval ratings hit 65 percent.
But as the campaign drags into its eighth month and the death toll mounts, Calderón is facing a growing cadre of critics, including the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights representative in Mexico, who opposes the use of the military in policing. Calderón is also contending with foes in Mexico's Congress who want to strip him of the authority to dispatch troops without congressional approval. The Washington Office on Latin America, a human rights organization, has faulted him as quick to use the military but slow to reform Mexico's corrupt police.
All this is familiar territory for Calderón, a former congressman and energy secretary who appears comfortable in the role of political scrapper.
Pundits predicted he would struggle in office after collecting barely more than a third of the vote in last July's election and being forced into a two-month legal battle -- twice as long as the Bush-Gore electoral crisis in 2000 -- before being declared president by Mexico's Supreme Electoral Tribunal.
But Calderón has not only pounced on the drug violence. He also has pushed through a controversial reform of Mexico's corrupt and antiquated pension system, and he is gaining momentum for a massive fiscal initiative aimed at reducing the country's dependence on oil revenue.
"This seems to be his political destiny," wrote Ramón Alberto Garza, editor of the weekly Indigo. "To sail with the wind against him, a storm on the horizon, with a mutinous crew but to finish the journey safe in port."
Calderón inherited Mexico's drug problem, which was beginning to rival in scope and savagery the 1980s drug wars in Colombia. Drug lords, who make their riches trafficking in cocaine, but also methamphetamines and marijuana, were beheading rivals and killing police officers, municipal officials and journalists who got in their way. Some municipal governments and police forces were so infiltrated by organized crime that they essentially ceased to function as public service entities and became virtual arms of the cartels.
A War Over 'Plaza'
As far back as mid-July 2006, with the election outcome still in doubt, Calderón began laying the groundwork for the military campaign, Mexico's attorney general, Eduardo Medina Mora, said in an interview. With corruption raging throughout local governments and only 27,000 federal police officers available, Medina Mora said, the military seemed to be the only viable option.
"The size of the problem was large enough to understand that using the full federal deployment of police was not enough," Medina Mora said as a Beethoven piano sonata played in the background at his high-rise headquarters in Mexico City.
By the time Calderón took office in December, Mexico's two most powerful drug organizations -- the Sinaloa and Gulf cartels -- were deep into a war over "plaza," as Mexicans call drug territory. Carnage led the news almost every night. It was then that Calderón, a careful, wonkish public speaker not known for soaring rhetoric, started hitting verbal home runs.
"My hand won't tremble" in acting firmly to stop the crime that is holding Mexicans hostage, Calderón said repeatedly.
On Dec. 11, 10 days after taking office, Calderón launched the first of six military operations, sending more than 6,000 federal troops and police officers to his home state of Michoacan. The next day, a cousin of first lady Margarita Zavala was found murdered in the trunk of a car outside Mexico City -- a killing that some suspect was retribution by drug gangs. Undaunted, Calderón sent a force of 3,000 to Tijuana three weeks later.
The day after the Tijuana raid became a signal moment in Calderón's drug war. He donned a khaki hat and military uniform to review his troops in the city of Apatzingan, purportedly the first time in a century that a Mexican president had dressed in military attire. Columnists fretted that he would turn Mexico into a military state. Others mocked the hang of a baggy uniform on the diminutive, unathletic Calderón.
"He looked pathetic," Sen. Graco Ramírez -- a Calderón nemesis who is the son, grandson and brother of Mexican army generals -- sniffed during a recent interview at Mexico's legislative palace.
Ramírez is more than a fashion critic; he and other members of the Democratic Revolutionary Party are among the leaders of a push to declare the use of the military in drug raids unconstitutional. Medina Mora counters that under the Mexican constitution, the armed forces "have not only the power but the duty to preserve internal order."
Calderón dismissed the criticisms. In February, he announced a 45 percent pay increase for the army, a move that contrasted neatly with a decision to lower his own salary by 10 percent and abolish pensions for Mexican presidents.
Admirers in the U.S.
In the six months since he first appeared in a military uniform, Calderón has sent thousands of troops to the infamous drug zones of Sinaloa, Durango and Chihuahua, known as the Golden Triangle, and to Acapulco, Veracruz and the states of Tamaulipas and Nuevo Leon, home to Mexico's industrial capital, Monterrey. The soldiers operate roadblocks, cordon off urban areas for house-to-house searches and often engage heavily armed drug dealers in gun battles.
The troops have arrested more than 580 people, according to the government, though only one would qualify as a major figure. Since the military campaign began, 19 troops and 168 police officers have been killed; more than 1,080 civilian deaths have been recorded, though most of those were the result of infighting among cartels.
Analysts say it is too soon to tell whether the military operations will have a long-term effect. Execution-style killings have decreased somewhat in recent weeks, but some news reports attribute that to what they call a truce between warring cartels; Medina Mora credits the military and said there was no evidence of such a truce.
None of the deaths has resonated like five that occurred mistakenly June 2, when soldiers shot two unarmed women and three children at a roadblock in the northern state of Sonora. The killings set off fierce criticism in Mexico, but Calderón has kept to his military strategy.
The approach has won admirers in the United States, where law enforcement agencies have long pushed for Mexico to confront drug cartels more aggressively.
That positive reception comes at a potentially critical moment in U.S.-Mexico talks to dramatically increase American aid.
News accounts originally compared the Mexican initiative to the multibillion-dollar Plan Colombia, an extensive aid package designed to eradicate coca and erode support for Marxist rebels. Mexican diplomats scrambled to note that their proposal differed in one key way: It does not contemplate a U.S. military presence similar to the one in Colombia. Any hint that U.S. troops would operate in Mexico is wildly inflammatory here; people still bear historical wounds from the Mexican-American War of 1846-48.
María Eugenia Campos Galván, chairwoman of the Foreign Relations Committee in the lower house of Mexico's Congress, said in an interview that Mexican authorities have considered asking for as much as $1 billion. U.S. Rep. Silvestre Reyes (D-Tex.), chairman of the House intelligence committee, is pushing for a major commitment of U.S. dollars.
"If we're smart, it'll be very high," Reyes said in an interview.
Mexican authorities say they've demonstrated cooperation by sharply increasing extraditions -- already in 2007 breaking Mexico's annual record with 63 extraditions in the first six months of the year. They are hoping the United States will reciprocate by paying for additional training and equipment, including technology that would allow for instant transfer of information between law enforcement officials on each side of the border. Calderón, in particular, is suggesting that the United States has an obligation to help with Mexico's law enforcement costs because of the extent of Americans' illegal drug use.
The talks have been complicated by sensitivities in the United States related to Mexico as Capitol Hill lawmakers were debating immigration proposals.
"When there was a school shooting over in Russia, I got e-mails saying, 'That's why we need a wall on the Mexican border,' " Reyes said. "Regardless of what we do, there are going to be those who try to politicize it."
Mexican authorities are well aware that political tensions could delay or scuttle proposals for more U.S. aid. For now, they are preparing for months, maybe years, of military battles with drug leaders without more help from the United States and for long Monday mornings in the presidential library.
Thursday, September 06, 2007
Administration Shaving Yardstick for Iraq Gains
Goals Unmet; Smaller Strides to Be Promoted
By Karen DeYoung and Thomas E. Ricks
Washington Post Staff Writers
Sunday, July 8, 2007; A01
The Iraqi government is unlikely to meet any of the political and security goals or timelines President Bush set for it in January when he announced a major shift in U.S. policy, according to senior administration officials closely involved in the matter. As they prepare an interim report due next week, officials are marshaling alternative evidence of progress to persuade Congress to continue supporting the war.
In a preview of the assessment it must deliver to Congress in September, the administration will report that Sunni tribal leaders in Anbar province are turning against the group al-Qaeda in Iraq in growing numbers; that sectarian killings were down in June; and that Iraqi political leaders managed last month to agree on a unified response to the bombing of a major religious shrine, officials said.
Those achievements are markedly different from the benchmarks Bush set when he announced his decision to send tens of thousands of additional troops to Iraq. More troops, Bush said, would enable the Iraqis to proceed with provincial elections this year and pass a raft of power-sharing legislation. In addition, he said, the government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki planned to "take responsibility for security in all of Iraq's provinces by November."
Congress expanded on Bush's benchmarks, writing 18 goals into law as part of the war-funding measure it passed in the spring.
In addition to the elections, legislation and security measures Bush outlined in January, Congress added demands that the Iraqi government complete a revision of its constitution and pass a law on de-Baathification and additional laws on militia disarmament, regional boundaries and other issues.
Lawmakers asked for an interim report in July and set a Sept. 15 deadline for a comprehensive assessment by Gen. David H. Petraeus, the top U.S. commander in Iraq, and Ryan C. Crocker, the U.S. ambassador. Now, as U.S. combat deaths have escalated, violence has spread far beyond Baghdad, and sectarian political divides have deepened, the administration must persuade lawmakers to use more flexible, less ambitious standards.
But anything short of progress on the original benchmarks is unlikely to appease the growing ranks of disaffected Republican lawmakers who are urging Bush to develop a new strategy. Although Republicans held the line this year against Democratic efforts to set a timeline for withdrawing troops, several influential GOP senators have broken with Bush in recent days, charging that his plan is failing and calling for troop redeployments starting as early as the spring.
According to several senior officials who agreed to discuss the situation in Iraq only on the condition of anonymity, the political goals that seemed achievable earlier this year remain hostage to the security situation. If the extreme violence were to decline, Iraq's political paralysis might eventually subside. "If they are arguing, accusing, gridlocking," one official said, "none of that would mean the country is falling apart if it was against the backdrop of a stabilizing security situation."
From a military perspective, however, the political stalemate is hampering security. "The security progress we're making is real," said a senior military intelligence official in Baghdad. "But it's only in part of the country, and there's not enough political progress to get us over the line in September."
In their September report, sources said, Petraeus and Crocker intend to emphasize how security and politics are intertwined, and how progress in either will be incremental. In that context, the administration will offer new measures of progress to justify continuing the war effort.
"There are things going on that we never could have foreseen," said one official, who noted that the original benchmarks set by Bush six months ago -- and endorsed by the Maliki government -- are not only unachievable in the short term but also irrelevant to changing the conditions in Iraq.
As they work to put together the reports due to Congress next week and in September, these officials and others close to Iraq policy recognize that the administration is boxed in by measurements that were enshrined in U.S. law in May.
"That is a problem," the official said. "These are congressionally mandated benchmarks now." They require Bush to certify movement in areas ranging from the passage of specific legislation by the Iraqi parliament to the numbers of Iraqi military units able to operate independently. If he cannot make a convincing case, the legislation requires the president to explain how he will change his strategy.
Top administration officials are aware that the strategy's stated goal -- using U.S. forces to create breathing space for Iraqi political reconciliation -- will not be met by September, said one person fresh from a White House meeting. But though some, including Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, have indicated flexibility toward other options, including early troop redeployments, Bush has made no decisions on a possible new course.
"The heart of darkness is the president," the person said. "Nobody knows what he thinks, even the people who work for him."
Mixed Security Results
Military commanders say that their offensive is improving security in Baghdad. "Everything takes time, and everything takes longer than you think it's going to take," Maj. Gen. Rick Lynch, commander of the Army's 3rd Infantry Division, which is fighting south of Baghdad, said Friday. He added: "There is indeed room for optimism. I see progress, but there needs to be more."
Yet the month of May, which came before the Phantom Thunder offensive began, was the most violent in Iraq since November 2004, when U.S. and Iraqi forces fought a fierce battle to retake Fallujah. That intensity promises to continue through the summer. "I see these aggressive offensive operations . . . taking us through July, August and into September," Lynch said.
Not even the most optimistic commanders contend that the offensive is allowing for political reconciliation. At best, Petraeus is likely to report in September, security will have improved in the capital, perhaps returning to the level of 2005, when the city was violent but not racked by low-level civil war.
More significant is whether that slight improvement in security can be built upon. Regardless of what decisions are made in Washington and Baghdad, the U.S. military cannot sustain the current force levels beyond March 2008 because of force rotations. Long-term holding of cleared areas will fall to Iraqi soldiers and police officers.
Because of corruption and mixed loyalties, a Pentagon official said about the Iraqi police, "half of them are part of the problem, not the solution." The portrait officials paint of the Iraqi military is somewhat brighter. "These guys have now been through some pretty hard combat," said a senior administration official. "They're in the fight, not running from it.
"But can they do it without us there? Almost certainly not," the official said.
Even if U.S. troops and their Iraqi allies are able to hold Baghdad and the surrounding provinces, noted the intelligence official, there is a good chance that security will deteriorate elsewhere because there are not enough U.S. troops to spread around. As U.S. troop numbers decrease, he said, it is possible that by sometime next year "we control the middle, the Kurds control the north, and the Iranians control the south."
A Hurdle to Progress
Last month, Iraq's largest Sunni political grouping announced that its four cabinet ministers were boycotting the government and that it was withdrawing its 44 members from parliament. The immediate cause was the arrest of a Sunni minister on murder charges and a vote by the Shiite-dominated legislature to fire the Sunni Arab speaker.
The withdrawal poses a serious problem for short-term U.S. goals. A new law to distribute oil revenue among Iraq's sectarian groups -- seen by U.S. officials as the best hope for a legislative achievement before September -- reached parliament last week after months of delay. Although the Shiite and Kurdish blocs could pass it, the absence of the Sunnis would make any victory meaningless.
U.S. officials despair of any timely progress on the oil law. "I suppose they'll pass it when they damn well want to," one official said.
Plans to hold provincial elections, envisioned to provide more power to Sunnis who boycotted a 2005 vote, have grown more complicated. As Anbar tribal chieftains have emerged to help fight al-Qaeda, they have also demanded more political power from traditional Sunni leaders. In southern Shiite areas, Maliki's Dawa organization continues to vie with the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council, the largest bloc in the Shiite alliance that dominates Iraq's parliament, while both fear the rising power of forces controlled by radical Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr.
"In mixed areas such as Baghdad," a U.S. official said, "the Sunnis are worried that the Shiites will just clean up again even if [Sunnis] participate this time, because so many Sunnis" have fled sectarian violence in the capital.
Late last year, amid strong doubts about Maliki's leadership capabilities, senior White House officials considered trying to engineer the Iraqi president's replacement. But most have now concluded that there are no viable alternatives and that any attempt to force a change would only worsen matters.
Instead, U.S. officials in Baghdad are engaged in a complicated hand-holding exercise with Iraqi leaders, and are striving for small gains rather than major advancement. The main example of success they cite is agreement reached by the top Shiite, Sunni and Kurd officials in the government to appeal for calm after last month's bombing of the Shiite shrine in Samarra.
Officials are encouraged by the growing numbers of local Sunni officials and tribal leaders in Anbar striving to wrest political and security control from al Qaeda in Iraq. Bush has also highlighted the importance of such local efforts. "This is where political reconciliation matters most," he said in a speech last month, "because it is where ordinary Iraqis are deciding whether to support new Iraq."
But officials caution that this transformation is no substitute for a national Iraqi identity, with unified leadership in Baghdad. Maliki's Shiite-dominated government must continue to reach out to Anbar "and give these emerging tribal forces status, adopting them," a U.S. official said.
"Trying to do the local initiative stuff and having that be the whole story does not advance the process," he said.
Warnings on Withdrawal
Facing increased public disapproval and eroding Republican support, Bush has stepped up his warnings that a sudden U.S. withdrawal would allow al-Qaeda or Iran -- or both -- to take over Iraq. What is more likely, several officials said, is a deeper split between competing Shiite groups supported in varying degrees by Iran, and greater involvement by neighboring Arab states in Sunni areas battling al-Qaeda in Iraq. The Kurdish region, officials said, would become further estranged from the rest of Iraq, and its tensions with Turkey would increase.
"I can't say that al-Qaeda is going to take over, or that Iran is going to take over," an official said. "I don't think either are true. But I do think that a lot of very, very bad things would happen." If the administration decided to have troops retreat to bases inside Iraq and not intervene in sectarian warfare, he said, the U.S. military could find itself in a position that "would make the Dutch at Srebrenica look like heroes."
For its part, the military has calculated that a veto-proof congressional majority is unlikely to demand a full, immediate withdrawal. But however long the troops remain, and in whatever number, the military intelligence official said, they see a clear mission ahead. "We're going to get it as stable as we can, with the troops we have, and in the time available. And then, we'll back out as carefully as we can," the official said.
Correction to This Article
The print edition of this article incorrectly referred to Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki as president. This version has been corrected.
Goals Unmet; Smaller Strides to Be Promoted
By Karen DeYoung and Thomas E. Ricks
Washington Post Staff Writers
Sunday, July 8, 2007; A01
The Iraqi government is unlikely to meet any of the political and security goals or timelines President Bush set for it in January when he announced a major shift in U.S. policy, according to senior administration officials closely involved in the matter. As they prepare an interim report due next week, officials are marshaling alternative evidence of progress to persuade Congress to continue supporting the war.
In a preview of the assessment it must deliver to Congress in September, the administration will report that Sunni tribal leaders in Anbar province are turning against the group al-Qaeda in Iraq in growing numbers; that sectarian killings were down in June; and that Iraqi political leaders managed last month to agree on a unified response to the bombing of a major religious shrine, officials said.
Those achievements are markedly different from the benchmarks Bush set when he announced his decision to send tens of thousands of additional troops to Iraq. More troops, Bush said, would enable the Iraqis to proceed with provincial elections this year and pass a raft of power-sharing legislation. In addition, he said, the government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki planned to "take responsibility for security in all of Iraq's provinces by November."
Congress expanded on Bush's benchmarks, writing 18 goals into law as part of the war-funding measure it passed in the spring.
In addition to the elections, legislation and security measures Bush outlined in January, Congress added demands that the Iraqi government complete a revision of its constitution and pass a law on de-Baathification and additional laws on militia disarmament, regional boundaries and other issues.
Lawmakers asked for an interim report in July and set a Sept. 15 deadline for a comprehensive assessment by Gen. David H. Petraeus, the top U.S. commander in Iraq, and Ryan C. Crocker, the U.S. ambassador. Now, as U.S. combat deaths have escalated, violence has spread far beyond Baghdad, and sectarian political divides have deepened, the administration must persuade lawmakers to use more flexible, less ambitious standards.
But anything short of progress on the original benchmarks is unlikely to appease the growing ranks of disaffected Republican lawmakers who are urging Bush to develop a new strategy. Although Republicans held the line this year against Democratic efforts to set a timeline for withdrawing troops, several influential GOP senators have broken with Bush in recent days, charging that his plan is failing and calling for troop redeployments starting as early as the spring.
According to several senior officials who agreed to discuss the situation in Iraq only on the condition of anonymity, the political goals that seemed achievable earlier this year remain hostage to the security situation. If the extreme violence were to decline, Iraq's political paralysis might eventually subside. "If they are arguing, accusing, gridlocking," one official said, "none of that would mean the country is falling apart if it was against the backdrop of a stabilizing security situation."
From a military perspective, however, the political stalemate is hampering security. "The security progress we're making is real," said a senior military intelligence official in Baghdad. "But it's only in part of the country, and there's not enough political progress to get us over the line in September."
In their September report, sources said, Petraeus and Crocker intend to emphasize how security and politics are intertwined, and how progress in either will be incremental. In that context, the administration will offer new measures of progress to justify continuing the war effort.
"There are things going on that we never could have foreseen," said one official, who noted that the original benchmarks set by Bush six months ago -- and endorsed by the Maliki government -- are not only unachievable in the short term but also irrelevant to changing the conditions in Iraq.
As they work to put together the reports due to Congress next week and in September, these officials and others close to Iraq policy recognize that the administration is boxed in by measurements that were enshrined in U.S. law in May.
"That is a problem," the official said. "These are congressionally mandated benchmarks now." They require Bush to certify movement in areas ranging from the passage of specific legislation by the Iraqi parliament to the numbers of Iraqi military units able to operate independently. If he cannot make a convincing case, the legislation requires the president to explain how he will change his strategy.
Top administration officials are aware that the strategy's stated goal -- using U.S. forces to create breathing space for Iraqi political reconciliation -- will not be met by September, said one person fresh from a White House meeting. But though some, including Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, have indicated flexibility toward other options, including early troop redeployments, Bush has made no decisions on a possible new course.
"The heart of darkness is the president," the person said. "Nobody knows what he thinks, even the people who work for him."
Mixed Security Results
Military commanders say that their offensive is improving security in Baghdad. "Everything takes time, and everything takes longer than you think it's going to take," Maj. Gen. Rick Lynch, commander of the Army's 3rd Infantry Division, which is fighting south of Baghdad, said Friday. He added: "There is indeed room for optimism. I see progress, but there needs to be more."
Yet the month of May, which came before the Phantom Thunder offensive began, was the most violent in Iraq since November 2004, when U.S. and Iraqi forces fought a fierce battle to retake Fallujah. That intensity promises to continue through the summer. "I see these aggressive offensive operations . . . taking us through July, August and into September," Lynch said.
Not even the most optimistic commanders contend that the offensive is allowing for political reconciliation. At best, Petraeus is likely to report in September, security will have improved in the capital, perhaps returning to the level of 2005, when the city was violent but not racked by low-level civil war.
More significant is whether that slight improvement in security can be built upon. Regardless of what decisions are made in Washington and Baghdad, the U.S. military cannot sustain the current force levels beyond March 2008 because of force rotations. Long-term holding of cleared areas will fall to Iraqi soldiers and police officers.
Because of corruption and mixed loyalties, a Pentagon official said about the Iraqi police, "half of them are part of the problem, not the solution." The portrait officials paint of the Iraqi military is somewhat brighter. "These guys have now been through some pretty hard combat," said a senior administration official. "They're in the fight, not running from it.
"But can they do it without us there? Almost certainly not," the official said.
Even if U.S. troops and their Iraqi allies are able to hold Baghdad and the surrounding provinces, noted the intelligence official, there is a good chance that security will deteriorate elsewhere because there are not enough U.S. troops to spread around. As U.S. troop numbers decrease, he said, it is possible that by sometime next year "we control the middle, the Kurds control the north, and the Iranians control the south."
A Hurdle to Progress
Last month, Iraq's largest Sunni political grouping announced that its four cabinet ministers were boycotting the government and that it was withdrawing its 44 members from parliament. The immediate cause was the arrest of a Sunni minister on murder charges and a vote by the Shiite-dominated legislature to fire the Sunni Arab speaker.
The withdrawal poses a serious problem for short-term U.S. goals. A new law to distribute oil revenue among Iraq's sectarian groups -- seen by U.S. officials as the best hope for a legislative achievement before September -- reached parliament last week after months of delay. Although the Shiite and Kurdish blocs could pass it, the absence of the Sunnis would make any victory meaningless.
U.S. officials despair of any timely progress on the oil law. "I suppose they'll pass it when they damn well want to," one official said.
Plans to hold provincial elections, envisioned to provide more power to Sunnis who boycotted a 2005 vote, have grown more complicated. As Anbar tribal chieftains have emerged to help fight al-Qaeda, they have also demanded more political power from traditional Sunni leaders. In southern Shiite areas, Maliki's Dawa organization continues to vie with the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council, the largest bloc in the Shiite alliance that dominates Iraq's parliament, while both fear the rising power of forces controlled by radical Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr.
"In mixed areas such as Baghdad," a U.S. official said, "the Sunnis are worried that the Shiites will just clean up again even if [Sunnis] participate this time, because so many Sunnis" have fled sectarian violence in the capital.
Late last year, amid strong doubts about Maliki's leadership capabilities, senior White House officials considered trying to engineer the Iraqi president's replacement. But most have now concluded that there are no viable alternatives and that any attempt to force a change would only worsen matters.
Instead, U.S. officials in Baghdad are engaged in a complicated hand-holding exercise with Iraqi leaders, and are striving for small gains rather than major advancement. The main example of success they cite is agreement reached by the top Shiite, Sunni and Kurd officials in the government to appeal for calm after last month's bombing of the Shiite shrine in Samarra.
Officials are encouraged by the growing numbers of local Sunni officials and tribal leaders in Anbar striving to wrest political and security control from al Qaeda in Iraq. Bush has also highlighted the importance of such local efforts. "This is where political reconciliation matters most," he said in a speech last month, "because it is where ordinary Iraqis are deciding whether to support new Iraq."
But officials caution that this transformation is no substitute for a national Iraqi identity, with unified leadership in Baghdad. Maliki's Shiite-dominated government must continue to reach out to Anbar "and give these emerging tribal forces status, adopting them," a U.S. official said.
"Trying to do the local initiative stuff and having that be the whole story does not advance the process," he said.
Warnings on Withdrawal
Facing increased public disapproval and eroding Republican support, Bush has stepped up his warnings that a sudden U.S. withdrawal would allow al-Qaeda or Iran -- or both -- to take over Iraq. What is more likely, several officials said, is a deeper split between competing Shiite groups supported in varying degrees by Iran, and greater involvement by neighboring Arab states in Sunni areas battling al-Qaeda in Iraq. The Kurdish region, officials said, would become further estranged from the rest of Iraq, and its tensions with Turkey would increase.
"I can't say that al-Qaeda is going to take over, or that Iran is going to take over," an official said. "I don't think either are true. But I do think that a lot of very, very bad things would happen." If the administration decided to have troops retreat to bases inside Iraq and not intervene in sectarian warfare, he said, the U.S. military could find itself in a position that "would make the Dutch at Srebrenica look like heroes."
For its part, the military has calculated that a veto-proof congressional majority is unlikely to demand a full, immediate withdrawal. But however long the troops remain, and in whatever number, the military intelligence official said, they see a clear mission ahead. "We're going to get it as stable as we can, with the troops we have, and in the time available. And then, we'll back out as carefully as we can," the official said.
Correction to This Article
The print edition of this article incorrectly referred to Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki as president. This version has been corrected.
In Morocco's 'Chemist,' A Glimpse of Al-Qaeda
Bombmaker Typified Resilient Network
By Craig Whitlock
Washington Post Foreign Service
Saturday, July 7, 2007; A01
CASABLANCA, Morocco -- On March 6, Moroccan police surrounded a cybercafe here and arrested a fugitive who many people assumed had fled the country or was dead. Saad al-Houssaini, known as "the Chemist" because of his scientific training and bombmaking skills, had vanished four years earlier after he was accused of helping to organize the deadliest terrorist attack in Moroccan history.
It turned out that Houssaini hadn't gone anywhere. Since 2003, according to Moroccan police documents, he had remained underground in Casablanca as he rebuilt a terrorist operative network and recruited fighters to go to Iraq. He also spent time honing his bombmaking techniques, designing explosives belts that investigators believe were used in a string of suicide attacks this spring, including one that targeted the U.S. Consulate in this North African port city.
"The Chemist" provides a vivid example of how veteran members of al-Qaeda's central command have continued to plot major terrorist attacks around the world, particularly in Europe, North Africa and Iraq, despite the capture or deaths of many of the network's top operatives since Sept. 11, 2001.
His long underground career demonstrates the limits of stepped-up anti-terrorism cooperation between governments in the past five years -- Houssaini, now 38, eluded not just Moroccan authorities but intelligence agents from France, Spain and the United States who feared he was involved with sleeper cells in Europe.
British counterterrorism officials say most major terrorist plots in their country in recent years, including the July 7, 2005, public transit bombings in London, can be traced back to al-Qaeda operatives in Pakistan. Investigators suspect that a key sponsor in at least two cases was Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi, an al-Qaeda military commander in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iraq who was captured in December in a CIA operation and is now imprisoned at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
British Prime Minister Gordon Brown has blamed last month's attempted car bombings in London and Glasgow on "people who are associated with al-Qaeda." Although officials have not revealed hard evidence of a connection to the network, British investigators are examining whether the plot had its roots in Iraq.
Security officials are focusing on the role played by Bilal Abdulla, a Sunni Iraqi who was charged Friday with conspiring to cause explosions. He and another man are alleged to have rammed a Jeep Cherokee into the Glasgow Airport terminal. Abdulla earned his medical degree in Baghdad in 2004 and was known for his radical views, as well as his strong verbal support of al-Qaeda operations in Iraq.
"We have seen how al-Qaeda has been able to survive a prolonged multinational assault on its structures, personnel and logistics," Peter Clarke, head of Scotland Yard's anti-terrorism branch, said in a recent speech. "It has certainly retained its ability to deliver centrally directed attacks here in the U.K. In case after case, the hand of core al-Qaeda can be clearly seen."
Morocco also continues to keep up its guard. On Friday, it raised its national security alert level to maximum, indicating that a serious terrorist attack was expected imminently, the Interior Ministry announced in a statement. The ministry cited "reliable intelligence information" but gave no details about a specific threat.
Houssaini, the Moroccan, abandoned his graduate studies in chemistry in Spain in the mid-1990s. He went to Afghanistan, where he trained in al-Qaeda camps and consulted with high-ranking members of the group, including deputy leader Ayman al-Zawahiri and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who would later become chief of the insurgent group al-Qaeda in Iraq, according to documents and interviews.
While there, he helped found an affiliated network known as the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group, which is blamed for the March 2004 train bombings in Madrid. As operational commander of the group, he was suspected of fashioning the bombs used in coordinated suicide attacks in Casablanca in May 2003 that killed 45 people.
Four years later, suicide bombers struck in Casablanca again, blowing themselves up on three separate occasions in March and April, including the attack on the U.S. Consulate. No bystanders were seriously injured in the attack on the consulate, but the diplomatic post remained closed for nearly two months because of security concerns.
At first, Moroccan authorities described the perpetrators as amateurs who lacked any international connections. But since then, investigators have concluded that the bombers intended to strike hotels, cruise ships and other tourist targets. Houssaini's arrest disrupted the plans and exposed the network, they say.
Police have arrested two other key figures in the network who had trained in al-Qaeda camps in Afghanistan. Abdelaziz Benzine, who police believe served as the brains of the network alongside Houssaini, was arrested March 11, hours before the first suicide bombing this spring.
Another collaborator, Abdelaziz Habbouch, was arrested May 28; police suspect him of playing a lead role in the May 2003 Casablanca bombings and helping to recruit fighters for al-Qaeda forces in Iraq.
"It's obvious that many of these people are linked directly to al-Qaeda," said Mohamed Darif, a Moroccan terrorism analyst and political science professor at Hassan II University in Mohammedia. "The police are discovering that these cells were much more advanced than they had thought. This is scary for them, and it should be."
Police said they seized more than 450 pounds of explosives, concocted primarily from ammonium nitrate and aluminum powder, a common al-Qaeda bombmaking recipe.
According to Moroccan police documents, Houssaini began teaching other members of the network, including Benzine and Habbouch, how to manufacture explosives and detonators using techniques he had learned in Afghanistan. He also recorded bombmaking instructions on a computer disk and tested the cells' makeshift explosives, records show.
Houssaini has been charged in Morocco with organizing a criminal enterprise and other terrorism-related activities. But he has not been formally accused of involvement in attacks that took place after his arrest, said his attorney, Tawfiq Mousaif. "The state so far hasn't presented any evidence at all pertaining to the charges," said Mousaif, who otherwise declined to comment on the allegations.
Years in Spain
Houssaini was born in Meknes, a north-central Moroccan city with about 500,000 residents. A professor's son, he studied chemistry in college and won a Moroccan government scholarship to attend graduate school at the University of Valencia in Spain.
The scholarship, however, paid only a few dollars a month in living expenses. Houssaini was forced to take frequent breaks from his studies and lab work to take odd jobs, said his academic adviser, Francisco F. Perez, a chemistry professor at the university.
"He was a hardworking individual," Perez said in a phone interview. "He would come for a month, then not show up for 10 days because he was selling carpets and junk at street markets, and when he got enough money to get by, he would come back."
When Houssaini arrived in Valencia in December 1992, he was not visibly religious and would occasionally join students or faculty for drinks, Perez recalled. The professor said he noticed a few changes toward the end of Houssaini's time in Spain, however: The student grew a beard and printed out so many religious poems and Koranic verses from a lab computer that he drew a reprimand.
"He was very interested in social justice," Perez said. "He said his country was governed by tyrants. . . . He never said anything bad about Western countries. Quite the opposite -- he envied our political regime here and said he wanted our political regime and democracy to be installed in Morocco."
Houssaini later told Moroccan police interrogators that he became radicalized in Spain after meeting a Tunisian friend who urged him to support Islamic fighters in Afghanistan. Details of the interrogation were first reported in Le Journal Hebdomadaire, a Moroccan news magazine.
"Our principal subjects of discussion were around the jihad," he said, according to a transcript of the interrogation. "He made me understand the importance of religion and faith, providing me with religious books and audiotapes of the great sheiks' speeches."
Houssaini left Valencia University at the end of 1995. He told his professors that he was going home to Morocco for the holy month of Ramadan but never returned. Colleagues said they were surprised because he was close to finishing his degree. In fact, a few months later, his primary research paper -- focusing on the anti-cancer properties of certain chemical compounds -- was accepted for publication by the International Journal of Chemical Kinetics.
But Houssaini hadn't left Valencia. In December 1996, he and two friends were arrested by Spanish police and charged with possessing false travel documents and manuals on how to manufacture explosives. He was released on bail.
A few weeks later, he fled Spain and made his way to Afghanistan.
After Afghanistan
Houssaini remained in Afghanistan for four years. In October 2001, after the U.S. military began its bombing campaign against the Taliban, he escaped the country in a Toyota truck with other Moroccan radicals, driving to Iran, according to his interrogation transcript.
After stops in Damascus, Syria, and Ankara, Turkey, he returned with his family to Casablanca in April 2002. He was questioned by police upon his arrival at the airport, but released without charge.
In addition to his efforts to establish domestic cells of bombers over the next few years, Houssaini gradually turned his attention to Iraq. By October 2006, he and other Moroccan radicals had created "many recruitment networks" to send would-be Moroccan suicide bombers and fighters to combat U.S.-led forces there, police documents allege.
The documents identify 18 Moroccans who had been recruited by Houssaini and his allies and who left for Iraq in early 2007. Investigators believe there were many more. Police said Houssaini's network was separate from other Moroccan recruiting pipelines that have sent scores of volunteer fighters to Iraq, including a major ring based in the northern city of Tetouan that was broken up last fall.
Moroccan police said Houssaini collaborated via the Internet with a Moroccan man based in Syria, known as Zeid, who would greet the volunteers in Damascus and arrange for their passage across the border into Iraq. Although few personal details were disclosed about the recruits, police documents show that Houssaini made a point of personally paying their families small sums of money.
Each family received between $100 and $150 last fall, as the volunteers were recruited during Ramadan, and an additional $175 at the end of December to mark the Muslim holiday of Eid al-Adha.
Then, in February, they received a final payment of $500 as the recruits departed for Iraq.
Bombmaker Typified Resilient Network
By Craig Whitlock
Washington Post Foreign Service
Saturday, July 7, 2007; A01
CASABLANCA, Morocco -- On March 6, Moroccan police surrounded a cybercafe here and arrested a fugitive who many people assumed had fled the country or was dead. Saad al-Houssaini, known as "the Chemist" because of his scientific training and bombmaking skills, had vanished four years earlier after he was accused of helping to organize the deadliest terrorist attack in Moroccan history.
It turned out that Houssaini hadn't gone anywhere. Since 2003, according to Moroccan police documents, he had remained underground in Casablanca as he rebuilt a terrorist operative network and recruited fighters to go to Iraq. He also spent time honing his bombmaking techniques, designing explosives belts that investigators believe were used in a string of suicide attacks this spring, including one that targeted the U.S. Consulate in this North African port city.
"The Chemist" provides a vivid example of how veteran members of al-Qaeda's central command have continued to plot major terrorist attacks around the world, particularly in Europe, North Africa and Iraq, despite the capture or deaths of many of the network's top operatives since Sept. 11, 2001.
His long underground career demonstrates the limits of stepped-up anti-terrorism cooperation between governments in the past five years -- Houssaini, now 38, eluded not just Moroccan authorities but intelligence agents from France, Spain and the United States who feared he was involved with sleeper cells in Europe.
British counterterrorism officials say most major terrorist plots in their country in recent years, including the July 7, 2005, public transit bombings in London, can be traced back to al-Qaeda operatives in Pakistan. Investigators suspect that a key sponsor in at least two cases was Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi, an al-Qaeda military commander in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iraq who was captured in December in a CIA operation and is now imprisoned at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
British Prime Minister Gordon Brown has blamed last month's attempted car bombings in London and Glasgow on "people who are associated with al-Qaeda." Although officials have not revealed hard evidence of a connection to the network, British investigators are examining whether the plot had its roots in Iraq.
Security officials are focusing on the role played by Bilal Abdulla, a Sunni Iraqi who was charged Friday with conspiring to cause explosions. He and another man are alleged to have rammed a Jeep Cherokee into the Glasgow Airport terminal. Abdulla earned his medical degree in Baghdad in 2004 and was known for his radical views, as well as his strong verbal support of al-Qaeda operations in Iraq.
"We have seen how al-Qaeda has been able to survive a prolonged multinational assault on its structures, personnel and logistics," Peter Clarke, head of Scotland Yard's anti-terrorism branch, said in a recent speech. "It has certainly retained its ability to deliver centrally directed attacks here in the U.K. In case after case, the hand of core al-Qaeda can be clearly seen."
Morocco also continues to keep up its guard. On Friday, it raised its national security alert level to maximum, indicating that a serious terrorist attack was expected imminently, the Interior Ministry announced in a statement. The ministry cited "reliable intelligence information" but gave no details about a specific threat.
Houssaini, the Moroccan, abandoned his graduate studies in chemistry in Spain in the mid-1990s. He went to Afghanistan, where he trained in al-Qaeda camps and consulted with high-ranking members of the group, including deputy leader Ayman al-Zawahiri and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who would later become chief of the insurgent group al-Qaeda in Iraq, according to documents and interviews.
While there, he helped found an affiliated network known as the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group, which is blamed for the March 2004 train bombings in Madrid. As operational commander of the group, he was suspected of fashioning the bombs used in coordinated suicide attacks in Casablanca in May 2003 that killed 45 people.
Four years later, suicide bombers struck in Casablanca again, blowing themselves up on three separate occasions in March and April, including the attack on the U.S. Consulate. No bystanders were seriously injured in the attack on the consulate, but the diplomatic post remained closed for nearly two months because of security concerns.
At first, Moroccan authorities described the perpetrators as amateurs who lacked any international connections. But since then, investigators have concluded that the bombers intended to strike hotels, cruise ships and other tourist targets. Houssaini's arrest disrupted the plans and exposed the network, they say.
Police have arrested two other key figures in the network who had trained in al-Qaeda camps in Afghanistan. Abdelaziz Benzine, who police believe served as the brains of the network alongside Houssaini, was arrested March 11, hours before the first suicide bombing this spring.
Another collaborator, Abdelaziz Habbouch, was arrested May 28; police suspect him of playing a lead role in the May 2003 Casablanca bombings and helping to recruit fighters for al-Qaeda forces in Iraq.
"It's obvious that many of these people are linked directly to al-Qaeda," said Mohamed Darif, a Moroccan terrorism analyst and political science professor at Hassan II University in Mohammedia. "The police are discovering that these cells were much more advanced than they had thought. This is scary for them, and it should be."
Police said they seized more than 450 pounds of explosives, concocted primarily from ammonium nitrate and aluminum powder, a common al-Qaeda bombmaking recipe.
According to Moroccan police documents, Houssaini began teaching other members of the network, including Benzine and Habbouch, how to manufacture explosives and detonators using techniques he had learned in Afghanistan. He also recorded bombmaking instructions on a computer disk and tested the cells' makeshift explosives, records show.
Houssaini has been charged in Morocco with organizing a criminal enterprise and other terrorism-related activities. But he has not been formally accused of involvement in attacks that took place after his arrest, said his attorney, Tawfiq Mousaif. "The state so far hasn't presented any evidence at all pertaining to the charges," said Mousaif, who otherwise declined to comment on the allegations.
Years in Spain
Houssaini was born in Meknes, a north-central Moroccan city with about 500,000 residents. A professor's son, he studied chemistry in college and won a Moroccan government scholarship to attend graduate school at the University of Valencia in Spain.
The scholarship, however, paid only a few dollars a month in living expenses. Houssaini was forced to take frequent breaks from his studies and lab work to take odd jobs, said his academic adviser, Francisco F. Perez, a chemistry professor at the university.
"He was a hardworking individual," Perez said in a phone interview. "He would come for a month, then not show up for 10 days because he was selling carpets and junk at street markets, and when he got enough money to get by, he would come back."
When Houssaini arrived in Valencia in December 1992, he was not visibly religious and would occasionally join students or faculty for drinks, Perez recalled. The professor said he noticed a few changes toward the end of Houssaini's time in Spain, however: The student grew a beard and printed out so many religious poems and Koranic verses from a lab computer that he drew a reprimand.
"He was very interested in social justice," Perez said. "He said his country was governed by tyrants. . . . He never said anything bad about Western countries. Quite the opposite -- he envied our political regime here and said he wanted our political regime and democracy to be installed in Morocco."
Houssaini later told Moroccan police interrogators that he became radicalized in Spain after meeting a Tunisian friend who urged him to support Islamic fighters in Afghanistan. Details of the interrogation were first reported in Le Journal Hebdomadaire, a Moroccan news magazine.
"Our principal subjects of discussion were around the jihad," he said, according to a transcript of the interrogation. "He made me understand the importance of religion and faith, providing me with religious books and audiotapes of the great sheiks' speeches."
Houssaini left Valencia University at the end of 1995. He told his professors that he was going home to Morocco for the holy month of Ramadan but never returned. Colleagues said they were surprised because he was close to finishing his degree. In fact, a few months later, his primary research paper -- focusing on the anti-cancer properties of certain chemical compounds -- was accepted for publication by the International Journal of Chemical Kinetics.
But Houssaini hadn't left Valencia. In December 1996, he and two friends were arrested by Spanish police and charged with possessing false travel documents and manuals on how to manufacture explosives. He was released on bail.
A few weeks later, he fled Spain and made his way to Afghanistan.
After Afghanistan
Houssaini remained in Afghanistan for four years. In October 2001, after the U.S. military began its bombing campaign against the Taliban, he escaped the country in a Toyota truck with other Moroccan radicals, driving to Iran, according to his interrogation transcript.
After stops in Damascus, Syria, and Ankara, Turkey, he returned with his family to Casablanca in April 2002. He was questioned by police upon his arrival at the airport, but released without charge.
In addition to his efforts to establish domestic cells of bombers over the next few years, Houssaini gradually turned his attention to Iraq. By October 2006, he and other Moroccan radicals had created "many recruitment networks" to send would-be Moroccan suicide bombers and fighters to combat U.S.-led forces there, police documents allege.
The documents identify 18 Moroccans who had been recruited by Houssaini and his allies and who left for Iraq in early 2007. Investigators believe there were many more. Police said Houssaini's network was separate from other Moroccan recruiting pipelines that have sent scores of volunteer fighters to Iraq, including a major ring based in the northern city of Tetouan that was broken up last fall.
Moroccan police said Houssaini collaborated via the Internet with a Moroccan man based in Syria, known as Zeid, who would greet the volunteers in Damascus and arrange for their passage across the border into Iraq. Although few personal details were disclosed about the recruits, police documents show that Houssaini made a point of personally paying their families small sums of money.
Each family received between $100 and $150 last fall, as the volunteers were recruited during Ramadan, and an additional $175 at the end of December to mark the Muslim holiday of Eid al-Adha.
Then, in February, they received a final payment of $500 as the recruits departed for Iraq.
Lawsuit Against Wiretaps Rejected
Case's Plaintiffs Have No Standing, Appeals Court Rules
By Amy Goldstein
Washington Post Staff Writer
Saturday, July 7, 2007; A01
A federal appeals court removed a serious legal challenge to the Bush administration's warrantless wiretapping program yesterday, overruling the only judge who held that a controversial surveillance effort by the National Security Agency was unconstitutional.
Two members of a three-judge panel of the Cincinnati-based U.S. Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit ordered the dismissal of a major lawsuit that challenged the wiretapping, which President Bush authorized secretly to eavesdrop on communications involving potential terrorists shortly after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks.
The court did not rule on the spying program's legality. Instead, it declared that the American Civil Liberties Union and the others who brought the case -- including academics, lawyers and journalists -- did not have the standing to sue because they could not demonstrate that they had been direct targets of the clandestine surveillance.
The decision vacates a ruling in the case made last August by a U.S. District Court judge in Detroit, who ruled that the administration's program to monitor private communications violated the Bill of Rights and a 1970s federal law.
Yesterday's action in the 6th Circuit means that the principal remaining legal challenge to the NSA surveillance program is a group of cases pending before a U.S. District Court judge and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit in California. The primary issue before that appeals court, differing somewhat from that in the Michigan case, is whether the administration may claim that a privilege covering state secrets precludes the litigation.
The eavesdropping program -- first revealed by news accounts in late 2005 and the subject of intense political wrangling since then -- is one aspect of a broad assertion of presidential power by Bush in the past six years to justify policies meant to deter terrorism here and abroad.
As first devised, the program allowed the NSA to intercept telephone calls and e-mail between the United States and overseas in which at least one party was suspected to be affiliated with al-Qaeda or related groups, without the court approval typically required for government wiretaps, administration officials said.
The program prompted vehement objections from privacy advocates and many Democrats, who contended that it was illegal because it bypassed a secret court, created under the 1978 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), to provide judicial oversight of clandestine surveillance within the United States.
In January, after Democrats gained control of Congress, the administration abruptly shifted its position. Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales announced that the surveillance program would be overseen by the FISA court. But administration officials have not described critical details of the new approach, including whether a separate warrant would be required for each instance of monitoring. Aides to Bush have asserted that the president retains the authority to conduct surveillance without court permission.
With the change in the program, the administration argued before the 6th Circuit that the case is moot. The two judges who made up the majority, both Republican appointees, did not address that issue. Judge Alice M. Batchelder, who wrote the 35-page main opinion, focused her lengthy analysis on why she concluded that the plaintiffs -- many of whom have professional ties with people and organizations suspected of terrorism -- do not have the legal standing to bring the lawsuit. She said the plaintiffs could not show that they had been injured directly by the surveillance.
Judge Ronald Lee Gilman, a Democratic appointee, disagreed. In a dissenting opinion, he concluded that the plaintiffs are entitled to sue because they felt a need to alter their communications after the program was disclosed. Gilman also wrote that the case is not moot because "the president maintains that he has the authority to 'opt out' of the FISA framework at any time." And he agreed with the lower-court judge that the program violates federal law.
Administration officials lauded the 6th Circuit's decision. Deputy White House press secretary Tony Fratto called the lower court's finding that the program was unconstitutional "wrongly decided." Fratto said the appellate court "properly determined that the plaintiffs had failed to show their claims were entitled to review in federal court."
Steven R. Shapiro, the ACLU's legal director, said: "As a result of today's decision, the Bush administration has been left free to violate the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, which Congress adopted almost 30 years ago to prevent the executive branch from engaging in precisely this kind of unchecked surveillance." He said the ACLU is examining its options, including the possibility of an appeal to the Supreme Court.
Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Patrick J. Leahy (D-Vt.) called the court decision "a disappointing one that was not made on the merits of the case, yet closes the courthouse door to resolving it." The panel has been conducting an investigation into the warrantless wiretapping program. Last month, it issued subpoenas to the administration, seeking documents related to the program's "authorization and legal justification."
The two lawsuits pending before the 9th Circuit include Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation, Inc. v. Bush, in which the plaintiffs, an Oregon branch of a Saudi charity that has been investigated for alleged terrorist ties and others, contend that they have a document proving they were a direct target of NSA surveillance. The other case, Hepting v. AT&T Corp., has been brought on behalf of a group of AT&T customers who allege that the company intercepted their phone calls and e-mails and disclosed them to the NSA.
The two cases are scheduled to be heard Aug. 15.
Case's Plaintiffs Have No Standing, Appeals Court Rules
By Amy Goldstein
Washington Post Staff Writer
Saturday, July 7, 2007; A01
A federal appeals court removed a serious legal challenge to the Bush administration's warrantless wiretapping program yesterday, overruling the only judge who held that a controversial surveillance effort by the National Security Agency was unconstitutional.
Two members of a three-judge panel of the Cincinnati-based U.S. Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit ordered the dismissal of a major lawsuit that challenged the wiretapping, which President Bush authorized secretly to eavesdrop on communications involving potential terrorists shortly after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks.
The court did not rule on the spying program's legality. Instead, it declared that the American Civil Liberties Union and the others who brought the case -- including academics, lawyers and journalists -- did not have the standing to sue because they could not demonstrate that they had been direct targets of the clandestine surveillance.
The decision vacates a ruling in the case made last August by a U.S. District Court judge in Detroit, who ruled that the administration's program to monitor private communications violated the Bill of Rights and a 1970s federal law.
Yesterday's action in the 6th Circuit means that the principal remaining legal challenge to the NSA surveillance program is a group of cases pending before a U.S. District Court judge and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit in California. The primary issue before that appeals court, differing somewhat from that in the Michigan case, is whether the administration may claim that a privilege covering state secrets precludes the litigation.
The eavesdropping program -- first revealed by news accounts in late 2005 and the subject of intense political wrangling since then -- is one aspect of a broad assertion of presidential power by Bush in the past six years to justify policies meant to deter terrorism here and abroad.
As first devised, the program allowed the NSA to intercept telephone calls and e-mail between the United States and overseas in which at least one party was suspected to be affiliated with al-Qaeda or related groups, without the court approval typically required for government wiretaps, administration officials said.
The program prompted vehement objections from privacy advocates and many Democrats, who contended that it was illegal because it bypassed a secret court, created under the 1978 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), to provide judicial oversight of clandestine surveillance within the United States.
In January, after Democrats gained control of Congress, the administration abruptly shifted its position. Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales announced that the surveillance program would be overseen by the FISA court. But administration officials have not described critical details of the new approach, including whether a separate warrant would be required for each instance of monitoring. Aides to Bush have asserted that the president retains the authority to conduct surveillance without court permission.
With the change in the program, the administration argued before the 6th Circuit that the case is moot. The two judges who made up the majority, both Republican appointees, did not address that issue. Judge Alice M. Batchelder, who wrote the 35-page main opinion, focused her lengthy analysis on why she concluded that the plaintiffs -- many of whom have professional ties with people and organizations suspected of terrorism -- do not have the legal standing to bring the lawsuit. She said the plaintiffs could not show that they had been injured directly by the surveillance.
Judge Ronald Lee Gilman, a Democratic appointee, disagreed. In a dissenting opinion, he concluded that the plaintiffs are entitled to sue because they felt a need to alter their communications after the program was disclosed. Gilman also wrote that the case is not moot because "the president maintains that he has the authority to 'opt out' of the FISA framework at any time." And he agreed with the lower-court judge that the program violates federal law.
Administration officials lauded the 6th Circuit's decision. Deputy White House press secretary Tony Fratto called the lower court's finding that the program was unconstitutional "wrongly decided." Fratto said the appellate court "properly determined that the plaintiffs had failed to show their claims were entitled to review in federal court."
Steven R. Shapiro, the ACLU's legal director, said: "As a result of today's decision, the Bush administration has been left free to violate the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, which Congress adopted almost 30 years ago to prevent the executive branch from engaging in precisely this kind of unchecked surveillance." He said the ACLU is examining its options, including the possibility of an appeal to the Supreme Court.
Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Patrick J. Leahy (D-Vt.) called the court decision "a disappointing one that was not made on the merits of the case, yet closes the courthouse door to resolving it." The panel has been conducting an investigation into the warrantless wiretapping program. Last month, it issued subpoenas to the administration, seeking documents related to the program's "authorization and legal justification."
The two lawsuits pending before the 9th Circuit include Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation, Inc. v. Bush, in which the plaintiffs, an Oregon branch of a Saudi charity that has been investigated for alleged terrorist ties and others, contend that they have a document proving they were a direct target of NSA surveillance. The other case, Hepting v. AT&T Corp., has been brought on behalf of a group of AT&T customers who allege that the company intercepted their phone calls and e-mails and disclosed them to the NSA.
The two cases are scheduled to be heard Aug. 15.
A PM offering to reduce his powers?
By Niall Ferguson
Last Updated: 12:01am BST 08/07/2007
telegraph.co.uk
Britain’s new Prime Minister, Gordon Brown, was a day early with his Independence Day celebrations.
Last Tuesday, on July 3, he made one of the most startling statements ever made by a newly installed premier before the House of Commons. Unless my ears mistook me, Mr Brown pledged to transform the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland into the United States of Britain.
Opinion polls such as the Pew Global Attitudes survey continue to testify to widespread anti-American feeling among British voters. Mr Brown himself has already hinted that he will pursue a less slavishly pro-American foreign policy than his predecessor Tony Blair.
Yet the “new British constitutional settlement” Mr Brown promised last week owes an unmistakable debt to the American system.
Even more remarkable, no one so much as grumbled. Indeed, the opposition parties’ sole complaint seemed to be that Mr Brown was not going far enough in the direction of Americanising Britain.
My question is: Has anyone in London been to Washington lately? On paper, no doubt, the American constitution looks great. It’s the real-life practice of American government that isn’t quite living up to the founding fathers’ lofty ideals.
Let’s take a closer look at Mr Brown’s speech, which contained no fewer than seven American-inspired initiatives:
1: “For centuries,” declared Mr Brown, the Prime Minister and the Executive “have exercised authority in the name of the monarchy without the people and their elected representatives being consulted”. His aim, by contrast, is to “entrust more power to Parliament and the British people”. Nota Bene: from royal authority to “We, the people”. Remind you of anything?
2: Mr Brown offered to delegate the power to declare war to the House of Commons, albeit on the basis of a resolution rather than a statute (unlike the power to ratify new international treaties, which will also be given to the Commons). Again, this imitates the United States, where (under Article I, Section VIII, of the Constitution) Congress alone has the power to declare war.
3: The Commons will be empowered to hold pre-appointment hearings for public officials such as the chief inspector of prisons, the civil service commissioner and members of the Bank of England’s Monetary Policy Committee. This is a straight American import.
4: The Government is to publish, on a regular basis, a national security strategy. Another import: President Bush has published two such documents since 2001.
5: There is to be a British national security council. The American model for this dates back to 1947.
6: The House of Lords is almost certainly to become an elected body. Hey, Gordon, how about renaming it “the Senate”?
7: Above all, Mr Brown proposes to “codify… both the duties and rights of citizens and the balance of power between Government, Parliament and the people”. In concluding his statement, he explicitly raised the possibility of a Bill of Rights and written constitution.
Wow. It’s taken more than 200 years, but finally a British prime minister has accepted that Hamilton, Jefferson, Madison and Washington were right. The only one of Mr Brown’s suggestions that did not have “Made in America” stamped on it was his call for weekend elections (a European custom).
Given the current public mood, these proposals might have been expected to elicit a storm of indignation. An earlier generation of Tories would have been dismayed by such an assault on our time-honoured traditions, not least for its obvious anti-monarchical undertone.
Yet the Conservative leader David Cameron’s response seemed to be: Why stop there?
Ever since the resurrection of the Scottish Parliament by Tony Blair, Tories have been posing the so-called “West Lothian Question”: Why can Scottish MPs at Westminster still vote on purely English matters, while English MPs have no say over the Scottish matters that are now debated in Edinburgh?
In effect, the Conservatives are now arguing that Westminster should house two parliaments: the present one for UK-wide matters and a smaller one, excluding the MPs for Scottish constituencies, for matters that concern only England.
When you think about it, that would be a step towards American-style federalism. There would be four states, England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, each with its own assembly, leaving only matters of collective concern to the federal Parliament.
In this light, Mr Brown’s retort that such an arrangement would threaten the Union makes no sense. Why copy so many American institutions, but rule out federalism?
Now, I agree that there are some superficially plausible arguments for an Americanisation of the British system of government. Under Mr Brown’s predecessor, there is no doubt that the power of the executive relative to Parliament grew intolerably and was systematically abused by the prime minister and his cronies.
However, there are even more compelling arguments against the creation of a United States of Britain.
The most important of these is that, whatever it says on paper, in practice the US constitution gives the executive branch even more power than is currently enjoyed by the British executive.
Did Congress restrain President Bush from going to war in Iraq? Of course not. Did Congressional hearings prevent Mr Bush from making a succession of disastrous appointments to high office, notably to the Federal Emergency Management Agency? Again, no.
Did it improve American foreign policy to publish a National Security Strategy? On the contrary.
And how about that Bill of Rights? Did it stop the administration from treating habeas corpus as an optional extra when it comes to terrorist suspects? I don’t think so.
As if to prove the point, President Bush chose last week to give a brazen exhibition of the quasi-monarchical power the occupant of the White House now wields by annulling the 30-month prison sentence handed down to Lewis “Scooter” Libby, the former chief of staff to Vice-President Dick Cheney, for perjury and obstruction of justice.
Why? Ostensibly because the sentence was “excessive”. In reality, it was because Libby is a loyal insider who knows where a great many of this administration’s bodies are buried.
Guess how much attention this president will give to the 3,000 other current petitions to have sentences commuted. One second? Two?
Louis XIV famously declared: L’état¸c’est moi. How long before Mr Bush declares: “I am the States.”
It may be that, as some of his fans maintain, Gordon Brown really is a reclusive scholarly type, who derives his knowledge of constitutional matters exclusively from the academic tomes that line his study. Maybe he is blissfully unaware of the rise of the imperial presidency in the United States.
But there is another possibility. Perhaps the truth is that Mr Brown understands the American system of government very well. Perhaps what impresses him most is precisely its combination of apparent popular liberty and actual executive privilege.
It is one of Mr Brown’s great talents to accumulate power even while appearing to give it away. He began his career as Chancellor of the Exchequer by handing the Bank of England operational independence, a remarkable renunciation of the power to set interest rates.
Yet this power turned out to be insignificant compared with the powers that Mr Brown retained. He will deservedly be remembered as the most powerful chancellor since Gladstone, a man who used the Treasury’s control over expenditure to exert a vice-like grip on all the other Government departments.
I suspect Mr Brown’s intention as Prime Minister is to replay that gambit. Even as British parliamentarians were gasping at the goodies being offered to them, Mr Brown was quietly calculating how to strengthen the underlying grip of the Prime Minister.
His predecessor, of course, had all the outward appearance of an American president. In the end, however, those presidential trappings cost him dear, for it meant that all the blame for the Iraq debacle fell on Mr Blair alone.
Mr Brown’s game is to mask a genuinely imperial premiership behind a reassuring constitutional facade. Frankly, when a man who has waited 10 long years to become prime minister offers on Day 1 to hand power back to the people, there has to be a catch.
Niall Ferguson is Laurence A Tisch Professor of History at Harvard University www.niallferguson.org. © Niall Ferguson, 2007
By Niall Ferguson
Last Updated: 12:01am BST 08/07/2007
telegraph.co.uk
Britain’s new Prime Minister, Gordon Brown, was a day early with his Independence Day celebrations.
Last Tuesday, on July 3, he made one of the most startling statements ever made by a newly installed premier before the House of Commons. Unless my ears mistook me, Mr Brown pledged to transform the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland into the United States of Britain.
Opinion polls such as the Pew Global Attitudes survey continue to testify to widespread anti-American feeling among British voters. Mr Brown himself has already hinted that he will pursue a less slavishly pro-American foreign policy than his predecessor Tony Blair.
Yet the “new British constitutional settlement” Mr Brown promised last week owes an unmistakable debt to the American system.
Even more remarkable, no one so much as grumbled. Indeed, the opposition parties’ sole complaint seemed to be that Mr Brown was not going far enough in the direction of Americanising Britain.
My question is: Has anyone in London been to Washington lately? On paper, no doubt, the American constitution looks great. It’s the real-life practice of American government that isn’t quite living up to the founding fathers’ lofty ideals.
Let’s take a closer look at Mr Brown’s speech, which contained no fewer than seven American-inspired initiatives:
1: “For centuries,” declared Mr Brown, the Prime Minister and the Executive “have exercised authority in the name of the monarchy without the people and their elected representatives being consulted”. His aim, by contrast, is to “entrust more power to Parliament and the British people”. Nota Bene: from royal authority to “We, the people”. Remind you of anything?
2: Mr Brown offered to delegate the power to declare war to the House of Commons, albeit on the basis of a resolution rather than a statute (unlike the power to ratify new international treaties, which will also be given to the Commons). Again, this imitates the United States, where (under Article I, Section VIII, of the Constitution) Congress alone has the power to declare war.
3: The Commons will be empowered to hold pre-appointment hearings for public officials such as the chief inspector of prisons, the civil service commissioner and members of the Bank of England’s Monetary Policy Committee. This is a straight American import.
4: The Government is to publish, on a regular basis, a national security strategy. Another import: President Bush has published two such documents since 2001.
5: There is to be a British national security council. The American model for this dates back to 1947.
6: The House of Lords is almost certainly to become an elected body. Hey, Gordon, how about renaming it “the Senate”?
7: Above all, Mr Brown proposes to “codify… both the duties and rights of citizens and the balance of power between Government, Parliament and the people”. In concluding his statement, he explicitly raised the possibility of a Bill of Rights and written constitution.
Wow. It’s taken more than 200 years, but finally a British prime minister has accepted that Hamilton, Jefferson, Madison and Washington were right. The only one of Mr Brown’s suggestions that did not have “Made in America” stamped on it was his call for weekend elections (a European custom).
Given the current public mood, these proposals might have been expected to elicit a storm of indignation. An earlier generation of Tories would have been dismayed by such an assault on our time-honoured traditions, not least for its obvious anti-monarchical undertone.
Yet the Conservative leader David Cameron’s response seemed to be: Why stop there?
Ever since the resurrection of the Scottish Parliament by Tony Blair, Tories have been posing the so-called “West Lothian Question”: Why can Scottish MPs at Westminster still vote on purely English matters, while English MPs have no say over the Scottish matters that are now debated in Edinburgh?
In effect, the Conservatives are now arguing that Westminster should house two parliaments: the present one for UK-wide matters and a smaller one, excluding the MPs for Scottish constituencies, for matters that concern only England.
When you think about it, that would be a step towards American-style federalism. There would be four states, England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, each with its own assembly, leaving only matters of collective concern to the federal Parliament.
In this light, Mr Brown’s retort that such an arrangement would threaten the Union makes no sense. Why copy so many American institutions, but rule out federalism?
Now, I agree that there are some superficially plausible arguments for an Americanisation of the British system of government. Under Mr Brown’s predecessor, there is no doubt that the power of the executive relative to Parliament grew intolerably and was systematically abused by the prime minister and his cronies.
However, there are even more compelling arguments against the creation of a United States of Britain.
The most important of these is that, whatever it says on paper, in practice the US constitution gives the executive branch even more power than is currently enjoyed by the British executive.
Did Congress restrain President Bush from going to war in Iraq? Of course not. Did Congressional hearings prevent Mr Bush from making a succession of disastrous appointments to high office, notably to the Federal Emergency Management Agency? Again, no.
Did it improve American foreign policy to publish a National Security Strategy? On the contrary.
And how about that Bill of Rights? Did it stop the administration from treating habeas corpus as an optional extra when it comes to terrorist suspects? I don’t think so.
As if to prove the point, President Bush chose last week to give a brazen exhibition of the quasi-monarchical power the occupant of the White House now wields by annulling the 30-month prison sentence handed down to Lewis “Scooter” Libby, the former chief of staff to Vice-President Dick Cheney, for perjury and obstruction of justice.
Why? Ostensibly because the sentence was “excessive”. In reality, it was because Libby is a loyal insider who knows where a great many of this administration’s bodies are buried.
Guess how much attention this president will give to the 3,000 other current petitions to have sentences commuted. One second? Two?
Louis XIV famously declared: L’état¸c’est moi. How long before Mr Bush declares: “I am the States.”
It may be that, as some of his fans maintain, Gordon Brown really is a reclusive scholarly type, who derives his knowledge of constitutional matters exclusively from the academic tomes that line his study. Maybe he is blissfully unaware of the rise of the imperial presidency in the United States.
But there is another possibility. Perhaps the truth is that Mr Brown understands the American system of government very well. Perhaps what impresses him most is precisely its combination of apparent popular liberty and actual executive privilege.
It is one of Mr Brown’s great talents to accumulate power even while appearing to give it away. He began his career as Chancellor of the Exchequer by handing the Bank of England operational independence, a remarkable renunciation of the power to set interest rates.
Yet this power turned out to be insignificant compared with the powers that Mr Brown retained. He will deservedly be remembered as the most powerful chancellor since Gladstone, a man who used the Treasury’s control over expenditure to exert a vice-like grip on all the other Government departments.
I suspect Mr Brown’s intention as Prime Minister is to replay that gambit. Even as British parliamentarians were gasping at the goodies being offered to them, Mr Brown was quietly calculating how to strengthen the underlying grip of the Prime Minister.
His predecessor, of course, had all the outward appearance of an American president. In the end, however, those presidential trappings cost him dear, for it meant that all the blame for the Iraq debacle fell on Mr Blair alone.
Mr Brown’s game is to mask a genuinely imperial premiership behind a reassuring constitutional facade. Frankly, when a man who has waited 10 long years to become prime minister offers on Day 1 to hand power back to the people, there has to be a catch.
Niall Ferguson is Laurence A Tisch Professor of History at Harvard University www.niallferguson.org. © Niall Ferguson, 2007
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad silences his critics
By Colin Freeman in Teheran, Sunday Telegraph
Last Updated: 2:28am BST 08/07/2007
telefraph.co.uk
Ali Nikoo Nesbati glances carefully at the couple who have just sat down at the table next to him. Aged in their 20s and dressed in fashionable Western clothes, they seem like the kind of people who'd be natural supporters of the pro-democracy movement that he leads. Yet their decision to sit right next to him, when the rest of the café in the secluded Teheran alley is empty, is enough to make him suspicious.
"They were probably just ordinary customers," he whispered, as he ushered The Sunday Telegraph back on to the streets to continue the interview elsewhere. "But you never know. We were sat in that café for 45 minutes, which is long enough for the intelligence services to find out where we are."
A paranoia about who might be listening is an occupational hazard for activists like Mr Nesbati, whose campaigns for reform of Iran's theocratic government have led to constant run-ins with the secret police since the late Nineties.
But that sense of paranoia is now greater than ever, as a long-feared crackdown by Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the country's puritanical leader, finally appears to be coming into force.
In what activists claim is a "cultural revolution" reminiscent of the Islamic Republic's turbulent birth in 1979, the regime has turned on its critics in all walks of life, harassing pro-democracy activists, shutting down dissident publications and dismissing independent-minded government officials and academics.
The onslaught has confounded early impressions that Mr Ahmadinejad, despite his religious zealotry, threats against Israel and defiance over Iran's nuclear programme, was not proving as aggressive as feared when it came to dealing with his internal opposition.
When members of Mr Nesbati's pro-democracy group staged a demonstration at Teheran's Amir Kabir University last December, in which they held photos of the president upside-down and denounced him as a "fascist", Mr Ahmadinejad surprised the world by requesting that they should not be arrested. He later cited his move as proof of the "absolute, total freedom" Iranians enjoyed.
The presidential pardon appears to have been short-lived. Eight of those protesters have since been jailed, the victims of what Mr Nesbati claims was a state-sponsored plot.
"Ahmadinejad said nobody would touch them, but the intelligence agencies smeared them by printing a blasphemous publication which they blamed on the students," he said. "We believe that was Ahmadinejad's revenge. We don't know if he ordered it himself, but we are convinced it was his supporters."
The students, one of whom has now spent more than two months in jail, are among 70 to have been arrested since Mr Ahmadinejad came to power; nearly half of these were seized in the last four months. More than 500 others have been suspended or expelled from university because of political activities, while about 130 student publications and 40 student organisations have been closed.
The accusations levelled against them typically include "endangering national security", spreading "rumours and lies" and "having relations with foreign intelligence agencies", all charges that Mr Nesbati has faced in his years as an activist, during which he has been arrested three times.
"They're not really charges as such, they just assume you are guilty and then ask why you did it," he said. "It's stressful the first time you're arrested but after that it's not so bad, although it depends what they do to you.
"Sometimes people get put in a room where they're made to stand facing a wall for 48 hours at a time. If you fall asleep, they hit you."
Campaigners say the crackdown began in March, when Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran's Supreme Spiritual Leader and a man of similar hardline views to Mr Ahmadinejad, made a speech warning Iranians against the West's "psychological warfare". This was taken to be a reference to Washington's funding of opposition groups, pro-democracy movements and anti-regime satellite broadcasts.
The president, who is regarded by many as little more than a mouthpiece for Mr Khamenei, is thought to have taken this as a cue to move against any groups critical of the regime.
Women's rights groups and trade union leaders have reported being harassed, scholars have been put under pressure for refusing to sign anti-Israeli statements, and Iran's press has claimed to have received lists of banned topics, such as the effect of threatened United Nations sanctions. University professors have also been warned against attending conferences abroad, and several visiting Iranian-American academics remain in custody after being charged with espionage.
One Western diplomat in Iran said the situation was "uneasy". He said: "The crackdown has been more gradual than people expected, but over the last few months we have been getting a lot of stories of people being hassled."
Similar clampdowns took place under President Mohammad Khatami, Mr Ahmadinejad's reformist-minded predecessor, whose campaign to introduce a liberal regime was not always heeded by hardline elements in the security forces.
However, activists say that now there is no longer a voice in government to speak for them. "Back then people would get arrested, but then Khatami would use his influence to get them released," said Abdullah Momeni, the leader of Tahkim Vahdat, Iran's largest student organisation and a prominent critic of the regime. "Now those who are arrested are not even getting released."
The attacks on reformists come as they struggle to recover from the splits and apathy that led to them losing the 2005 elections to Mr Ahmadinejad. The movement is divided between more conservative elements, who prefer gradual change within the existing clerical system of government, and those who wish to replace the Islamic republic altogether with a Western-style, secular democracy.
Both sides have talked of forming an alliance to defeat Mr Ahmadinejad in the next presidential elections, but no mutually credible figure has emerged to head it.
The fact that many reformists were still at large to criticise the regime, meanwhile, was not grounds for optimism, said Mr Momeni. "Now the judiciary and parliament and president feel so powerful that they don't really see us as a threat any more. It shows that in a sense, we have lost our status and position in society."
By Colin Freeman in Teheran, Sunday Telegraph
Last Updated: 2:28am BST 08/07/2007
telefraph.co.uk
Ali Nikoo Nesbati glances carefully at the couple who have just sat down at the table next to him. Aged in their 20s and dressed in fashionable Western clothes, they seem like the kind of people who'd be natural supporters of the pro-democracy movement that he leads. Yet their decision to sit right next to him, when the rest of the café in the secluded Teheran alley is empty, is enough to make him suspicious.
"They were probably just ordinary customers," he whispered, as he ushered The Sunday Telegraph back on to the streets to continue the interview elsewhere. "But you never know. We were sat in that café for 45 minutes, which is long enough for the intelligence services to find out where we are."
A paranoia about who might be listening is an occupational hazard for activists like Mr Nesbati, whose campaigns for reform of Iran's theocratic government have led to constant run-ins with the secret police since the late Nineties.
But that sense of paranoia is now greater than ever, as a long-feared crackdown by Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the country's puritanical leader, finally appears to be coming into force.
In what activists claim is a "cultural revolution" reminiscent of the Islamic Republic's turbulent birth in 1979, the regime has turned on its critics in all walks of life, harassing pro-democracy activists, shutting down dissident publications and dismissing independent-minded government officials and academics.
The onslaught has confounded early impressions that Mr Ahmadinejad, despite his religious zealotry, threats against Israel and defiance over Iran's nuclear programme, was not proving as aggressive as feared when it came to dealing with his internal opposition.
When members of Mr Nesbati's pro-democracy group staged a demonstration at Teheran's Amir Kabir University last December, in which they held photos of the president upside-down and denounced him as a "fascist", Mr Ahmadinejad surprised the world by requesting that they should not be arrested. He later cited his move as proof of the "absolute, total freedom" Iranians enjoyed.
The presidential pardon appears to have been short-lived. Eight of those protesters have since been jailed, the victims of what Mr Nesbati claims was a state-sponsored plot.
"Ahmadinejad said nobody would touch them, but the intelligence agencies smeared them by printing a blasphemous publication which they blamed on the students," he said. "We believe that was Ahmadinejad's revenge. We don't know if he ordered it himself, but we are convinced it was his supporters."
The students, one of whom has now spent more than two months in jail, are among 70 to have been arrested since Mr Ahmadinejad came to power; nearly half of these were seized in the last four months. More than 500 others have been suspended or expelled from university because of political activities, while about 130 student publications and 40 student organisations have been closed.
The accusations levelled against them typically include "endangering national security", spreading "rumours and lies" and "having relations with foreign intelligence agencies", all charges that Mr Nesbati has faced in his years as an activist, during which he has been arrested three times.
"They're not really charges as such, they just assume you are guilty and then ask why you did it," he said. "It's stressful the first time you're arrested but after that it's not so bad, although it depends what they do to you.
"Sometimes people get put in a room where they're made to stand facing a wall for 48 hours at a time. If you fall asleep, they hit you."
Campaigners say the crackdown began in March, when Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran's Supreme Spiritual Leader and a man of similar hardline views to Mr Ahmadinejad, made a speech warning Iranians against the West's "psychological warfare". This was taken to be a reference to Washington's funding of opposition groups, pro-democracy movements and anti-regime satellite broadcasts.
The president, who is regarded by many as little more than a mouthpiece for Mr Khamenei, is thought to have taken this as a cue to move against any groups critical of the regime.
Women's rights groups and trade union leaders have reported being harassed, scholars have been put under pressure for refusing to sign anti-Israeli statements, and Iran's press has claimed to have received lists of banned topics, such as the effect of threatened United Nations sanctions. University professors have also been warned against attending conferences abroad, and several visiting Iranian-American academics remain in custody after being charged with espionage.
One Western diplomat in Iran said the situation was "uneasy". He said: "The crackdown has been more gradual than people expected, but over the last few months we have been getting a lot of stories of people being hassled."
Similar clampdowns took place under President Mohammad Khatami, Mr Ahmadinejad's reformist-minded predecessor, whose campaign to introduce a liberal regime was not always heeded by hardline elements in the security forces.
However, activists say that now there is no longer a voice in government to speak for them. "Back then people would get arrested, but then Khatami would use his influence to get them released," said Abdullah Momeni, the leader of Tahkim Vahdat, Iran's largest student organisation and a prominent critic of the regime. "Now those who are arrested are not even getting released."
The attacks on reformists come as they struggle to recover from the splits and apathy that led to them losing the 2005 elections to Mr Ahmadinejad. The movement is divided between more conservative elements, who prefer gradual change within the existing clerical system of government, and those who wish to replace the Islamic republic altogether with a Western-style, secular democracy.
Both sides have talked of forming an alliance to defeat Mr Ahmadinejad in the next presidential elections, but no mutually credible figure has emerged to head it.
The fact that many reformists were still at large to criticise the regime, meanwhile, was not grounds for optimism, said Mr Momeni. "Now the judiciary and parliament and president feel so powerful that they don't really see us as a threat any more. It shows that in a sense, we have lost our status and position in society."
Gen Musharraf survives gun attack on plane
By Isambard Wilkinson
Last Updated: 4:27am BST 07/07/2007
telegraph.co.uk
Pakistan's president, Pervez Musharraf, survived an apparent assassination attempt yesterday after his aircraft was fired on, raising fears for Pakistan's stability amid increasing Islamist threats.
Gen Musharraf's plane was shot at as it left the Chaklala military airbase in Rawalpindi, a garrison town outside the capital, Islamabad.
Almost immediately security forces surrounded a nearby house, arrested one man and recovered a 12.7mm anti-aircraft gun and a 7.62mm machinegun from the roof.
The weapons were placed between satellite dishes and a water tank. The building was beneath the flight path.
The gunfire missed the aircraft and Gen Musharraf, a key American ally who has escaped several al-Qa'eda-linked attempts on his life, was unharmed, said Pakistani officials.
After security forces had originally refuted the reports, one official said: "It was an unsuccessful attempt to shoot the president's plane."
The guns were "similar to those used by the Taliban in Afghanistan", said the official.
Security is normally deployed ahead of president's flights, the timings of which are kept secret. Last night it was unknown which group was responsible for the attempted assassination and security forces were searching for a couple said to have rented the house from where the shots were fired.
The attempt on the president's life added to fears for Pakistan's stability as security forces laid siege to a group of armed Islamist students in Islamabad's Lal Masjid, or Red Mosque, where at least 21 people have been killed and fighting continued for a fourth consecutive day.
Security officials said it was "possible the incident was against the backdrop of the episode of Lal Masjid".
Elsewhere, a suicide bomber threw himself at an army jeep and killed six soldiers in north-western Pakistan. It was the third bomb attack in the frontier region in the past three days with victims now totalling 18.
Gen Musharraf, who was flying to visit flood victims in the south of Pakistan, has incurred the bitter enmity of Islamic militants who oppose his close ties to the United States and his support for the overthrow of the Taliban from power in Afghanistan after the attacks of September 11, 2001.
Militants belonging to groups such as Jaish-e-Mohammed, which Gen Musharraf claimed last week had sent suicide bombers into the besieged Red Mosque, have been linked to past attempts on the president's life.
Jaish-e-Mohammed is one of several terrorist groups originally financed and trained by Pakistan's military intelligence but which were angered by Gen Musharraf's pursuit of peace with India over the disputed territory of Kashmir.
In October 2006, security forces found rockets aimed at Gen Musharraf's official residence in Islamabad while an explosion occurred near his army house in Rawalpindi. He said the incidents had possible links to al-Qa'eda.
A suicide attack targeted the general's motorcade on Christmas Day 2003 in Rawalpindi, leaving 14 people dead. He escaped unscathed.
Less than two weeks earlier he survived another assassination attempt when attackers blew up a bridge as his limousine passed, but electronic jamming equipment in the car delayed the blast.
Pakistan's Supreme Court last September upheld death sentences handed down to 12 men, including soldiers and civilians, convicted of taking part in the two attempts on his life.
The beleaguered Pakistani leader has experienced mounting secular political opposition to his rule since he attempted to sack the chief justice ahead of elections scheduled for later this year.
The former Pakistani premier, Nawaz Sharif, will host opposition talks in London this weekend in a bid to "rescue" Pakistan from eight years of military rule and restore democracy.
The conference in London today and tomorrow takes place as Gen Musharraf, who overthrew Mr Sharif eight years ago, struggles to face down increasing protests against his rule at home.
By Isambard Wilkinson
Last Updated: 4:27am BST 07/07/2007
telegraph.co.uk
Pakistan's president, Pervez Musharraf, survived an apparent assassination attempt yesterday after his aircraft was fired on, raising fears for Pakistan's stability amid increasing Islamist threats.
Gen Musharraf's plane was shot at as it left the Chaklala military airbase in Rawalpindi, a garrison town outside the capital, Islamabad.
Almost immediately security forces surrounded a nearby house, arrested one man and recovered a 12.7mm anti-aircraft gun and a 7.62mm machinegun from the roof.
The weapons were placed between satellite dishes and a water tank. The building was beneath the flight path.
The gunfire missed the aircraft and Gen Musharraf, a key American ally who has escaped several al-Qa'eda-linked attempts on his life, was unharmed, said Pakistani officials.
After security forces had originally refuted the reports, one official said: "It was an unsuccessful attempt to shoot the president's plane."
The guns were "similar to those used by the Taliban in Afghanistan", said the official.
Security is normally deployed ahead of president's flights, the timings of which are kept secret. Last night it was unknown which group was responsible for the attempted assassination and security forces were searching for a couple said to have rented the house from where the shots were fired.
The attempt on the president's life added to fears for Pakistan's stability as security forces laid siege to a group of armed Islamist students in Islamabad's Lal Masjid, or Red Mosque, where at least 21 people have been killed and fighting continued for a fourth consecutive day.
Security officials said it was "possible the incident was against the backdrop of the episode of Lal Masjid".
Elsewhere, a suicide bomber threw himself at an army jeep and killed six soldiers in north-western Pakistan. It was the third bomb attack in the frontier region in the past three days with victims now totalling 18.
Gen Musharraf, who was flying to visit flood victims in the south of Pakistan, has incurred the bitter enmity of Islamic militants who oppose his close ties to the United States and his support for the overthrow of the Taliban from power in Afghanistan after the attacks of September 11, 2001.
Militants belonging to groups such as Jaish-e-Mohammed, which Gen Musharraf claimed last week had sent suicide bombers into the besieged Red Mosque, have been linked to past attempts on the president's life.
Jaish-e-Mohammed is one of several terrorist groups originally financed and trained by Pakistan's military intelligence but which were angered by Gen Musharraf's pursuit of peace with India over the disputed territory of Kashmir.
In October 2006, security forces found rockets aimed at Gen Musharraf's official residence in Islamabad while an explosion occurred near his army house in Rawalpindi. He said the incidents had possible links to al-Qa'eda.
A suicide attack targeted the general's motorcade on Christmas Day 2003 in Rawalpindi, leaving 14 people dead. He escaped unscathed.
Less than two weeks earlier he survived another assassination attempt when attackers blew up a bridge as his limousine passed, but electronic jamming equipment in the car delayed the blast.
Pakistan's Supreme Court last September upheld death sentences handed down to 12 men, including soldiers and civilians, convicted of taking part in the two attempts on his life.
The beleaguered Pakistani leader has experienced mounting secular political opposition to his rule since he attempted to sack the chief justice ahead of elections scheduled for later this year.
The former Pakistani premier, Nawaz Sharif, will host opposition talks in London this weekend in a bid to "rescue" Pakistan from eight years of military rule and restore democracy.
The conference in London today and tomorrow takes place as Gen Musharraf, who overthrew Mr Sharif eight years ago, struggles to face down increasing protests against his rule at home.
Dead end: Counterinsurgency warfare as military malpractice
BY Edward Luttwak
PUBLISHED February 2007
Harpers.com
PROLOGUE
Modern armed forces continue to be structured for large-scale war, but advanced societies whose small families lack expendable children have a very low tolerance for casualties. Even supposedly warlike Americans gravely count casualties in Iraq that in three years have yet to reach 3,000—fewer than were lost in many a single day of battle in past wars. Fortunately, this refusal to spill the blood needed to fuel battles diminishes the likelihood that advanced societies will deliberately set out to fight one another (pas des enfants, pas des Suisses, pas de guerre) unless they are somehow able to convince themselves that a war could be entirely or very largely aerial and naval. Such wars, however, are difficult to imagine, except when islands are involved, as in a China-Taiwan war, which is very improbable for its own reasons. Air and naval forces can certainly be employed advantageously against any less advanced enemy incautious enough to rely on a conventional defense, conducted by regular forces, but in that context as well there must be severe doubts about the continued usefulness of the ground forces of advanced countries that are intolerant of casualties. It is easy enough to blockade the enemy, to successfully bomb all the right nodal points and shut down electrical, transportation, and communications networks. Air strikes can disable runways and destroy both sheltered and unsheltered aircraft, ballistic missiles, and nuclear installations. Air power can also sink warships, or rout any mechanized forces deployed in the open, as the United States did with Iraq in 1991 and partly in 2003, and as it could do with Iran. No real role would remain for ground forces except to dislodge the enemy from any territory he had occupied, or to occupy his own territory. That, however, is bound to cost casualties that might not be tolerated; it is also bound to provoke an insurgency.
In that event, naval forces cannot do much, because insurgencies rarely have an important maritime dimension (the Sri Lanka case is an exception) and riverine operations are usually minor. Air forces can have surveillance and transport roles, but insurgents rarely present targets of sufficient stability and sufficient contrast to be identified, designated, and effectively attacked from the air. That leaves almost everything to the ground forces, and when the advanced attack the less advanced, the more advanced forces will have large advantages in firepower, mobility, and operational coherence. But they will also have no visible enemy to fight, so that the normal operational methods and tactics of conventional warfare cannot be applied. True, there are the alternative methods and tactics of counterinsurgency warfare, but do they actually work? Insurgents do not always win, but their defeats can rarely be attributed to counterinsurgency warfare, as we shall see.
THE THEORY OF COUNTERINSURGENCY WARFARE
Two distinguished American generals of exceptional intelligence, James N. Mattis of the Marine Corps and David H. Petraeus of the Army, each now responsible for the training and doctrine policy of his own service, have recently circulated the text of a new “counterinsurgency” field manual, FM 3-24 DRAFT, which they propose for official use. Its doctrines emerge from the chapter titles. After a first chapter of definitions (which any military manual must have, because the battlefield is no place for semantic debate) we come to the first substantive chapter, “Unity of Effort: Integrating Civil and Military Activities,” in which the authors duly recognize and strongly emphasize the essentially political nature of the struggle against insurgents. That is hardly an original discovery, as the two generals and their staffs would be the first to recognize, yet it is still necessary to affirm what should be obvious, because amid the frustrations of fighting a mostly invisible enemy, it is hard to resist the tempting delusion that some clever new tactics, or even some clever new technology, can defeat the insurgents.
Much more questionable is the proposition that follows, which is presented as self-evident, that a necessary if not sufficient condition of victory is to provide what the insurgents cannot: basic public services, physical reconstruction, the hope of economic development and social amelioration. The hidden assumption here is that there is only one kind of politics in this world, a politics in which popular support is important or even decisive, and that such support can be won by providing better government. Yet the extraordinary persistence of dictatorships as diverse in style as the regimes of Cuba, Libya, North Korea, and Syria shows that in fact government needs no popular support as long as it can secure obedience. As for better government, that is certainly wanted in France, Norway, or the United States, but obviously not in Afghanistan or Iraq, where many people prefer indigenous and religious oppression to the freedoms offered by foreign invaders.
The very word “guerrilla,” which now refers only to a tactic, was first used to describe the ferocious insurgency of the illiterate Spanish poor against their would-be liberators, under the leadership of their traditional oppressors. On July 6, 1808, King Joseph of Spain presented a draft constitution that for the first time in Spain’s history offered an independent judiciary, freedom of the press, and the abolition of the remaining feudal privileges of the aristocracy and of the Church. At that time, abbeys, monasteries, and bishops still owned every building and every piece of land in 3,148 towns and villages, which were inhabited by some of Europe’s most wretched tenants. Despite the fact that the new constitution would have liberated them and let them keep their harvests for themselves, the Spanish peasantry failed to rise up in its support. Instead, they obeyed the priests, who summoned them to fight against the ungodly innovations of the foreign invader. For Joseph was the brother of Napoleon Bonaparte, placed on the Spanish throne by French troops. That was all that mattered to most Spaniards—not what was proposed but by whom it was proposed.
By then the French should have known better. In 1799 the same thing had happened in Naples, whose liberals, supported by the French, were slaughtered by the very peasants and plebeians they wished to emancipate. They were mustered into a militia of the “Holy Faith” by Cardinal Fabrizio Ruffo, coincidentally a member of Calabria’s largest land-owning family, who led his men forward on horseback. Ruffo easily persuaded his followers that all promises of material betterment were irrelevant, because the real aim of the French and the liberals was to destroy the Catholic religion in the service of Satan. Spain’s clergy did the same, and their illiterate followers could not know that the very first clause of Joseph’s draft constitution had not only recognized the Roman Apostolic Catholic Church but stated that it was the only one allowed in Spain.
* * *
The same kind of politics are now in evidence in Afghanistan and Iraq, including the ineffectual enshrinement of Islam in the new Iraqi constitution, and the emergence of clerical warlords who are as ready to use violence as Cardinal Ruffo was. Since the 2003 invasion, both Shiite and Sunni clerics have been repeating over and over again that the Americans and their “Christian” allies have come to Iraq to destroy Islam in its cultural heartland and to steal the country’s oil. The clerics dismiss all talk of democracy and human rights by the invaders as mere hypocrisy—with the exception of women’s rights, which the clerics say are only propagandized to persuade Iraqi daughters and wives to dishonor their families by imitating the shameless nakedness and impertinence of Western women.
The vast majority of Afghans and Iraqis naturally believe their religious leaders. The alternative would be to believe what for them is entirely unbelievable: that foreigners are unselfishly expending blood and treasure in order to help them. They themselves would never invade a foreign country except to plunder it, the way Iraq invaded Kuwait, thus having made Saddam Hussein genuinely popular for a time when troops brought back their loot. As many opinion polls and countless incidents demonstrate, the Americans and their allies are widely considered to be the worst of invaders, who came to rob Muslim Iraqis not only of their territory and oil but also of their religion and even their family honor. Many Muslims around the world believe as much, even in Turkey, whose most successful recent film depicted an American Jewish military doctor who was operating on Iraqis not to save their lives but to remove their kidneys, which of course he was sending back to the U.S. for transplantation and his personal profit (he was Jewish after all). It is the same in Afghanistan, where the American-imposed quota of women parliamentarians has caused widespread resentment, not least because most Afghans are scandalized by the spectacle of a woman contradicting a man in public—as in, for example, televised parliamentary debates.
In other words, “Integrating Civil and Military Activities” to improve local conditions need not gain public support. And even if it did, it does not automatically follow that such support would be decisive, or even important.
* * *
Next comes a very long section on “Intelligence in Counterinsurgency,” which reflects the crucial predicament of counterinsurgency warfare: the unseen enemy, who can choose when to emerge from civilian cover to launch his attacks, and increasingly can attack by remote control, reducing his exposure or avoiding exposure altogether. Everywhere outgunned, and in Iraq if not Afghanistan outnumbered as well, the insurgents would be easily defeated if their invisibility could be stripped away. That much is obvious. But the authors then automatically assume that it is simply an intelligence problem to identify the insurgents among the population. This is another very questionable proposition, as we shall see, because in fact it is a political problem, which always has a political solution, however unpalatable that may be.
In any case, proceeding on their general premise, the detailed headings that follow point to different ways of overcoming the invisibility of insurgents by using all possible intelligence sources, methods, and assets. The chapter entitled “Intelligence Characteristics in Counterinsurgency” points to the need to have rather different skills and talents when the targets are extremely “low-contrast” insurgents, as opposed to high-contrast targets such as airfields or warships. Next comes “Predeployment Planning and Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield,” a section that emphasizes the specificity of counterinsurgency as to time, place, population, culture, and more, as opposed to the general-purpose intelligence preparations for regular war. For example, it is useful to have trained Arabic-speaking interrogators if one plans to invade an Arab-speaking country, and, at a less elementary level, it is useful to have some cultural instruction before trying to analyze the behavior of the locals.
After that comes “Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Operations,” discussing, among other things, the different ways of using regular forces, with their regular platforms and sensors, to find the elusive insurgents. These methods may or may not work but certainly entail the use of ultrasophisticated and very expensive F-15s and F-18s, with the most advanced sensors to detect and track the man, the boy, and the donkey who may or may not be transporting an “improvised explosive device” to its intended emplacement. Then comes the delicate subject of “Counterintelligence and Counterreconnaissance.” The second of these is straightforward enough: before attacking a target, it is usually essential for insurgents to observe it in order to plan the action, and with a bit of luck such observers can be spotted by alert defenders. Often the best way of protecting potential targets is to anticipate attacks against them by countersurveillance (or “counterreconnaissance”), then to pre-empt or ambush the attackers. What is delicate is the “Counterintelligence” part, which points to the likelihood of insurgent penetrations of the local forces that are supposedly fighting the insurgency—the friends and allies in need that are being provided with training, weapons, and money. Penetrations always occur, even in the best of military forces and intelligence services, but there is a difference in scale between the consequences of a traitor or two and wholesale enlistments to serve the enemy cause (or the inadvertent recruitment of enemies into the ranks). For example, it must be universally recognized by now that in Iraq many if not most of the Shiites in the army and police force are actually under the orders of one or another of the Shiite militias, including the “Mahdi army,” that occasionally launch surprise attacks on American or British forces. Equally, many of the Kurds who are paid by the government or by the Americans directly are in the service of either Massoud Barazani or Jalal Talebani, the two chieftains who trade under the labels of the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan. (Talebani, moreover, is now Iraq’s president.) Far more dangerously, the Sunnis in the army and police force who have been recruited, trained, equipped, and salaried to fight the Sunni insurgents are just as likely to help the insurgency, or even to be insurgents themselves, on temporary detachment to the government forces, so to speak. That is the only way that Sunnis, whose families live among the Sunni population, can both receive a salary and also keep their families alive. But again, this is really a political problem, which has an unpalatable solution that is certainly more reliable than “Counterintelligence” could ever be.
Later comes “Intelligence Collaboration and Fusion,” which refers to the sharing and integration of intelligence coming in separate channels from different services, branches, and individual sources. Such cooperation is characteristic of regular war operations as well, but it is more critical when the targets are almost always unstable, elusive, and lowcontrast—if even identifiable at all, as they rarely are. What follows are more predictable chapters on “Designing Counterintelligence Operations” and executing them, and developing “Host Nation” security forces, the relative brevity of these chapters underlining the emphasis the authors place on intelligence operations. Recent scandals readily explain the need for an entire chapter on “Leadership and Ethics for Counterinsurgency,” and the chapter on “Building and Sustaining Capability and Capacity,” with a subsection on counterinsurgency logistics, also reflects the unhappy experience of Iraq.
Ammunition supply—along with fuel, usually the biggest item in regular operations budgets—is relatively unimportant, since very little ammunition is expended fighting an insurgency, yet logistics still present difficulties in Iraq because supplies cannot simply be trucked from A to B without a high risk of destructive attacks by insurgents, hijacking by militias in need of supplies, simple highway robbery, or opportunistic looting by ordinary civilians. (There are many natural predators in the Iraqi population, probably because of the high proportion of ex-nomads and their direct descendants, for whom the razzia is still an honorable and manly tradition.) Truck convoys can be more secure if rather less efficient, but their safety depends on the quality of their escorts, which are necessarily very scarce and expensive if they are U.S. troops (the British, near the seaport, as is their wont, are more easily supplied), less scarce but even more expensive if they are security contractors, and very cheap but extremely unreliable if they are Iraqi soldiers or police. The end result is that hyper-expensive helicopter hours are very often used to carry even low-value, non-urgent supplies, which is one reason why the occupation costs so much even though very little ordnance is being expended.
Incidentally, in spite of all the advances in “jointness,” when the U.S. Air Force tried to help out the Army (and dissuade it from acquiring its own intra-theater fixed-wing aircraft) by providing a regular shuttle service of C-130 turboprop transports between Kuwait and different bases in Iraq, the aircraft ended up carrying mostly “sailboat fuel”—that is, they flew empty because it was easier for Army formations to use their own helicopters and smaller fixed-wing aircraft than to “interface” with the Air Force.
Two more things can be noted about the new field manual before turning to the peculiar politics of insurgency and counterinsurgency. There is an Appendix to the chapter on “Predeployment Planning and Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield” that further emphasizes the subject’s importance and includes a section on “Linguistic Support.” It is a sad story indeed when the astonishing linguistic incapacity of U.S. military forces and intelligence organizations is contrasted with the abundance of American civilians who speak all known foreign languages, and the brilliant record of foreign-language education in the U.S. Army and Navy, which used to produce as many good Chinese and Japanese speakers as they wanted by selecting for natural aptitude in the recruit pool, giving them a year of intensive courses (eight hours a day, six days a week), and quickly sending away those who failed to keep up with their classes. Nothing prevents the military from doing the same for Arabic, Persian and, say, Azeri now, except for an unwillingness to invest in the future, and probably a lack of disciplined volunteers willing to learn a language eight hours a day, six days a week, for a whole year or more.
FM 3-24 DRAFT ends with a list of suggested readings, and one of the first books on the list is Small Wars: A Tactical Handbook for Imperial Soldiers (1890), by Charles E. Calwell. The previous counterinsurgency manual, FM 3-07.22, also had such a list, and its first suggested reading was The Battle of the Casbah: Terrorism and Counterterrorism in Algeria, 1955‒57, by Paul Aussaresses. Is it therefore the case that counterinsurgency doctrine has been evolving backward, from the doubts of the 1950s to the certitudes of 1890? That is no accusation, alas, because one needs to go back even further to find convincing models of success in defeating insurgents by military means.
COUNTERINSURGENCY IN PRACTICE: IRAQ
We begin with some elementary observations. The armed forces of the most advanced countries, and certainly of the United States, all formidable against enemies assembled in conveniently targetable massed formations, are least effective in fighting insurgents. That was demonstrated in Vietnam in many different ways over many years, even as the occasional North Vietnamese regular unit that ventured to fight conventionally was efficiently destroyed. The same two-part proposition is unnecessarily being proven all over again in Iraq, damaging the reputation of the United States for wisdom and strength, misusing fine soldiers, wasting vast amounts of money on skillful but ineffectual air and ground operations, inflicting added suffering on Iraqis at large, and taking the lives of young Americans whose sacrifice, one fears, will be deemed futile.
There is no mystery about the first part of the proposition. Because of their abundant resources and all-round competence, morale, discipline, and skills, the armed forces of the United States on the largest scale, and of other advanced countries on their scale, can usually generate much more firepower than their antagonists. These days, moreover, they can do so with routine precision because of sensors that reveal targets even in poor visibility; platforms and weapons that can reach targets at any planetary range; accurate guidance and homing devices; and command and communication networks that combine all those abilities. Up to a point, the second part of the proposition is merely the logical consequence of the first: faced with especially superior firepower, insurgents strive to be especially elusive—more so than if they were facing less formidable regular forces—and as targets diminish, so does the value of firepower.
But there is much more to it than that. Specifically, there is the matter of politics, on both sides. Unless insurgents confine their operations to thoroughly deserted areas where there is no one to observe them, they must have at least the passive cooperation of local inhabitants. Whether they fail to report the insurgents to the authorities out of sympathy for their cause or in terror of their vengeance is entirely irrelevant. In either case, the insurgents are in control of the population around them, and not the authorities. That essentially political advantage is enough to allow motivated insurgents to overcome all manner of tactical weaknesses in combat skills and weapons.
As in so many previous cases, in a manner abundantly familiar from previous insurgencies, that political situation is now playing out in Iraq, where insurgents live very safely in Sunni neighborhoods, towns, and villages, emerging to place bombs or launch attacks when and where it suits them before resuming innocuous civilian identities once again. Local insurgents may indeed pass unobserved by their neighbors when inactive, but not when they take up weapons and gather for operations, while the foreign volunteers among them necessarily attract attention even when they carry no weapons because of their distinct speech and manner. Many of the local inhabitants certainly know who the insurgents are and where they keep their stores of explosives and weapons, but they are not telling. That is why U.S. Army and Marine patrols cannot find insurgents unless they choose to reveal themselves by engaging in direct combat, which of course they rarely do, and only when they think that they have a great advantage. The mostly futile American patrols therefore expose soldiers to the mines, remote-controlled explosives, snipers, and mortar bombs that inflict daily casualties.
Naturally, every form of technical intelligence and every possible sensor is being employed to supplant the lack of very elementary but indispensable human intelligence, including synthetic-aperture radars aboard big four-engine aircraft and the infrared and video sensors of the latest targeting pods on two-seat heavyweight jet fighters. The expense of these flights alone is huge, amounting to hundreds of millions of dollars a month, but the results are very meager. The aim, of course, is to gather immediately actionable imagery, especially at night, showing such things as insurgents placing side bombs alongside U.S. patrol routes or approaching oil pipelines bearing explosives. Failing that, it is at least hoped that possible insurgent activities could be detected for further investigation; for example, people furtively bringing things to isolated buildings at night. But in practice, unless insurgents carry recognizable weapons, it is simply impossible to differentiate between them and innocent people going about their peaceful business. In the meantime, very elaborate equipment that is very costly to operate, and very effective in identifying armored vehicles, bunkers, missile launchers, and any other readily recognizable target of classic form, is still being employed every day in futile attempts to detect deliveries of a few dollars of food, or the emplacement of readily improvised explosive devices. This too is an aspect of the structural unsuitability of modern armed forces to fight elusive enemies that present no stable targets.
The essentially political advantage of the insurgents in commanding at least the silence of the local population cannot be overcome by technical means no matter how advanced. Nor can the better operational methods and tactics advocated in FM 3-24 DRAFT be of much help. So few of the insurgents ever engage in direct combat, so much of the insurgency takes covert forms, ranging from the infiltration of the government to bombings, sabotage, and assassinations, that the tactical defeats inflicted on the insurgents—including the killing of their top leaders and heroes—have no perceptible impact on the volume of the violence, and of its political consequences.
* * *
In Iraq, as noted, there is supposed to be a far better way of finding insurgents than patrols driving about or sensors, howsoever sophisticated: the Iraqi police and army. Their recruitment, training, equipment, and upkeep, a very costly enterprise in both money and blood, has also yielded meager results because the politics of the situation are again central, and again unfavorable. It is easy to recruit local auxiliaries in any poor country, and any number of Shiites, Kurds, and Sunni Arabs can readily be recruited—in recent decades that is how many of them made a living, by exploiting their privileged access as Sunnis and Arabs to prized military and police salaries. Other jobs were much less desirable, because they required work, and now, in any case, they are very scarce. But while they are willing to wear the uniforms and accept training up to a point, Sunni Arabs are naturally disinclined to help capture or kill insurgents who are fighting to restore the Sunni Arab ascendancy over Iraq. Besides, their families would be in deadly peril if they were suspected of loyalty to their government, and by extension to the Americans. Some of those policemen and soldiers know much about the insurgents and where exactly they might be found, but are still of no help in finding them, precisely because they are insurgents themselves. Even if specifically ordered into action on those rare occasions in which there is overt combat, most Sunni Arab policemen and soldiers will not fight the insurgents; if they cannot simply stand back quietly, they are apt to desert, usually with their weapons. As for army and police units manned mostly by Shiite Arabs or Kurds, they are not actively disloyal, but they cannot gather information on the insurgents either. Sunni Arab civilians will not confide in them any more than in Americans, and perhaps less, because sooner or later the Americans will leave Iraq, but the Kurds and Shiites will not, and they are therefore the greater enemy.
The adverse political terrain of counterinsurgency is simply a given in Iraq, as it is everywhere else, for if insurgents do not receive, or cannot forcibly exact, at least the passive collaboration of the population at large, they normally cannot survive at all.
THE EASY AND RELIABLE WAY OF DEFEATING ALL INSURGENCIES EVERYWHERE
Perfectly ordinary regular armed forces, with no counterinsurgency doctrine or training whatever, have in the past regularly defeated insurgents, by using a number of well-proven methods. It is enough to consider these methods to see why the armed forces of the United States or of any other democratic country cannot possibly use them.
The simple starting point is that insurgents are not the only ones who can intimidate or terrorize civilians. For instance, whenever insurgents are believed to be present in a village, small town, or distinct city district—a very common occurrence in Iraq at present, as in other insurgency situations—the local notables can be compelled to surrender them to the authorities, under the threat of escalating punishments, all the way to mass executions. That is how the Ottoman Empire could control entire provinces with a few feared janissaries and a squadron or two of cavalry. The Turks were simply too few to hunt down hidden rebels, but they did not have to: they went to the village chiefs and town notables instead, to demand their surrender, or else. A massacre once in a while remained an effective warning for decades. So it was mostly by social pressure rather than brute force that the Ottomans preserved their rule: it was the leaders of each ethnic or religious group inclined to rebellion that did their best to keep things quiet, and if they failed, they were quite likely to tell the Turks where to find the rebels before more harm was done.
Long before the Ottoman Empire, the Romans knew how to combine sticks and carrots to obtain obedience and suppress insurgencies. Conquered peoples too proud to accept the benefits of their rule, from public baths and free circus shows to reliable law courts, were “de-bellicized” (a very Roman idea). It was done by killing all who dared to resist in arms—it made good combat practice for the legions—by selling into slavery any who were captured in battle, by leveling towns that held out under siege instead of promptly surrendering, and by readily accepting as peaceful subjects and future citizens all who submitted to Roman rule. In the first two and most successful centuries of imperial Rome, some 300,000 soldiers in all, only half of them highly trained legionary troops, were enough to secure a vast empire that stretched well beyond the Mediterranean basin that formed its core, today the territory of some thirty European, Middle Eastern, and North African states. The Romans could not disperse their soldiers in hundreds of cities, thousands of towns, and countless hamlets to repress riot or rebellion; the troops were needed to guard the frontiers. Instead, they relied on deterrence, which was periodically reinforced by exemplary punishments. Most inhabitants of the empire never rebelled after their initial conquest. A few tribes and nations had to be reconquered after trying and failing to overthrow Roman rule. A few simply refused to become obedient, and so they were killed off: “They make a wasteland and call it peace” was the bitter complaint of a Scottish chieftain (as reported by Tacitus).
Terrible reprisals to deter any form of resistance were standard operating procedure for the German armed forces in the Second World War, and very effective they were in containing resistance with very few troops. As against all the dramatic films and books that describe the heroic achievements of the resistance all over occupied Europe, military historians have documented the tranquillity that the German occupiers mostly enjoyed, and the normality of collaboration, not merely by notorious traitors such as the incautious French poet or the failed Norwegian politician but by vast numbers of ordinary people. Polish railwaymen, for example, secured the entire sustenance of the German eastern front. As for the daring resistance attacks that feature in films, they did happen occasionally, but not often, and not because of any lack of bravery in fighting the routinely formidable Germans but because of the terrible punishments they inflicted on the population.
Occupiers can thus be successful without need of any specialized counterinsurgency methods or tactics if they are willing to out-terrorize the insurgents, so that the fear of reprisals outweighs the desire to help the insurgents or their threats. The Germans also established secure and economical forms of occupation by exploiting isolated resistance attacks to achieve much broader demonstration effects. Lone German dispatch riders were easily toppled by tensed wires or otherwise intercepted and killed, but then troops would arrive on the scene to burn or demolish the surrounding buildings or farms or the nearest village, seizing and killing anyone who aroused suspicion or just happened to be there. After word of the terrible deeds spread and was duly exaggerated, German dispatch riders could safely continue on their way, until reaching some other uninstructed part of the world, where the sequence would have to be repeated.
Likewise in the Vietnam War, the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese were skilled in using terror to secure their pervasive territorial control and very ready to use any amount of violence against civilians, from countless individual assassinations to mass executions, as in Hue in 1968. The Communist cause had its enthusiasts, “fellow travelers,” and opportunistic followers, but Vietnamese who were none of the above, and not outright enemies, were compelled to collaborate actively or passively by the threat of the violence so liberally used. That is exactly what the insurgents in Iraq are now doing, and this is no coincidence. All insurgencies follow the same pattern. Locals who are not sympathetic to begin with, who cannot be recruited to the cause, are compelled to collaborate by the fear of violence, readily reinforced by the demonstrative killing of those who insist on refusing to help the resistance. Neutrality is not an option.
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By contrast, the capacity of American armed forces to inflict collective punishments does not extend much beyond curfews and other such restrictions, inconvenient to be sure and perhaps sufficient to impose real hardship, but obviously insufficient to out-terrorize insurgents. Needless to say, this is not a political limitation that Americans would ever want their armed forces to overcome, but it does leave the insurgents in control of the population, the real “terrain” of any insurgency. Of course, the ordinary administrative functions of government can also be employed against the insurgents, less compellingly perhaps but without need of violence. Insurgents everywhere seek to prohibit any form of collaboration or contact with the authorities, but they cannot normally prevent civilians from entering government offices to apply for obligatory licenses, permits, travel documents, and such. That provides venues for intelligence officers on site to ask applicants to provide information on the insurgents, in exchange for the approval of their requests and perhaps other rewards. This effective and straightforward method has been widely used, and there is no ethical or legal reason why it should not be used by the armed forces of the United States as well. But it does require the apparatus of military government, complete with administrative services for civilians. During and after the Second World War, after very detailed preparations, the U.S. Army and Navy governed the American zone of Germany, all of Japan, and parts of Italy. Initially, U.S. officers were themselves the administrators, with such assistance from local officials they chose to re-employ. Since then, however, the United States has preferred both in Vietnam long ago and now in Iraq to leave government to the locals.
That decision reflects another kind of politics, manifest in the ambivalence of a United States government that is willing to fight wars, that is willing to start wars because of future threats, that is willing to conquer territory or even entire countries, and yet is unwilling to govern what it conquers, even for a few years. Consequently, for all the real talent manifest in the writing of FM 3-24 DRAFT, its prescriptions are in the end of little or no use and amount to a kind of malpractice. All its best methods, all its clever tactics, all the treasure and blood that the United States has been willing to expend, cannot overcome the crippling ambivalence of occupiers who refuse to govern, and their principled and inevitable refusal to out-terrorize the insurgents, the necessary and sufficient condition of a tranquil occupation.
BY Edward Luttwak
PUBLISHED February 2007
Harpers.com
PROLOGUE
Modern armed forces continue to be structured for large-scale war, but advanced societies whose small families lack expendable children have a very low tolerance for casualties. Even supposedly warlike Americans gravely count casualties in Iraq that in three years have yet to reach 3,000—fewer than were lost in many a single day of battle in past wars. Fortunately, this refusal to spill the blood needed to fuel battles diminishes the likelihood that advanced societies will deliberately set out to fight one another (pas des enfants, pas des Suisses, pas de guerre) unless they are somehow able to convince themselves that a war could be entirely or very largely aerial and naval. Such wars, however, are difficult to imagine, except when islands are involved, as in a China-Taiwan war, which is very improbable for its own reasons. Air and naval forces can certainly be employed advantageously against any less advanced enemy incautious enough to rely on a conventional defense, conducted by regular forces, but in that context as well there must be severe doubts about the continued usefulness of the ground forces of advanced countries that are intolerant of casualties. It is easy enough to blockade the enemy, to successfully bomb all the right nodal points and shut down electrical, transportation, and communications networks. Air strikes can disable runways and destroy both sheltered and unsheltered aircraft, ballistic missiles, and nuclear installations. Air power can also sink warships, or rout any mechanized forces deployed in the open, as the United States did with Iraq in 1991 and partly in 2003, and as it could do with Iran. No real role would remain for ground forces except to dislodge the enemy from any territory he had occupied, or to occupy his own territory. That, however, is bound to cost casualties that might not be tolerated; it is also bound to provoke an insurgency.
In that event, naval forces cannot do much, because insurgencies rarely have an important maritime dimension (the Sri Lanka case is an exception) and riverine operations are usually minor. Air forces can have surveillance and transport roles, but insurgents rarely present targets of sufficient stability and sufficient contrast to be identified, designated, and effectively attacked from the air. That leaves almost everything to the ground forces, and when the advanced attack the less advanced, the more advanced forces will have large advantages in firepower, mobility, and operational coherence. But they will also have no visible enemy to fight, so that the normal operational methods and tactics of conventional warfare cannot be applied. True, there are the alternative methods and tactics of counterinsurgency warfare, but do they actually work? Insurgents do not always win, but their defeats can rarely be attributed to counterinsurgency warfare, as we shall see.
THE THEORY OF COUNTERINSURGENCY WARFARE
Two distinguished American generals of exceptional intelligence, James N. Mattis of the Marine Corps and David H. Petraeus of the Army, each now responsible for the training and doctrine policy of his own service, have recently circulated the text of a new “counterinsurgency” field manual, FM 3-24 DRAFT, which they propose for official use. Its doctrines emerge from the chapter titles. After a first chapter of definitions (which any military manual must have, because the battlefield is no place for semantic debate) we come to the first substantive chapter, “Unity of Effort: Integrating Civil and Military Activities,” in which the authors duly recognize and strongly emphasize the essentially political nature of the struggle against insurgents. That is hardly an original discovery, as the two generals and their staffs would be the first to recognize, yet it is still necessary to affirm what should be obvious, because amid the frustrations of fighting a mostly invisible enemy, it is hard to resist the tempting delusion that some clever new tactics, or even some clever new technology, can defeat the insurgents.
Much more questionable is the proposition that follows, which is presented as self-evident, that a necessary if not sufficient condition of victory is to provide what the insurgents cannot: basic public services, physical reconstruction, the hope of economic development and social amelioration. The hidden assumption here is that there is only one kind of politics in this world, a politics in which popular support is important or even decisive, and that such support can be won by providing better government. Yet the extraordinary persistence of dictatorships as diverse in style as the regimes of Cuba, Libya, North Korea, and Syria shows that in fact government needs no popular support as long as it can secure obedience. As for better government, that is certainly wanted in France, Norway, or the United States, but obviously not in Afghanistan or Iraq, where many people prefer indigenous and religious oppression to the freedoms offered by foreign invaders.
The very word “guerrilla,” which now refers only to a tactic, was first used to describe the ferocious insurgency of the illiterate Spanish poor against their would-be liberators, under the leadership of their traditional oppressors. On July 6, 1808, King Joseph of Spain presented a draft constitution that for the first time in Spain’s history offered an independent judiciary, freedom of the press, and the abolition of the remaining feudal privileges of the aristocracy and of the Church. At that time, abbeys, monasteries, and bishops still owned every building and every piece of land in 3,148 towns and villages, which were inhabited by some of Europe’s most wretched tenants. Despite the fact that the new constitution would have liberated them and let them keep their harvests for themselves, the Spanish peasantry failed to rise up in its support. Instead, they obeyed the priests, who summoned them to fight against the ungodly innovations of the foreign invader. For Joseph was the brother of Napoleon Bonaparte, placed on the Spanish throne by French troops. That was all that mattered to most Spaniards—not what was proposed but by whom it was proposed.
By then the French should have known better. In 1799 the same thing had happened in Naples, whose liberals, supported by the French, were slaughtered by the very peasants and plebeians they wished to emancipate. They were mustered into a militia of the “Holy Faith” by Cardinal Fabrizio Ruffo, coincidentally a member of Calabria’s largest land-owning family, who led his men forward on horseback. Ruffo easily persuaded his followers that all promises of material betterment were irrelevant, because the real aim of the French and the liberals was to destroy the Catholic religion in the service of Satan. Spain’s clergy did the same, and their illiterate followers could not know that the very first clause of Joseph’s draft constitution had not only recognized the Roman Apostolic Catholic Church but stated that it was the only one allowed in Spain.
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The same kind of politics are now in evidence in Afghanistan and Iraq, including the ineffectual enshrinement of Islam in the new Iraqi constitution, and the emergence of clerical warlords who are as ready to use violence as Cardinal Ruffo was. Since the 2003 invasion, both Shiite and Sunni clerics have been repeating over and over again that the Americans and their “Christian” allies have come to Iraq to destroy Islam in its cultural heartland and to steal the country’s oil. The clerics dismiss all talk of democracy and human rights by the invaders as mere hypocrisy—with the exception of women’s rights, which the clerics say are only propagandized to persuade Iraqi daughters and wives to dishonor their families by imitating the shameless nakedness and impertinence of Western women.
The vast majority of Afghans and Iraqis naturally believe their religious leaders. The alternative would be to believe what for them is entirely unbelievable: that foreigners are unselfishly expending blood and treasure in order to help them. They themselves would never invade a foreign country except to plunder it, the way Iraq invaded Kuwait, thus having made Saddam Hussein genuinely popular for a time when troops brought back their loot. As many opinion polls and countless incidents demonstrate, the Americans and their allies are widely considered to be the worst of invaders, who came to rob Muslim Iraqis not only of their territory and oil but also of their religion and even their family honor. Many Muslims around the world believe as much, even in Turkey, whose most successful recent film depicted an American Jewish military doctor who was operating on Iraqis not to save their lives but to remove their kidneys, which of course he was sending back to the U.S. for transplantation and his personal profit (he was Jewish after all). It is the same in Afghanistan, where the American-imposed quota of women parliamentarians has caused widespread resentment, not least because most Afghans are scandalized by the spectacle of a woman contradicting a man in public—as in, for example, televised parliamentary debates.
In other words, “Integrating Civil and Military Activities” to improve local conditions need not gain public support. And even if it did, it does not automatically follow that such support would be decisive, or even important.
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Next comes a very long section on “Intelligence in Counterinsurgency,” which reflects the crucial predicament of counterinsurgency warfare: the unseen enemy, who can choose when to emerge from civilian cover to launch his attacks, and increasingly can attack by remote control, reducing his exposure or avoiding exposure altogether. Everywhere outgunned, and in Iraq if not Afghanistan outnumbered as well, the insurgents would be easily defeated if their invisibility could be stripped away. That much is obvious. But the authors then automatically assume that it is simply an intelligence problem to identify the insurgents among the population. This is another very questionable proposition, as we shall see, because in fact it is a political problem, which always has a political solution, however unpalatable that may be.
In any case, proceeding on their general premise, the detailed headings that follow point to different ways of overcoming the invisibility of insurgents by using all possible intelligence sources, methods, and assets. The chapter entitled “Intelligence Characteristics in Counterinsurgency” points to the need to have rather different skills and talents when the targets are extremely “low-contrast” insurgents, as opposed to high-contrast targets such as airfields or warships. Next comes “Predeployment Planning and Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield,” a section that emphasizes the specificity of counterinsurgency as to time, place, population, culture, and more, as opposed to the general-purpose intelligence preparations for regular war. For example, it is useful to have trained Arabic-speaking interrogators if one plans to invade an Arab-speaking country, and, at a less elementary level, it is useful to have some cultural instruction before trying to analyze the behavior of the locals.
After that comes “Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Operations,” discussing, among other things, the different ways of using regular forces, with their regular platforms and sensors, to find the elusive insurgents. These methods may or may not work but certainly entail the use of ultrasophisticated and very expensive F-15s and F-18s, with the most advanced sensors to detect and track the man, the boy, and the donkey who may or may not be transporting an “improvised explosive device” to its intended emplacement. Then comes the delicate subject of “Counterintelligence and Counterreconnaissance.” The second of these is straightforward enough: before attacking a target, it is usually essential for insurgents to observe it in order to plan the action, and with a bit of luck such observers can be spotted by alert defenders. Often the best way of protecting potential targets is to anticipate attacks against them by countersurveillance (or “counterreconnaissance”), then to pre-empt or ambush the attackers. What is delicate is the “Counterintelligence” part, which points to the likelihood of insurgent penetrations of the local forces that are supposedly fighting the insurgency—the friends and allies in need that are being provided with training, weapons, and money. Penetrations always occur, even in the best of military forces and intelligence services, but there is a difference in scale between the consequences of a traitor or two and wholesale enlistments to serve the enemy cause (or the inadvertent recruitment of enemies into the ranks). For example, it must be universally recognized by now that in Iraq many if not most of the Shiites in the army and police force are actually under the orders of one or another of the Shiite militias, including the “Mahdi army,” that occasionally launch surprise attacks on American or British forces. Equally, many of the Kurds who are paid by the government or by the Americans directly are in the service of either Massoud Barazani or Jalal Talebani, the two chieftains who trade under the labels of the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan. (Talebani, moreover, is now Iraq’s president.) Far more dangerously, the Sunnis in the army and police force who have been recruited, trained, equipped, and salaried to fight the Sunni insurgents are just as likely to help the insurgency, or even to be insurgents themselves, on temporary detachment to the government forces, so to speak. That is the only way that Sunnis, whose families live among the Sunni population, can both receive a salary and also keep their families alive. But again, this is really a political problem, which has an unpalatable solution that is certainly more reliable than “Counterintelligence” could ever be.
Later comes “Intelligence Collaboration and Fusion,” which refers to the sharing and integration of intelligence coming in separate channels from different services, branches, and individual sources. Such cooperation is characteristic of regular war operations as well, but it is more critical when the targets are almost always unstable, elusive, and lowcontrast—if even identifiable at all, as they rarely are. What follows are more predictable chapters on “Designing Counterintelligence Operations” and executing them, and developing “Host Nation” security forces, the relative brevity of these chapters underlining the emphasis the authors place on intelligence operations. Recent scandals readily explain the need for an entire chapter on “Leadership and Ethics for Counterinsurgency,” and the chapter on “Building and Sustaining Capability and Capacity,” with a subsection on counterinsurgency logistics, also reflects the unhappy experience of Iraq.
Ammunition supply—along with fuel, usually the biggest item in regular operations budgets—is relatively unimportant, since very little ammunition is expended fighting an insurgency, yet logistics still present difficulties in Iraq because supplies cannot simply be trucked from A to B without a high risk of destructive attacks by insurgents, hijacking by militias in need of supplies, simple highway robbery, or opportunistic looting by ordinary civilians. (There are many natural predators in the Iraqi population, probably because of the high proportion of ex-nomads and their direct descendants, for whom the razzia is still an honorable and manly tradition.) Truck convoys can be more secure if rather less efficient, but their safety depends on the quality of their escorts, which are necessarily very scarce and expensive if they are U.S. troops (the British, near the seaport, as is their wont, are more easily supplied), less scarce but even more expensive if they are security contractors, and very cheap but extremely unreliable if they are Iraqi soldiers or police. The end result is that hyper-expensive helicopter hours are very often used to carry even low-value, non-urgent supplies, which is one reason why the occupation costs so much even though very little ordnance is being expended.
Incidentally, in spite of all the advances in “jointness,” when the U.S. Air Force tried to help out the Army (and dissuade it from acquiring its own intra-theater fixed-wing aircraft) by providing a regular shuttle service of C-130 turboprop transports between Kuwait and different bases in Iraq, the aircraft ended up carrying mostly “sailboat fuel”—that is, they flew empty because it was easier for Army formations to use their own helicopters and smaller fixed-wing aircraft than to “interface” with the Air Force.
Two more things can be noted about the new field manual before turning to the peculiar politics of insurgency and counterinsurgency. There is an Appendix to the chapter on “Predeployment Planning and Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield” that further emphasizes the subject’s importance and includes a section on “Linguistic Support.” It is a sad story indeed when the astonishing linguistic incapacity of U.S. military forces and intelligence organizations is contrasted with the abundance of American civilians who speak all known foreign languages, and the brilliant record of foreign-language education in the U.S. Army and Navy, which used to produce as many good Chinese and Japanese speakers as they wanted by selecting for natural aptitude in the recruit pool, giving them a year of intensive courses (eight hours a day, six days a week), and quickly sending away those who failed to keep up with their classes. Nothing prevents the military from doing the same for Arabic, Persian and, say, Azeri now, except for an unwillingness to invest in the future, and probably a lack of disciplined volunteers willing to learn a language eight hours a day, six days a week, for a whole year or more.
FM 3-24 DRAFT ends with a list of suggested readings, and one of the first books on the list is Small Wars: A Tactical Handbook for Imperial Soldiers (1890), by Charles E. Calwell. The previous counterinsurgency manual, FM 3-07.22, also had such a list, and its first suggested reading was The Battle of the Casbah: Terrorism and Counterterrorism in Algeria, 1955‒57, by Paul Aussaresses. Is it therefore the case that counterinsurgency doctrine has been evolving backward, from the doubts of the 1950s to the certitudes of 1890? That is no accusation, alas, because one needs to go back even further to find convincing models of success in defeating insurgents by military means.
COUNTERINSURGENCY IN PRACTICE: IRAQ
We begin with some elementary observations. The armed forces of the most advanced countries, and certainly of the United States, all formidable against enemies assembled in conveniently targetable massed formations, are least effective in fighting insurgents. That was demonstrated in Vietnam in many different ways over many years, even as the occasional North Vietnamese regular unit that ventured to fight conventionally was efficiently destroyed. The same two-part proposition is unnecessarily being proven all over again in Iraq, damaging the reputation of the United States for wisdom and strength, misusing fine soldiers, wasting vast amounts of money on skillful but ineffectual air and ground operations, inflicting added suffering on Iraqis at large, and taking the lives of young Americans whose sacrifice, one fears, will be deemed futile.
There is no mystery about the first part of the proposition. Because of their abundant resources and all-round competence, morale, discipline, and skills, the armed forces of the United States on the largest scale, and of other advanced countries on their scale, can usually generate much more firepower than their antagonists. These days, moreover, they can do so with routine precision because of sensors that reveal targets even in poor visibility; platforms and weapons that can reach targets at any planetary range; accurate guidance and homing devices; and command and communication networks that combine all those abilities. Up to a point, the second part of the proposition is merely the logical consequence of the first: faced with especially superior firepower, insurgents strive to be especially elusive—more so than if they were facing less formidable regular forces—and as targets diminish, so does the value of firepower.
But there is much more to it than that. Specifically, there is the matter of politics, on both sides. Unless insurgents confine their operations to thoroughly deserted areas where there is no one to observe them, they must have at least the passive cooperation of local inhabitants. Whether they fail to report the insurgents to the authorities out of sympathy for their cause or in terror of their vengeance is entirely irrelevant. In either case, the insurgents are in control of the population around them, and not the authorities. That essentially political advantage is enough to allow motivated insurgents to overcome all manner of tactical weaknesses in combat skills and weapons.
As in so many previous cases, in a manner abundantly familiar from previous insurgencies, that political situation is now playing out in Iraq, where insurgents live very safely in Sunni neighborhoods, towns, and villages, emerging to place bombs or launch attacks when and where it suits them before resuming innocuous civilian identities once again. Local insurgents may indeed pass unobserved by their neighbors when inactive, but not when they take up weapons and gather for operations, while the foreign volunteers among them necessarily attract attention even when they carry no weapons because of their distinct speech and manner. Many of the local inhabitants certainly know who the insurgents are and where they keep their stores of explosives and weapons, but they are not telling. That is why U.S. Army and Marine patrols cannot find insurgents unless they choose to reveal themselves by engaging in direct combat, which of course they rarely do, and only when they think that they have a great advantage. The mostly futile American patrols therefore expose soldiers to the mines, remote-controlled explosives, snipers, and mortar bombs that inflict daily casualties.
Naturally, every form of technical intelligence and every possible sensor is being employed to supplant the lack of very elementary but indispensable human intelligence, including synthetic-aperture radars aboard big four-engine aircraft and the infrared and video sensors of the latest targeting pods on two-seat heavyweight jet fighters. The expense of these flights alone is huge, amounting to hundreds of millions of dollars a month, but the results are very meager. The aim, of course, is to gather immediately actionable imagery, especially at night, showing such things as insurgents placing side bombs alongside U.S. patrol routes or approaching oil pipelines bearing explosives. Failing that, it is at least hoped that possible insurgent activities could be detected for further investigation; for example, people furtively bringing things to isolated buildings at night. But in practice, unless insurgents carry recognizable weapons, it is simply impossible to differentiate between them and innocent people going about their peaceful business. In the meantime, very elaborate equipment that is very costly to operate, and very effective in identifying armored vehicles, bunkers, missile launchers, and any other readily recognizable target of classic form, is still being employed every day in futile attempts to detect deliveries of a few dollars of food, or the emplacement of readily improvised explosive devices. This too is an aspect of the structural unsuitability of modern armed forces to fight elusive enemies that present no stable targets.
The essentially political advantage of the insurgents in commanding at least the silence of the local population cannot be overcome by technical means no matter how advanced. Nor can the better operational methods and tactics advocated in FM 3-24 DRAFT be of much help. So few of the insurgents ever engage in direct combat, so much of the insurgency takes covert forms, ranging from the infiltration of the government to bombings, sabotage, and assassinations, that the tactical defeats inflicted on the insurgents—including the killing of their top leaders and heroes—have no perceptible impact on the volume of the violence, and of its political consequences.
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In Iraq, as noted, there is supposed to be a far better way of finding insurgents than patrols driving about or sensors, howsoever sophisticated: the Iraqi police and army. Their recruitment, training, equipment, and upkeep, a very costly enterprise in both money and blood, has also yielded meager results because the politics of the situation are again central, and again unfavorable. It is easy to recruit local auxiliaries in any poor country, and any number of Shiites, Kurds, and Sunni Arabs can readily be recruited—in recent decades that is how many of them made a living, by exploiting their privileged access as Sunnis and Arabs to prized military and police salaries. Other jobs were much less desirable, because they required work, and now, in any case, they are very scarce. But while they are willing to wear the uniforms and accept training up to a point, Sunni Arabs are naturally disinclined to help capture or kill insurgents who are fighting to restore the Sunni Arab ascendancy over Iraq. Besides, their families would be in deadly peril if they were suspected of loyalty to their government, and by extension to the Americans. Some of those policemen and soldiers know much about the insurgents and where exactly they might be found, but are still of no help in finding them, precisely because they are insurgents themselves. Even if specifically ordered into action on those rare occasions in which there is overt combat, most Sunni Arab policemen and soldiers will not fight the insurgents; if they cannot simply stand back quietly, they are apt to desert, usually with their weapons. As for army and police units manned mostly by Shiite Arabs or Kurds, they are not actively disloyal, but they cannot gather information on the insurgents either. Sunni Arab civilians will not confide in them any more than in Americans, and perhaps less, because sooner or later the Americans will leave Iraq, but the Kurds and Shiites will not, and they are therefore the greater enemy.
The adverse political terrain of counterinsurgency is simply a given in Iraq, as it is everywhere else, for if insurgents do not receive, or cannot forcibly exact, at least the passive collaboration of the population at large, they normally cannot survive at all.
THE EASY AND RELIABLE WAY OF DEFEATING ALL INSURGENCIES EVERYWHERE
Perfectly ordinary regular armed forces, with no counterinsurgency doctrine or training whatever, have in the past regularly defeated insurgents, by using a number of well-proven methods. It is enough to consider these methods to see why the armed forces of the United States or of any other democratic country cannot possibly use them.
The simple starting point is that insurgents are not the only ones who can intimidate or terrorize civilians. For instance, whenever insurgents are believed to be present in a village, small town, or distinct city district—a very common occurrence in Iraq at present, as in other insurgency situations—the local notables can be compelled to surrender them to the authorities, under the threat of escalating punishments, all the way to mass executions. That is how the Ottoman Empire could control entire provinces with a few feared janissaries and a squadron or two of cavalry. The Turks were simply too few to hunt down hidden rebels, but they did not have to: they went to the village chiefs and town notables instead, to demand their surrender, or else. A massacre once in a while remained an effective warning for decades. So it was mostly by social pressure rather than brute force that the Ottomans preserved their rule: it was the leaders of each ethnic or religious group inclined to rebellion that did their best to keep things quiet, and if they failed, they were quite likely to tell the Turks where to find the rebels before more harm was done.
Long before the Ottoman Empire, the Romans knew how to combine sticks and carrots to obtain obedience and suppress insurgencies. Conquered peoples too proud to accept the benefits of their rule, from public baths and free circus shows to reliable law courts, were “de-bellicized” (a very Roman idea). It was done by killing all who dared to resist in arms—it made good combat practice for the legions—by selling into slavery any who were captured in battle, by leveling towns that held out under siege instead of promptly surrendering, and by readily accepting as peaceful subjects and future citizens all who submitted to Roman rule. In the first two and most successful centuries of imperial Rome, some 300,000 soldiers in all, only half of them highly trained legionary troops, were enough to secure a vast empire that stretched well beyond the Mediterranean basin that formed its core, today the territory of some thirty European, Middle Eastern, and North African states. The Romans could not disperse their soldiers in hundreds of cities, thousands of towns, and countless hamlets to repress riot or rebellion; the troops were needed to guard the frontiers. Instead, they relied on deterrence, which was periodically reinforced by exemplary punishments. Most inhabitants of the empire never rebelled after their initial conquest. A few tribes and nations had to be reconquered after trying and failing to overthrow Roman rule. A few simply refused to become obedient, and so they were killed off: “They make a wasteland and call it peace” was the bitter complaint of a Scottish chieftain (as reported by Tacitus).
Terrible reprisals to deter any form of resistance were standard operating procedure for the German armed forces in the Second World War, and very effective they were in containing resistance with very few troops. As against all the dramatic films and books that describe the heroic achievements of the resistance all over occupied Europe, military historians have documented the tranquillity that the German occupiers mostly enjoyed, and the normality of collaboration, not merely by notorious traitors such as the incautious French poet or the failed Norwegian politician but by vast numbers of ordinary people. Polish railwaymen, for example, secured the entire sustenance of the German eastern front. As for the daring resistance attacks that feature in films, they did happen occasionally, but not often, and not because of any lack of bravery in fighting the routinely formidable Germans but because of the terrible punishments they inflicted on the population.
Occupiers can thus be successful without need of any specialized counterinsurgency methods or tactics if they are willing to out-terrorize the insurgents, so that the fear of reprisals outweighs the desire to help the insurgents or their threats. The Germans also established secure and economical forms of occupation by exploiting isolated resistance attacks to achieve much broader demonstration effects. Lone German dispatch riders were easily toppled by tensed wires or otherwise intercepted and killed, but then troops would arrive on the scene to burn or demolish the surrounding buildings or farms or the nearest village, seizing and killing anyone who aroused suspicion or just happened to be there. After word of the terrible deeds spread and was duly exaggerated, German dispatch riders could safely continue on their way, until reaching some other uninstructed part of the world, where the sequence would have to be repeated.
Likewise in the Vietnam War, the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese were skilled in using terror to secure their pervasive territorial control and very ready to use any amount of violence against civilians, from countless individual assassinations to mass executions, as in Hue in 1968. The Communist cause had its enthusiasts, “fellow travelers,” and opportunistic followers, but Vietnamese who were none of the above, and not outright enemies, were compelled to collaborate actively or passively by the threat of the violence so liberally used. That is exactly what the insurgents in Iraq are now doing, and this is no coincidence. All insurgencies follow the same pattern. Locals who are not sympathetic to begin with, who cannot be recruited to the cause, are compelled to collaborate by the fear of violence, readily reinforced by the demonstrative killing of those who insist on refusing to help the resistance. Neutrality is not an option.
* * *
By contrast, the capacity of American armed forces to inflict collective punishments does not extend much beyond curfews and other such restrictions, inconvenient to be sure and perhaps sufficient to impose real hardship, but obviously insufficient to out-terrorize insurgents. Needless to say, this is not a political limitation that Americans would ever want their armed forces to overcome, but it does leave the insurgents in control of the population, the real “terrain” of any insurgency. Of course, the ordinary administrative functions of government can also be employed against the insurgents, less compellingly perhaps but without need of violence. Insurgents everywhere seek to prohibit any form of collaboration or contact with the authorities, but they cannot normally prevent civilians from entering government offices to apply for obligatory licenses, permits, travel documents, and such. That provides venues for intelligence officers on site to ask applicants to provide information on the insurgents, in exchange for the approval of their requests and perhaps other rewards. This effective and straightforward method has been widely used, and there is no ethical or legal reason why it should not be used by the armed forces of the United States as well. But it does require the apparatus of military government, complete with administrative services for civilians. During and after the Second World War, after very detailed preparations, the U.S. Army and Navy governed the American zone of Germany, all of Japan, and parts of Italy. Initially, U.S. officers were themselves the administrators, with such assistance from local officials they chose to re-employ. Since then, however, the United States has preferred both in Vietnam long ago and now in Iraq to leave government to the locals.
That decision reflects another kind of politics, manifest in the ambivalence of a United States government that is willing to fight wars, that is willing to start wars because of future threats, that is willing to conquer territory or even entire countries, and yet is unwilling to govern what it conquers, even for a few years. Consequently, for all the real talent manifest in the writing of FM 3-24 DRAFT, its prescriptions are in the end of little or no use and amount to a kind of malpractice. All its best methods, all its clever tactics, all the treasure and blood that the United States has been willing to expend, cannot overcome the crippling ambivalence of occupiers who refuse to govern, and their principled and inevitable refusal to out-terrorize the insurgents, the necessary and sufficient condition of a tranquil occupation.
Sovereignty, NAFTA loom large at summit
The leaders of Canada, Mexico, and the US face anxieties at home about weaker national sovereignty.
By Howard LaFranchi | Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor
from the August 22, 2007 edition
Washington
Cooperative – but not too close.
With the leaders of the United States, Canada, and Mexico each facing rising anxieties at home over perceptions of weakening national sovereignty, that was the common objective of Tuesday's NAFTA summit at a wooded resort in Quebec.
US President George W. Bush, Mexican President Felipe Calderón, and Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper wanted their annual gathering to highlight efforts to accommodate booming trade among the three countries while also enhancing border security. To that end, the leaders were expected to announce a new plan for meeting border-crossing demands during emergencies – either natural or man-made, such as a terrorist attack – at a press conference Tuesday afternoon.
But even as hurricane Dean bore down on Mexico's Yucatán Peninsula, a figurative storm of national-sovereignty fears was churning relations among the three neighbors, linked by the North American Free Trade Agreement since 1994. The anxiety reflects disappointments over NAFTA's results, some experts say, even as the trade agreement is blamed for the perceived negative impact of closer relations.
"We've now had more than a decade of implementation of NAFTA, and there's a rising sense of negatives associated with that – in particular a sense of loss of local control to some overarching superentity – even as the promises of NAFTA uplifting everyone, creating jobs, and enhancing the rate of development do not seem to have been kept," says Miguel Tinker-Salas, an expert in Western Hemisphere relations at Pomona College in Claremont, Calif. "In all three countries, people feel this super-government they have no say in is having a growing influence over their lives."
•In the US, Mr. Bush faces growing criticism, largely from within his own conservative base, that illegal immigration and a border left porous to accommodate trade that serves the interests of large corporations are reducing America's control of its own affairs.
In a letter to Bush on the eve of his trip to Canada, 22 members of Congress – 21 Republicans and one Democrat – expressed "serious and growing concerns" about decisions the Bush administration has taken with neighbor governments that "may actually undermine our security and sovereignty." In particular, the members of Congress warned Bush off any deepening of a Security and Prosperity Partnership (SPP) that the US launched with Canada and Mexico in 2005.
•In Canada, a few hundred protesters calling for a "No to Americanada" gathered outside the summit site, motivated in part by fears that an integration of the three North American countries is proceeding under the public's radar and at official gatherings closed to outside scrutiny.
Whipping up Canadian sentiments are Canada's participation in the war in Afghanistan and the US response to Canada's recent claim to the Northwest Passage in the northern Arctic region. The Bush administration says it considers the shipping route – expected to grow in importance with the melting of Arctic ices – to be in international waters.
•In Mexico, age-old worries about American interference in internal affairs have spiked recently with discussion of a plan for increased US assistance in fighting Mexico's drug gangs. At the same time, members of Mexico's Congress have railed against lost control of internal affairs to the SPP process, which some say is dominated by the more-powerful US.
In the US, discussion of lost sovereignty as a result of advancing NAFTA integration – a discussion that is particularly strong on anti-immigration websites and blogs – has become so pervasive that the White House has taken the unusual step of providing its own rebuttal on a special "myths vs. facts" Web page about the SPP. The site labels as "myth," for example, that North America is headed toward a common currency.
But some critics say the Bush administration has brought the rumors and speculations on itself by conducting meetings on the SPP's implementation away from public scrutiny. Of particular concern is a North American forum in Canada last September, the minutes of which were labeled "not for public release." Later obtained by the watchdog group Judicial Watch through a Freedom of Information Act request, the minutes included the use of the expression "evolution by stealth" to describe how "the concept of North America" might best move forward. (see page 9)
While the concerns about lack of transparency in NAFTA relations are real, some experts say that growing concerns in the US about illegal immigration are the big motivation behind the anti-NAFTA boom. "For better or worse, these concerns are expressed in terms of Mexican immigration," says Mr. Tinker-Salas.
He notes that when Americans worry about "Mexican trucks careening down our freeways with bad brakes" – a reference to a measure under the SPP that would open the border to Mexican truck transport – fears of more Mexicans taking American jobs are not far behind.
At the same time, when Mexicans see the anti-immigration discussion in the US, they feel they've been hoodwinked once again. An executive order by Bush earlier this month that seeks to tighten immigration controls in the wake of congressional failure to enact immigration reform is one example for them of the reality of American control of their destiny.
"For many Mexicans, NAFTA was a matter of integration, an agreement that would put relations on more of an equal footing," says Tinker-Salas. "But now it's very clear to them that things are back to the usual, that Mexicans are being scapegoated once again as the source of all of America's ills."
The leaders of Canada, Mexico, and the US face anxieties at home about weaker national sovereignty.
By Howard LaFranchi | Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor
from the August 22, 2007 edition
Washington
Cooperative – but not too close.
With the leaders of the United States, Canada, and Mexico each facing rising anxieties at home over perceptions of weakening national sovereignty, that was the common objective of Tuesday's NAFTA summit at a wooded resort in Quebec.
US President George W. Bush, Mexican President Felipe Calderón, and Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper wanted their annual gathering to highlight efforts to accommodate booming trade among the three countries while also enhancing border security. To that end, the leaders were expected to announce a new plan for meeting border-crossing demands during emergencies – either natural or man-made, such as a terrorist attack – at a press conference Tuesday afternoon.
But even as hurricane Dean bore down on Mexico's Yucatán Peninsula, a figurative storm of national-sovereignty fears was churning relations among the three neighbors, linked by the North American Free Trade Agreement since 1994. The anxiety reflects disappointments over NAFTA's results, some experts say, even as the trade agreement is blamed for the perceived negative impact of closer relations.
"We've now had more than a decade of implementation of NAFTA, and there's a rising sense of negatives associated with that – in particular a sense of loss of local control to some overarching superentity – even as the promises of NAFTA uplifting everyone, creating jobs, and enhancing the rate of development do not seem to have been kept," says Miguel Tinker-Salas, an expert in Western Hemisphere relations at Pomona College in Claremont, Calif. "In all three countries, people feel this super-government they have no say in is having a growing influence over their lives."
•In the US, Mr. Bush faces growing criticism, largely from within his own conservative base, that illegal immigration and a border left porous to accommodate trade that serves the interests of large corporations are reducing America's control of its own affairs.
In a letter to Bush on the eve of his trip to Canada, 22 members of Congress – 21 Republicans and one Democrat – expressed "serious and growing concerns" about decisions the Bush administration has taken with neighbor governments that "may actually undermine our security and sovereignty." In particular, the members of Congress warned Bush off any deepening of a Security and Prosperity Partnership (SPP) that the US launched with Canada and Mexico in 2005.
•In Canada, a few hundred protesters calling for a "No to Americanada" gathered outside the summit site, motivated in part by fears that an integration of the three North American countries is proceeding under the public's radar and at official gatherings closed to outside scrutiny.
Whipping up Canadian sentiments are Canada's participation in the war in Afghanistan and the US response to Canada's recent claim to the Northwest Passage in the northern Arctic region. The Bush administration says it considers the shipping route – expected to grow in importance with the melting of Arctic ices – to be in international waters.
•In Mexico, age-old worries about American interference in internal affairs have spiked recently with discussion of a plan for increased US assistance in fighting Mexico's drug gangs. At the same time, members of Mexico's Congress have railed against lost control of internal affairs to the SPP process, which some say is dominated by the more-powerful US.
In the US, discussion of lost sovereignty as a result of advancing NAFTA integration – a discussion that is particularly strong on anti-immigration websites and blogs – has become so pervasive that the White House has taken the unusual step of providing its own rebuttal on a special "myths vs. facts" Web page about the SPP. The site labels as "myth," for example, that North America is headed toward a common currency.
But some critics say the Bush administration has brought the rumors and speculations on itself by conducting meetings on the SPP's implementation away from public scrutiny. Of particular concern is a North American forum in Canada last September, the minutes of which were labeled "not for public release." Later obtained by the watchdog group Judicial Watch through a Freedom of Information Act request, the minutes included the use of the expression "evolution by stealth" to describe how "the concept of North America" might best move forward. (see page 9)
While the concerns about lack of transparency in NAFTA relations are real, some experts say that growing concerns in the US about illegal immigration are the big motivation behind the anti-NAFTA boom. "For better or worse, these concerns are expressed in terms of Mexican immigration," says Mr. Tinker-Salas.
He notes that when Americans worry about "Mexican trucks careening down our freeways with bad brakes" – a reference to a measure under the SPP that would open the border to Mexican truck transport – fears of more Mexicans taking American jobs are not far behind.
At the same time, when Mexicans see the anti-immigration discussion in the US, they feel they've been hoodwinked once again. An executive order by Bush earlier this month that seeks to tighten immigration controls in the wake of congressional failure to enact immigration reform is one example for them of the reality of American control of their destiny.
"For many Mexicans, NAFTA was a matter of integration, an agreement that would put relations on more of an equal footing," says Tinker-Salas. "But now it's very clear to them that things are back to the usual, that Mexicans are being scapegoated once again as the source of all of America's ills."
Death squad leader behind abduction of five Britons is named
Martin Fletcher in Baghdad
From The Times (UK)
August 30, 2007
Iraq’s most infamous Shia death squad commander was accused yesterday of masterminding the kidnapping of five British citizens who have not been heard from since their abduction in Baghdad three months ago.
Hoshyar Zebari, Iraq’s Foreign Minister, told The Times that a group led by Abu Dera, a legendary figure with strong Iranian connections who is renowned for his brutality, was behind the abduction of the five Britons from the Iraqi Finance Ministry on May 29.
Mr Zebari said there was a striking similiarity between their abduction and that of Iraq’s Deputy Oil Minister by Abu Dera’s supporters on August 14. In both instances well-organised forces broke into heavily protected compounds.
The minister and five colleagues were seized by gunmen dressed in security force uniforms who forced their way into the offices of Iraq’s crude oil marketing agency. The Britons were seized by armed men dressed as Iraqi policemen who broke into the Finance Ministry. “I believe the same group who did this did the Ministry of Finance [raid],” Mr Zebari said in an interview in which he also cautioned of “catastrophic consequences” if Britain and America prematurely withdraw from Iraq.
Abdel Jabber al-Wagaa, the Deputy Oil Minister, and his colleagues were released unharmed on Tuesday after what Mr Zebari described as “tough” negotiations with the kidnappers. These talks enabled the Iraqi authorities to establish who the kidnappers were. However, Mr Zebari said he was unaware of any contact with the kidnappers of the Britons – a computer consultant and four security guards – and could not say for certain that they were still alive. “People say that since there’s not been any announcements or videos they may have been killed, but I really don’t know,” he said.
Britain has consistently refused to discuss its efforts to rescue the hostages, or even to name them, and an embassy spokeswoman in Baghdad declined to comment on Abu Dera’s alleged involvement yesterday.
The Foreign and Commonwealth Office is in contact with the families of the five hostages and has advised them all not to speak publicly.
In a separate development yesterday the rebel Shia cleric Moqtada al-Sadr ordered his al-Mahdi Army to suspend all armed activities for six months while it restructured itself.
The al-Mahdi Army has been accused of the widespread killing of Sunni civilians as well as numerous attacks on US and British forces. In April the Pentagon labelled it the biggest threat to stability in Iraq. On Tuesday its gunmen fought a running battle with police allied to the rival Badr Brigade in the Shia city of Kerbala, killing 52 people and forcing hundreds of thousands of pilgrims to abandon an important religious festival.
But US and Iraqi officials were unsure that the announcement would lead to a reduction in violence. Some experts believe that Moqtada simply wants to distance himself from what happened in Karbala, and his authority is no longer absolute. The al-Mahdi Army is said to have splintered in recent months, with breakaway factions backed by Iran being blamed for some of the worst violence. Abu Dera is believed to lead one of those.
He is an elusive figure who is spoken of with awe in the Shia slums of Sadr City, where he was raised.
After the US invasion of 2003 he is thought to have been a leading member of the al-Mahdi Army and to have led attacks on American troops. And when Sunni extremists bombed the Shia shrine in Samarra in 2006 he is said to have led the Shia death squads that killed thousands of innocent Sunnis in revenge. Locals say the Iraqi police allowed him free passage.
Stories of his barbarity are legion. A profile published by the Jamestown Foundation reports that he once commandeered several ambulances, drove them into a Sunni neighbourhood and announced on loudspeakers that Shias were slaughtering Sunnis. The young Sunnis who rushed to help were killed.
He allegedly offers his victims the choice of being executed through suffocation, shooting or being smashed to death with cinder blocks. There is a video recording of a man believed to be Abu Dera kidnapping Saddam Hussein’s lawyer Khamis al-Obeidi, parading him through the streets of Sadr City, and then shooting him three times in the head.
Abu Dera, whose real name is Ismail al-Zerjawi, is thought to be in his late thirties, married with two sons. His daring raids into Sunni communities have made him a hero to many poor young Shias. To others he is known as the “Shiite Zarqawi” – a reference to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the former leader in al-Qaeda in Iraq who exhorted Sunnis to kill Shias.
Martin Fletcher in Baghdad
From The Times (UK)
August 30, 2007
Iraq’s most infamous Shia death squad commander was accused yesterday of masterminding the kidnapping of five British citizens who have not been heard from since their abduction in Baghdad three months ago.
Hoshyar Zebari, Iraq’s Foreign Minister, told The Times that a group led by Abu Dera, a legendary figure with strong Iranian connections who is renowned for his brutality, was behind the abduction of the five Britons from the Iraqi Finance Ministry on May 29.
Mr Zebari said there was a striking similiarity between their abduction and that of Iraq’s Deputy Oil Minister by Abu Dera’s supporters on August 14. In both instances well-organised forces broke into heavily protected compounds.
The minister and five colleagues were seized by gunmen dressed in security force uniforms who forced their way into the offices of Iraq’s crude oil marketing agency. The Britons were seized by armed men dressed as Iraqi policemen who broke into the Finance Ministry. “I believe the same group who did this did the Ministry of Finance [raid],” Mr Zebari said in an interview in which he also cautioned of “catastrophic consequences” if Britain and America prematurely withdraw from Iraq.
Abdel Jabber al-Wagaa, the Deputy Oil Minister, and his colleagues were released unharmed on Tuesday after what Mr Zebari described as “tough” negotiations with the kidnappers. These talks enabled the Iraqi authorities to establish who the kidnappers were. However, Mr Zebari said he was unaware of any contact with the kidnappers of the Britons – a computer consultant and four security guards – and could not say for certain that they were still alive. “People say that since there’s not been any announcements or videos they may have been killed, but I really don’t know,” he said.
Britain has consistently refused to discuss its efforts to rescue the hostages, or even to name them, and an embassy spokeswoman in Baghdad declined to comment on Abu Dera’s alleged involvement yesterday.
The Foreign and Commonwealth Office is in contact with the families of the five hostages and has advised them all not to speak publicly.
In a separate development yesterday the rebel Shia cleric Moqtada al-Sadr ordered his al-Mahdi Army to suspend all armed activities for six months while it restructured itself.
The al-Mahdi Army has been accused of the widespread killing of Sunni civilians as well as numerous attacks on US and British forces. In April the Pentagon labelled it the biggest threat to stability in Iraq. On Tuesday its gunmen fought a running battle with police allied to the rival Badr Brigade in the Shia city of Kerbala, killing 52 people and forcing hundreds of thousands of pilgrims to abandon an important religious festival.
But US and Iraqi officials were unsure that the announcement would lead to a reduction in violence. Some experts believe that Moqtada simply wants to distance himself from what happened in Karbala, and his authority is no longer absolute. The al-Mahdi Army is said to have splintered in recent months, with breakaway factions backed by Iran being blamed for some of the worst violence. Abu Dera is believed to lead one of those.
He is an elusive figure who is spoken of with awe in the Shia slums of Sadr City, where he was raised.
After the US invasion of 2003 he is thought to have been a leading member of the al-Mahdi Army and to have led attacks on American troops. And when Sunni extremists bombed the Shia shrine in Samarra in 2006 he is said to have led the Shia death squads that killed thousands of innocent Sunnis in revenge. Locals say the Iraqi police allowed him free passage.
Stories of his barbarity are legion. A profile published by the Jamestown Foundation reports that he once commandeered several ambulances, drove them into a Sunni neighbourhood and announced on loudspeakers that Shias were slaughtering Sunnis. The young Sunnis who rushed to help were killed.
He allegedly offers his victims the choice of being executed through suffocation, shooting or being smashed to death with cinder blocks. There is a video recording of a man believed to be Abu Dera kidnapping Saddam Hussein’s lawyer Khamis al-Obeidi, parading him through the streets of Sadr City, and then shooting him three times in the head.
Abu Dera, whose real name is Ismail al-Zerjawi, is thought to be in his late thirties, married with two sons. His daring raids into Sunni communities have made him a hero to many poor young Shias. To others he is known as the “Shiite Zarqawi” – a reference to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the former leader in al-Qaeda in Iraq who exhorted Sunnis to kill Shias.
Justice Dept wary of "net neutrality" proposals
Thu Sep 6, 2007 3:28PM EDT
By Peter Kaplan
WASHINGTON (Reuters) - Antitrust authorities at the U.S. Justice Department on Thursday warned regulators against imposing "network neutrality" regulations that would bar broadband Internet service companies from charging extra to some content providers.
In comments submitted to the Federal Communications Commission, the department said some net neutrality proposals "could deter broadband Internet providers from upgrading and expanding their networks to reach more Americans."
"Regulators should be careful not to impose regulations that could limit consumer choice and investment in broadband facilities," the department's antitrust chief, Thomas Barnett, said in a statement.
The concept of net neutrality is being studied by the FCC and has been the subject of much debate in Congress. Some lawmakers tried unsuccessfully to get net neutrality legislation passed last year.
Network neutrality proposals, backed by Internet content companies like Google Inc and eBay Inc, would bar Internet providers from charging extra fees to guarantee access to the Internet or give priority to some content.
However, the idea has been staunchly opposed by high-speed Internet providers such as AT&T Inc and Verizon Communications Inc.
Companies like eBay and Google worry that AT&T and Verizon will charge them more to get access to consumers or make it harder for consumers to get access to unaffiliated content.
The network providers counter that they would not block access to public Internet sites but want to offer private Internet-based services with faster speeds for uses such as downloading movies.
Last year, the FCC approved AT&T's purchase of BellSouth Corp after AT&T promised to maintain net neutrality of its high-speed Internet platform for two years. It was one of several key concessions that AT&T made to ease concerns about competition.
The comments from the Justice Department come on the heels of a report in June by antitrust experts at the Federal Trade Commission that expressed similar views and recommended that regulators "proceed with caution" on any such proposals.
The department said proponents of the Internet regulation had failed to show that many consumers had been harmed in a way that would justify government intervention.
It said there was nothing unusual about the practice of setting different levels of service and pricing, citing as an example the various mail options offered by the U.S. Postal Service.
"These differentiated products respond to market demand and expand consumers' choice," the department said.
Advocates of the network neutrality idea criticized the department's conclusions, saying regulations were needed because many consumers had little or no choice of broadband providers.
"This lack of competition and consumer choice for broadband access is the reason why (we support) preemptive safeguards to ensure that cable and telephone companies do not destroy the Internet as we know it," said the Open Internet Coalition, a group comprised of consumer groups and Internet content companies such as Google.
On the other hand, the department's comments were met with praise from AT&T.
"We continue to urge policymakers to focus on the real issue of the broadband era, which is to promote the benefits of broadband services at affordable rates for all consumers," AT&T said in a statement.
Thu Sep 6, 2007 3:28PM EDT
By Peter Kaplan
WASHINGTON (Reuters) - Antitrust authorities at the U.S. Justice Department on Thursday warned regulators against imposing "network neutrality" regulations that would bar broadband Internet service companies from charging extra to some content providers.
In comments submitted to the Federal Communications Commission, the department said some net neutrality proposals "could deter broadband Internet providers from upgrading and expanding their networks to reach more Americans."
"Regulators should be careful not to impose regulations that could limit consumer choice and investment in broadband facilities," the department's antitrust chief, Thomas Barnett, said in a statement.
The concept of net neutrality is being studied by the FCC and has been the subject of much debate in Congress. Some lawmakers tried unsuccessfully to get net neutrality legislation passed last year.
Network neutrality proposals, backed by Internet content companies like Google Inc and eBay Inc, would bar Internet providers from charging extra fees to guarantee access to the Internet or give priority to some content.
However, the idea has been staunchly opposed by high-speed Internet providers such as AT&T Inc and Verizon Communications Inc.
Companies like eBay and Google worry that AT&T and Verizon will charge them more to get access to consumers or make it harder for consumers to get access to unaffiliated content.
The network providers counter that they would not block access to public Internet sites but want to offer private Internet-based services with faster speeds for uses such as downloading movies.
Last year, the FCC approved AT&T's purchase of BellSouth Corp after AT&T promised to maintain net neutrality of its high-speed Internet platform for two years. It was one of several key concessions that AT&T made to ease concerns about competition.
The comments from the Justice Department come on the heels of a report in June by antitrust experts at the Federal Trade Commission that expressed similar views and recommended that regulators "proceed with caution" on any such proposals.
The department said proponents of the Internet regulation had failed to show that many consumers had been harmed in a way that would justify government intervention.
It said there was nothing unusual about the practice of setting different levels of service and pricing, citing as an example the various mail options offered by the U.S. Postal Service.
"These differentiated products respond to market demand and expand consumers' choice," the department said.
Advocates of the network neutrality idea criticized the department's conclusions, saying regulations were needed because many consumers had little or no choice of broadband providers.
"This lack of competition and consumer choice for broadband access is the reason why (we support) preemptive safeguards to ensure that cable and telephone companies do not destroy the Internet as we know it," said the Open Internet Coalition, a group comprised of consumer groups and Internet content companies such as Google.
On the other hand, the department's comments were met with praise from AT&T.
"We continue to urge policymakers to focus on the real issue of the broadband era, which is to promote the benefits of broadband services at affordable rates for all consumers," AT&T said in a statement.
The Policies and Politics of Antitrust
C. Evan Stewart
New York Law Journal
September 6, 2007
Almost 30 years ago Robert Bork, in his seminal book "The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War With Itself," wrote that: "modern antitrust law has so decayed that the policy is no longer intellectually respectable. Some of it is no longer respectable as law; more of it is not respectable as economics; ... a great deal of antitrust is not even respectable as politics." Fast forward from 1978 to 2007 and do we find all has become "respectable"? No and yes.
BIG BROTHER I: MICROSOFT
In the 1990s, the Justice Department brought on civil litigation to break up Microsoft. That litigation (which concerned the company's desktop software portal to the Internet -- was it a "feature" [Microsoft's position] or was it a "product" [the anti-Microsoft position]) was significant for at least four reasons: (1) the Clinton administration was highly influenced in its enforcement efforts by the views of competitors (to the exclusion of evidence of harm to consumers); (2) the government's litigation was fueled in large measure by the active prompting by various state attorney generals; (3) the fervor of the disparate antitrust enforcers was energized by Microsoft's (and its lawyers') ham-handed mixture of arrogance/contempt (i.e., the government was clueless as to technology issues, the government had no business sticking its big nose into the affairs of the "new" economy's leader, etc.), and ineptitude (i.e., the company had traditionally disdained political influence and was adverse to employing lobbyists, the company's witnesses evidenced defensiveness (or worse) about its documented efforts to out-perform its competitors, etc.); and (4) Bork, who was retained by Microsoft's principal competitor (Netscape), espoused a position 180 degrees different from that which he unambiguously advocated in "The Antitrust Paradox" ("Antitrust should not interfere with any firm size created by internal growth.").[FOOTNOTE 1]
Ultimately, after a fairly messy litigation history in the District of Columbia (which included the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit removing U.S. District Judge Thomas Penfield Jackson), the government's case was resolved by a fairly benign consent decree in 2002. And a new federal district judge (Colleen Kollar-Kottelly) was charged with overseeing Microsoft's prospective compliance with the 2002 decree.
BIG BROTHER II: MICROSOFT
Today, a different competitor of Microsoft's -- Google -- has launched an antitrust challenge to Microsoft's business efforts in a different sphere. Google has lobbied both the federal government and the state attorney generals to put significant restrictions upon Microsoft's Windows Vista operating system which (according to Google) makes it difficult for consumers to use competitors' (read Google) desktop-search application; more specifically, Google's complaints center on software that allows computer users to scan the contents of their hard drives, e-mails, and other personal information (Vista, it is charged, is not interchangeable with similar software from Microsoft's competitors).
Taking a page from Bork (as expressed in "The Antitrust Paradox" -- as opposed to when he was an advocate for Netscape), the Justice Department did not cotton much to Google's complaint.[FOOTNOTE 2] The state attorneys general, on the other hand, picked up the same cudgels they had a decade earlier (then on behalf of Microsoft's competitor Netscape) and indicated that they wanted to pursue antitrust remedies against Microsoft under the consent decree.[FOOTNOTE 3]
Having learned from its painful experiences from the 1990s (and having become more savvy in the political ways of Washington), Microsoft chose not to play litigation hardball. Instead, the company agreed to make changes to the Vista system, allowing for Vista users to more readily use Microsoft's competitors' software to search through hard drive files. And while this step satisfied the Justice Department and (more importantly) a number of the state attorneys general, it did not satisfy Google and at least one state's attorney general[FOOTNOTE 4] -- they asked Kollar-Kottelly to weigh in on Microsoft as being in violation of the consent decree (or at least to extend the duration of the life of the decree, so as to ensure ongoing judicial oversight). The judge -- previously skeptical of certain of Microsoft's business practices -- has (thus far) not taken the bait.
So what does all the foregoing tell us? Well, for one thing, antitrust enforcement by elected officials seems not a whole lot more principled in 2007 than it was in 1978 (or in the 1990s). Politics, rather than economics and consumer-based concerns, seem at least as front and center as ever. Perhaps that is inescapable. But in the high-tech/cyberspace economy, we should evaluate politicians attempting to apply traditional antitrust concepts with a healthy degree of skepticism, given market fluidity, low (or nonexistent) barriers to entry, and lightning changes in innovation.[FOOTNOTE 5]
SUPREME COURT (PART I)
As opposed to government regulation, antitrust policy as recently decided on by the U.S. Supreme Court has shown much greater progress toward what Bork would deem "respectability."
On June 27, 2007, the Supreme Court struck down an antitrust precedent dating from 1911: Justice Charles Evans Hughes' decision in the Dr. Miles case -- that vertical price fixing (aka resale price maintenance) is illegal per se. In Leegin Creations Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc. (2007-1 CCH trade cases, 75,753), the Court (by a 5-4 decision) ruled that a "rule of reason" standard should be applied when manufacturers establish and enforce minimum prices for their products downstream in the marketplace (e.g., discount retailers); put another way, minimum price agreements may run afoul of the antitrust laws if they are determined to be anti-competitive, but such arrangements are not automatically illegal.
The five Supreme Court justices sided with Bork's view that retail price maintenance does not restrain or restrict output, but rather "promote[s] effective distribution and marketing," which are "beneficial to consumers." And since the "sole consideration" of the antitrust laws should be "the maximization of consumer welfare" (according to Bork), the majority of the justices voided years of tortured glosses on Dr. Miles, glosses which attempted to thread a needle between a "fixed" economic arrangement (historically, anything "fixed" had been deemed illegal) and the freedom of manufacturers to unilaterally price their products and deal with retailers as they saw fit.[FOOTNOTE 6]
Justice Stephen G. Breyer (the Court's antitrust expert), for the dissent, contended that no compelling reason had recently come to the fore requiring the overruling of Dr. Miles. He further contended that, regardless of the doctrinal purity advocated by Bork (and others),[FOOTNOTE 7] both manufacturers and retailers had come to accept and live with Dr. Miles and its glosses. As such, Breyer predicted not only higher prices, but also "considerable legal turbulence" as federal judges will now be prospectively determining the appropriateness of resale price maintenance agreements, agreements re drafted in light of the majority's decision.
Will the dire consequences predicted by Breyer come to pass? As to the issue of guaranteed higher prices, most economists would say no; but what will happen in the real world remains to be seen.[FOOTNOTE 8] Most (but not all) market participants doubt that there will be a huge gravitational shift in the balance of power to manufacturers (and their ability to increase prices with no push back). As to federal judges having trouble with prospective antitrust litigation, that seems doubtful.[FOOTNOTE 9] But even if we get different jurisprudential results in the near term, that is simply a regular feature of our current, balkanized judicial system. In any event, the heavily glossed law that developed because of Dr. Miles had led to many decades of federal judges struggling with conflicts involving vertical business arrangements. Perhaps now that that slate has been wiped clean, we (and the federal judiciary) can do better.
SUPREME COURT (PART II)
Among other key antitrust decisions rendered by the Court in this past session was its June 17, 2007, decision in Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC v. Billing.[FOOTNOTE 10] The issue in Billing was the applicability of the doctrine of implied immunity -- whether conduct impermissible under the antitrust laws may be nonactionable if conflicting regulatory prerogatives of the Securities and Exchange Commission have been (are or could be) put at issue.
The specific matter was teed up by charges that the initial public offering (IPO) process and its aftermarket had been illegally manipulated to the detriment of investors who had purchased securities brought to the capital markets between 1997 and 2000. More than 1,000 securities class actions charging illegal/fraudulent manipulation(s) in the IPO process were brought under the federal securities laws; those cases were consolidated in the Southern District of New York before Judge Shira Scheindlin.[FOOTNOTE 11]
Based upon exactly the same conduct, nine consolidated antitrust actions were brought on against various securities underwriters; these were also initiated in the Southern District of New York, and were before Judge William Pauley. One of Pauley's initial steps was to determine whether these antitrust claims could go forward independent of the separately filed securities claims (i.e., whether the doctrine of implied immunity was applicable). The SEC weighed in on that subject, arguing to Pauley that implied immunity was clearly applicable in light of the SEC's (and NASD's) regulation of the underwriting process. The Justice Department did, as well, arguing the opposite to Pauley.[FOOTNOTE 12]
Defendants moved to dismiss the antitrust actions, and Pauley granted the motion. Based upon the record before him, Pauley was persuaded that:
• the SEC expressly regulates the underwriting syndicate process;
• the SEC expressly regulates the "road show" process;
• the SEC expressly allows for underwriter communications (through the rules of the various self-regulatory organizations [SROs] -- e.g., the NASD); and
• the SEC, both previously and contemporaneously, had considered (and was considering) rules specifically addressing the alleged misconduct at issue.
In light of the foregoing, Pauley held that implied immunity was called for because "the SEC, both directly and through its pervasive oversight of the NASD and other SROs, either expressly permits the conduct alleged or has the power to regulate the conduct[,] such that a failure to find implied immunity would 'conflict with an overall regulatory scheme that empowers the [SEC] to allow conduct that the antitrust laws would prohibit.'"[FOOTNOTE 13]
Happily, I had predicted the result determined by Pauley.[FOOTNOTE 14] Unhappily, the 2nd U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals took a different view on implied immunity and reversed Pauley; and while I publicly criticized the 2nd Circuit's analysis and outcome, that is where matters stood until the Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the 2nd Circuit's decision.[FOOTNOTE 15]
By 7-1, the Supreme Court reversed the 2nd Circuit and reinstated Pauley's dismissal.[FOOTNOTE 16] Writing for the Court, Breyer opined that allowing for civil liability under both the antitrust and securities laws would constitute an improper legal whipsaw, with "conflicting guidance, requirements, duties, privileges or standards of conduct ... [that] would threaten serious harm to the efficient functioning of the securities markets."
Applying prior Supreme Court precedent in this area (with which the 2nd Circuit had some difficulty), Breyer's focus was on the issue of whether any conflict between the two legal schemes rose to the level of incompatibility. Not only did he find a high level of incompatibility, Breyer (i) found pervasive regulation of the underwriting process by securities regulators, (ii) observed that drawing a line between permissible and impermissible activities in that process in antitrust cases would be extremely difficult and "could seriously alter underwriter conduct in undesirable ways," and (iii) noted that investors harmed by improper underwriter conduct were not without a remedy -- they had the ability to seek full redress under the securities laws and did not need a second bite of the same apple under the antitrust laws.
Breyer's analysis was right on and was fully consistent with the Court's prior precedent. By removing the liability whipsaw created by the 2nd Circuit, Breyer's ruling will give a helpful predictive boost to securities industry actors who want to know where the liability lines are (and are not). Chalk Billing up as one for the good guys.
CONCLUSION
The foregoing shows conflicting trends: antitrust policy in the hands of the executive branch seems to be determined in large part based upon politics and personnel; antitrust policy in the hands of the judicial branch, on the other hand, seems to have moved in the direction of antitrust theory, economics and efficient regulatory oversight. This latter trend may not reflect heaven on earth, but it would seem to indicate a bit of progress in the right direction.
C. Evan Stewart is a partner with Zuckerman Spaeder, an adjunct law professor at Fordham Law School and Brooklyn Law School, and a visiting professor at Cornell University.
:::::FOOTNOTES:::::
FN1 The record evidence before Judge Jackson showed: (i) no injury(ies) to consumers; (ii) no monopoly pricing by Microsoft (in fact, prices were dramatically dropping); (iii) significant product innovation; and (iv) no barriers to entry preventing Microsoft competitors from coming up with a product superior to Microsoft's. Thus, what Microsoft had achieved was a result of superior skill, experience, drive, etc. -- all the things Judge Bork wrote should never be penalized under the antitrust laws.
FN2 In the words of the head of the Justice Department's Antitrust Division (Thomas Barnett), "The purpose of the consent decree was to prevent and prohibit Microsoft from certain exclusionary behavior that was anti-competitive in nature. It was not designed to pick who would win or determine who would have what market share." S. Labaton, "Microsoft Finds Legal Defender in Justice Department," The New York Times, A1 (June 10, 2007).
FN3 As stated by Richard Blumenthal (Connecticut's attorney general), "In concept, if not directly word for word, it is the Microsoft-Netscape situation. The question is whether we're seeing déjà vu all over again." S. Labaton, "Microsoft Finds Legal Defender in Justice Department," The New York Times, A1 (June 10, 2007).
FN4 Connecticut Attorney General Richard Blumenthal.
FN5 See C. Stewart & P. Tozzi, "Antitrust Enforcement in the Millennium -- Back to the Future," BNA Mergers & Acquisitions Law Report, Vol. 4, p. 222 (Feb. 26, 2001). Microsoft is not lily pure itself on this score, having lobbied the government to give close antitrust scrutiny to Google's acquisition of DoubleClick.
FN6 Compare Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons, 220 US 373 (1911), with United States v. Colgate, 250 US 300 (1919), with Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 740 US 211 (1951), with White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 US 261 (1963), with United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 US 365 (1967), with GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 US 36 (1977). As a prelude to Leegin, the Supreme Court 10 years ago struck down per se treatment for maximum retail price maintenance agreements. State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 US 3 (1997).
FN7 The Justice Department and the Federal Trade Commission filed an amicus brief urging that Dr. Miles be overturned.
FN8 At oral argument Justice Breyer presumed that higher prices would automatically flow from the Court's decision. That recalls Justice William J. Brennan's observation in White Motor (concurring opinion) that resale price maintenance almost invariably reduces price competition; according to Judge Bork, that "observation runs counter to theory and experience." And as one former CEO from the fashion world has noted, moreover, the antitrust laws at the end of the day "have questionable efficacy because ... supply and demand determines what price is." E. Clark & K. Ellis, "Retailer vs. Vendor: Supreme Court Mulls Power of Price Fixing," WWD.com (June 19, 2007) (comments of J. Aronson).
FN9 In point of fact, it is pretty unlikely that courts will find many resale price agreements violative of the antitrust laws under the rule of reason standard. Only where a manufacturer has dominant market power could one foresee this standard coming into play.
FN10 Another recent Supreme Court case of significant antitrust jurisprudence (but beyond the scope of this article) is Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 2007-1 CCH Trade Cases ¶75,709 (merely alleging parallel conduct was held to be insufficient as a matter of pleading an antitrust conspiracy in order to survive a motion to dismiss under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
FN11 See In re Initial Public Offering Securities Litigation, 241 FSupp2d 281 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
FN12 Interestingly, federal regulators frequently have taken contrary (and often inconsistent) views on the issue of implied immunity.
FN13 241 FSupp2d at 523 (quoting In re Stock Exchange Options Trading Antitrust Litigation, 317 FSupp 134, 149 (2d Cir. 2003)).
FN14 See C. Stewart, "Securities Regulations and the Antitrust Laws: Navigating the Law Enforcement Schemes," 35 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 196 (Feb. 3, 2003).
FN15 426 F3d 130 (2d Cir. 2005). See C. Stewart, "A Dangerous Intersection of the Securities and Antitrust Laws," 38 Sec. Reg. and L. Rep. (BNA) 1 (Jan. 9, 2006); C. Stewart, "'Carnacking' the Future," New York Law Journal (Feb. 15, 2007).
FN16 Justice Clarence Thomas dissented; Justice Anthony M. Kennedy declined to participate in the case.
C. Evan Stewart
New York Law Journal
September 6, 2007
Almost 30 years ago Robert Bork, in his seminal book "The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War With Itself," wrote that: "modern antitrust law has so decayed that the policy is no longer intellectually respectable. Some of it is no longer respectable as law; more of it is not respectable as economics; ... a great deal of antitrust is not even respectable as politics." Fast forward from 1978 to 2007 and do we find all has become "respectable"? No and yes.
BIG BROTHER I: MICROSOFT
In the 1990s, the Justice Department brought on civil litigation to break up Microsoft. That litigation (which concerned the company's desktop software portal to the Internet -- was it a "feature" [Microsoft's position] or was it a "product" [the anti-Microsoft position]) was significant for at least four reasons: (1) the Clinton administration was highly influenced in its enforcement efforts by the views of competitors (to the exclusion of evidence of harm to consumers); (2) the government's litigation was fueled in large measure by the active prompting by various state attorney generals; (3) the fervor of the disparate antitrust enforcers was energized by Microsoft's (and its lawyers') ham-handed mixture of arrogance/contempt (i.e., the government was clueless as to technology issues, the government had no business sticking its big nose into the affairs of the "new" economy's leader, etc.), and ineptitude (i.e., the company had traditionally disdained political influence and was adverse to employing lobbyists, the company's witnesses evidenced defensiveness (or worse) about its documented efforts to out-perform its competitors, etc.); and (4) Bork, who was retained by Microsoft's principal competitor (Netscape), espoused a position 180 degrees different from that which he unambiguously advocated in "The Antitrust Paradox" ("Antitrust should not interfere with any firm size created by internal growth.").[FOOTNOTE 1]
Ultimately, after a fairly messy litigation history in the District of Columbia (which included the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit removing U.S. District Judge Thomas Penfield Jackson), the government's case was resolved by a fairly benign consent decree in 2002. And a new federal district judge (Colleen Kollar-Kottelly) was charged with overseeing Microsoft's prospective compliance with the 2002 decree.
BIG BROTHER II: MICROSOFT
Today, a different competitor of Microsoft's -- Google -- has launched an antitrust challenge to Microsoft's business efforts in a different sphere. Google has lobbied both the federal government and the state attorney generals to put significant restrictions upon Microsoft's Windows Vista operating system which (according to Google) makes it difficult for consumers to use competitors' (read Google) desktop-search application; more specifically, Google's complaints center on software that allows computer users to scan the contents of their hard drives, e-mails, and other personal information (Vista, it is charged, is not interchangeable with similar software from Microsoft's competitors).
Taking a page from Bork (as expressed in "The Antitrust Paradox" -- as opposed to when he was an advocate for Netscape), the Justice Department did not cotton much to Google's complaint.[FOOTNOTE 2] The state attorneys general, on the other hand, picked up the same cudgels they had a decade earlier (then on behalf of Microsoft's competitor Netscape) and indicated that they wanted to pursue antitrust remedies against Microsoft under the consent decree.[FOOTNOTE 3]
Having learned from its painful experiences from the 1990s (and having become more savvy in the political ways of Washington), Microsoft chose not to play litigation hardball. Instead, the company agreed to make changes to the Vista system, allowing for Vista users to more readily use Microsoft's competitors' software to search through hard drive files. And while this step satisfied the Justice Department and (more importantly) a number of the state attorneys general, it did not satisfy Google and at least one state's attorney general[FOOTNOTE 4] -- they asked Kollar-Kottelly to weigh in on Microsoft as being in violation of the consent decree (or at least to extend the duration of the life of the decree, so as to ensure ongoing judicial oversight). The judge -- previously skeptical of certain of Microsoft's business practices -- has (thus far) not taken the bait.
So what does all the foregoing tell us? Well, for one thing, antitrust enforcement by elected officials seems not a whole lot more principled in 2007 than it was in 1978 (or in the 1990s). Politics, rather than economics and consumer-based concerns, seem at least as front and center as ever. Perhaps that is inescapable. But in the high-tech/cyberspace economy, we should evaluate politicians attempting to apply traditional antitrust concepts with a healthy degree of skepticism, given market fluidity, low (or nonexistent) barriers to entry, and lightning changes in innovation.[FOOTNOTE 5]
SUPREME COURT (PART I)
As opposed to government regulation, antitrust policy as recently decided on by the U.S. Supreme Court has shown much greater progress toward what Bork would deem "respectability."
On June 27, 2007, the Supreme Court struck down an antitrust precedent dating from 1911: Justice Charles Evans Hughes' decision in the Dr. Miles case -- that vertical price fixing (aka resale price maintenance) is illegal per se. In Leegin Creations Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc. (2007-1 CCH trade cases, 75,753), the Court (by a 5-4 decision) ruled that a "rule of reason" standard should be applied when manufacturers establish and enforce minimum prices for their products downstream in the marketplace (e.g., discount retailers); put another way, minimum price agreements may run afoul of the antitrust laws if they are determined to be anti-competitive, but such arrangements are not automatically illegal.
The five Supreme Court justices sided with Bork's view that retail price maintenance does not restrain or restrict output, but rather "promote[s] effective distribution and marketing," which are "beneficial to consumers." And since the "sole consideration" of the antitrust laws should be "the maximization of consumer welfare" (according to Bork), the majority of the justices voided years of tortured glosses on Dr. Miles, glosses which attempted to thread a needle between a "fixed" economic arrangement (historically, anything "fixed" had been deemed illegal) and the freedom of manufacturers to unilaterally price their products and deal with retailers as they saw fit.[FOOTNOTE 6]
Justice Stephen G. Breyer (the Court's antitrust expert), for the dissent, contended that no compelling reason had recently come to the fore requiring the overruling of Dr. Miles. He further contended that, regardless of the doctrinal purity advocated by Bork (and others),[FOOTNOTE 7] both manufacturers and retailers had come to accept and live with Dr. Miles and its glosses. As such, Breyer predicted not only higher prices, but also "considerable legal turbulence" as federal judges will now be prospectively determining the appropriateness of resale price maintenance agreements, agreements re drafted in light of the majority's decision.
Will the dire consequences predicted by Breyer come to pass? As to the issue of guaranteed higher prices, most economists would say no; but what will happen in the real world remains to be seen.[FOOTNOTE 8] Most (but not all) market participants doubt that there will be a huge gravitational shift in the balance of power to manufacturers (and their ability to increase prices with no push back). As to federal judges having trouble with prospective antitrust litigation, that seems doubtful.[FOOTNOTE 9] But even if we get different jurisprudential results in the near term, that is simply a regular feature of our current, balkanized judicial system. In any event, the heavily glossed law that developed because of Dr. Miles had led to many decades of federal judges struggling with conflicts involving vertical business arrangements. Perhaps now that that slate has been wiped clean, we (and the federal judiciary) can do better.
SUPREME COURT (PART II)
Among other key antitrust decisions rendered by the Court in this past session was its June 17, 2007, decision in Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC v. Billing.[FOOTNOTE 10] The issue in Billing was the applicability of the doctrine of implied immunity -- whether conduct impermissible under the antitrust laws may be nonactionable if conflicting regulatory prerogatives of the Securities and Exchange Commission have been (are or could be) put at issue.
The specific matter was teed up by charges that the initial public offering (IPO) process and its aftermarket had been illegally manipulated to the detriment of investors who had purchased securities brought to the capital markets between 1997 and 2000. More than 1,000 securities class actions charging illegal/fraudulent manipulation(s) in the IPO process were brought under the federal securities laws; those cases were consolidated in the Southern District of New York before Judge Shira Scheindlin.[FOOTNOTE 11]
Based upon exactly the same conduct, nine consolidated antitrust actions were brought on against various securities underwriters; these were also initiated in the Southern District of New York, and were before Judge William Pauley. One of Pauley's initial steps was to determine whether these antitrust claims could go forward independent of the separately filed securities claims (i.e., whether the doctrine of implied immunity was applicable). The SEC weighed in on that subject, arguing to Pauley that implied immunity was clearly applicable in light of the SEC's (and NASD's) regulation of the underwriting process. The Justice Department did, as well, arguing the opposite to Pauley.[FOOTNOTE 12]
Defendants moved to dismiss the antitrust actions, and Pauley granted the motion. Based upon the record before him, Pauley was persuaded that:
• the SEC expressly regulates the underwriting syndicate process;
• the SEC expressly regulates the "road show" process;
• the SEC expressly allows for underwriter communications (through the rules of the various self-regulatory organizations [SROs] -- e.g., the NASD); and
• the SEC, both previously and contemporaneously, had considered (and was considering) rules specifically addressing the alleged misconduct at issue.
In light of the foregoing, Pauley held that implied immunity was called for because "the SEC, both directly and through its pervasive oversight of the NASD and other SROs, either expressly permits the conduct alleged or has the power to regulate the conduct[,] such that a failure to find implied immunity would 'conflict with an overall regulatory scheme that empowers the [SEC] to allow conduct that the antitrust laws would prohibit.'"[FOOTNOTE 13]
Happily, I had predicted the result determined by Pauley.[FOOTNOTE 14] Unhappily, the 2nd U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals took a different view on implied immunity and reversed Pauley; and while I publicly criticized the 2nd Circuit's analysis and outcome, that is where matters stood until the Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the 2nd Circuit's decision.[FOOTNOTE 15]
By 7-1, the Supreme Court reversed the 2nd Circuit and reinstated Pauley's dismissal.[FOOTNOTE 16] Writing for the Court, Breyer opined that allowing for civil liability under both the antitrust and securities laws would constitute an improper legal whipsaw, with "conflicting guidance, requirements, duties, privileges or standards of conduct ... [that] would threaten serious harm to the efficient functioning of the securities markets."
Applying prior Supreme Court precedent in this area (with which the 2nd Circuit had some difficulty), Breyer's focus was on the issue of whether any conflict between the two legal schemes rose to the level of incompatibility. Not only did he find a high level of incompatibility, Breyer (i) found pervasive regulation of the underwriting process by securities regulators, (ii) observed that drawing a line between permissible and impermissible activities in that process in antitrust cases would be extremely difficult and "could seriously alter underwriter conduct in undesirable ways," and (iii) noted that investors harmed by improper underwriter conduct were not without a remedy -- they had the ability to seek full redress under the securities laws and did not need a second bite of the same apple under the antitrust laws.
Breyer's analysis was right on and was fully consistent with the Court's prior precedent. By removing the liability whipsaw created by the 2nd Circuit, Breyer's ruling will give a helpful predictive boost to securities industry actors who want to know where the liability lines are (and are not). Chalk Billing up as one for the good guys.
CONCLUSION
The foregoing shows conflicting trends: antitrust policy in the hands of the executive branch seems to be determined in large part based upon politics and personnel; antitrust policy in the hands of the judicial branch, on the other hand, seems to have moved in the direction of antitrust theory, economics and efficient regulatory oversight. This latter trend may not reflect heaven on earth, but it would seem to indicate a bit of progress in the right direction.
C. Evan Stewart is a partner with Zuckerman Spaeder, an adjunct law professor at Fordham Law School and Brooklyn Law School, and a visiting professor at Cornell University.
:::::FOOTNOTES:::::
FN1 The record evidence before Judge Jackson showed: (i) no injury(ies) to consumers; (ii) no monopoly pricing by Microsoft (in fact, prices were dramatically dropping); (iii) significant product innovation; and (iv) no barriers to entry preventing Microsoft competitors from coming up with a product superior to Microsoft's. Thus, what Microsoft had achieved was a result of superior skill, experience, drive, etc. -- all the things Judge Bork wrote should never be penalized under the antitrust laws.
FN2 In the words of the head of the Justice Department's Antitrust Division (Thomas Barnett), "The purpose of the consent decree was to prevent and prohibit Microsoft from certain exclusionary behavior that was anti-competitive in nature. It was not designed to pick who would win or determine who would have what market share." S. Labaton, "Microsoft Finds Legal Defender in Justice Department," The New York Times, A1 (June 10, 2007).
FN3 As stated by Richard Blumenthal (Connecticut's attorney general), "In concept, if not directly word for word, it is the Microsoft-Netscape situation. The question is whether we're seeing déjà vu all over again." S. Labaton, "Microsoft Finds Legal Defender in Justice Department," The New York Times, A1 (June 10, 2007).
FN4 Connecticut Attorney General Richard Blumenthal.
FN5 See C. Stewart & P. Tozzi, "Antitrust Enforcement in the Millennium -- Back to the Future," BNA Mergers & Acquisitions Law Report, Vol. 4, p. 222 (Feb. 26, 2001). Microsoft is not lily pure itself on this score, having lobbied the government to give close antitrust scrutiny to Google's acquisition of DoubleClick.
FN6 Compare Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons, 220 US 373 (1911), with United States v. Colgate, 250 US 300 (1919), with Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 740 US 211 (1951), with White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 US 261 (1963), with United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 US 365 (1967), with GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 US 36 (1977). As a prelude to Leegin, the Supreme Court 10 years ago struck down per se treatment for maximum retail price maintenance agreements. State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 US 3 (1997).
FN7 The Justice Department and the Federal Trade Commission filed an amicus brief urging that Dr. Miles be overturned.
FN8 At oral argument Justice Breyer presumed that higher prices would automatically flow from the Court's decision. That recalls Justice William J. Brennan's observation in White Motor (concurring opinion) that resale price maintenance almost invariably reduces price competition; according to Judge Bork, that "observation runs counter to theory and experience." And as one former CEO from the fashion world has noted, moreover, the antitrust laws at the end of the day "have questionable efficacy because ... supply and demand determines what price is." E. Clark & K. Ellis, "Retailer vs. Vendor: Supreme Court Mulls Power of Price Fixing," WWD.com (June 19, 2007) (comments of J. Aronson).
FN9 In point of fact, it is pretty unlikely that courts will find many resale price agreements violative of the antitrust laws under the rule of reason standard. Only where a manufacturer has dominant market power could one foresee this standard coming into play.
FN10 Another recent Supreme Court case of significant antitrust jurisprudence (but beyond the scope of this article) is Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 2007-1 CCH Trade Cases ¶75,709 (merely alleging parallel conduct was held to be insufficient as a matter of pleading an antitrust conspiracy in order to survive a motion to dismiss under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
FN11 See In re Initial Public Offering Securities Litigation, 241 FSupp2d 281 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
FN12 Interestingly, federal regulators frequently have taken contrary (and often inconsistent) views on the issue of implied immunity.
FN13 241 FSupp2d at 523 (quoting In re Stock Exchange Options Trading Antitrust Litigation, 317 FSupp 134, 149 (2d Cir. 2003)).
FN14 See C. Stewart, "Securities Regulations and the Antitrust Laws: Navigating the Law Enforcement Schemes," 35 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 196 (Feb. 3, 2003).
FN15 426 F3d 130 (2d Cir. 2005). See C. Stewart, "A Dangerous Intersection of the Securities and Antitrust Laws," 38 Sec. Reg. and L. Rep. (BNA) 1 (Jan. 9, 2006); C. Stewart, "'Carnacking' the Future," New York Law Journal (Feb. 15, 2007).
FN16 Justice Clarence Thomas dissented; Justice Anthony M. Kennedy declined to participate in the case.
3rd Circuit Rules on Patent Holders' Antitrust Liability in Qualcomm Case
Mary Pat Gallagher
New Jersey Law Journal
09-06-2007
In a decision that may increase competition in the cell phone industry, a federal appeals court says a patent holder can be sued under antitrust laws for deceptive conduct toward an organization that sets uniform telecommunications standards.
The ruling, issued Tuesday by the 3rd U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., No. 06-492, is the first to address the issue and reverses a lower court holding that dismissed the antitrust claims.
The litigation involves computer chipsets, the core electronics that allow cell phones to transmit and receive data. They are made in accordance with one of two sets of standards to ensure that phones can communicate with each other.
One of the standard-setting groups, European Telecommunications Standards Institute, based its standards on a technology for which Qualcomm held the patent.
Because the decision to use a proprietary technology can confer monopoly power on whoever controls it, standard-setting groups require patent holders to agree they will license their technology on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory (FRAND) terms.
Qualcomm allegedly agreed to do so but then demanded higher royalties from Broadcom and other competitors and from companies using chipsets not made by Qualcomm.
The complaint accuses Qualcomm of intentional deception and of monopolizing certain markets for cell phone technology in violation of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act and sections 3 and 7 of the Clayton Act.
On Aug. 30, 2006, U.S. District Judge Mary Cooper dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim, reasoning that Qualcomm has a legally sanctioned monopoly in its patented technology, including the right to exclude competitors and to set terms for distribution.
Cooper also concluded that even if Qualcomm was deceptive, it did not matter under antitrust law because the standard-setting process would inevitably result in the absence of competition.
In reversing, the appeals court said Cooper failed to consider that the FRAND commitments "were intended as a bulwark against unlawful monopoly" and that the standards groups could otherwise have chosen an unpatented technology.
"We hold that ... in a consensus-oriented private standard-setting environment, ... a patent holder's intentionally false promise to license essential proprietary technology on FRAND terms, ... coupled with [a standard setting group's] reliance on that promise when including the technology in a standard, and ... the patent holder's subsequent breach of that promise, is actionable anticompetitive conduct," wrote Judge Maryanne Trump Barry, joined by Julio Fuentes and Leonard Garth.
Though the appeals court acknowledged that no court or agency had decided the issue, it did point to several Federal Trade Commission proceedings that lent support to its position, especially In the Matter of Rambus, No. 9302, decided Aug. 2, 2006. There, the FTC found that Rambus, a developer of computer memory technologies, misled a standards group about the nature of its patent interests, leading the group to adopt a standard using a proprietary Rambus technology. The FTC found Rambus engaged in anticompetitive conduct and violated antitrust law.
Other cited cases, involving Dell Computer Corp. and Unocal, demonstrate the types of products subject to comparable industry standard-setting.
The FTC accused Dell of concealing its patent for what wound up as an important design feature of a standard for a computer switch. Dell even allegedly certified to the standards group that its proposed standard did not infringe any Dell patent, but once the standard proved successful, Dell tried to assert its patent rights. The case, In the Matter of Dell Computer Corp., 121 F.T.C. 616, ended in 1996 with a consent order requiring Dell to cease and desist from asserting that use of the standard violated its intellectual property rights.
A 2005 consent order in In the Matter of Union Oil Company of California, No. 9305 (F.T.C. July 27, 2005), similarly resolved allegations that the company made misrepresentations to a standards board about its intellectual property rights.
Broadcom's lawyer, David Stone, says "the court below, to some extent, immunized people and companies who manage to get their technology put into a standard," allowing them to have a monopoly without looking at how they got it. "The 3rd Circuit said that's not right," adds Stone, of Boies Schiller & Flexner in Short Hills, N.J.
Evan Chesler, who represents Qualcomm, calls the case "a business dispute between two companies" over licensing rates and "not an antitrust case."
The standards groups left FRAND "explicitly undefined" so that "participants in the market setting" could decide what it requires, says Chesler of New York's Cravath Swaine & Moore.
But Mark Patterson, a professor of antitrust and intellectual property at Fordham University School of Law who had been following the case, says the appeals court's ruling "potentially offers more room for competition."
The lower court ruling offered "firms carte blanche to mislead standards organizations in order to gain an advantage," an interpretation that would have increased monopolies, he says.
Several standards-setting groups, including the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers and the PCI Industrial Computer Manufacturers Group, were amici in the appeal.
The American Antitrust Institute and the Consumer Federation of America also weighed in. Their lawyer, Eric Cramer of Berger & Montague in Philadelphia, said in his amicus brief that the case "reach[es] to the heart of how antitrust law should function in connection with standard setting and licensing involving intellectual property rights" and implicating the interests of consumers, who pay the price for unlawful monopolization in the form of higher prices and less innovation.
Other amici were several companies that produce cell phones or related technology, including Texas Instruments Inc. and Nokia Corp.
Mary Pat Gallagher
New Jersey Law Journal
09-06-2007
In a decision that may increase competition in the cell phone industry, a federal appeals court says a patent holder can be sued under antitrust laws for deceptive conduct toward an organization that sets uniform telecommunications standards.
The ruling, issued Tuesday by the 3rd U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., No. 06-492, is the first to address the issue and reverses a lower court holding that dismissed the antitrust claims.
The litigation involves computer chipsets, the core electronics that allow cell phones to transmit and receive data. They are made in accordance with one of two sets of standards to ensure that phones can communicate with each other.
One of the standard-setting groups, European Telecommunications Standards Institute, based its standards on a technology for which Qualcomm held the patent.
Because the decision to use a proprietary technology can confer monopoly power on whoever controls it, standard-setting groups require patent holders to agree they will license their technology on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory (FRAND) terms.
Qualcomm allegedly agreed to do so but then demanded higher royalties from Broadcom and other competitors and from companies using chipsets not made by Qualcomm.
The complaint accuses Qualcomm of intentional deception and of monopolizing certain markets for cell phone technology in violation of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act and sections 3 and 7 of the Clayton Act.
On Aug. 30, 2006, U.S. District Judge Mary Cooper dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim, reasoning that Qualcomm has a legally sanctioned monopoly in its patented technology, including the right to exclude competitors and to set terms for distribution.
Cooper also concluded that even if Qualcomm was deceptive, it did not matter under antitrust law because the standard-setting process would inevitably result in the absence of competition.
In reversing, the appeals court said Cooper failed to consider that the FRAND commitments "were intended as a bulwark against unlawful monopoly" and that the standards groups could otherwise have chosen an unpatented technology.
"We hold that ... in a consensus-oriented private standard-setting environment, ... a patent holder's intentionally false promise to license essential proprietary technology on FRAND terms, ... coupled with [a standard setting group's] reliance on that promise when including the technology in a standard, and ... the patent holder's subsequent breach of that promise, is actionable anticompetitive conduct," wrote Judge Maryanne Trump Barry, joined by Julio Fuentes and Leonard Garth.
Though the appeals court acknowledged that no court or agency had decided the issue, it did point to several Federal Trade Commission proceedings that lent support to its position, especially In the Matter of Rambus, No. 9302, decided Aug. 2, 2006. There, the FTC found that Rambus, a developer of computer memory technologies, misled a standards group about the nature of its patent interests, leading the group to adopt a standard using a proprietary Rambus technology. The FTC found Rambus engaged in anticompetitive conduct and violated antitrust law.
Other cited cases, involving Dell Computer Corp. and Unocal, demonstrate the types of products subject to comparable industry standard-setting.
The FTC accused Dell of concealing its patent for what wound up as an important design feature of a standard for a computer switch. Dell even allegedly certified to the standards group that its proposed standard did not infringe any Dell patent, but once the standard proved successful, Dell tried to assert its patent rights. The case, In the Matter of Dell Computer Corp., 121 F.T.C. 616, ended in 1996 with a consent order requiring Dell to cease and desist from asserting that use of the standard violated its intellectual property rights.
A 2005 consent order in In the Matter of Union Oil Company of California, No. 9305 (F.T.C. July 27, 2005), similarly resolved allegations that the company made misrepresentations to a standards board about its intellectual property rights.
Broadcom's lawyer, David Stone, says "the court below, to some extent, immunized people and companies who manage to get their technology put into a standard," allowing them to have a monopoly without looking at how they got it. "The 3rd Circuit said that's not right," adds Stone, of Boies Schiller & Flexner in Short Hills, N.J.
Evan Chesler, who represents Qualcomm, calls the case "a business dispute between two companies" over licensing rates and "not an antitrust case."
The standards groups left FRAND "explicitly undefined" so that "participants in the market setting" could decide what it requires, says Chesler of New York's Cravath Swaine & Moore.
But Mark Patterson, a professor of antitrust and intellectual property at Fordham University School of Law who had been following the case, says the appeals court's ruling "potentially offers more room for competition."
The lower court ruling offered "firms carte blanche to mislead standards organizations in order to gain an advantage," an interpretation that would have increased monopolies, he says.
Several standards-setting groups, including the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers and the PCI Industrial Computer Manufacturers Group, were amici in the appeal.
The American Antitrust Institute and the Consumer Federation of America also weighed in. Their lawyer, Eric Cramer of Berger & Montague in Philadelphia, said in his amicus brief that the case "reach[es] to the heart of how antitrust law should function in connection with standard setting and licensing involving intellectual property rights" and implicating the interests of consumers, who pay the price for unlawful monopolization in the form of higher prices and less innovation.
Other amici were several companies that produce cell phones or related technology, including Texas Instruments Inc. and Nokia Corp.
Global Credit Rout May Paralyze Infrastructure Loans, S&P Says
By Steve Rothwell
Sept. 6 (Bloomberg) -- The global credit rout, sparked by the U.S. subprime mortgage slump, may leave as much as $34 billion of leveraged loans for railroads, tollways and other infrastructure projects ``paralyzed,'' according to analysts at Standard & Poor's.
Surging appetite for infrastructure assets prompted the takeover of U.K. airport operator BAA Plc by Grupo Ferrovial SA, a Spanish construction company, and the acquisition of Associated British Ports Holdings Plc by Goldman Sachs Group Inc. last year. Banks, saddled with as much as $332 billion of unsold leveraged loans, will now likely refrain from lending to infrastructure projects.
``With the credit cycle turning, loosely structured and highly leveraged acquisition loans are looking shaky,'' wrote Mike Wilkins, a London-based analyst at S&P, in a report published today. ``Risks are likely to be exacerbated as credit markets become increasingly volatile and investor confidence fragile.''
By loosening borrowing restrictions, or covenants, banks allowed infrastructure funds to increase debt levels and bid up the price of assets such as airports and utilities, the report said.
By Steve Rothwell
Sept. 6 (Bloomberg) -- The global credit rout, sparked by the U.S. subprime mortgage slump, may leave as much as $34 billion of leveraged loans for railroads, tollways and other infrastructure projects ``paralyzed,'' according to analysts at Standard & Poor's.
Surging appetite for infrastructure assets prompted the takeover of U.K. airport operator BAA Plc by Grupo Ferrovial SA, a Spanish construction company, and the acquisition of Associated British Ports Holdings Plc by Goldman Sachs Group Inc. last year. Banks, saddled with as much as $332 billion of unsold leveraged loans, will now likely refrain from lending to infrastructure projects.
``With the credit cycle turning, loosely structured and highly leveraged acquisition loans are looking shaky,'' wrote Mike Wilkins, a London-based analyst at S&P, in a report published today. ``Risks are likely to be exacerbated as credit markets become increasingly volatile and investor confidence fragile.''
By loosening borrowing restrictions, or covenants, banks allowed infrastructure funds to increase debt levels and bid up the price of assets such as airports and utilities, the report said.
'New Al Qaeda plot to blow up planes on September 11' smashed
dailymail.co.uk
05/09/07 - World news section
Police have smashed a suspected al Qaeda terror cell nursing a "profound hatred of US citizens" plotting to bomb civilian and military jets.
The force of the planned explosions would have been worse than the train bombings in Madrid and the Tube and bus attacks in London on 7 July, 2005, according to German security sources. Those attacks killed 191 and 52 people respectively.
Three men aged 22, 28 and 29 have been arrested in Germany days before they planned to strike, and bomb-making equipment and explosives have been seized.
The arrests come a day after Danish police conducted raids and took eight young Muslims into custody whom they suspect of plotting a bomb attack and having links with al Qaeda. No direct link has yet been established between the two plots.
Federal prosecutor Monika Harms said the three suspects had bought 700kg (1,500lbs) of hydrogen peroxide to make massive bombs. She said: "We have prevented what we believe would have been the worst terror attacks ever on German soil".
She declined to name specific targets but said the suspects had an eye on institutions and establishments frequented by Americans in Germany, including discos, pubs and airports.
Citing unnamed security sources in Berlin, the broadcaster Suedwestfunk said Frankfurt International Airport and US Ramstein Air Base were among targets.
Joerg Ziercke, the head of Germany's federal crime office, said the men had a "profound hatred of US citizens".
German security sources have reportedly said the men belonged to the Islamic Jihad, an Egyptain terrorist group that merged with al Qaeda in 2001.
Wolfgang Bosbach, an MP with Chancellor Angela Merkel's Christian Democrats, said the plot may have been timed to coincide with the anniversary of the 2001 atrocities in the US.
Franz Josef Jung, the defence minister, said: "The attacks were planned for the near future. They presented a real threat to life."
The suspects are believed to have been planning simultaneous attacks on aircraft sitting on the ground. Security services had been watching them for six months until yesterday, when the investigators spontaneously made the arrests after the men were observed moving chemicals from one storage location to another.
As is customary in Germany, the suspects have only been identified by their first names and last initials. Daniel S comes from the Saarland, Fritz G from Ulm in Bavaria and Adem Y from Turkey, although there are reports that he holds a Pakistani passport. The two Germans are 22 and 28, while Adem Y is 29.
The men were arrested yesterday as two dozen raids took place across Germany. They are believed to have been detained in the Frankfurt area.
One of those held, Fritz G, put up a fight when police raided the men's house in the Frankfurt area. He escaped through a bathroom window and managed to reach an outer cordon of officers about 300 metres away before being aprehended. He was able to snatch a gun, which went off, from a policeman. No one was hurt.
A German network reported that shots had been fired when police raided a house in a town in the western state of North Rhine-Westphalia.
The Germans are converts to Islam. At least one of the men is reported to have received terrorist training overseas.
The German intelligence service is said to have learned of the plot through emails.
The suspects are reported to have confessed. Security services are trawling their contacts to make sure there are no back-up teams.
Ramstein serves as America's main logistical base to service the war in Iraq. Germany has ground troops in Afghanistan.
"There are clear indications that at a minimum Ramstein and the Frankfurt airport were possible targets and that they would not have waited long to strike," leading conservative politician Wolfgang Bosbach told German television station N24, adding the attacks could have been timed to coincide with the anniversary of September 11.
Police believe that the men wanted to experiment in the coming days and weeks with the chemicals and possibly start building a bomb. They were, however, far away from making a bomb that could be detonated.
A "bomb factory" is said to have been found in the village of Oberschledorn in the Sauerland. Locals said undercover police had been watching the house from a caravan.
Captain Jeff Gradeck, a spokesman for the US European Command (EUCOM) in Stuttgart, said: "We don't have any information yet that US facilities were targeted."
There was no comment from Frankfurt airport, one of Europe's busiest. The Ramstein base in the nearby state of Rhineland-Palatinate, 130 km (80 miles) southwest of the airport, is one of the most important US air bases overseas.
Germany, which has forces stationed in Afghanistan, has been on high alert for attacks. The country has feared a re-emergence of militant Islamic groups since 2001, when the northern city of Hamburg was used as a base for planning the September 11 attacks.
Earlier this year, federal prosecutors charged a Lebanese man held in detention over an unsuccessful attempt to detonate bombs on two trains in Germany in 2006.
He and another suspect were caught on surveillance cameras wheeling suitcases containing bombs aboard trains at Cologne's main railway station.
Both men left suitcases on the trains, which they planned to detonate later in the day with a timed explosive device. Despite being activated, the bombs failed to go off because of a technical error, the prosecutor's office said.
dailymail.co.uk
05/09/07 - World news section
Police have smashed a suspected al Qaeda terror cell nursing a "profound hatred of US citizens" plotting to bomb civilian and military jets.
The force of the planned explosions would have been worse than the train bombings in Madrid and the Tube and bus attacks in London on 7 July, 2005, according to German security sources. Those attacks killed 191 and 52 people respectively.
Three men aged 22, 28 and 29 have been arrested in Germany days before they planned to strike, and bomb-making equipment and explosives have been seized.
The arrests come a day after Danish police conducted raids and took eight young Muslims into custody whom they suspect of plotting a bomb attack and having links with al Qaeda. No direct link has yet been established between the two plots.
Federal prosecutor Monika Harms said the three suspects had bought 700kg (1,500lbs) of hydrogen peroxide to make massive bombs. She said: "We have prevented what we believe would have been the worst terror attacks ever on German soil".
She declined to name specific targets but said the suspects had an eye on institutions and establishments frequented by Americans in Germany, including discos, pubs and airports.
Citing unnamed security sources in Berlin, the broadcaster Suedwestfunk said Frankfurt International Airport and US Ramstein Air Base were among targets.
Joerg Ziercke, the head of Germany's federal crime office, said the men had a "profound hatred of US citizens".
German security sources have reportedly said the men belonged to the Islamic Jihad, an Egyptain terrorist group that merged with al Qaeda in 2001.
Wolfgang Bosbach, an MP with Chancellor Angela Merkel's Christian Democrats, said the plot may have been timed to coincide with the anniversary of the 2001 atrocities in the US.
Franz Josef Jung, the defence minister, said: "The attacks were planned for the near future. They presented a real threat to life."
The suspects are believed to have been planning simultaneous attacks on aircraft sitting on the ground. Security services had been watching them for six months until yesterday, when the investigators spontaneously made the arrests after the men were observed moving chemicals from one storage location to another.
As is customary in Germany, the suspects have only been identified by their first names and last initials. Daniel S comes from the Saarland, Fritz G from Ulm in Bavaria and Adem Y from Turkey, although there are reports that he holds a Pakistani passport. The two Germans are 22 and 28, while Adem Y is 29.
The men were arrested yesterday as two dozen raids took place across Germany. They are believed to have been detained in the Frankfurt area.
One of those held, Fritz G, put up a fight when police raided the men's house in the Frankfurt area. He escaped through a bathroom window and managed to reach an outer cordon of officers about 300 metres away before being aprehended. He was able to snatch a gun, which went off, from a policeman. No one was hurt.
A German network reported that shots had been fired when police raided a house in a town in the western state of North Rhine-Westphalia.
The Germans are converts to Islam. At least one of the men is reported to have received terrorist training overseas.
The German intelligence service is said to have learned of the plot through emails.
The suspects are reported to have confessed. Security services are trawling their contacts to make sure there are no back-up teams.
Ramstein serves as America's main logistical base to service the war in Iraq. Germany has ground troops in Afghanistan.
"There are clear indications that at a minimum Ramstein and the Frankfurt airport were possible targets and that they would not have waited long to strike," leading conservative politician Wolfgang Bosbach told German television station N24, adding the attacks could have been timed to coincide with the anniversary of September 11.
Police believe that the men wanted to experiment in the coming days and weeks with the chemicals and possibly start building a bomb. They were, however, far away from making a bomb that could be detonated.
A "bomb factory" is said to have been found in the village of Oberschledorn in the Sauerland. Locals said undercover police had been watching the house from a caravan.
Captain Jeff Gradeck, a spokesman for the US European Command (EUCOM) in Stuttgart, said: "We don't have any information yet that US facilities were targeted."
There was no comment from Frankfurt airport, one of Europe's busiest. The Ramstein base in the nearby state of Rhineland-Palatinate, 130 km (80 miles) southwest of the airport, is one of the most important US air bases overseas.
Germany, which has forces stationed in Afghanistan, has been on high alert for attacks. The country has feared a re-emergence of militant Islamic groups since 2001, when the northern city of Hamburg was used as a base for planning the September 11 attacks.
Earlier this year, federal prosecutors charged a Lebanese man held in detention over an unsuccessful attempt to detonate bombs on two trains in Germany in 2006.
He and another suspect were caught on surveillance cameras wheeling suitcases containing bombs aboard trains at Cologne's main railway station.
Both men left suitcases on the trains, which they planned to detonate later in the day with a timed explosive device. Despite being activated, the bombs failed to go off because of a technical error, the prosecutor's office said.
Hard times help leaders in Iran tighten their grip
By Michael Slackman
Tuesday, September 4, 2007
IHT
TEHRAN, Iran: Rents are soaring, inflation hovers around 17 percent, and 10 million Iranians live below the poverty line. The police shut 20 barbershops for men in Tehran last week because they offered inappropriate hairstyles, and women have been banned from riding bicycles in many places, as a crackdown on social freedoms presses on.
For months now, average Iranians have endured economic hardships, political repression and international isolation as the nation's top officials remain defiant over Iran's nuclear program. But in a country whose leaders see national security, government stability and Islamic values as inextricably entwined, problems that usually would constitute threats to the leadership are instead viewed as an opportunity to secure its rule.
Paradoxically, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's economic missteps and the animosity generated in the West by his aggressive posture on the nuclear issue help Iran's leaders hold back what they see as corrupting foreign influences by increasing the country's economic and political isolation, say economists, diplomats, political analysts, businessmen and clerics interviewed over the past two weeks. Pressure from the West over Iran's nuclear program and its role in Iraq, including biting economic sanctions, have also empowered those pushing the harder line.
"The leader is concerned that any effort to make the country more manageable will lead to reform and will undermine his authority," said Saeed Leylaz, an economist and former government official.
The effort to keep Iran's doors to the West sealed tight was on display Sunday, when Ahmadinejad announced that Iran had developed 3,000 centrifuges and mocked the West for trying to press Iran to stop uranium enrichment and slow its nuclear program. On Monday, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the country's Supreme Leader, used Western pressure to rally public sentiment: "Iran will defeat these drunken and arrogant powers using its artful and wise ways," he told a group of students, according to state run television.
The caustic remarks were seen here by Western diplomats and political analysts as an attempt by the president to undermine months of careful negotiations between more pragmatic conservatives in the leadership and the International Atomic Energy Agency, which only days earlier had insisted Iran was being more cooperative. The message was clear, a Western diplomat said.
"They are convinced the rest of the world is trying to put pressure on Iran to keep Iran down," said the diplomat, insisting on anonymity so as not to compromise his ability to work in Iran. "They believe if Iran makes a concession to the West on the nuclear issue, it will be the first step toward regime change."
The economic component of Iran's go-it-alone approach began with Ahmadinejad's election two years ago. He laid down a series of erratic economic decrees that he said were aimed at helping the poor, but instead often made their lives harder. Recently, the head of the central bank and the ministers of oil and industry resigned, warning that the country was heading toward trouble. The president's decisions have frightened away investors, derailing efforts to open Iran to world markets, analysts said.
The leadership has been able to ease some of the pain because of unprecedented income from the sale of crude oil. Ultimately, those interviewed agreed, the president has continued unimpeded because he has the support of Khamenei, who has the final say.
"The only thing that has kept Ahmadinejad in power is the support of the leadership," said Muhammad Atrianfar, publisher of two newspapers that have been closed and an ally of former president Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani. "As soon as the leader stops supporting him, he can easily be impeached and dismissed."
No one accuses the leadership of deliberately fostering economic chaos; instead, economists here say Ahmadinejad fails to understand the effect of his policies. "He feels the pain of the poor, but doesn't have any solution," said Ali Rashadi, an independent economist. "He is wrecking a system that was patched together over 25 years."
Many journalists, academics, and former government officials said that they think Ahmadinejad has been more active, and reckless with the economy, than Khamenei had expected. But he is comfortable with Ahmadinejad because he can count on him to preserve the system and to roll back political, economic and social change that conservatives feared were insidious steps toward a velvet revolution, those interviewed here said. A Western-allied ambassador here said that the supreme leader and the security services decided to arrest Haleh Esfandiari, the Iranian-American scholar, partly as a warning to Iranian insiders who have expressed dismay over the direction of the country.
"They think little by little we have moved away from Islamic values." said Mohsen Kadivar, a cleric who recently was removed from his position teaching at Tehran University. "They see Ahmadinejad as the man to return Iran to these values."
He added, "What's important for them is being in power."
When Ahmadinejad was elected, he campaigned as a sort of Islamic Robin Hood, promising to redistribute the country's oil wealth from the rich to the poor. One of his first edicts was to order banks to lower interest rates to 12 percent from as high as 17 percent. The order, like others, backfired, making loans harder to come by.
In another case, Ahmadinejad decided that the price of cement was too high, so he ordered that reduced, too. Rashadi, the economist, said the decree frightened away investors who had planned to build new cement factories around the country. Rashadi said the president's constant insults aimed at the stock market undermined investor confidence, which he said encouraged people with money to invest in real estate, driving up property values.
"My income does not match my cost of living," said Hassan Khalili, 37, who rents a small apartment in the village of Vardan, a meandering hillside community of about 9,000 people an hour outside of Tehran. "I thought it was going to get better under Ahmadinejad, but it didn't."
But with its oil revenues, the government has, in the short term, been able to buy itself out of an economic meltdown with $60 billion spent on subsidies and a massive increase in imports — though that has undermined local manufacturing, local economists said.
Oil revenue has also helped shore up the regime by enriching a new ruling class made up of Revolutionary Guard and members and alumni of the Basij militia who have their hand in nearly every aspect of the economy, and now the government, people here said.
The president's economic policies have also cushioned many homeowners because property values have skyrocketed. Three years ago, for example, a four-bedroom apartment in a good Tehran neighborhood sold for $200,000; today it is worth over $1 million.
Mehdi Panahi lives in central Tehran and runs a small snack shop in the mountains just north of the city, where many people hike and relax on the weekends. He has had to raise his prices 20 percent since March, he said, because his rent doubled in the last year. The cost of cooking oil shot up 50 percent, tomato paste rose 70 percent, and prices of dairy products increased by 70 percent.
However, in the current environment of fear and caution, he insisted: "Of course I am optimistic. What is there not to be optimistic about?"
The economic upheaval has been coupled with a far-reaching, months-long security clampdown. The authorities have arrested prominent Iranian-American intellectuals, suppressed the student movement, rolled back social freedoms, purged university faculties, closed newspapers and moved to marginalize once-powerful political figures, like the former president, Rafsanjani, who are out of step with the current trend. The arrests include a once-prominent insider and former nuclear negotiator, Hossein Mousavian, on spy charges this May.
The repression is calibrated. Students and female activists have been encouraged to leave the country or face stepped-up pressure. The idea is to send a message without spreading the pain too widely.
As a result, the streets are calm, but there is an undercurrent of unease and confusion. People routinely say that life is good, better even under this president — then rattle off a litany of complaints. Last week Ahmedinejad attended a conference of religious leaders in the north of Tehran. Ali Akhbar Akhbari, his wife and two young daughters live in a tent a block from the convention center. They said they were homeless and collected bottles to make money for food. Marziah, 13, and Roziah, 9, slept in their own small tent decorated with Looney Tunes characters.
"No one will help them," shouted Valioalah Ghiyasi, 60, as he walked down the street, his hands deep in the pockets of his sport coat. He pulled a pay stub from his pocket, showing his own small government salary, the equivalent of $131 a month.
"It was a better situation before," he said. "My wife has cancer and I can't afford the medicine. I haven't been able to pay my rent in five months, my rent is $250 a month. I don't know what to do. I am begging."
The net effect of his policies can be seen in the village of Vadan. Suddenly, property values have gone up so much that a local man, Ghalan Abbas Mahmoodi, has been able to open a real estate office. Farmers are selling off land, and wealthy people from Tehran are building villas on scenic hills overlooking the rolling countryside. For those who do not own land and have seen their rents soar, such as Khalili, it is a near catastrophe.
Mahmoodi, the realtor, had a different view. "As my income increases, my purchase power increases," he said.
While the president has lost a great deal of political support within the system, he has not shown any signs of being deterred. "There is an honorable butcher in our neighborhood who is aware of all the problems of the people," he said, "and I also get important economic information from him."
By Michael Slackman
Tuesday, September 4, 2007
IHT
TEHRAN, Iran: Rents are soaring, inflation hovers around 17 percent, and 10 million Iranians live below the poverty line. The police shut 20 barbershops for men in Tehran last week because they offered inappropriate hairstyles, and women have been banned from riding bicycles in many places, as a crackdown on social freedoms presses on.
For months now, average Iranians have endured economic hardships, political repression and international isolation as the nation's top officials remain defiant over Iran's nuclear program. But in a country whose leaders see national security, government stability and Islamic values as inextricably entwined, problems that usually would constitute threats to the leadership are instead viewed as an opportunity to secure its rule.
Paradoxically, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's economic missteps and the animosity generated in the West by his aggressive posture on the nuclear issue help Iran's leaders hold back what they see as corrupting foreign influences by increasing the country's economic and political isolation, say economists, diplomats, political analysts, businessmen and clerics interviewed over the past two weeks. Pressure from the West over Iran's nuclear program and its role in Iraq, including biting economic sanctions, have also empowered those pushing the harder line.
"The leader is concerned that any effort to make the country more manageable will lead to reform and will undermine his authority," said Saeed Leylaz, an economist and former government official.
The effort to keep Iran's doors to the West sealed tight was on display Sunday, when Ahmadinejad announced that Iran had developed 3,000 centrifuges and mocked the West for trying to press Iran to stop uranium enrichment and slow its nuclear program. On Monday, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the country's Supreme Leader, used Western pressure to rally public sentiment: "Iran will defeat these drunken and arrogant powers using its artful and wise ways," he told a group of students, according to state run television.
The caustic remarks were seen here by Western diplomats and political analysts as an attempt by the president to undermine months of careful negotiations between more pragmatic conservatives in the leadership and the International Atomic Energy Agency, which only days earlier had insisted Iran was being more cooperative. The message was clear, a Western diplomat said.
"They are convinced the rest of the world is trying to put pressure on Iran to keep Iran down," said the diplomat, insisting on anonymity so as not to compromise his ability to work in Iran. "They believe if Iran makes a concession to the West on the nuclear issue, it will be the first step toward regime change."
The economic component of Iran's go-it-alone approach began with Ahmadinejad's election two years ago. He laid down a series of erratic economic decrees that he said were aimed at helping the poor, but instead often made their lives harder. Recently, the head of the central bank and the ministers of oil and industry resigned, warning that the country was heading toward trouble. The president's decisions have frightened away investors, derailing efforts to open Iran to world markets, analysts said.
The leadership has been able to ease some of the pain because of unprecedented income from the sale of crude oil. Ultimately, those interviewed agreed, the president has continued unimpeded because he has the support of Khamenei, who has the final say.
"The only thing that has kept Ahmadinejad in power is the support of the leadership," said Muhammad Atrianfar, publisher of two newspapers that have been closed and an ally of former president Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani. "As soon as the leader stops supporting him, he can easily be impeached and dismissed."
No one accuses the leadership of deliberately fostering economic chaos; instead, economists here say Ahmadinejad fails to understand the effect of his policies. "He feels the pain of the poor, but doesn't have any solution," said Ali Rashadi, an independent economist. "He is wrecking a system that was patched together over 25 years."
Many journalists, academics, and former government officials said that they think Ahmadinejad has been more active, and reckless with the economy, than Khamenei had expected. But he is comfortable with Ahmadinejad because he can count on him to preserve the system and to roll back political, economic and social change that conservatives feared were insidious steps toward a velvet revolution, those interviewed here said. A Western-allied ambassador here said that the supreme leader and the security services decided to arrest Haleh Esfandiari, the Iranian-American scholar, partly as a warning to Iranian insiders who have expressed dismay over the direction of the country.
"They think little by little we have moved away from Islamic values." said Mohsen Kadivar, a cleric who recently was removed from his position teaching at Tehran University. "They see Ahmadinejad as the man to return Iran to these values."
He added, "What's important for them is being in power."
When Ahmadinejad was elected, he campaigned as a sort of Islamic Robin Hood, promising to redistribute the country's oil wealth from the rich to the poor. One of his first edicts was to order banks to lower interest rates to 12 percent from as high as 17 percent. The order, like others, backfired, making loans harder to come by.
In another case, Ahmadinejad decided that the price of cement was too high, so he ordered that reduced, too. Rashadi, the economist, said the decree frightened away investors who had planned to build new cement factories around the country. Rashadi said the president's constant insults aimed at the stock market undermined investor confidence, which he said encouraged people with money to invest in real estate, driving up property values.
"My income does not match my cost of living," said Hassan Khalili, 37, who rents a small apartment in the village of Vardan, a meandering hillside community of about 9,000 people an hour outside of Tehran. "I thought it was going to get better under Ahmadinejad, but it didn't."
But with its oil revenues, the government has, in the short term, been able to buy itself out of an economic meltdown with $60 billion spent on subsidies and a massive increase in imports — though that has undermined local manufacturing, local economists said.
Oil revenue has also helped shore up the regime by enriching a new ruling class made up of Revolutionary Guard and members and alumni of the Basij militia who have their hand in nearly every aspect of the economy, and now the government, people here said.
The president's economic policies have also cushioned many homeowners because property values have skyrocketed. Three years ago, for example, a four-bedroom apartment in a good Tehran neighborhood sold for $200,000; today it is worth over $1 million.
Mehdi Panahi lives in central Tehran and runs a small snack shop in the mountains just north of the city, where many people hike and relax on the weekends. He has had to raise his prices 20 percent since March, he said, because his rent doubled in the last year. The cost of cooking oil shot up 50 percent, tomato paste rose 70 percent, and prices of dairy products increased by 70 percent.
However, in the current environment of fear and caution, he insisted: "Of course I am optimistic. What is there not to be optimistic about?"
The economic upheaval has been coupled with a far-reaching, months-long security clampdown. The authorities have arrested prominent Iranian-American intellectuals, suppressed the student movement, rolled back social freedoms, purged university faculties, closed newspapers and moved to marginalize once-powerful political figures, like the former president, Rafsanjani, who are out of step with the current trend. The arrests include a once-prominent insider and former nuclear negotiator, Hossein Mousavian, on spy charges this May.
The repression is calibrated. Students and female activists have been encouraged to leave the country or face stepped-up pressure. The idea is to send a message without spreading the pain too widely.
As a result, the streets are calm, but there is an undercurrent of unease and confusion. People routinely say that life is good, better even under this president — then rattle off a litany of complaints. Last week Ahmedinejad attended a conference of religious leaders in the north of Tehran. Ali Akhbar Akhbari, his wife and two young daughters live in a tent a block from the convention center. They said they were homeless and collected bottles to make money for food. Marziah, 13, and Roziah, 9, slept in their own small tent decorated with Looney Tunes characters.
"No one will help them," shouted Valioalah Ghiyasi, 60, as he walked down the street, his hands deep in the pockets of his sport coat. He pulled a pay stub from his pocket, showing his own small government salary, the equivalent of $131 a month.
"It was a better situation before," he said. "My wife has cancer and I can't afford the medicine. I haven't been able to pay my rent in five months, my rent is $250 a month. I don't know what to do. I am begging."
The net effect of his policies can be seen in the village of Vadan. Suddenly, property values have gone up so much that a local man, Ghalan Abbas Mahmoodi, has been able to open a real estate office. Farmers are selling off land, and wealthy people from Tehran are building villas on scenic hills overlooking the rolling countryside. For those who do not own land and have seen their rents soar, such as Khalili, it is a near catastrophe.
Mahmoodi, the realtor, had a different view. "As my income increases, my purchase power increases," he said.
While the president has lost a great deal of political support within the system, he has not shown any signs of being deterred. "There is an honorable butcher in our neighborhood who is aware of all the problems of the people," he said, "and I also get important economic information from him."
Troops chase militants in flight after siege at camp
theherald.co.uk
5 Sept 2007
HUSSEIN DAKROUB in MOHAMMARA
Lebanese troops exchanged fire with militants on the run yesterday, as the military swept the area around a Palestinian refugee camp in northern Lebanon to try to capture the diehards after a climactic battle.
The army launched an hour-long volley of artillery fire after reports said some fugitives opened fire and threw a hand grenade at a military patrol, injuring two soldiers. State media said two militants were killed and three were captured following the brief exchange.
The exchange marred the festive mood that engulfed the country after the army on Sunday crushed the al Qaeda-inspired Fatah Islam in a ferocious final battle, killing 39, capturing 24 and ending a three-month siege that cost the army 158 soldiers and devastated the Nahr el Bared refugee camp.
Soldiers on the ground yesterday, along with helicopters and speedboats in the Mediterranean Sea, searched neighbourhoods, scrubland and coastal waters for militants who escaped the dragnet.
The camp remained off-limits to the refugees who had lived there and had fled the camp early in the fighting under army orders.
Inside the camp, military sappers combed destroyed living areas, looking for booby traps, unexploded shells and mines.
The body of Fatah Islam leader Shaker al Absi was identified by his wife at a hospital in Tripoli, said Nasser Adra, its director.
Al Absi, a Palestinian linked to the late leader of al Qaeda in Iraq, Abu Musab al Zarqawi, has not been seen or heard from since early in the fighting that started May 20.
His brother, Abdul-Razzak, said in Jordan he would ask authorities to have the body brought there for "a celebration for his martyrdom." It was not clear whether Jordan would allow a burial.
A Jordanian military court sentenced al Absi to death in absentia in 2004, along with al Zarqawi, for their roles in the 2002 slaying of a US diplomat in Amman. Al Zarqawi was killed in a US airstrike a year ago.
Fatah Islam's collapse brought an end to Lebanon's worst internal fighting since the 1975-90 civil war. At least 20 civilians were also killed in the three-month battle.
Fatah Islam, estimated at its height to have about 360 fighters, had set up its headquarters at Nahr el Bared last autumn.
Some officials say the group is a branch of al Qaeda that wanted to make Lebanon and the Palestinian refugee camps a safe haven.
theherald.co.uk
5 Sept 2007
HUSSEIN DAKROUB in MOHAMMARA
Lebanese troops exchanged fire with militants on the run yesterday, as the military swept the area around a Palestinian refugee camp in northern Lebanon to try to capture the diehards after a climactic battle.
The army launched an hour-long volley of artillery fire after reports said some fugitives opened fire and threw a hand grenade at a military patrol, injuring two soldiers. State media said two militants were killed and three were captured following the brief exchange.
The exchange marred the festive mood that engulfed the country after the army on Sunday crushed the al Qaeda-inspired Fatah Islam in a ferocious final battle, killing 39, capturing 24 and ending a three-month siege that cost the army 158 soldiers and devastated the Nahr el Bared refugee camp.
Soldiers on the ground yesterday, along with helicopters and speedboats in the Mediterranean Sea, searched neighbourhoods, scrubland and coastal waters for militants who escaped the dragnet.
The camp remained off-limits to the refugees who had lived there and had fled the camp early in the fighting under army orders.
Inside the camp, military sappers combed destroyed living areas, looking for booby traps, unexploded shells and mines.
The body of Fatah Islam leader Shaker al Absi was identified by his wife at a hospital in Tripoli, said Nasser Adra, its director.
Al Absi, a Palestinian linked to the late leader of al Qaeda in Iraq, Abu Musab al Zarqawi, has not been seen or heard from since early in the fighting that started May 20.
His brother, Abdul-Razzak, said in Jordan he would ask authorities to have the body brought there for "a celebration for his martyrdom." It was not clear whether Jordan would allow a burial.
A Jordanian military court sentenced al Absi to death in absentia in 2004, along with al Zarqawi, for their roles in the 2002 slaying of a US diplomat in Amman. Al Zarqawi was killed in a US airstrike a year ago.
Fatah Islam's collapse brought an end to Lebanon's worst internal fighting since the 1975-90 civil war. At least 20 civilians were also killed in the three-month battle.
Fatah Islam, estimated at its height to have about 360 fighters, had set up its headquarters at Nahr el Bared last autumn.
Some officials say the group is a branch of al Qaeda that wanted to make Lebanon and the Palestinian refugee camps a safe haven.
U.S. colonel reaches out to Iraqi sheiks
With a 'spider sense,' he tries to discern who can be trusted and tries to win their help.
By Garrett Therolf
Times Staff Writer
July 10, 2007
BAQUBAH, IRAQ — The U.S. commander meets with the former general in Saddam Hussein's army over lunch, promises weapons, wishes him a return to high office. For both men, the conversation comes at great risk, and neither knows whether the other is an ally or an enemy.
For Army Lt. Col. Morris Goins, his "spider sense" tells him to keep talking, even after the general, a Sunni tribal leader, tells him, "If you see me shooting at you, you should shoot back."
Goins is unfazed. It is a potentially deadly complication he will endure to press the tribes to quell the violence here in Diyala province, the nation's deadliest for U.S. troops on a per-capita basis.
Some tribal leaders have sworn allegiances against the United States, but they are believed to hold the most powerful sway over Diyala's vast terrain.
Months before the sheiks drew U.S. attention as potential allies against Al Qaeda in Iraq, Goins began to spend most of his time on the strategy. "It's a way to not just fight the war, but shape it," he said.
Army Gen. David H. Petraeus, the top U.S. commander in Iraq, has made such efforts with tribal sheiks a top priority throughout Iraq, citing the "breathtaking" success Sunni Muslim sheiks in Al Anbar province achieved by banding together to drive Al Qaeda in Iraq out of their region.
That success, however, benefited from an overwhelming Sunni majority that is uncommon in Iraq, and the tribal coalition was originated by the sheiks themselves. The efforts by Goins, therefore, may present the most realistic picture of how the strategy may play out in the rest of Iraq. It is being initiated by an American commander rather than the sheiks, and Diyala contains large numbers of all three of Iraq's major groups: Sunnis, Shiites and Kurds.
The meetings are often held clandestinely, and the Sunni sheiks are not named out of fear that they would be killed by members of the Sunni-led insurgency. For those who agree to help, Goins offers protection, money, weapons. He's never sure what he will gain in return.
"It's complicated, man," Goins said. "The danger is that you just become one of these guys' militia."
Soldiers have faith in him
Over three tours in Iraq, the tall, skinny Army lieutenant colonel from Southern Pines, N.C., has been known for commanding with a focus on relationships as much as on firepower.
Goins' subordinates say he has won their trust in a war of heavy losses partly because he expresses the kind of strong emotions that lets soldiers know he understands their sacrifice.
At the halfway point of its tour, his 1,000-strong 1st Battalion, 12th Cavalry, has seen 26 men killed and 99 injured. At a recent memorial service for a 21-year-old father of two young boys, Goins told his soldiers that the difference between them and the so-called "greatest generation" of World War II is, "We say, 'I love you' to each other more often."
For him, the devotion to his troops meant sitting down for tea with sheiks who, in some cases, he privately hated and believed to have aided the Al Qaeda-linked operatives who killed his men.
"What's hard for me is irrelevant, though," Goins said. "What's personal and professional are two different things. Nobody gives a damn what your feelings are. You have to go where the information and the intelligence drive you."
Ever since he lost the first three soldiers of the tour in November, he has pursued the sheiks in earnest. His preparation was a two-week military course and a few books he "thumbed through."
He also relies on the counsel of a handful of people who gather in his dusty office to strategize beside a big-screen television and a bucket of bubble gum.
One of them is Dean Jones, a retired Denver police investigator who works as a Defense Department contractor. In an interview, he said he was happy to see the commander take a holistic approach to the province's myriad problems.
"Where is the CIA? The State Department? Or anybody else? They're not here. It's just us. We have to play all those roles," Jones said.
Another counselor is Sheik Adnan Tamimi, a first cousin of the Shiite provincial governor and a leader of a tribe with roughly 200,000 members. Tamimi and Goins talk most days on the phone, and Goins visits the sheik's compound about once a week for lunch.
In between intelligence help on militants and tips on how to approach other sheiks, Tamimi talks about his hopes to visit Goins in the United States and the changing family dynamic as he prepares to marry a second wife. Goins says he hopes to bring his own wife on a trip to Iraq one day.
A tribal hero
When Tamimi suffered a heart attack last month, Goins personally rushed him to U.S. military doctors, who brought him back to stable health. As Goins drove Tamimi home a few days later, women burst out the front door and tossed candy as they wailed in celebration.
Goins was emotionally embraced as a tribal hero, and a sheep was slaughtered at the sheik's feet in thanks for his return. Two days later, Tamimi held a lunch for more than 100 people to honor Goins, and he passed more information to him about militants in the region.
It was confirmation of a relationship already shaded with life-and-death consequences.
On April 23, when a U.S. Army captain declined to take Tamimi's advice that a tribal round-table was not safe, two car bombs struck the U.S. caravan traveling from the meeting. Nine soldiers were killed.
"The captain was such a nice guy that he thought the sheiks were sincere," Tamimi said. "Not all Iraqis are sincere, not all Iraqis are liars."
Goins' central goal, repeated with nearly every contact with tribal leaders, is to bring Sunni and Shiite sheiks to the same negotiating table with leaders of the provincial government and Iraqi security forces.
Offering tea and trust
It was again the topic when Goins invited the former general for tea at a small U.S. military outpost outside Baqubah, Diyala's capital. To coax him out of the shadows, Goins had invited three other Sunni sheiks who were friendly with the ex-general but did not know he had been talking to the Americans.
Going into the meeting, Jones, the Pentagon contractor, said, "When we talk to this guy, we know we are talking directly to a moderate member of Al Qaeda. His family is Al Qaeda, the people around him are Al Qaeda, he's Al Qaeda."
Jones said the military believed the sheik could turn against Al Qaeda, however, and cooperate with American forces if he was promised a high-profile role in the province. "He was a big deal around here once, and now that's gone. He'd like to be a big deal again," Jones said.
When the former general arrived for his meeting, he saw that he had been ambushed with unexpected attendees. He shook hands cautiously as he moved around the cramped room.
He complained of the meeting location, saying the trip to visit Goins had been dangerous. Goins countered that every time he had gone to visit the sheik's home, his caravan had been hit by a makeshift bomb in the road. "I didn't put those bombs there," the sheik said with a wide smile.
The meeting ended with the sheik's request to meet with Goins for two minutes outside.
The sheik said he was still waiting for the weapons Goins had promised, and Goins said, "I'm going to get the weapons to you soon. You'll get some AK-47s."
That's when the sheik made his enigmatic comment about not holding fire: "If people shoot at you from my house, you shoot back. Even if you see me shooting at you, you should shoot back."
Back at Goins' office, he was still trying to parse the meaning of those final words. He told Jones, "I took that as him saying, 'I'm surrounded,' or, 'There are dudes in my own camp who are out to get me.' "
'He's up for grabs'
When Goins and the others considered the meeting as a whole, they said they worried that the sheik's demands did not mention the welfare of other tribal members but centered on his own protection and power.
Goins' interpreter said he believed the demands signaled that his allegiance would go to the highest bidder. "You can say he's up for grabs. You can either bring him into your fold or he'll go into their fold," said the interpreter, Kamali, who uses only one name.
No one was able to say how much influence the sheik held with members of his tribe, though, or even how much of the tribe remained in Diyala.
Jones asked what procedures would be put into place to manage the sheik. "If we can't manage him, we have to consider him our enemy," Jones said.
Goins nodded in agreement, but said, "My spider sense says he has the ability to be a power broker. He has the look, the stature, the voice."
At the very least, a bundle of AK-47s would be delivered to keep the conversation going, Goins said.
With a 'spider sense,' he tries to discern who can be trusted and tries to win their help.
By Garrett Therolf
Times Staff Writer
July 10, 2007
BAQUBAH, IRAQ — The U.S. commander meets with the former general in Saddam Hussein's army over lunch, promises weapons, wishes him a return to high office. For both men, the conversation comes at great risk, and neither knows whether the other is an ally or an enemy.
For Army Lt. Col. Morris Goins, his "spider sense" tells him to keep talking, even after the general, a Sunni tribal leader, tells him, "If you see me shooting at you, you should shoot back."
Goins is unfazed. It is a potentially deadly complication he will endure to press the tribes to quell the violence here in Diyala province, the nation's deadliest for U.S. troops on a per-capita basis.
Some tribal leaders have sworn allegiances against the United States, but they are believed to hold the most powerful sway over Diyala's vast terrain.
Months before the sheiks drew U.S. attention as potential allies against Al Qaeda in Iraq, Goins began to spend most of his time on the strategy. "It's a way to not just fight the war, but shape it," he said.
Army Gen. David H. Petraeus, the top U.S. commander in Iraq, has made such efforts with tribal sheiks a top priority throughout Iraq, citing the "breathtaking" success Sunni Muslim sheiks in Al Anbar province achieved by banding together to drive Al Qaeda in Iraq out of their region.
That success, however, benefited from an overwhelming Sunni majority that is uncommon in Iraq, and the tribal coalition was originated by the sheiks themselves. The efforts by Goins, therefore, may present the most realistic picture of how the strategy may play out in the rest of Iraq. It is being initiated by an American commander rather than the sheiks, and Diyala contains large numbers of all three of Iraq's major groups: Sunnis, Shiites and Kurds.
The meetings are often held clandestinely, and the Sunni sheiks are not named out of fear that they would be killed by members of the Sunni-led insurgency. For those who agree to help, Goins offers protection, money, weapons. He's never sure what he will gain in return.
"It's complicated, man," Goins said. "The danger is that you just become one of these guys' militia."
Soldiers have faith in him
Over three tours in Iraq, the tall, skinny Army lieutenant colonel from Southern Pines, N.C., has been known for commanding with a focus on relationships as much as on firepower.
Goins' subordinates say he has won their trust in a war of heavy losses partly because he expresses the kind of strong emotions that lets soldiers know he understands their sacrifice.
At the halfway point of its tour, his 1,000-strong 1st Battalion, 12th Cavalry, has seen 26 men killed and 99 injured. At a recent memorial service for a 21-year-old father of two young boys, Goins told his soldiers that the difference between them and the so-called "greatest generation" of World War II is, "We say, 'I love you' to each other more often."
For him, the devotion to his troops meant sitting down for tea with sheiks who, in some cases, he privately hated and believed to have aided the Al Qaeda-linked operatives who killed his men.
"What's hard for me is irrelevant, though," Goins said. "What's personal and professional are two different things. Nobody gives a damn what your feelings are. You have to go where the information and the intelligence drive you."
Ever since he lost the first three soldiers of the tour in November, he has pursued the sheiks in earnest. His preparation was a two-week military course and a few books he "thumbed through."
He also relies on the counsel of a handful of people who gather in his dusty office to strategize beside a big-screen television and a bucket of bubble gum.
One of them is Dean Jones, a retired Denver police investigator who works as a Defense Department contractor. In an interview, he said he was happy to see the commander take a holistic approach to the province's myriad problems.
"Where is the CIA? The State Department? Or anybody else? They're not here. It's just us. We have to play all those roles," Jones said.
Another counselor is Sheik Adnan Tamimi, a first cousin of the Shiite provincial governor and a leader of a tribe with roughly 200,000 members. Tamimi and Goins talk most days on the phone, and Goins visits the sheik's compound about once a week for lunch.
In between intelligence help on militants and tips on how to approach other sheiks, Tamimi talks about his hopes to visit Goins in the United States and the changing family dynamic as he prepares to marry a second wife. Goins says he hopes to bring his own wife on a trip to Iraq one day.
A tribal hero
When Tamimi suffered a heart attack last month, Goins personally rushed him to U.S. military doctors, who brought him back to stable health. As Goins drove Tamimi home a few days later, women burst out the front door and tossed candy as they wailed in celebration.
Goins was emotionally embraced as a tribal hero, and a sheep was slaughtered at the sheik's feet in thanks for his return. Two days later, Tamimi held a lunch for more than 100 people to honor Goins, and he passed more information to him about militants in the region.
It was confirmation of a relationship already shaded with life-and-death consequences.
On April 23, when a U.S. Army captain declined to take Tamimi's advice that a tribal round-table was not safe, two car bombs struck the U.S. caravan traveling from the meeting. Nine soldiers were killed.
"The captain was such a nice guy that he thought the sheiks were sincere," Tamimi said. "Not all Iraqis are sincere, not all Iraqis are liars."
Goins' central goal, repeated with nearly every contact with tribal leaders, is to bring Sunni and Shiite sheiks to the same negotiating table with leaders of the provincial government and Iraqi security forces.
Offering tea and trust
It was again the topic when Goins invited the former general for tea at a small U.S. military outpost outside Baqubah, Diyala's capital. To coax him out of the shadows, Goins had invited three other Sunni sheiks who were friendly with the ex-general but did not know he had been talking to the Americans.
Going into the meeting, Jones, the Pentagon contractor, said, "When we talk to this guy, we know we are talking directly to a moderate member of Al Qaeda. His family is Al Qaeda, the people around him are Al Qaeda, he's Al Qaeda."
Jones said the military believed the sheik could turn against Al Qaeda, however, and cooperate with American forces if he was promised a high-profile role in the province. "He was a big deal around here once, and now that's gone. He'd like to be a big deal again," Jones said.
When the former general arrived for his meeting, he saw that he had been ambushed with unexpected attendees. He shook hands cautiously as he moved around the cramped room.
He complained of the meeting location, saying the trip to visit Goins had been dangerous. Goins countered that every time he had gone to visit the sheik's home, his caravan had been hit by a makeshift bomb in the road. "I didn't put those bombs there," the sheik said with a wide smile.
The meeting ended with the sheik's request to meet with Goins for two minutes outside.
The sheik said he was still waiting for the weapons Goins had promised, and Goins said, "I'm going to get the weapons to you soon. You'll get some AK-47s."
That's when the sheik made his enigmatic comment about not holding fire: "If people shoot at you from my house, you shoot back. Even if you see me shooting at you, you should shoot back."
Back at Goins' office, he was still trying to parse the meaning of those final words. He told Jones, "I took that as him saying, 'I'm surrounded,' or, 'There are dudes in my own camp who are out to get me.' "
'He's up for grabs'
When Goins and the others considered the meeting as a whole, they said they worried that the sheik's demands did not mention the welfare of other tribal members but centered on his own protection and power.
Goins' interpreter said he believed the demands signaled that his allegiance would go to the highest bidder. "You can say he's up for grabs. You can either bring him into your fold or he'll go into their fold," said the interpreter, Kamali, who uses only one name.
No one was able to say how much influence the sheik held with members of his tribe, though, or even how much of the tribe remained in Diyala.
Jones asked what procedures would be put into place to manage the sheik. "If we can't manage him, we have to consider him our enemy," Jones said.
Goins nodded in agreement, but said, "My spider sense says he has the ability to be a power broker. He has the look, the stature, the voice."
At the very least, a bundle of AK-47s would be delivered to keep the conversation going, Goins said.
A Brief History of Economic Time
By STEVEN LANDSBURG
June 9, 2007; Page A8
wsj.com
Modern humans first emerged about 100,000 years ago. For the next 99,800 years or so, nothing happened. Well, not quite nothing. There were wars, political intrigue, the invention of agriculture -- but none of that stuff had much effect on the quality of people's lives. Almost everyone lived on the modern equivalent of $400 to $600 a year, just above the subsistence level. True, there were always tiny aristocracies who lived far better, but numerically they were quite insignificant.
Then -- just a couple of hundred years ago, maybe 10 generations -- people started getting richer. And richer and richer still. Per capita income, at least in the West, began to grow at the unprecedented rate of about three quarters of a percent per year. A couple of decades later, the same thing was happening around the world.
Then it got even better. By the 20th century, per capita real incomes, that is, incomes adjusted for inflation, were growing at 1.5% per year, on average, and for the past half century they've been growing at about 2.3%. If you're earning a modest middle-class income of $50,000 a year, and if you expect your children, 25 years from now, to occupy that same modest rung on the economic ladder, then with a 2.3% growth rate, they'll be earning the inflation-adjusted equivalent of $89,000 a year. Their children, another 25 years down the line, will earn $158,000 a year.
Against a backdrop like that, the temporary ups and downs of the business cycle seem fantastically minor. In the 1930s, we had a Great Depression, when income levels fell back to where they had been 20 years earlier. For a few years, people had to live the way their parents had always lived, and they found it almost intolerable. The underlying expectation -- that the present is supposed to be better than the past -- is a new phenomenon in history. No 18th-century politician would have asked "Are you better off than you were four years ago?" because it never would have occurred to anyone that they ought to be better off than they were four years ago.
Rising income is only part of the story. One hundred years ago the average American workweek was over 60 hours; today it's under 35. One hundred years ago 6% of manufacturing workers took vacations; today it's over 90%. One hundred years ago the average housekeeper spent 12 hours a day on laundry, cooking, cleaning and sewing; today it's about three hours.
As far as the quality of the goods we buy, try picking up an electronics catalogue from, oh, say, 2001 and ask yourself whether there's anything there you'd want to buy. That was the year my friend Ben spent $600 for a 1.3-megapixel digital camera that weighed a pound and a half. What about services, such as health care? Would you rather purchase today's health care at today's prices or the health care of, say, 1970 at 1970 prices? I don't know any informed person who would choose 1970, which means that despite all the hype about costs, health care now is a better bargain than it's ever been before.
The moral is that increases in measured income -- even the phenomenal increases of the past two centuries -- grossly understate the real improvements in our economic condition. The average middle-class American might have a smaller measured income than the European monarchs of the Middle Ages, but I suspect that Tudor King Henry VIII would have traded half his kingdom for modern plumbing, a lifetime supply of antibiotics and access to the Internet.
The source of this wealth -- the engine of prosperity -- is technological progress. And the engine of technological progress is ideas -- not just the ideas from engineering laboratories, but also ideas like new methods of crop rotation, or just-in-time inventory management. You can fly from New York to Tokyo partly because someone figured out how to build an airplane and partly because someone figured out how to insure it. I'm writing this on a personal computer instead of an electric typewriter partly because someone said, "Hey! I wonder if we can make computer chips out of silicon!" and partly because someone said "Hey! I wonder if we can finance startups with junk bonds!"
Which contribution is more important? By one rough measure -- the profits earned by the innovator -- they're about equal. In the late 1980s, Microsoft earned economic profits of about $600 million a year, while Michael Milken, the inventor of the junk bond, earned an annual income that was just about the same.
Some good ideas even come from economists. Julian Simon came up with the idea of bribing airline passengers to give up their seats on overbooked flights -- and gone were the days when you relied on the luck of the draw to make it to your daughter's wedding. Economists first suggested creating property rights in African elephants, a policy that has given villagers an incentive to harvest at a sustainable rate and drive the poachers away. The result? Villagers have prospered and the elephant population has soared.
Engineers figure out how to harness the power of technology; economists figure out how to harness the power of incentives. Our prosperity relies on both.
Mr. Landsburg's latest book is "More Sex Is Safer Sex: The Unconventional Wisdom of Economics" (The Free Press, 2007).
By STEVEN LANDSBURG
June 9, 2007; Page A8
wsj.com
Modern humans first emerged about 100,000 years ago. For the next 99,800 years or so, nothing happened. Well, not quite nothing. There were wars, political intrigue, the invention of agriculture -- but none of that stuff had much effect on the quality of people's lives. Almost everyone lived on the modern equivalent of $400 to $600 a year, just above the subsistence level. True, there were always tiny aristocracies who lived far better, but numerically they were quite insignificant.
Then -- just a couple of hundred years ago, maybe 10 generations -- people started getting richer. And richer and richer still. Per capita income, at least in the West, began to grow at the unprecedented rate of about three quarters of a percent per year. A couple of decades later, the same thing was happening around the world.
Then it got even better. By the 20th century, per capita real incomes, that is, incomes adjusted for inflation, were growing at 1.5% per year, on average, and for the past half century they've been growing at about 2.3%. If you're earning a modest middle-class income of $50,000 a year, and if you expect your children, 25 years from now, to occupy that same modest rung on the economic ladder, then with a 2.3% growth rate, they'll be earning the inflation-adjusted equivalent of $89,000 a year. Their children, another 25 years down the line, will earn $158,000 a year.
Against a backdrop like that, the temporary ups and downs of the business cycle seem fantastically minor. In the 1930s, we had a Great Depression, when income levels fell back to where they had been 20 years earlier. For a few years, people had to live the way their parents had always lived, and they found it almost intolerable. The underlying expectation -- that the present is supposed to be better than the past -- is a new phenomenon in history. No 18th-century politician would have asked "Are you better off than you were four years ago?" because it never would have occurred to anyone that they ought to be better off than they were four years ago.
Rising income is only part of the story. One hundred years ago the average American workweek was over 60 hours; today it's under 35. One hundred years ago 6% of manufacturing workers took vacations; today it's over 90%. One hundred years ago the average housekeeper spent 12 hours a day on laundry, cooking, cleaning and sewing; today it's about three hours.
As far as the quality of the goods we buy, try picking up an electronics catalogue from, oh, say, 2001 and ask yourself whether there's anything there you'd want to buy. That was the year my friend Ben spent $600 for a 1.3-megapixel digital camera that weighed a pound and a half. What about services, such as health care? Would you rather purchase today's health care at today's prices or the health care of, say, 1970 at 1970 prices? I don't know any informed person who would choose 1970, which means that despite all the hype about costs, health care now is a better bargain than it's ever been before.
The moral is that increases in measured income -- even the phenomenal increases of the past two centuries -- grossly understate the real improvements in our economic condition. The average middle-class American might have a smaller measured income than the European monarchs of the Middle Ages, but I suspect that Tudor King Henry VIII would have traded half his kingdom for modern plumbing, a lifetime supply of antibiotics and access to the Internet.
The source of this wealth -- the engine of prosperity -- is technological progress. And the engine of technological progress is ideas -- not just the ideas from engineering laboratories, but also ideas like new methods of crop rotation, or just-in-time inventory management. You can fly from New York to Tokyo partly because someone figured out how to build an airplane and partly because someone figured out how to insure it. I'm writing this on a personal computer instead of an electric typewriter partly because someone said, "Hey! I wonder if we can make computer chips out of silicon!" and partly because someone said "Hey! I wonder if we can finance startups with junk bonds!"
Which contribution is more important? By one rough measure -- the profits earned by the innovator -- they're about equal. In the late 1980s, Microsoft earned economic profits of about $600 million a year, while Michael Milken, the inventor of the junk bond, earned an annual income that was just about the same.
Some good ideas even come from economists. Julian Simon came up with the idea of bribing airline passengers to give up their seats on overbooked flights -- and gone were the days when you relied on the luck of the draw to make it to your daughter's wedding. Economists first suggested creating property rights in African elephants, a policy that has given villagers an incentive to harvest at a sustainable rate and drive the poachers away. The result? Villagers have prospered and the elephant population has soared.
Engineers figure out how to harness the power of technology; economists figure out how to harness the power of incentives. Our prosperity relies on both.
Mr. Landsburg's latest book is "More Sex Is Safer Sex: The Unconventional Wisdom of Economics" (The Free Press, 2007).
Iranian banks feel the heat
By Con Coughlin
Last Updated: 12:01am BST 06/07/2007
telegraph.co.uk
It has been a long time coming, but unmistakable cracks are beginning to appear in the edifice of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's autocratic regime.
Ever since the ayatollahs overthrew the Shah and seized control of the country in the bloody revolution of 1979, the government of the Islamic Republic has owed its survival to a combination of brutal repression and a highly effective security infrastructure controlled by the Revolutionary Guards.
Most of the country's professional and middle classes were wiped out after Khomeini's takeover, and subsequent attempts by more moderate elements to tone down the revolutionary rhetoric have been repressed. A campaign by the Iranian Reform Movement in 2000 to make the country more democratic and the government more accountable collapsed when its leader was shot in the face by a young religious fanatic.
More recently, Mr Ahmadinejad, a former commander in the Revolutionary Guards, has quashed any hint of dissent, closing newspapers and censoring access to the internet.
Which all makes the recent riots over the introduction of petrol rationing most heartening. Here we have a country that is awash with oil - Iran produces 4.3 million barrels a day and possesses the world's second largest known oil reserves - and yet it cannot provide sufficient quantities of refined material to meet the needs of its 65 million people.
The reason for this ludicrous state of affairs is simple. The regime's insistence on diverting too much of its energy and resources in pursuit of the holy grail of nuclear enrichment, and the subsequent UN economic sanctions that policy has attracted, means the ayatollahs are unable to maintain the oil-refining facilities.
Mr Ahmadinejad, of course, still clings to the fiction that the sanctions have made no impact on the Iranian economy, insisting that they are merely part of a campaign of psychological warfare being waged by the Bush Administration to provoke dissent.
But the reality of Iran's economic condition - inflation is running at 17 per cent and the government has failed to meet any of its growth targets - was brought home to the country's long-suffering populace when the government announced it was rationing petrol to 100 litres a month for each household - the equivalent of two full tanks for the average family car.
For once, the regime was unable to contain the anger of ordinary Iranians, who took to the streets in their tens of thousands to vent their rage. It is estimated that 30 per cent of the nation's petrol stations have been destroyed in the orgy of violence and destruction that swept the country, the worst outbreak of anti-government protests for more than a decade.
However much Mr Ahmadinejad tries to dismiss the effect the sanctions are having, the fact is they have brought the Iranian economy to its knees and will continue to do so, particularly if Britain and America are successful in persuading the UN to toughen them to punish Teheran for refusing to curtail its nuclear enrichment programme.
The UN first imposed sanctions in January, aimed at restricting the development of its nuclear programme. The sanctions were increased in March with a limited freeze on assets and an arms embargo.
There are encouraging signs that the sanctions have thrown the regime into panic. The latest evidence that Mr Ahmadinejad is feeling the heat comes from banking experts advising the UN, who say Teheran has recently ordered the withdrawal of millions of dollars worth of deposits from Iranian-owned banks based in Europe, a pre-emptive move to prevent the funds being frozen by any toughening of UN sanctions.
One official told me this week that the Iranian government had ordered the transfer of "significant cash deposits" to Iran.
British diplomats at the UN want a new resolution that would place tight restrictions on the movement of Iranian aircraft and shipping, as well as freezing the assets of Iranian banks suspected of providing funds for the illicit nuclear programme.
Two banks have already been blacklisted by the US Treasury Department: Bank Saderat, because of its alleged involvement in financing Hizbollah, and Bank Sepah, because it is suspected of providing the finance for the nuclear programme. Another Iranian bank with offices in Europe, Bank Melli, is also under scrutiny by UN and American officials over allegations that it is involved in financing Iran's nuclear programme.
As with imposing petrol rationing, withdrawing funds from Europe to Iran smacks of desperation. "Make no mistake, this is a frantic money transfer operation," explained one official advising the UN. "If Iran withdraws all its funds from these banks, they could fold."
The money retrieved from Europe may help to ease the Iranian government's difficulties in the short term, but it will not be enough to restore its reputation for economic competence.
Which is good news for those who believe that regime change in Teheran is the only way to avoid the catastrophic consequences of military conflict over Iran's nuclear programme. The sanctions against Iran are working: let's have more of them.
By Con Coughlin
Last Updated: 12:01am BST 06/07/2007
telegraph.co.uk
It has been a long time coming, but unmistakable cracks are beginning to appear in the edifice of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's autocratic regime.
Ever since the ayatollahs overthrew the Shah and seized control of the country in the bloody revolution of 1979, the government of the Islamic Republic has owed its survival to a combination of brutal repression and a highly effective security infrastructure controlled by the Revolutionary Guards.
Most of the country's professional and middle classes were wiped out after Khomeini's takeover, and subsequent attempts by more moderate elements to tone down the revolutionary rhetoric have been repressed. A campaign by the Iranian Reform Movement in 2000 to make the country more democratic and the government more accountable collapsed when its leader was shot in the face by a young religious fanatic.
More recently, Mr Ahmadinejad, a former commander in the Revolutionary Guards, has quashed any hint of dissent, closing newspapers and censoring access to the internet.
Which all makes the recent riots over the introduction of petrol rationing most heartening. Here we have a country that is awash with oil - Iran produces 4.3 million barrels a day and possesses the world's second largest known oil reserves - and yet it cannot provide sufficient quantities of refined material to meet the needs of its 65 million people.
The reason for this ludicrous state of affairs is simple. The regime's insistence on diverting too much of its energy and resources in pursuit of the holy grail of nuclear enrichment, and the subsequent UN economic sanctions that policy has attracted, means the ayatollahs are unable to maintain the oil-refining facilities.
Mr Ahmadinejad, of course, still clings to the fiction that the sanctions have made no impact on the Iranian economy, insisting that they are merely part of a campaign of psychological warfare being waged by the Bush Administration to provoke dissent.
But the reality of Iran's economic condition - inflation is running at 17 per cent and the government has failed to meet any of its growth targets - was brought home to the country's long-suffering populace when the government announced it was rationing petrol to 100 litres a month for each household - the equivalent of two full tanks for the average family car.
For once, the regime was unable to contain the anger of ordinary Iranians, who took to the streets in their tens of thousands to vent their rage. It is estimated that 30 per cent of the nation's petrol stations have been destroyed in the orgy of violence and destruction that swept the country, the worst outbreak of anti-government protests for more than a decade.
However much Mr Ahmadinejad tries to dismiss the effect the sanctions are having, the fact is they have brought the Iranian economy to its knees and will continue to do so, particularly if Britain and America are successful in persuading the UN to toughen them to punish Teheran for refusing to curtail its nuclear enrichment programme.
The UN first imposed sanctions in January, aimed at restricting the development of its nuclear programme. The sanctions were increased in March with a limited freeze on assets and an arms embargo.
There are encouraging signs that the sanctions have thrown the regime into panic. The latest evidence that Mr Ahmadinejad is feeling the heat comes from banking experts advising the UN, who say Teheran has recently ordered the withdrawal of millions of dollars worth of deposits from Iranian-owned banks based in Europe, a pre-emptive move to prevent the funds being frozen by any toughening of UN sanctions.
One official told me this week that the Iranian government had ordered the transfer of "significant cash deposits" to Iran.
British diplomats at the UN want a new resolution that would place tight restrictions on the movement of Iranian aircraft and shipping, as well as freezing the assets of Iranian banks suspected of providing funds for the illicit nuclear programme.
Two banks have already been blacklisted by the US Treasury Department: Bank Saderat, because of its alleged involvement in financing Hizbollah, and Bank Sepah, because it is suspected of providing the finance for the nuclear programme. Another Iranian bank with offices in Europe, Bank Melli, is also under scrutiny by UN and American officials over allegations that it is involved in financing Iran's nuclear programme.
As with imposing petrol rationing, withdrawing funds from Europe to Iran smacks of desperation. "Make no mistake, this is a frantic money transfer operation," explained one official advising the UN. "If Iran withdraws all its funds from these banks, they could fold."
The money retrieved from Europe may help to ease the Iranian government's difficulties in the short term, but it will not be enough to restore its reputation for economic competence.
Which is good news for those who believe that regime change in Teheran is the only way to avoid the catastrophic consequences of military conflict over Iran's nuclear programme. The sanctions against Iran are working: let's have more of them.
Mosque siege students 'holding human shields'
By Isambard Wilkinson
Last Updated: 2:14am BST 06/07/2007
telegraph.co.uk
The Pakistani government tried to blast through the walls around a mosque yesterday amid violent clashes with radical extremists who government officials said are holding women and children inside as human shields.
Despite calls from its captured leader, Abdul Aziz, to surrender, a number of hardline students holed up inside the mosque clashed with troops for a third consecutive day in the heart of the capital where at least 19 people have died in recent violence.
The fighting erupted after a six-month stand-off between the government and two brothers who run the mosque in Islamabad.
Pakistan's president, Gen Pervez Musharraf, had grown embarrassed by the two brothers' increasingly defiant anti-government antics and their demand for the imposition of Islamic law.
The interior minister, Aftab Sherpao, said the radical students besieged in the Lal Masjid, or Red Mosque, were armed with Kalashnikov assault rifles, hand grenades and Molotov cocktails.
"The total of casualties is 19," said Mr Sherpao. "There are 50 to 60 hardcore militants inside the mosque. They are keeping women and children who want to come out of the mosque and are not allowing them to leave."
Several students who had fled the mosque claimed in interviews with The Daily Telegraph that some men, women and children had been prevented from leaving the mosque and madrassa that houses Pakistan's largest girls' seminary.
Niaz Muhammad Khan, 28, from Mardan, said: "I was with my brother in Lal Masjid as a guest when this operation was launched."
"I tried to take my brother out of the Madrassa, but the Madrassa management refused to allow us to go out. Last night I managed to escape the place," he added.
Earlier in the day troops blew up most of the wall surrounding the mosque and smashed in one of its doors with an armoured personnel carrier, according to eye witness reports.
Some of the heaviest clashes yet erupted when students opened fire on troops and hurled hand grenades, said the chief military spokesman Maj Gen Waheed Arshad.
US-built Cobra helicopter gunships flew low over the building as explosions boomed across the normally peaceful city.
The detained mosque leader and his brother Abdul Rashid Ghazi, who remains cooped up in the mosque, both denied that anyone was being kept against their will.
Aziz was captured by police on Wednesday as he tried to flee the mosque complex wearing a burqa. He told state television that about 1,000 male and female students remained inside.
"After coming out I saw the siege was massive and came to the conclusion that we should give up," he said. "The government has massive resources and I realised that people will not be able to stay inside for long."
Somewhat inexplicably Aziz made his television appearance wearing a black burqa under which his grey beard was partly visible.
The interviewer asked him to take off the veil, which he then did to reveal a bemused smile.
The cleric later appeared in court charged with plotting terrorist attacks and kidnapping people, including seven Chinese nationals abducted by his students from an acupuncture clinic for allegedly running a brothel. He was later remanded in custody.
Ghazi refused to leave the mosque, saying: "We are not terrorists, so why should we lay down our arms?"
Brigadier Javed Iqbal Cheema, spokesman for the Ministry of Interior, said that 1,146 people have surrendered.
"Time is passing quickly, the sooner they surrender the better it will be for them," he said of the remaining people in the compound.
Gen Musharraf, a key US ally, had however ordered security chiefs not to raid the mosque yet to avoid casualties among women and children, according to a top government official. "That is delaying the final push against the compound," he added.
By Isambard Wilkinson
Last Updated: 2:14am BST 06/07/2007
telegraph.co.uk
The Pakistani government tried to blast through the walls around a mosque yesterday amid violent clashes with radical extremists who government officials said are holding women and children inside as human shields.
Despite calls from its captured leader, Abdul Aziz, to surrender, a number of hardline students holed up inside the mosque clashed with troops for a third consecutive day in the heart of the capital where at least 19 people have died in recent violence.
The fighting erupted after a six-month stand-off between the government and two brothers who run the mosque in Islamabad.
Pakistan's president, Gen Pervez Musharraf, had grown embarrassed by the two brothers' increasingly defiant anti-government antics and their demand for the imposition of Islamic law.
The interior minister, Aftab Sherpao, said the radical students besieged in the Lal Masjid, or Red Mosque, were armed with Kalashnikov assault rifles, hand grenades and Molotov cocktails.
"The total of casualties is 19," said Mr Sherpao. "There are 50 to 60 hardcore militants inside the mosque. They are keeping women and children who want to come out of the mosque and are not allowing them to leave."
Several students who had fled the mosque claimed in interviews with The Daily Telegraph that some men, women and children had been prevented from leaving the mosque and madrassa that houses Pakistan's largest girls' seminary.
Niaz Muhammad Khan, 28, from Mardan, said: "I was with my brother in Lal Masjid as a guest when this operation was launched."
"I tried to take my brother out of the Madrassa, but the Madrassa management refused to allow us to go out. Last night I managed to escape the place," he added.
Earlier in the day troops blew up most of the wall surrounding the mosque and smashed in one of its doors with an armoured personnel carrier, according to eye witness reports.
Some of the heaviest clashes yet erupted when students opened fire on troops and hurled hand grenades, said the chief military spokesman Maj Gen Waheed Arshad.
US-built Cobra helicopter gunships flew low over the building as explosions boomed across the normally peaceful city.
The detained mosque leader and his brother Abdul Rashid Ghazi, who remains cooped up in the mosque, both denied that anyone was being kept against their will.
Aziz was captured by police on Wednesday as he tried to flee the mosque complex wearing a burqa. He told state television that about 1,000 male and female students remained inside.
"After coming out I saw the siege was massive and came to the conclusion that we should give up," he said. "The government has massive resources and I realised that people will not be able to stay inside for long."
Somewhat inexplicably Aziz made his television appearance wearing a black burqa under which his grey beard was partly visible.
The interviewer asked him to take off the veil, which he then did to reveal a bemused smile.
The cleric later appeared in court charged with plotting terrorist attacks and kidnapping people, including seven Chinese nationals abducted by his students from an acupuncture clinic for allegedly running a brothel. He was later remanded in custody.
Ghazi refused to leave the mosque, saying: "We are not terrorists, so why should we lay down our arms?"
Brigadier Javed Iqbal Cheema, spokesman for the Ministry of Interior, said that 1,146 people have surrendered.
"Time is passing quickly, the sooner they surrender the better it will be for them," he said of the remaining people in the compound.
Gen Musharraf, a key US ally, had however ordered security chiefs not to raid the mosque yet to avoid casualties among women and children, according to a top government official. "That is delaying the final push against the compound," he added.
Liquidity fears shake Shanghai
By Mark Kleinman in Hong Kong
Last Updated: 1:25am BST 06/07/2007
telegraph.co.uk
Fears of an imminent liquidity crunch triggered the Shanghai stock market's biggest one-day fall in a month yesterday as the Chinese government accelerated plans to launch a $200bn (£99bn) investment vehicle.
The benchmark Shanghai composite index slipped almost 5.3pc on investors' concerns that a special treasury bond issue to facilitate the inauguration of the new entity would sap market liquidity. The Shenzhen Composite Index, the smaller of China's two stock markets, also experienced a significant fall, losing 5.8pc of its value.
Beijing's plans for the country's first dedicated vehicle for investing some of China's more than $1,300bn in foreign exchange reserves are said to be at an advanced stage. The State Investment Company has already shelled out $3bn for a more than 9pc stake in Blackstone, the US buy-out firm. So far, the investment has proved to be a loss-making one, with Blackstone trading below the $31 at which the shares were floated in New York last month.
There are lingering suspicions that Chinese A-shares remain overvalued after a prolonged bull run which has seen the main index soar by more than 50pc this year on top of last year's 130pc gain.
At a briefing in Hong Kong earlier this week, Andrew Freris, Asia chief economist at BNP Paribas, echoed the thoughts of other commentators as he predicted that the Shanghai market was "subject to a considerable adjustment" and that a severe correction would also adversely affect Hong Kong.
Concerted pressure from Beijing on mainland Chinese companies to shun listings in Hong Kong and instead raise capital on the Shanghai market has also contributed to the growing concern over liquidity issues, according to analysts.
Another trigger for the latest wobble in investor confidence was attributed yesterday to the planned expansion of Chinese regulators' Qualified Domestic Institutional Investor (QDII) programme, which will provide another channel for domestic funds to flow overseas.
By Mark Kleinman in Hong Kong
Last Updated: 1:25am BST 06/07/2007
telegraph.co.uk
Fears of an imminent liquidity crunch triggered the Shanghai stock market's biggest one-day fall in a month yesterday as the Chinese government accelerated plans to launch a $200bn (£99bn) investment vehicle.
The benchmark Shanghai composite index slipped almost 5.3pc on investors' concerns that a special treasury bond issue to facilitate the inauguration of the new entity would sap market liquidity. The Shenzhen Composite Index, the smaller of China's two stock markets, also experienced a significant fall, losing 5.8pc of its value.
Beijing's plans for the country's first dedicated vehicle for investing some of China's more than $1,300bn in foreign exchange reserves are said to be at an advanced stage. The State Investment Company has already shelled out $3bn for a more than 9pc stake in Blackstone, the US buy-out firm. So far, the investment has proved to be a loss-making one, with Blackstone trading below the $31 at which the shares were floated in New York last month.
There are lingering suspicions that Chinese A-shares remain overvalued after a prolonged bull run which has seen the main index soar by more than 50pc this year on top of last year's 130pc gain.
At a briefing in Hong Kong earlier this week, Andrew Freris, Asia chief economist at BNP Paribas, echoed the thoughts of other commentators as he predicted that the Shanghai market was "subject to a considerable adjustment" and that a severe correction would also adversely affect Hong Kong.
Concerted pressure from Beijing on mainland Chinese companies to shun listings in Hong Kong and instead raise capital on the Shanghai market has also contributed to the growing concern over liquidity issues, according to analysts.
Another trigger for the latest wobble in investor confidence was attributed yesterday to the planned expansion of Chinese regulators' Qualified Domestic Institutional Investor (QDII) programme, which will provide another channel for domestic funds to flow overseas.
President Defends War on July 4th
Bush Compares Iraq To Revolutionary War
By Tim Craig
Washington Post Staff Writer
Thursday, July 5, 2007; A02
MARTINSBURG, W.Va., July 4 -- President Bush warned Wednesday that the Iraq war "will require more patience, more courage and more sacrifice," as he appealed to a war-weary public for time and sought to link today's conflict to the storied battles that gave birth to the nation.
In an Independence Day address before members of the National Guard and their families, the president again painted a dire portrait of the consequences of pulling out of Iraq, asserting as he has before that "terrorists and extremists" would try to strike inside the United States.
"If we were to quit Iraq before the job is done, the terrorists we are fighting would not declare victory and lay down their arms. They would follow us here, home," Bush told a crowd of about 1,000 gathered at a West Virginia Air National Guard maintenance hangar.
Bush's two-hour trip to West Virginia came as he faces growing pressure, including from some senior Republicans on Capitol Hill, to draw down U.S. forces in Iraq.
Bush showed little sign of backing down Wednesday. He urged the American public to be patient, saying he will not withdraw troops "prematurely based on politics."
"We must succeed for our sake. For the security of our citizens, we must support the Iraqi government and we must defeat al-Qaeda in Iraq," said Bush, who will turn 61 on Friday.
The president, who was accompanied by senior adviser Karl Rove, began his remarks by comparing today's soldiers to those who fought in the Revolutionary War.
The president mentioned Adam Stephen, a Revolutionary War general who founded Martinsburg, a city of 15,000 in the panhandle of West Virginia. "We give thanks for all the brave citizen-soldiers of our Continental Army who dropped pitchforks and took up muskets to fight for our freedom and liberty and independence," Bush said. He added: "You're the successors of those brave men. . . . Like those early patriots, you're fighting a new and unprecedented war."
Bush singled out two West Virginia guardsmen, Brad Runkles and Derek Brown, who recently reenlisted although they were badly wounded in Iraq in 2004.
"Your service is needed. We need for people to volunteer to defend America," the president said.
The audience, which was crammed in a corner of a hangar draped with two-story-high American flags, included troops in uniform and the children, spouses, mothers and fathers of serving Guard members.
Most said they are solidly behind the president -- who spent 20 minutes shaking hands after his remarks -- and the mission in Iraq.
"I love him, and my son loves him. He gets the job done," said Donna L. Ruppenthal, of Hedgesville, W.Va., whose son is serving in Iraq.
Several family members said the president's speech helped to ease their doubts about whether the war in Iraq is worth the loss of more than 3,500 soldiers.
"I'm glad we came. I think it helped clear up some confusion and some misgivings about our reasons for being there," said Chris Davis, 56, who has a 26-year-old son in the Guard. "The president gave us some pride, knowing what [our son] is doing for the country."
Others, however, remained unimpressed. "I've heard it all before," said Patti Scott, 72, of Richmond. "I just don't approve of the war."
Bush Compares Iraq To Revolutionary War
By Tim Craig
Washington Post Staff Writer
Thursday, July 5, 2007; A02
MARTINSBURG, W.Va., July 4 -- President Bush warned Wednesday that the Iraq war "will require more patience, more courage and more sacrifice," as he appealed to a war-weary public for time and sought to link today's conflict to the storied battles that gave birth to the nation.
In an Independence Day address before members of the National Guard and their families, the president again painted a dire portrait of the consequences of pulling out of Iraq, asserting as he has before that "terrorists and extremists" would try to strike inside the United States.
"If we were to quit Iraq before the job is done, the terrorists we are fighting would not declare victory and lay down their arms. They would follow us here, home," Bush told a crowd of about 1,000 gathered at a West Virginia Air National Guard maintenance hangar.
Bush's two-hour trip to West Virginia came as he faces growing pressure, including from some senior Republicans on Capitol Hill, to draw down U.S. forces in Iraq.
Bush showed little sign of backing down Wednesday. He urged the American public to be patient, saying he will not withdraw troops "prematurely based on politics."
"We must succeed for our sake. For the security of our citizens, we must support the Iraqi government and we must defeat al-Qaeda in Iraq," said Bush, who will turn 61 on Friday.
The president, who was accompanied by senior adviser Karl Rove, began his remarks by comparing today's soldiers to those who fought in the Revolutionary War.
The president mentioned Adam Stephen, a Revolutionary War general who founded Martinsburg, a city of 15,000 in the panhandle of West Virginia. "We give thanks for all the brave citizen-soldiers of our Continental Army who dropped pitchforks and took up muskets to fight for our freedom and liberty and independence," Bush said. He added: "You're the successors of those brave men. . . . Like those early patriots, you're fighting a new and unprecedented war."
Bush singled out two West Virginia guardsmen, Brad Runkles and Derek Brown, who recently reenlisted although they were badly wounded in Iraq in 2004.
"Your service is needed. We need for people to volunteer to defend America," the president said.
The audience, which was crammed in a corner of a hangar draped with two-story-high American flags, included troops in uniform and the children, spouses, mothers and fathers of serving Guard members.
Most said they are solidly behind the president -- who spent 20 minutes shaking hands after his remarks -- and the mission in Iraq.
"I love him, and my son loves him. He gets the job done," said Donna L. Ruppenthal, of Hedgesville, W.Va., whose son is serving in Iraq.
Several family members said the president's speech helped to ease their doubts about whether the war in Iraq is worth the loss of more than 3,500 soldiers.
"I'm glad we came. I think it helped clear up some confusion and some misgivings about our reasons for being there," said Chris Davis, 56, who has a 26-year-old son in the Guard. "The president gave us some pride, knowing what [our son] is doing for the country."
Others, however, remained unimpressed. "I've heard it all before," said Patti Scott, 72, of Richmond. "I just don't approve of the war."
Wednesday, September 05, 2007
Homemade, Cheap and Dangerous
Terror Cells Favor Simple Ingredients In Building Bombs
By Craig Whitlock
Washington Post Foreign Service
Thursday, July 5, 2007; A01
LONDON, July 4 -- The 39-page memo recovered from an al-Qaeda laptop computer in Pakistan three years ago read like an Idiot's Guide to Bombmaking. Forget military explosives or fancy detonators, it lectured. Instead, the manual advised a shopping trip to a hardware store or pharmacy, where all the necessary ingredients for a terrorist attack are stocked on the shelves.
"Make use of that which is available at your disposal and . . . bend it to suit your needs, (improvise) rather than waste valuable time becoming despondent over that which is not within your reach," counseled the author of the memo, Dhiren Barot, a British citizen who said he developed his keep-it-simple philosophy by "observing senior planners" at al-Qaeda training camps.
Barot, who was later captured near London and is serving a 30-year sentence, had envisioned an attack with multiple car bombs that would detonate liquid-gas cylinders encased in rusty nails -- a strategy with striking similarities to an attempt last week by a suspected terrorist cell to blow up three vehicles in London and Glasgow, Scotland.
Counterterrorism officials have warned for years that Osama bin Laden and his lieutenants have tried to obtain weapons of mass destruction, such as a nuclear device or chemical or biological weapons. In response, U.S. military and intelligence agencies have invested vast amounts of money to block their acquisition.
So far, however, al-Qaeda and its affiliates have relied almost solely on simple, homemade bombs crafted from everyday ingredients -- such as nail-polish remover and fertilizer -- when plotting attacks in Europe and the United States.
The makeshift bombs lack the destructive potential of the conventional explosives that rake Iraq on a daily basis. They are also less reliable, as demonstrated by the car bombs that failed to go off in London last week after the culprits tried to ignite them with detonators wired to cellphones.
But other attempts have generated plenty of mayhem and damage, including the kitchen-built backpack bombs that killed 52 people in the London public transit system on July 7, 2005.
"It makes no difference to your average person if somebody puts a car bomb out there that is crude or one that is sophisticated," said Chris Driver-Williams, a retired British major and military intelligence officer who studies explosive devices used by terrorist groups. "If it detonates, all of a sudden you've got a very serious device and one that has achieved exactly what the terrorists wanted."
The advantages of homemade explosives are that they are easy and cheap to manufacture, as well as difficult for law enforcement agencies to detect. According to one expert, the peroxide-based liquid explosives that an al-Qaeda cell allegedly intended to use to blow up nine transatlantic airliners last summer would have cost as little as $15 a bomb.
It is technically simple to make such explosives. Instructions are widely available on the Internet. Experts added, however, that it takes skill and sophistication to construct a viable bomb by adding timing devices, detonators or secondary charges.
Investigations have found evidence that most al-Qaeda cells involved in bombing plots in Europe have received training in camps in Pakistan or Afghanistan, or were tutored by graduates of those camps.
Among them: cell members involved in the July 7, 2005, bombings in Britain and a separate plot two weeks later that also targeted the London subway. The suspected ringleaders of the May 16, 2003, bombings in Casablanca were also al-Qaeda camp veterans who had experimented in explosives. Richard Reid, who tried to blow up an American Airlines flight from Paris to Miami in 2001, was taught how to build his shoe bomb in Afghanistan.
Stephen Swain, former head of the international counterterrorism unit at Scotland Yard in London, said the culprits in each case had been trained by seasoned al-Qaeda operatives "without a shadow of a doubt."
"It's a common thread throughout the entire theater of al-Qaeda-style operations," said Swain, who retired last year and is a senior consultant for Control Risks Group, an international security firm. "There's quite a lot of training going on in this regard."
Simple Recipes
Terrorist groups have been using homemade explosives for years. In February 1993, Islamic radicals drove a truck loaded with about 1,500 pounds of urea nitrate -- a fertilizer-based explosive -- and hydrogen-gas cylinders into a garage underneath the World Trade Center.
The bomb killed six people and injured more than 1,000. Investigators determined that the cell built the bomb in New Jersey by consulting manuals brought from Pakistan. Two years later, the ringleader of the plot, Ramzi Yousef, tried but failed to use homemade liquid explosives to down 11 airliners crossing the Pacific Ocean.
The same year, Timothy J. McVeigh blew up the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City with a truck bomb consisting of 5,000 pounds of fuel oil and fertilizer, killing 168 people.
Since then, it has become more difficult to purchase large quantities of fertilizer without attracting attention; sellers in the United States and many European countries are supposed to notify authorities of suspicious customers.
The last known attempt by al-Qaeda to construct a fertilizer-based bomb in Europe came in 2003, when a cell operative bought 1,200 pounds of bagged Kemira GrowHow fertilizer for about $200 from an agricultural supply store in Britain. The salesman, John Stone, later testified that he thought the transaction was strange because it was the wrong time of year to apply the substance and the buyer claimed to have only a small garden plot.
"I hope you're not going around bombing anything," Stone said he told the buyer half-jokingly, although the salesclerk did not notify police.
British authorities were tipped off soon after, however, by an employee at a rental-storage center where the cell was keeping the fertilizer. In April, five members of the group were convicted in the plot, known as Operation Crevice. Many European fertilizer manufacturers have since reduced the amount of ammonium nitrate, a key bomb ingredient, in their products.
Partly as a result, European and U.S. counterterrorism officials said terrorist cells are increasingly turning to peroxide-based explosives, which can be made in much smaller quantities from materials available at drugstores.
The most commonly used compound is triacetone triperoxide, or TATP. Primary ingredients for a homemade batch typically include acetone, which can be found in nail-polish remover, and hydrogen peroxide, a chemical used in hair-bleaching products.
TATP wields about 85 percent of the explosive power of TNT and can be made in a kitchen or bathroom. A dime-size amount of the explosive can ignite a fireball the size of a basketball.
'Nobody Ever Stops Me'
The risky side of TATP is that it is highly unstable. A spark or light friction can detonate the explosive, making it extraordinarily difficult to handle. Experts and police said there have been numerous cases in which suspected terrorists -- as well as foolhardy amateur chemists -- have set off accidental explosions, resulting in death or severe injuries.
"You need to concentrate the chemicals," said Hans J. Michels, a professor of chemical engineering at Imperial College in London. "It's a filthy job and it's dangerous, but it can be done."
Despite the dangers, al-Qaeda cells have used peroxide-based explosives in more than a dozen plots in the past decade, including the July 7 and 21, 2005, London incidents, as well as attacks in Casablanca, Istanbul and the Indonesian island of Bali, according to counterterrorism officials. Danish police also discovered TATP in September during the arrest of seven terrorism suspects in Odense.
In crystalline form, TATP looks like powdered sugar and is difficult to detect in airports; security officials need to examine an exposed surface with a swab kit or other tester to determine its presence.
"TATP and peroxide-based explosives are concern number one for the aviation industry," said Ehud Keinan, a chemistry professor at Technion-Israel Institute of Technology and a leading researcher on the substance. "It will take some time before we are protected. Right now, we are not."
Reached by telephone in Paris, where he was scheduled to give a lecture about TATP on Wednesday at an international conference, Keinan said he often carries a small sample of the volatile compound in his carry-on luggage when he flies -- just to test airport security. "Nobody ever stops me," he said.
When asked if it might be dangerous to sit next to him on a plane, he said, "If you know how to take care of it, it's okay. If you don't know what you're doing, you're in trouble."
U.S. Homeland Security officials have said terrorism suspects arrested last August in Britain on charges that they were plotting to blow up several transatlantic airliners might have been planning to smuggle on board TATP or a related compound, HMTD, hexamethylene triperoxide diamine. Experts said it would take as little as one or two quarts of those explosives to down a large plane.
TATP was discovered in the late 19th century but was deemed to have no industrial or commercial applications because it was so unstable. Researchers generally ignored the substance until 1980, when Palestinian fighters used it for the first time in a bomb in Israel.
Palestinian bombers have used it ever since. TATP was used for the first time in an attack in Europe in July 1994, when Palestinians exploded a car bomb outside the Israeli Embassy in London.
U.S. and European counterterrorism investigators paid limited attention to the explosive until the July 2005 bombings in London. Afterward, the New York City Police Department built an exact replica of the apartment in Leeds, England, that the July 7 conspirators allegedly used to manufacture their backpack bombs.
Hugh O'Rourke, deputy inspector of the NYPD counterterrorism division, said the police department wanted to show beat officers what a kitchen-counter TATP production line would look like. He said it is easy to mistake the white powder and its cooking tools -- such as pool cleaners, large tubs or commercial-size fans -- for a common drug lab.
"Patrol cops see a lot of white powder, think it's crack, and want to touch it and package it," which could easily result in an explosion, he said. "We don't want them doing that."
Terror Cells Favor Simple Ingredients In Building Bombs
By Craig Whitlock
Washington Post Foreign Service
Thursday, July 5, 2007; A01
LONDON, July 4 -- The 39-page memo recovered from an al-Qaeda laptop computer in Pakistan three years ago read like an Idiot's Guide to Bombmaking. Forget military explosives or fancy detonators, it lectured. Instead, the manual advised a shopping trip to a hardware store or pharmacy, where all the necessary ingredients for a terrorist attack are stocked on the shelves.
"Make use of that which is available at your disposal and . . . bend it to suit your needs, (improvise) rather than waste valuable time becoming despondent over that which is not within your reach," counseled the author of the memo, Dhiren Barot, a British citizen who said he developed his keep-it-simple philosophy by "observing senior planners" at al-Qaeda training camps.
Barot, who was later captured near London and is serving a 30-year sentence, had envisioned an attack with multiple car bombs that would detonate liquid-gas cylinders encased in rusty nails -- a strategy with striking similarities to an attempt last week by a suspected terrorist cell to blow up three vehicles in London and Glasgow, Scotland.
Counterterrorism officials have warned for years that Osama bin Laden and his lieutenants have tried to obtain weapons of mass destruction, such as a nuclear device or chemical or biological weapons. In response, U.S. military and intelligence agencies have invested vast amounts of money to block their acquisition.
So far, however, al-Qaeda and its affiliates have relied almost solely on simple, homemade bombs crafted from everyday ingredients -- such as nail-polish remover and fertilizer -- when plotting attacks in Europe and the United States.
The makeshift bombs lack the destructive potential of the conventional explosives that rake Iraq on a daily basis. They are also less reliable, as demonstrated by the car bombs that failed to go off in London last week after the culprits tried to ignite them with detonators wired to cellphones.
But other attempts have generated plenty of mayhem and damage, including the kitchen-built backpack bombs that killed 52 people in the London public transit system on July 7, 2005.
"It makes no difference to your average person if somebody puts a car bomb out there that is crude or one that is sophisticated," said Chris Driver-Williams, a retired British major and military intelligence officer who studies explosive devices used by terrorist groups. "If it detonates, all of a sudden you've got a very serious device and one that has achieved exactly what the terrorists wanted."
The advantages of homemade explosives are that they are easy and cheap to manufacture, as well as difficult for law enforcement agencies to detect. According to one expert, the peroxide-based liquid explosives that an al-Qaeda cell allegedly intended to use to blow up nine transatlantic airliners last summer would have cost as little as $15 a bomb.
It is technically simple to make such explosives. Instructions are widely available on the Internet. Experts added, however, that it takes skill and sophistication to construct a viable bomb by adding timing devices, detonators or secondary charges.
Investigations have found evidence that most al-Qaeda cells involved in bombing plots in Europe have received training in camps in Pakistan or Afghanistan, or were tutored by graduates of those camps.
Among them: cell members involved in the July 7, 2005, bombings in Britain and a separate plot two weeks later that also targeted the London subway. The suspected ringleaders of the May 16, 2003, bombings in Casablanca were also al-Qaeda camp veterans who had experimented in explosives. Richard Reid, who tried to blow up an American Airlines flight from Paris to Miami in 2001, was taught how to build his shoe bomb in Afghanistan.
Stephen Swain, former head of the international counterterrorism unit at Scotland Yard in London, said the culprits in each case had been trained by seasoned al-Qaeda operatives "without a shadow of a doubt."
"It's a common thread throughout the entire theater of al-Qaeda-style operations," said Swain, who retired last year and is a senior consultant for Control Risks Group, an international security firm. "There's quite a lot of training going on in this regard."
Simple Recipes
Terrorist groups have been using homemade explosives for years. In February 1993, Islamic radicals drove a truck loaded with about 1,500 pounds of urea nitrate -- a fertilizer-based explosive -- and hydrogen-gas cylinders into a garage underneath the World Trade Center.
The bomb killed six people and injured more than 1,000. Investigators determined that the cell built the bomb in New Jersey by consulting manuals brought from Pakistan. Two years later, the ringleader of the plot, Ramzi Yousef, tried but failed to use homemade liquid explosives to down 11 airliners crossing the Pacific Ocean.
The same year, Timothy J. McVeigh blew up the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City with a truck bomb consisting of 5,000 pounds of fuel oil and fertilizer, killing 168 people.
Since then, it has become more difficult to purchase large quantities of fertilizer without attracting attention; sellers in the United States and many European countries are supposed to notify authorities of suspicious customers.
The last known attempt by al-Qaeda to construct a fertilizer-based bomb in Europe came in 2003, when a cell operative bought 1,200 pounds of bagged Kemira GrowHow fertilizer for about $200 from an agricultural supply store in Britain. The salesman, John Stone, later testified that he thought the transaction was strange because it was the wrong time of year to apply the substance and the buyer claimed to have only a small garden plot.
"I hope you're not going around bombing anything," Stone said he told the buyer half-jokingly, although the salesclerk did not notify police.
British authorities were tipped off soon after, however, by an employee at a rental-storage center where the cell was keeping the fertilizer. In April, five members of the group were convicted in the plot, known as Operation Crevice. Many European fertilizer manufacturers have since reduced the amount of ammonium nitrate, a key bomb ingredient, in their products.
Partly as a result, European and U.S. counterterrorism officials said terrorist cells are increasingly turning to peroxide-based explosives, which can be made in much smaller quantities from materials available at drugstores.
The most commonly used compound is triacetone triperoxide, or TATP. Primary ingredients for a homemade batch typically include acetone, which can be found in nail-polish remover, and hydrogen peroxide, a chemical used in hair-bleaching products.
TATP wields about 85 percent of the explosive power of TNT and can be made in a kitchen or bathroom. A dime-size amount of the explosive can ignite a fireball the size of a basketball.
'Nobody Ever Stops Me'
The risky side of TATP is that it is highly unstable. A spark or light friction can detonate the explosive, making it extraordinarily difficult to handle. Experts and police said there have been numerous cases in which suspected terrorists -- as well as foolhardy amateur chemists -- have set off accidental explosions, resulting in death or severe injuries.
"You need to concentrate the chemicals," said Hans J. Michels, a professor of chemical engineering at Imperial College in London. "It's a filthy job and it's dangerous, but it can be done."
Despite the dangers, al-Qaeda cells have used peroxide-based explosives in more than a dozen plots in the past decade, including the July 7 and 21, 2005, London incidents, as well as attacks in Casablanca, Istanbul and the Indonesian island of Bali, according to counterterrorism officials. Danish police also discovered TATP in September during the arrest of seven terrorism suspects in Odense.
In crystalline form, TATP looks like powdered sugar and is difficult to detect in airports; security officials need to examine an exposed surface with a swab kit or other tester to determine its presence.
"TATP and peroxide-based explosives are concern number one for the aviation industry," said Ehud Keinan, a chemistry professor at Technion-Israel Institute of Technology and a leading researcher on the substance. "It will take some time before we are protected. Right now, we are not."
Reached by telephone in Paris, where he was scheduled to give a lecture about TATP on Wednesday at an international conference, Keinan said he often carries a small sample of the volatile compound in his carry-on luggage when he flies -- just to test airport security. "Nobody ever stops me," he said.
When asked if it might be dangerous to sit next to him on a plane, he said, "If you know how to take care of it, it's okay. If you don't know what you're doing, you're in trouble."
U.S. Homeland Security officials have said terrorism suspects arrested last August in Britain on charges that they were plotting to blow up several transatlantic airliners might have been planning to smuggle on board TATP or a related compound, HMTD, hexamethylene triperoxide diamine. Experts said it would take as little as one or two quarts of those explosives to down a large plane.
TATP was discovered in the late 19th century but was deemed to have no industrial or commercial applications because it was so unstable. Researchers generally ignored the substance until 1980, when Palestinian fighters used it for the first time in a bomb in Israel.
Palestinian bombers have used it ever since. TATP was used for the first time in an attack in Europe in July 1994, when Palestinians exploded a car bomb outside the Israeli Embassy in London.
U.S. and European counterterrorism investigators paid limited attention to the explosive until the July 2005 bombings in London. Afterward, the New York City Police Department built an exact replica of the apartment in Leeds, England, that the July 7 conspirators allegedly used to manufacture their backpack bombs.
Hugh O'Rourke, deputy inspector of the NYPD counterterrorism division, said the police department wanted to show beat officers what a kitchen-counter TATP production line would look like. He said it is easy to mistake the white powder and its cooking tools -- such as pool cleaners, large tubs or commercial-size fans -- for a common drug lab.
"Patrol cops see a lot of white powder, think it's crack, and want to touch it and package it," which could easily result in an explosion, he said. "We don't want them doing that."
Pakistan mosque rocked by explosions
By Our Foreign Staff
Last Updated: 2:14am BST 06/07/2007
telegraph.co.uk
Large explosions and heavy gunfire were heard early this morning at a besieged radical mosque in the Pakistani capital, hours after its leader was arrested while trying to escape dressed in a woman's burqa.
The arrest of Abdul Aziz, the chief cleric of Islamabad's Red Mosque, was a major coup for the government.
At least seven blasts were heard around the compound in the early hours of today. Shortly before the explosions, armoured personnel carriers positioned in the area began to move toward the mosque.
Hundreds of police and soldiers, supported by APCs and with orders to shoot armed militants on sight, had earlier sealed off the mosque and imposed a curfew in the area after Tuesday's clashes. Nearly 700 radical Muslim students based at the mosque surrendered yesterday, a day after bloody clashes outside.
Aziz tried to slip out among women from a mosque school, who all wear black, all-enveloping burqas, yesterday.
"He was wearing a burqa. He was caught at the checkpoint where some policemen found his appearance suspicious," said the deputy city administrator, Chaudhry Mohammad Ali.
Aziz runs the mosque with his brother, Abdul Rashid Ghazi, who is believed to be still inside, along with a hardcore of militant supporters who are defying government ultimatums to surrender. It was not clear yesterday how many students remained.
Sixteen people have been killed in the violence that erupted after a month-long stand-off between the authorities and a Taliban-style movement based at Lal Masjid, or Red Mosque, less than a mile from parliament and the capital's diplomatic enclave.
Liberal politicians have for months pressed President Pervez Musharraf to crack down on the clerics, who had threatened suicide attacks if force was used against them.
Two separate bomb attacks yesterday killed six civilians, including two children, and six soldiers in the North West Frontier Province.
By Our Foreign Staff
Last Updated: 2:14am BST 06/07/2007
telegraph.co.uk
Large explosions and heavy gunfire were heard early this morning at a besieged radical mosque in the Pakistani capital, hours after its leader was arrested while trying to escape dressed in a woman's burqa.
The arrest of Abdul Aziz, the chief cleric of Islamabad's Red Mosque, was a major coup for the government.
At least seven blasts were heard around the compound in the early hours of today. Shortly before the explosions, armoured personnel carriers positioned in the area began to move toward the mosque.
Hundreds of police and soldiers, supported by APCs and with orders to shoot armed militants on sight, had earlier sealed off the mosque and imposed a curfew in the area after Tuesday's clashes. Nearly 700 radical Muslim students based at the mosque surrendered yesterday, a day after bloody clashes outside.
Aziz tried to slip out among women from a mosque school, who all wear black, all-enveloping burqas, yesterday.
"He was wearing a burqa. He was caught at the checkpoint where some policemen found his appearance suspicious," said the deputy city administrator, Chaudhry Mohammad Ali.
Aziz runs the mosque with his brother, Abdul Rashid Ghazi, who is believed to be still inside, along with a hardcore of militant supporters who are defying government ultimatums to surrender. It was not clear yesterday how many students remained.
Sixteen people have been killed in the violence that erupted after a month-long stand-off between the authorities and a Taliban-style movement based at Lal Masjid, or Red Mosque, less than a mile from parliament and the capital's diplomatic enclave.
Liberal politicians have for months pressed President Pervez Musharraf to crack down on the clerics, who had threatened suicide attacks if force was used against them.
Two separate bomb attacks yesterday killed six civilians, including two children, and six soldiers in the North West Frontier Province.
Foreign Doctors Queried in Bomb Plot
Thousands Evacuated From Heathrow Airport After Luggage Scare
By Kevin Sullivan and Craig Whitlock
Washington Post Foreign Service
Wednesday, July 4, 2007; A10
LONDON, July 3 -- Police investigating last weekend's failed bomb attacks in London and Glasgow on Tuesday questioned foreign-born doctors who are suspected of plotting the attacks, while a suspicious piece of luggage at Heathrow Airport forced the evacuation of thousands of travelers and the cancellation of more than 100 flights.
All eight suspects now in custody are believed to have worked for Britain's National Health Service, seven as doctors or medical students and one as a laboratory technician, according to officials and British media reports. One of the eight is being held in Australia. The suspects are said to have earned their medical degrees in Iraq, Jordan, India and other countries before immigrating to Britain.
A British counterterrorism official said investigators were pursuing a theory that one or two of the doctors might have recruited other members of the alleged cell after arriving in the United Kingdom. The official, who spoke on condition of anonymity, said there was no evidence that the entire group was formed outside the country, although it remains unclear exactly how the suspects may have come to know one another.
While anti-terrorism police at Scotland Yard, who formally took over the investigation Tuesday, declined to comment, accounts of the broad outline of the alleged plot continued to seep out in widespread news accounts.
The two men who rammed a blazing Jeep Cherokee packed with propane gas canisters into Glasgow Airport's main terminal on Saturday were reported to be doctors from Iraq who worked at Royal Alexandra Hospital a few miles from the airport. Some reports said they were also suspected of driving the two Mercedes sedans, packed with propane gas and nails, that were left in a busy downtown London district Friday night; the cars failed to detonate.
The driver of the Jeep, who was being treated at the hospital for severe burns suffered in the attack, was identified in several reports as Khalid Ahmed. According to records at the General Medical Council, Britain's medical regulator, a Khalid Ahmed earned his medical degree in Mosul, Iraq, in 1993 and became registered to practice in Britain in July 2004. Doctors said he had a slim chance of survival, with burns to 90 percent of his body.
The other man in the car was reportedly Bilal Abdulla, a doctor who did his training in Baghdad. He was arrested at the scene but transferred to London for questioning.
Abdulla worked at the hospital in a supervised role as a trainee doctor, according to medical officials. Co-workers described Abdulla -- whose job was to fill in for other doctors when they were not available -- as being absent from work often and more interested in scanning Arabic Web sites than working.
The BBC on Tuesday evening identified a suspect arrested in Liverpool on Sunday as Sabeel Ahmed, 26. According to the General Medical Council, a doctor by that name earned his medical degree in 2005 at the Rajiv Gandhi University of Health Sciences in India.
Police said two men attempting to buy propane gas canisters were arrested on terrorism-related charges Tuesday in Blackburn, northern England. Police did not immediately say whether the arrests were linked to the London and Glasgow incidents.
At Heathrow Airport on Tuesday, police ordered the evacuation of Terminal 4 after a suspicious bag was found about 11 a.m. The terminal reopened six hours later; the bag apparently proved harmless. The canceled flights included at least seven bound for the United States on the day before the July 4 holiday.
Some terrorism analysts said it was likely that the suspects received guidance or direction from abroad. Investigations into virtually all major terrorist plots planned by Islamic radicals in Britain -- including the July 7, 2005, subway bombings and a similar failed attack two weeks later -- have shown that at least some of the conspirators were trained or recruited in Pakistan or other al-Qaeda sanctuaries.
"There will almost certainly be a foreign connection to this," said John Horgan, a senior research fellow at the Center for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence at the University of St. Andrews in Scotland. "The idea that these kind of things are a purely homegrown phenomenon is I think utterly misleading. It's only a matter of time before a foreign connection emerges here."
Until last year, foreigners who wanted to practice medicine in the United Kingdom were not required to obtain work permits, just to become medically certified in Britain and undergo a criminal background check. The work permit rule was added not because of security concerns, but because a deficit of British physicians had eased.
Some security analysts said more rigorous background checks would be unlikely to do much good in preventing terrorist plots.
"Do you scrutinize absolutely everybody who comes into the country? It would be a colossal task," said Sandra Bell, director of homeland security and resilience for the Royal United Services Institute, a London think tank. "It just demonstrates how porous our borders are. You can't profile people who have a terrorist intent, so you really can't stop it from coming on."
Royal Alexandra Hospital in the town of Paisley, just outside Glasgow, is a prime focus of the terrorism probe. Several of the eight suspects arrested worked at the sprawling medical complex, some of them living in doctors' quarters on site.
Mary Cowan, 86, who was at the hospital Tuesday, said she has long been coming to the facility, located beside a cricket field. "It's usually quiet, but what a kerfluffle!" she said. "But we can't moan about it. We have got to get on with it."
At Glasgow Airport, the acrid scent of the Jeep fire still hung in the air Tuesday. "Apart from the smell, we are getting back to normal," said Wilma Adam, a sales assistant in a clothing store there. "But to tell you the truth, I don't think we have taken it all in yet."
John Smeaton, a baggage handler who knocked one of the men in the blazing Jeep to the ground, is now something of a celebrity, hailed on Web sites as Glasgow's Jack Bauer, hero of the American TV drama "24." One Web site set up in Smeaton's honor is asking people to pay $6 for a pint of beer for him; it claims 1,000 pints have already been ordered.
Thousands Evacuated From Heathrow Airport After Luggage Scare
By Kevin Sullivan and Craig Whitlock
Washington Post Foreign Service
Wednesday, July 4, 2007; A10
LONDON, July 3 -- Police investigating last weekend's failed bomb attacks in London and Glasgow on Tuesday questioned foreign-born doctors who are suspected of plotting the attacks, while a suspicious piece of luggage at Heathrow Airport forced the evacuation of thousands of travelers and the cancellation of more than 100 flights.
All eight suspects now in custody are believed to have worked for Britain's National Health Service, seven as doctors or medical students and one as a laboratory technician, according to officials and British media reports. One of the eight is being held in Australia. The suspects are said to have earned their medical degrees in Iraq, Jordan, India and other countries before immigrating to Britain.
A British counterterrorism official said investigators were pursuing a theory that one or two of the doctors might have recruited other members of the alleged cell after arriving in the United Kingdom. The official, who spoke on condition of anonymity, said there was no evidence that the entire group was formed outside the country, although it remains unclear exactly how the suspects may have come to know one another.
While anti-terrorism police at Scotland Yard, who formally took over the investigation Tuesday, declined to comment, accounts of the broad outline of the alleged plot continued to seep out in widespread news accounts.
The two men who rammed a blazing Jeep Cherokee packed with propane gas canisters into Glasgow Airport's main terminal on Saturday were reported to be doctors from Iraq who worked at Royal Alexandra Hospital a few miles from the airport. Some reports said they were also suspected of driving the two Mercedes sedans, packed with propane gas and nails, that were left in a busy downtown London district Friday night; the cars failed to detonate.
The driver of the Jeep, who was being treated at the hospital for severe burns suffered in the attack, was identified in several reports as Khalid Ahmed. According to records at the General Medical Council, Britain's medical regulator, a Khalid Ahmed earned his medical degree in Mosul, Iraq, in 1993 and became registered to practice in Britain in July 2004. Doctors said he had a slim chance of survival, with burns to 90 percent of his body.
The other man in the car was reportedly Bilal Abdulla, a doctor who did his training in Baghdad. He was arrested at the scene but transferred to London for questioning.
Abdulla worked at the hospital in a supervised role as a trainee doctor, according to medical officials. Co-workers described Abdulla -- whose job was to fill in for other doctors when they were not available -- as being absent from work often and more interested in scanning Arabic Web sites than working.
The BBC on Tuesday evening identified a suspect arrested in Liverpool on Sunday as Sabeel Ahmed, 26. According to the General Medical Council, a doctor by that name earned his medical degree in 2005 at the Rajiv Gandhi University of Health Sciences in India.
Police said two men attempting to buy propane gas canisters were arrested on terrorism-related charges Tuesday in Blackburn, northern England. Police did not immediately say whether the arrests were linked to the London and Glasgow incidents.
At Heathrow Airport on Tuesday, police ordered the evacuation of Terminal 4 after a suspicious bag was found about 11 a.m. The terminal reopened six hours later; the bag apparently proved harmless. The canceled flights included at least seven bound for the United States on the day before the July 4 holiday.
Some terrorism analysts said it was likely that the suspects received guidance or direction from abroad. Investigations into virtually all major terrorist plots planned by Islamic radicals in Britain -- including the July 7, 2005, subway bombings and a similar failed attack two weeks later -- have shown that at least some of the conspirators were trained or recruited in Pakistan or other al-Qaeda sanctuaries.
"There will almost certainly be a foreign connection to this," said John Horgan, a senior research fellow at the Center for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence at the University of St. Andrews in Scotland. "The idea that these kind of things are a purely homegrown phenomenon is I think utterly misleading. It's only a matter of time before a foreign connection emerges here."
Until last year, foreigners who wanted to practice medicine in the United Kingdom were not required to obtain work permits, just to become medically certified in Britain and undergo a criminal background check. The work permit rule was added not because of security concerns, but because a deficit of British physicians had eased.
Some security analysts said more rigorous background checks would be unlikely to do much good in preventing terrorist plots.
"Do you scrutinize absolutely everybody who comes into the country? It would be a colossal task," said Sandra Bell, director of homeland security and resilience for the Royal United Services Institute, a London think tank. "It just demonstrates how porous our borders are. You can't profile people who have a terrorist intent, so you really can't stop it from coming on."
Royal Alexandra Hospital in the town of Paisley, just outside Glasgow, is a prime focus of the terrorism probe. Several of the eight suspects arrested worked at the sprawling medical complex, some of them living in doctors' quarters on site.
Mary Cowan, 86, who was at the hospital Tuesday, said she has long been coming to the facility, located beside a cricket field. "It's usually quiet, but what a kerfluffle!" she said. "But we can't moan about it. We have got to get on with it."
At Glasgow Airport, the acrid scent of the Jeep fire still hung in the air Tuesday. "Apart from the smell, we are getting back to normal," said Wilma Adam, a sales assistant in a clothing store there. "But to tell you the truth, I don't think we have taken it all in yet."
John Smeaton, a baggage handler who knocked one of the men in the blazing Jeep to the ground, is now something of a celebrity, hailed on Web sites as Glasgow's Jack Bauer, hero of the American TV drama "24." One Web site set up in Smeaton's honor is asking people to pay $6 for a pint of beer for him; it claims 1,000 pints have already been ordered.
Hedge Funds Mystify Markets, Regulators
Deeply Powerful, Largely Unchecked
By David Cho
Washington Post Staff Writer
Wednesday, July 4, 2007; A01
Wall Street chroniclers one day could look back at the early 21st century and easily dub it the Era of the Hedge Fund. The question is whether it will be remembered as an age of reason or irrational exuberance.
Hedge funds hold unparalleled sway over the financial markets, as confirmed by the recent unraveling of $20 billion in Bear Stearns funds. Portrayed as the new masters of the universe by author Tom Wolfe, hedge-fund managers are responsible for more than a third of stock trades and control more than $2 trillion worth of assets, according to industry researchers. Each of the top hedge-fund managers earned more than $1 billion in 2006 alone.
But like the Wizard of Oz, these funds hide behind a cloak of mystery as they pull the levers that make Wall Street go. "To a great degree they're unregulated and hardly understood or not understood at all," said James Grant, publisher of Grant's Interest Rate Observer.
Understanding the impact of this secretive world gained urgency in Washington after the crisis at the two Bear Stearns hedge funds sent the Dow Jones industrial average down 279 points and prompted the Securities and Exchange Commission to begin an informal investigation last week.
The Bear Stearns funds were on the cutting edge of the hedge-fund world that reaps billions of dollars from slicing up corporate loans, mortgages and other kinds of debt into pieces that can be traded like shares on the stock market. This process is considered by many bankers and regulators to be one of the great advances in finance over the past five years. With hedge funds acting like shock absorbers, investment banks and lenders have been able to make massive loans to freewheeling borrowers and feel less impact from the risk.
Money became easy to get and was easily lent. Banks offered huge mortgages to people with questionable credit. The business of borrowing billions of dollars to buy troubled companies boomed. Backed by hedge funds, insurance companies could offer coverage to homeowners in New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina.
Some analysts say hedge funds have become more important financiers than the long-established investment firms of Wall Street. Greenwich, Conn., where more than half of the biggest hedge funds are based, has earned nicknames such as "The New Wall Street" and "Hedgistan." It also has become one of the most important stops along the presidential campaign fundraising trail.
Yet the trouble at Bear Stearns is revealing that the system may not be as crash-proof as once thought. And it has left Washington regulators and Wall Street analysts with questions: How dependent has the new financial system become on hedge funds? Are their trades getting more risky? If one of them unravels, who absorbs those losses?
The answers are unclear, even to top economists. Part of the problem is that most hedge funds do not reveal much about their trading activities. Many operate offshore. Even for the ones that are based in the United States, no federal agency is empowered to regulate or watch their activities.
The SEC in 2004 passed a rule requiring hedge-fund managers to register with the agency and submit to some oversight. But a U.S. Court of Appeals struck down that rule in June 2006. Later that summer, SEC Chairman Christopher Cox testified to the Senate Banking Committee that hedge funds were operating in a "gap" in the SEC's authority, but he fell short of asking Congress to address the issue through legislation.
The President's Working Group on Financial Markets, which was founded after the collapse of hedge fund Long Term Capital Management in 1998, said in February that hedge funds needed no regulation.
Yet many market watchers worry that, shielded from regulators and operating in the dark, the biggest and most influential hedge funds might be making bets that put the entire financial system at risk. As the two Bear Stearns funds demonstrated, some hedge funds are investing large amounts of money in complex securities that are difficult to value accurately. And much of it is being done with borrowed money -- or "leverage" -- which can magnify returns but also exacerbate losses.
"There's been a fundamental change in the debt markets that I don't think people appreciate yet," said Richard Bookstaber, who has managed hedge funds and recently wrote a book on the topic, "A Demon of Our Own Design."
"I don't think anybody knows how much leverage a particular [group] of hedge funds is using or how much leverage has grown. . . . We are running the risk of making the markets more levered and more complex so that something can go wrong all of a sudden," Bookstaber said.
So what is a hedge fund?
For starters, hedge funds take money only from those with deep pockets. They pool huge amounts of money mainly from super-wealthy investors, Wall Street banks and other hedge funds. About 25 percent of their money comes from pension funds and endowments, according to data from Greenwich Associates.
In the late 1940s, managers of the first hedge funds invented ways to make money no matter which way the stock market was moving. They used terms like "short the market" -- a technique for profiting when stocks go down -- and "going long" -- which means selling stocks after their prices have gone up. The trick was figuring out how many "short" and "long" positions a manager should have in a portfolio.
But to understand what hedge funds do today, it could take "two PhDs and an MBA," as Greenwich Associates hedge-fund analyst Karan Sampson put it.
Some funds bet on how stocks, gold prices and interest rates will move. Others turn almost any kind of cash flow -- including credit card payments, home mortgages, corporate loans, plane leases, and even movie theater revenue -- into bonds and trade them.
One of the most successful fund managers, Edward S. Lampert of ESL Investments, runs an $18 billion fund that makes money in part from what are called "total return swaps." These provide insurance for traders holding risky investments. If the investment goes down, Lampert absorbs the loss, but if it goes up, he enjoys the gain. In exchange for agreeing to the swap, the trader gets regular cash payments from Lampert.
Lampert's fund reportedly has earned returns of 30 percent every year by trading in swaps and other obscure financial tools. He personally made more than $1 billion last year. Most fund managers get their pay by taking a 20 percent cut of the profits from their trades and collecting from investors a 2 percent annual fee based on the total value of a portfolio.
Former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan was an advocate for how hedge funds help spread investment risk across many partners. The concept of "risk dispersion" has been described by Federal Reserve Governor Donald L. Kohn as a pillar of the "Greenspan doctrine." Over the past five years, advocates say, it has created a more stable financial system.
In 1998, just when hedge funds were starting to become big, Long Term Capital Management collapsed, nearly paralyzing the U.S. bond market. The disruption was so severe that the Fed had to organize a temporary rescue. The fund lost about $3.6 billion before closing in 2000.
But when the Amaranth hedge fund imploded in September 2006, losing about $6.4 billion on bad bets in natural-gas commodities, federal regulators stayed on the sidelines. Returns plummeted for a few hedge-fund managers and a pension fund in San Diego, but the markets generally shrugged off the news.
The new financial system seemed to be working.
Still, a growing number of market watchers wonder whether the system is encouraging hedge funds to take on too much risk.
"It's a weird dynamic that the market has now," said Dan Freed, a senior writer at Investment Dealer's Digest. "You used to have a small number of institutions taking a lot of risk. Now you take something that's toxic and you divide it into a thousand pieces and you say, okay, well, it's not toxic anymore. . . . But if it's toxic, isn't it [still] toxic?"
The Bear Stearns hedge-fund managers not only made risky bets but also did so with massive loans. They raised hundreds of millions of dollars from wealthy investors and other hedge funds, and borrowed many times that amount from Wall Street banks. With $20 billion at their disposal, they traded obscure securities backed by mortgage loans made to homeowners with shoddy credit histories.
The securities were so exotic that few knew whether the managers were getting good prices as they traded them.
The problem is similar to what happens in the housing market. Because houses are "traded" infrequently, homeowners often struggle to figure out the right price to attract interest. An appraisal can help, but a house's actual value is established only when a buyer and seller agree on a price.
Stocks, on the other hand, are exchanged every day, so their prices generally are considered accurate.
In the case of the Bear Stearns funds, the managers appeared to struggle to value their assets accurately or find buyers for them. In May, they said the funds had lost 6.75 percent of their value in April. In June, they revised that loss to 18 percent. The revision spooked traders, and ultimately some of their assets had to be dumped in a fire sale. Bear Stearns also lent $3.2 billion to bail out one of the funds after Wall Street banks demanded their money back.
Analysts worried about the ripple effects. Other hedge funds holding similar securities had to mark down the value of their assets. Banks suddenly got skittish about making big loans.
Some analysts wondered whether the era of easy money was ending. Daniel A. Strachman, author of "The Fundamentals of Hedge Fund Management," noted that the markets had put a lot of confidence in the new hedge-fund-dominated financial system even though it had not been tested seriously during the economic expansion of the past five years.
"I think there are a significant amount of people who call themselves hedge-fund managers who have been very lucky because they were able to ride the market wave," he said.
But as the Bear Stearns case showed, it may be impossible to know from where the next crisis will emerge and whether there are other troubled hedge funds.
"Wall Street creates all these increasingly sophisticated financial products, and no one really seems to understand them but the people involved in creating them," Freed said. "They assure everybody that everything's going to be okay, and we are forced to believe them."
Deeply Powerful, Largely Unchecked
By David Cho
Washington Post Staff Writer
Wednesday, July 4, 2007; A01
Wall Street chroniclers one day could look back at the early 21st century and easily dub it the Era of the Hedge Fund. The question is whether it will be remembered as an age of reason or irrational exuberance.
Hedge funds hold unparalleled sway over the financial markets, as confirmed by the recent unraveling of $20 billion in Bear Stearns funds. Portrayed as the new masters of the universe by author Tom Wolfe, hedge-fund managers are responsible for more than a third of stock trades and control more than $2 trillion worth of assets, according to industry researchers. Each of the top hedge-fund managers earned more than $1 billion in 2006 alone.
But like the Wizard of Oz, these funds hide behind a cloak of mystery as they pull the levers that make Wall Street go. "To a great degree they're unregulated and hardly understood or not understood at all," said James Grant, publisher of Grant's Interest Rate Observer.
Understanding the impact of this secretive world gained urgency in Washington after the crisis at the two Bear Stearns hedge funds sent the Dow Jones industrial average down 279 points and prompted the Securities and Exchange Commission to begin an informal investigation last week.
The Bear Stearns funds were on the cutting edge of the hedge-fund world that reaps billions of dollars from slicing up corporate loans, mortgages and other kinds of debt into pieces that can be traded like shares on the stock market. This process is considered by many bankers and regulators to be one of the great advances in finance over the past five years. With hedge funds acting like shock absorbers, investment banks and lenders have been able to make massive loans to freewheeling borrowers and feel less impact from the risk.
Money became easy to get and was easily lent. Banks offered huge mortgages to people with questionable credit. The business of borrowing billions of dollars to buy troubled companies boomed. Backed by hedge funds, insurance companies could offer coverage to homeowners in New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina.
Some analysts say hedge funds have become more important financiers than the long-established investment firms of Wall Street. Greenwich, Conn., where more than half of the biggest hedge funds are based, has earned nicknames such as "The New Wall Street" and "Hedgistan." It also has become one of the most important stops along the presidential campaign fundraising trail.
Yet the trouble at Bear Stearns is revealing that the system may not be as crash-proof as once thought. And it has left Washington regulators and Wall Street analysts with questions: How dependent has the new financial system become on hedge funds? Are their trades getting more risky? If one of them unravels, who absorbs those losses?
The answers are unclear, even to top economists. Part of the problem is that most hedge funds do not reveal much about their trading activities. Many operate offshore. Even for the ones that are based in the United States, no federal agency is empowered to regulate or watch their activities.
The SEC in 2004 passed a rule requiring hedge-fund managers to register with the agency and submit to some oversight. But a U.S. Court of Appeals struck down that rule in June 2006. Later that summer, SEC Chairman Christopher Cox testified to the Senate Banking Committee that hedge funds were operating in a "gap" in the SEC's authority, but he fell short of asking Congress to address the issue through legislation.
The President's Working Group on Financial Markets, which was founded after the collapse of hedge fund Long Term Capital Management in 1998, said in February that hedge funds needed no regulation.
Yet many market watchers worry that, shielded from regulators and operating in the dark, the biggest and most influential hedge funds might be making bets that put the entire financial system at risk. As the two Bear Stearns funds demonstrated, some hedge funds are investing large amounts of money in complex securities that are difficult to value accurately. And much of it is being done with borrowed money -- or "leverage" -- which can magnify returns but also exacerbate losses.
"There's been a fundamental change in the debt markets that I don't think people appreciate yet," said Richard Bookstaber, who has managed hedge funds and recently wrote a book on the topic, "A Demon of Our Own Design."
"I don't think anybody knows how much leverage a particular [group] of hedge funds is using or how much leverage has grown. . . . We are running the risk of making the markets more levered and more complex so that something can go wrong all of a sudden," Bookstaber said.
So what is a hedge fund?
For starters, hedge funds take money only from those with deep pockets. They pool huge amounts of money mainly from super-wealthy investors, Wall Street banks and other hedge funds. About 25 percent of their money comes from pension funds and endowments, according to data from Greenwich Associates.
In the late 1940s, managers of the first hedge funds invented ways to make money no matter which way the stock market was moving. They used terms like "short the market" -- a technique for profiting when stocks go down -- and "going long" -- which means selling stocks after their prices have gone up. The trick was figuring out how many "short" and "long" positions a manager should have in a portfolio.
But to understand what hedge funds do today, it could take "two PhDs and an MBA," as Greenwich Associates hedge-fund analyst Karan Sampson put it.
Some funds bet on how stocks, gold prices and interest rates will move. Others turn almost any kind of cash flow -- including credit card payments, home mortgages, corporate loans, plane leases, and even movie theater revenue -- into bonds and trade them.
One of the most successful fund managers, Edward S. Lampert of ESL Investments, runs an $18 billion fund that makes money in part from what are called "total return swaps." These provide insurance for traders holding risky investments. If the investment goes down, Lampert absorbs the loss, but if it goes up, he enjoys the gain. In exchange for agreeing to the swap, the trader gets regular cash payments from Lampert.
Lampert's fund reportedly has earned returns of 30 percent every year by trading in swaps and other obscure financial tools. He personally made more than $1 billion last year. Most fund managers get their pay by taking a 20 percent cut of the profits from their trades and collecting from investors a 2 percent annual fee based on the total value of a portfolio.
Former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan was an advocate for how hedge funds help spread investment risk across many partners. The concept of "risk dispersion" has been described by Federal Reserve Governor Donald L. Kohn as a pillar of the "Greenspan doctrine." Over the past five years, advocates say, it has created a more stable financial system.
In 1998, just when hedge funds were starting to become big, Long Term Capital Management collapsed, nearly paralyzing the U.S. bond market. The disruption was so severe that the Fed had to organize a temporary rescue. The fund lost about $3.6 billion before closing in 2000.
But when the Amaranth hedge fund imploded in September 2006, losing about $6.4 billion on bad bets in natural-gas commodities, federal regulators stayed on the sidelines. Returns plummeted for a few hedge-fund managers and a pension fund in San Diego, but the markets generally shrugged off the news.
The new financial system seemed to be working.
Still, a growing number of market watchers wonder whether the system is encouraging hedge funds to take on too much risk.
"It's a weird dynamic that the market has now," said Dan Freed, a senior writer at Investment Dealer's Digest. "You used to have a small number of institutions taking a lot of risk. Now you take something that's toxic and you divide it into a thousand pieces and you say, okay, well, it's not toxic anymore. . . . But if it's toxic, isn't it [still] toxic?"
The Bear Stearns hedge-fund managers not only made risky bets but also did so with massive loans. They raised hundreds of millions of dollars from wealthy investors and other hedge funds, and borrowed many times that amount from Wall Street banks. With $20 billion at their disposal, they traded obscure securities backed by mortgage loans made to homeowners with shoddy credit histories.
The securities were so exotic that few knew whether the managers were getting good prices as they traded them.
The problem is similar to what happens in the housing market. Because houses are "traded" infrequently, homeowners often struggle to figure out the right price to attract interest. An appraisal can help, but a house's actual value is established only when a buyer and seller agree on a price.
Stocks, on the other hand, are exchanged every day, so their prices generally are considered accurate.
In the case of the Bear Stearns funds, the managers appeared to struggle to value their assets accurately or find buyers for them. In May, they said the funds had lost 6.75 percent of their value in April. In June, they revised that loss to 18 percent. The revision spooked traders, and ultimately some of their assets had to be dumped in a fire sale. Bear Stearns also lent $3.2 billion to bail out one of the funds after Wall Street banks demanded their money back.
Analysts worried about the ripple effects. Other hedge funds holding similar securities had to mark down the value of their assets. Banks suddenly got skittish about making big loans.
Some analysts wondered whether the era of easy money was ending. Daniel A. Strachman, author of "The Fundamentals of Hedge Fund Management," noted that the markets had put a lot of confidence in the new hedge-fund-dominated financial system even though it had not been tested seriously during the economic expansion of the past five years.
"I think there are a significant amount of people who call themselves hedge-fund managers who have been very lucky because they were able to ride the market wave," he said.
But as the Bear Stearns case showed, it may be impossible to know from where the next crisis will emerge and whether there are other troubled hedge funds.
"Wall Street creates all these increasingly sophisticated financial products, and no one really seems to understand them but the people involved in creating them," Freed said. "They assure everybody that everything's going to be okay, and we are forced to believe them."
Violence Erupts at Pakistani Mosque
Radicals Confront Security Forces in Deadly Street Clash
By Griff Witte
Washington Post Foreign Service
Wednesday, July 4, 2007; A01
ISLAMABAD, Pakistan, July 4 -- A long-simmering standoff between the government and a radical mosque in the heart of the Pakistani capital exploded into a vicious street clash on Tuesday, with a dozen dead and more than 100 others injured.
For over 15 hours, paramilitary forces and bandanna-clad Islamic fighters manning positions in the Red Mosque traded automatic-weapons fire. At least three female students at a religious school affiliated with the mosque were killed, as were an army ranger and a Pakistani photographer who was caught in the crossfire.
At dawn Wednesday, the government was moving armored personnel carriers and special forces troops into position and warning of an all-out assault on the mosque. Power was shut down in the area, and security officials were demanding that pedestrians and vehicles stay out. Government officials said President Pervez Musharraf had signed off on the operation.
"Those who surrender will be forgiven," Zafar Iqbal Warraich, the minister of state for interior, said early Wednesday. "If someone comes out with a rifle, then we will answer a bullet with a bullet."
Later Wednesday morning, however, mediation was underway and it was unclear whether a raid would occur.
Tuesday's battle, which followed months of provocations by mosque leaders, dramatically displayed the rising threat of Islamic militancy in Pakistan and the struggles confronting Musharraf's besieged government. Tensions between the government and radical groups are not uncommon in Pakistan, but the clash at the mosque reflected their scope -- far beyond the deeply conservative tribal areas along the border with Afghanistan and into the orderly, tree-lined streets of Islamabad.
The mosque lies within walking distance of Musharraf's house, close enough for anyone home to hear the gunfire that reverberated through the city starting early Tuesday afternoon and continuing into the early morning Wednesday.
As the fighting raged, the troops -- holed up in nearby buildings -- fired tear gas to disperse a crowd of thousands that had gathered to show support for the Red Mosque's leadership. It was not known exactly how many people were inside the mosque compound, but mosque leaders had said there were at least 4,000 students in the religious school, or madrassa, alone.
They had also indicated that the students were willing to sacrifice their lives if the mosque, also known as the Lal Masjid, was attacked.
The mosque and its clerics have served for months as Islamabad's self-appointed vice squad. Its members have abducted police officers, kidnapped women and accused them of prostitution, threatened CD store owners with attacks and issued a fatwa, or religious edict, against a female cabinet minister who publicly hugged a man who was not her husband.
The government has threatened on several occasions to raid the mosque, but has pulled back each time. Musharraf, a U.S. ally on counterterrorism, has said that confronting religious extremism is among his top priorities. But critics charge that he has allowed it to flourish as he focuses instead on fending off attacks from moderate forces that want to restore civilian government to Pakistan eight years after a military-led coup brought Musharraf, the army chief of staff, to office.
"These are the fruits of military rule," said Ayaz Amir, a political analyst. "The main enemy of the government has not been what they call religious extremism. Musharraf's priority has been figuring out how to stick in power, how to keep his uniform and how to keep the secular opposition out in the cold."
Since March, Musharraf has been particularly preoccupied with a judicial crisis prompted by his suspension of the chief justice. The government has cracked down hard on political opponents and journalists who reported on the controversy.
Meanwhile, inside the mosque, preparations have been underway for war. Those efforts were fully evident for the first time Tuesday: All along the mosque's perimeter, armed men with gas masks sat in lookout posts and periodically fired from behind piles of sandbags.
Each side blamed the other for initiating the violence. Government forces said they had been attacked by madrassa students wielding sticks and rocks, and fought back only in self-defense. Mosque leaders said security forces had begun firing without warning.
Early in the struggle, madrassa students chanted "Long live the Taliban!" -- the hard-line Islamic movement ousted from rule in Afghanistan by a U.S.-led invasion -- as they flooded the streets and ransacked several government buildings adjacent to the mosque. Thick black smoke billowed from the Environment Ministry in the late afternoon, and by nightfall the building had been nearly gutted by fire.
Throughout Tuesday afternoon, mosque leaders used loudspeakers to call supporters to jihad. The surrounding neighborhood, a middle-class residential area, resonated with militant songs and the shouts of speaker after speaker exhorting people to rise up against the government in the name of Islam.
At one point, a woman's voice could be heard on the loudspeakers pleading through sobs for help. "God, please destroy the people who are attacking us," she yelled, the cries of others echoing in the background. At another point, a male voice came on and thundered a warning. "If they don't stop firing on this mosque in 15 minutes, we will start firing back," he said.
Fifteen minutes later, rifle shots rang out with a fevered intensity. "Now, God willing, we will succeed," the voice on the loudspeaker said.
The crowd in the streets around the mosque started off merely observing the battle. But bystanders soon began pummeling army troops with rocks. Referring to Musharraf, the crowd chanted: "Bush has a dog! He wears a uniform!"
"We blame the government. The government tries to control this country by firing on its own people," said Malik Iqbal Hussain, an unemployed 58-year-old. "The whole of the country is with the Red Mosque."
Not everyone agreed. Misbah Saboohi, a law professor at International Islamic University, said Tuesday evening that the government's response was long overdue. "Even now the government is showing a lot of restraint," said Saboohi, who grew up as a neighbor and friend of the two brothers who run the mosque. "The Red Mosque people have been asking for this."
But others around the country demonstrated their solidarity with the Red Mosque by staging protests in several cities and blocking major highways. A cleric in North-West Frontier Province, Maulana Fazlullah, told followers to occupy government buildings and carry out suicide attacks if the operation against the Red Mosque was not stopped.
The mosque's leaders -- brothers Abdul Rashid Ghazi and Maulana Abdul Aziz -- want to topple Musharraf's government in favor of a theocracy. They are also bitter over their belief that the government failed to investigate the murder of their father, who led the mosque until his death in 1998. The Red Mosque is government-owned, but the brothers have not received a salary for several years and have been prohibited from leaving the grounds, associates say.
Musharraf has wrestled with how to deal with the Red Mosque. Last week he told a group of journalists that he believed mosque leaders had links to al-Qaeda and that suicide bombers were using the mosque as a sanctuary. But the president said he worried that any raid would result in heavy casualties. "Action is ready but timing is important," he said. "I am not a coward. . . . But the issue is tomorrow you will say: What have you done? There are women and children inside."
Radicals Confront Security Forces in Deadly Street Clash
By Griff Witte
Washington Post Foreign Service
Wednesday, July 4, 2007; A01
ISLAMABAD, Pakistan, July 4 -- A long-simmering standoff between the government and a radical mosque in the heart of the Pakistani capital exploded into a vicious street clash on Tuesday, with a dozen dead and more than 100 others injured.
For over 15 hours, paramilitary forces and bandanna-clad Islamic fighters manning positions in the Red Mosque traded automatic-weapons fire. At least three female students at a religious school affiliated with the mosque were killed, as were an army ranger and a Pakistani photographer who was caught in the crossfire.
At dawn Wednesday, the government was moving armored personnel carriers and special forces troops into position and warning of an all-out assault on the mosque. Power was shut down in the area, and security officials were demanding that pedestrians and vehicles stay out. Government officials said President Pervez Musharraf had signed off on the operation.
"Those who surrender will be forgiven," Zafar Iqbal Warraich, the minister of state for interior, said early Wednesday. "If someone comes out with a rifle, then we will answer a bullet with a bullet."
Later Wednesday morning, however, mediation was underway and it was unclear whether a raid would occur.
Tuesday's battle, which followed months of provocations by mosque leaders, dramatically displayed the rising threat of Islamic militancy in Pakistan and the struggles confronting Musharraf's besieged government. Tensions between the government and radical groups are not uncommon in Pakistan, but the clash at the mosque reflected their scope -- far beyond the deeply conservative tribal areas along the border with Afghanistan and into the orderly, tree-lined streets of Islamabad.
The mosque lies within walking distance of Musharraf's house, close enough for anyone home to hear the gunfire that reverberated through the city starting early Tuesday afternoon and continuing into the early morning Wednesday.
As the fighting raged, the troops -- holed up in nearby buildings -- fired tear gas to disperse a crowd of thousands that had gathered to show support for the Red Mosque's leadership. It was not known exactly how many people were inside the mosque compound, but mosque leaders had said there were at least 4,000 students in the religious school, or madrassa, alone.
They had also indicated that the students were willing to sacrifice their lives if the mosque, also known as the Lal Masjid, was attacked.
The mosque and its clerics have served for months as Islamabad's self-appointed vice squad. Its members have abducted police officers, kidnapped women and accused them of prostitution, threatened CD store owners with attacks and issued a fatwa, or religious edict, against a female cabinet minister who publicly hugged a man who was not her husband.
The government has threatened on several occasions to raid the mosque, but has pulled back each time. Musharraf, a U.S. ally on counterterrorism, has said that confronting religious extremism is among his top priorities. But critics charge that he has allowed it to flourish as he focuses instead on fending off attacks from moderate forces that want to restore civilian government to Pakistan eight years after a military-led coup brought Musharraf, the army chief of staff, to office.
"These are the fruits of military rule," said Ayaz Amir, a political analyst. "The main enemy of the government has not been what they call religious extremism. Musharraf's priority has been figuring out how to stick in power, how to keep his uniform and how to keep the secular opposition out in the cold."
Since March, Musharraf has been particularly preoccupied with a judicial crisis prompted by his suspension of the chief justice. The government has cracked down hard on political opponents and journalists who reported on the controversy.
Meanwhile, inside the mosque, preparations have been underway for war. Those efforts were fully evident for the first time Tuesday: All along the mosque's perimeter, armed men with gas masks sat in lookout posts and periodically fired from behind piles of sandbags.
Each side blamed the other for initiating the violence. Government forces said they had been attacked by madrassa students wielding sticks and rocks, and fought back only in self-defense. Mosque leaders said security forces had begun firing without warning.
Early in the struggle, madrassa students chanted "Long live the Taliban!" -- the hard-line Islamic movement ousted from rule in Afghanistan by a U.S.-led invasion -- as they flooded the streets and ransacked several government buildings adjacent to the mosque. Thick black smoke billowed from the Environment Ministry in the late afternoon, and by nightfall the building had been nearly gutted by fire.
Throughout Tuesday afternoon, mosque leaders used loudspeakers to call supporters to jihad. The surrounding neighborhood, a middle-class residential area, resonated with militant songs and the shouts of speaker after speaker exhorting people to rise up against the government in the name of Islam.
At one point, a woman's voice could be heard on the loudspeakers pleading through sobs for help. "God, please destroy the people who are attacking us," she yelled, the cries of others echoing in the background. At another point, a male voice came on and thundered a warning. "If they don't stop firing on this mosque in 15 minutes, we will start firing back," he said.
Fifteen minutes later, rifle shots rang out with a fevered intensity. "Now, God willing, we will succeed," the voice on the loudspeaker said.
The crowd in the streets around the mosque started off merely observing the battle. But bystanders soon began pummeling army troops with rocks. Referring to Musharraf, the crowd chanted: "Bush has a dog! He wears a uniform!"
"We blame the government. The government tries to control this country by firing on its own people," said Malik Iqbal Hussain, an unemployed 58-year-old. "The whole of the country is with the Red Mosque."
Not everyone agreed. Misbah Saboohi, a law professor at International Islamic University, said Tuesday evening that the government's response was long overdue. "Even now the government is showing a lot of restraint," said Saboohi, who grew up as a neighbor and friend of the two brothers who run the mosque. "The Red Mosque people have been asking for this."
But others around the country demonstrated their solidarity with the Red Mosque by staging protests in several cities and blocking major highways. A cleric in North-West Frontier Province, Maulana Fazlullah, told followers to occupy government buildings and carry out suicide attacks if the operation against the Red Mosque was not stopped.
The mosque's leaders -- brothers Abdul Rashid Ghazi and Maulana Abdul Aziz -- want to topple Musharraf's government in favor of a theocracy. They are also bitter over their belief that the government failed to investigate the murder of their father, who led the mosque until his death in 1998. The Red Mosque is government-owned, but the brothers have not received a salary for several years and have been prohibited from leaving the grounds, associates say.
Musharraf has wrestled with how to deal with the Red Mosque. Last week he told a group of journalists that he believed mosque leaders had links to al-Qaeda and that suicide bombers were using the mosque as a sanctuary. But the president said he worried that any raid would result in heavy casualties. "Action is ready but timing is important," he said. "I am not a coward. . . . But the issue is tomorrow you will say: What have you done? There are women and children inside."
Musharraf crisis as nine die in clash at mosque
By Isambard Wilkinson
Last Updated: 2:25am BST 05/07/2007
telegraph.co.uk
Pakistan's president, Gen Pervez Musharraf, faced a violent challenge to his authority last night after nine people were killed in clashes between security forces and radical Islamist students.
After six months of deadlock, gun battles flared between police and students from a religious seminary in the heart of the capital, Islamabad. More than 140 were injured in the shooting.
The incident was sparked by dozens of baton-wielding -students and their women, clad in burqas, who attacked policemen near the Lal Masjid (Red Mosque) and stole four guns and a radio set.
The police responded with volleys of tear gas.
As shoppers in the commercial district fled, students wearing gas masks and wielding Kalashnikov rifles traded fire with security forces from behind sandbags and chanted "jihad". They set fire to two government buildings and more than two dozen cars.
A news cameraman was shot dead when troops let off a burst of gunfire to disperse the mob trying to smash up a nearby girls' school.
Doctors said they had treated about 60 people suffering the effects of tear gas and several students with bullet wounds.
A ceasefire was negotiated but as night fell and the security forces cordoned off Lal Masjid, where the students are based, a mullah shouted through the mosque's loudspeaker that the "blood of the martyrs" would be avenged.
Pakistan's deputy interior minister, Zafar Warriach, said: "The government is considering all options."
One of the two brothers who runs the mosque, Abdul Rashid Ghazi, said the students had retaliated after security forces opened fire. He said the authorities had broken an agreement not to besiege the mosque.
"The administration wants to see dead bodies scattered on the roads," he said.
"Why are they doing this? There had been no action from our side since the Chinese incident."
He was referring to the students' kidnap last month of seven Chinese citizens accused of running a brothel.
It was the most recent in a series of increasingly bold antics orchestrated by Mr Ghazi and his cleric brother.
In the past months large groups of students - mostly armed with sticks and petrol bombs but some with guns - have patrolled the area around mosque.
Gen Musharraf has said up to now that security forces cannot raid the mosque for fear of reprisals by al-Qa'eda-linked suicide bombers who are believed to be sheltering inside it. But the outbreak of violence has once again raised the question of why Pakistan's government, a key ally in the war on terrorism, has failed to curb Islamic extremism in the heart of the capital.
The government is divided over its failure to take on the controversial preacher and his brother. A senior adviser to Gen Musharraf said the Lal Masjid madrassa was symptomatic of the greater Islamic threat facing Pakistan.
"I fear that if we take them on and bodies of young girls are sent back to the conservative Frontier province, the reaction will be cataclysmic," he said. However, the education minister, a retired senior general, who is responsible for a children's library that was seized by students from the madrassa several months ago, angrily denied such a claim.
He said that the radical cleric should have been brought under control months ago. Some critics claim that the officials who organise affairs at the mosque have powerful friends in the security services, which has prevented the authorities from taking action.
Western diplomats suspect that the government has used the madrassa to play up the level of the extremist threat in order to ensure a continuing flow of money from America.
However, the American perception of Gen Musharraf's usefulness as an ally has been tarnished over the past six months.
By Isambard Wilkinson
Last Updated: 2:25am BST 05/07/2007
telegraph.co.uk
Pakistan's president, Gen Pervez Musharraf, faced a violent challenge to his authority last night after nine people were killed in clashes between security forces and radical Islamist students.
After six months of deadlock, gun battles flared between police and students from a religious seminary in the heart of the capital, Islamabad. More than 140 were injured in the shooting.
The incident was sparked by dozens of baton-wielding -students and their women, clad in burqas, who attacked policemen near the Lal Masjid (Red Mosque) and stole four guns and a radio set.
The police responded with volleys of tear gas.
As shoppers in the commercial district fled, students wearing gas masks and wielding Kalashnikov rifles traded fire with security forces from behind sandbags and chanted "jihad". They set fire to two government buildings and more than two dozen cars.
A news cameraman was shot dead when troops let off a burst of gunfire to disperse the mob trying to smash up a nearby girls' school.
Doctors said they had treated about 60 people suffering the effects of tear gas and several students with bullet wounds.
A ceasefire was negotiated but as night fell and the security forces cordoned off Lal Masjid, where the students are based, a mullah shouted through the mosque's loudspeaker that the "blood of the martyrs" would be avenged.
Pakistan's deputy interior minister, Zafar Warriach, said: "The government is considering all options."
One of the two brothers who runs the mosque, Abdul Rashid Ghazi, said the students had retaliated after security forces opened fire. He said the authorities had broken an agreement not to besiege the mosque.
"The administration wants to see dead bodies scattered on the roads," he said.
"Why are they doing this? There had been no action from our side since the Chinese incident."
He was referring to the students' kidnap last month of seven Chinese citizens accused of running a brothel.
It was the most recent in a series of increasingly bold antics orchestrated by Mr Ghazi and his cleric brother.
In the past months large groups of students - mostly armed with sticks and petrol bombs but some with guns - have patrolled the area around mosque.
Gen Musharraf has said up to now that security forces cannot raid the mosque for fear of reprisals by al-Qa'eda-linked suicide bombers who are believed to be sheltering inside it. But the outbreak of violence has once again raised the question of why Pakistan's government, a key ally in the war on terrorism, has failed to curb Islamic extremism in the heart of the capital.
The government is divided over its failure to take on the controversial preacher and his brother. A senior adviser to Gen Musharraf said the Lal Masjid madrassa was symptomatic of the greater Islamic threat facing Pakistan.
"I fear that if we take them on and bodies of young girls are sent back to the conservative Frontier province, the reaction will be cataclysmic," he said. However, the education minister, a retired senior general, who is responsible for a children's library that was seized by students from the madrassa several months ago, angrily denied such a claim.
He said that the radical cleric should have been brought under control months ago. Some critics claim that the officials who organise affairs at the mosque have powerful friends in the security services, which has prevented the authorities from taking action.
Western diplomats suspect that the government has used the madrassa to play up the level of the extremist threat in order to ensure a continuing flow of money from America.
However, the American perception of Gen Musharraf's usefulness as an ally has been tarnished over the past six months.
Carlyle Taking Nursing-Home Firm Private
$6.3 Billion Deal Extends Company's Flurry of Buyouts
By Thomas Heath
Washington Post Staff Writer
Tuesday, July 3, 2007; D01
Carlyle Group yesterday announced that it was purchasing Manor Care, a nursing-home operator, for $6.3 billion, the latest in a recent string of multibillion-dollar deals involving the District private-equity giant.
Shareholders in the Toledo health-care chain, which merged with Health Care and Retirement Corp. in 1998, will receive $67 in cash per share, according to the announcement. That price represents a premium of 2.6 percent over the shares' close Friday.
Carlyle's purchase of Manor Care, which was founded 48 years ago by Montgomery County businessman Stewart Bainum Sr., comes on the heels of several big private-equity deals announced in recent days while many have speculated that the buyout mania had peaked.
Two weeks ago, Carlyle teamed with two private-equity firms to buy Home Depot's supply arm for $10.3 billion. Last week, Carlyle and Onex of Canada bought Allison Transmission, a highly profitable unit of General Motors, for $5.6 billion. In the past several days, Carlyle offered about $20 billion in cash and assumption of debt for Virgin Media, the British cable TV firm whose largest shareholder is Richard Branson.
"Carlyle is one of several major private-equity firms that are on a roll right now, doing a deal a minute," said Peter Fitzgerald, chairman of Chain Bridge Bancorp in McLean and a former U.S. senator from Illinois. "Carlyle, along with Madison Dearborn, Blackstone, Cerberus and other big private-equity firms . . . may be trying to close deals before interest rates rise, capital gets more expensive and banks and other lenders tighten their conditions."
Manor Care, which traces its roots to a single nursing home in Wheaton 48 years ago, has grown into one of the largest providers of long-term care and services in the country, with nearly 60,000 employees in more than 500 facilities under the Heartland, ManorCare Health Services and Arden Courts brands.
"The transaction affords a significant cash premium to our shareholders while allowing the company to continue its strategic direction and commitment to quality care," said Paul A. Ormond, Manor Care chief executive, in a statement. "Carlyle appreciates the success we have achieved as a company and the role that our management and employees have played in the growth of this organization and its unique capabilities."
Karen Bechtel, who heads Carlyle's health-care team, said Manor Care "is positioned for continued growth and success."
The acquisition is scheduled to close in the fourth quarter.
Steven R. Howard, chairman of the investment management practice of Thacher Proffitt & Wood, a New York law firm specializing in private equity, said the deal makes sense because Manor Care needs Carlyle's access to capital.
"The projected profitability for this sector increases in direct proportion to the millions of Americans who are going to join the ranks of the retired," he said. "It's a good time to sell."
Several analysts said the $67 price was reasonable, given that the nursing-home industry has been financially stable and enjoys reliable reimbursement rates from the government and insurance companies. Another plus is the fact that the company owns the vast majority of the real estate under its facilities.
"This company owns 98 percent of the real estate of its portfolio, as opposed to leasing it," said Frank G. Morgan, an analyst with Jefferies, which has a "hold" on the stock.
Carlyle probably intends "to refinance the company and use the real estate's current market value to pay for the transaction," he said. "And over time, you continue to grow the cash flow of the company."
The enterprise that became Manor Care had been dominated by the Bainum family since Bainum Sr., a former plumber, built his first nursing home. By 1997, Manor Care -- then based in Gaithersburg -- was the 19th-largest publicly traded company in the Washington area, with revenue of $1.53 billion and profit of $136.9 million.
Manor Care was also once one of the nation's largest hotel franchisers, licensing such brands as Comfort Inn, Quality Inn, Clarion Inn, Econo Lodge, Sleep Inn, Rodeway Inn and Friendship Inn through its Choice Hotels International subsidiary, which it spun off in 1996. It later sold its 50 percent stake in Vitalink Pharmacy Services, which provides medications for nursing homes and other institutional buyers.
The company was headed for several years by Stewart Bainum Jr., a former Maryland state legislator who considered running for the state's Democratic gubernatorial nomination in 1994. He was chairman and chief executive of Manor Care from 1987 until 1998. Bainum is now chairman of Choice Hotels International, based in Silver Spring.
$6.3 Billion Deal Extends Company's Flurry of Buyouts
By Thomas Heath
Washington Post Staff Writer
Tuesday, July 3, 2007; D01
Carlyle Group yesterday announced that it was purchasing Manor Care, a nursing-home operator, for $6.3 billion, the latest in a recent string of multibillion-dollar deals involving the District private-equity giant.
Shareholders in the Toledo health-care chain, which merged with Health Care and Retirement Corp. in 1998, will receive $67 in cash per share, according to the announcement. That price represents a premium of 2.6 percent over the shares' close Friday.
Carlyle's purchase of Manor Care, which was founded 48 years ago by Montgomery County businessman Stewart Bainum Sr., comes on the heels of several big private-equity deals announced in recent days while many have speculated that the buyout mania had peaked.
Two weeks ago, Carlyle teamed with two private-equity firms to buy Home Depot's supply arm for $10.3 billion. Last week, Carlyle and Onex of Canada bought Allison Transmission, a highly profitable unit of General Motors, for $5.6 billion. In the past several days, Carlyle offered about $20 billion in cash and assumption of debt for Virgin Media, the British cable TV firm whose largest shareholder is Richard Branson.
"Carlyle is one of several major private-equity firms that are on a roll right now, doing a deal a minute," said Peter Fitzgerald, chairman of Chain Bridge Bancorp in McLean and a former U.S. senator from Illinois. "Carlyle, along with Madison Dearborn, Blackstone, Cerberus and other big private-equity firms . . . may be trying to close deals before interest rates rise, capital gets more expensive and banks and other lenders tighten their conditions."
Manor Care, which traces its roots to a single nursing home in Wheaton 48 years ago, has grown into one of the largest providers of long-term care and services in the country, with nearly 60,000 employees in more than 500 facilities under the Heartland, ManorCare Health Services and Arden Courts brands.
"The transaction affords a significant cash premium to our shareholders while allowing the company to continue its strategic direction and commitment to quality care," said Paul A. Ormond, Manor Care chief executive, in a statement. "Carlyle appreciates the success we have achieved as a company and the role that our management and employees have played in the growth of this organization and its unique capabilities."
Karen Bechtel, who heads Carlyle's health-care team, said Manor Care "is positioned for continued growth and success."
The acquisition is scheduled to close in the fourth quarter.
Steven R. Howard, chairman of the investment management practice of Thacher Proffitt & Wood, a New York law firm specializing in private equity, said the deal makes sense because Manor Care needs Carlyle's access to capital.
"The projected profitability for this sector increases in direct proportion to the millions of Americans who are going to join the ranks of the retired," he said. "It's a good time to sell."
Several analysts said the $67 price was reasonable, given that the nursing-home industry has been financially stable and enjoys reliable reimbursement rates from the government and insurance companies. Another plus is the fact that the company owns the vast majority of the real estate under its facilities.
"This company owns 98 percent of the real estate of its portfolio, as opposed to leasing it," said Frank G. Morgan, an analyst with Jefferies, which has a "hold" on the stock.
Carlyle probably intends "to refinance the company and use the real estate's current market value to pay for the transaction," he said. "And over time, you continue to grow the cash flow of the company."
The enterprise that became Manor Care had been dominated by the Bainum family since Bainum Sr., a former plumber, built his first nursing home. By 1997, Manor Care -- then based in Gaithersburg -- was the 19th-largest publicly traded company in the Washington area, with revenue of $1.53 billion and profit of $136.9 million.
Manor Care was also once one of the nation's largest hotel franchisers, licensing such brands as Comfort Inn, Quality Inn, Clarion Inn, Econo Lodge, Sleep Inn, Rodeway Inn and Friendship Inn through its Choice Hotels International subsidiary, which it spun off in 1996. It later sold its 50 percent stake in Vitalink Pharmacy Services, which provides medications for nursing homes and other institutional buyers.
The company was headed for several years by Stewart Bainum Jr., a former Maryland state legislator who considered running for the state's Democratic gubernatorial nomination in 1994. He was chairman and chief executive of Manor Care from 1987 until 1998. Bainum is now chairman of Choice Hotels International, based in Silver Spring.
Iran's Elite Force Is Said to Use Hezbollah as 'Proxy' in Iraq
General Describes Aid To Shiite Militiamen
By Joshua Partlow
Washington Post Foreign Service
Tuesday, July 3, 2007; A08
BAGHDAD, July 2 -- An American general said on Monday that Iraqi Shiite militiamen are being trained by Iranian security forces in cooperation with Hezbollah, the Lebanese Shiite movement, offering the most specific accusations to date of Iranian involvement in specific attacks against U.S. forces.
Brig. Gen. Kevin J. Bergner, a U.S. military spokesman, asserted that Iran's elite al-Quds Force, a wing of the Revolutionary Guard, was providing armor-piercing weapons to extremist groups in Iraq, funneling them up to $3 million a month and training Iraqi militiamen at three camps near Tehran.
"The Iranian Quds Force is using Lebanese Hezbollah essentially as a proxy, as a surrogate in Iraq," Bergner said. "Our intelligence reveals that senior leadership in Iran is aware of this activity."
Officials at the Iranian Embassy in Baghdad could not be reached for comment on Monday, but in response to previous assertions of this kind they have denied Iran is in any way responsible for violence in Iraq. Similar denials have been issued by Hezbollah.
The accusations against Iran occurred on a day when Iraqi health officials said U.S. airstrikes had caused civilian casualties in the southern city of Diwaniyah.
Early Monday, about 25 mortar shells struck inside the perimeter of Camp Echo, a base for Polish troops in Diwaniyah, injuring three coalition soldiers, the U.S. military said. Two U.S. F-16 fighter jets then bombed the suspected launch sites of the mortar and rocket attack.
The airstrikes killed at least 10 people and wounded 35, according to Hussein al-Jarrah, director of Diwaniyah General Hospital. In a statement about the incident, the U.S. military made no mention of civilian casualties, but said the bombing took place along a street "where insurgents persistently use urban areas from which to attack, in order to use civilians as human shields."
Angered by the violence, residents staged a protest near a government building and some threw rocks. Gunfire broke out, killing one of the demonstrators, police said. Two policemen were injured.
Also Monday, the U.S. military said a third American soldier had been charged in the deaths of three civilians near Iskandariyah. Sgt. Evan Vela, of Phoenix, Idaho, was charged Sunday with premeditated murder, wrongfully placing a weapon by the remains of a dead Iraqi, making a false statement and obstruction of justice.
Two other soldiers from the same unit -- Staff Sgt. Michael A. Hensley of Candler, N.C., and Spec. Jorge G. Sandoval Jr. of Laredo, Tex. -- have also been charged in the case. The alleged crimes took place over the past three months, the U.S. military said.
On Monday, the U.S. military also announced the deaths of five American soldiers and a Marine. One soldier was killed and two others were wounded by a bomb that exploded near their vehicle in Salahuddin province on Monday. The day before, a joint U.S.-Iraqi patrol was hit by a roadside bomb and gunfire in western Baghdad, killing one soldier and injuring two Iraqi policemen. Another soldier was killed by gunmen in southern Baghdad. Two other soldiers and the Marine died in Anbar province in western Iraq.
In what U.S. military officials called a "deliberate ambush," insurgents early Monday opened fire with heavy machine guns on two U.S. Kiowa light attack helicopters south of Baghdad, downing one of the aircraft. The two pilots crash-landed the damaged copter, suffering only minor injuries, and were rescued by an Apache combat helicopter called to the scene.
Bergner's briefing for reporters in Baghdad emphasized a Jan. 20 attack on a provincial government complex in the southern city of Karbala, during which gunmen wearing U.S. military-style uniforms and driving sport-utility vehicles entered the compound, killed an American serviceman and abducted four others, later killing them.
In March, a U.S. raid in Basra captured Qais Khazali, who admitted to authorizing the Karbala attack, Bergner said. Bergner asserted that Khazali, a former spokesman for Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr, worked closely with the Iranian Quds Force -- in particular a man known as Haji Yusif, deputy commander for the al-Quds Force Department of External Special Operations -- to develop a network of Shiite fighters in Iraq.
During the March raid, U.S. forces also captured Ali Musa Daqduq, who initially pretended that he was deaf and mute but later admitted to U.S. forces that he had been working with Hezbollah since 1983, Bergner said. Daqduq allegedly commanded a Hezbollah special operations group, provided security for the movement's leader, Hasan Nasrallah, and in May 2006 went to Iran to work with the Quds Force to train Iraqi Shiite militiamen organized into units that Bergner referred to as "special groups."
"Both Ali Musa Daqduq and Qais Khazali state that senior leadership within the Quds Force knew of and supported planning for the eventual Karbala attack that killed five coalition soldiers," Bergner said.
During his four trips into Iraq before his capture, Daqduq "monitored and reported on the training and arming of special groups in mortars and rockets, manufacturing and employment of improvised explosive devices and kidnapping operations," Bergner said. "Most significantly, he was tasked to organize the special groups in ways that mirrored how Hezbollah was organized in Lebanon."
A videotape of Daqduq detailing the training program he ran in Iran and his activities in Iraq is circulating among U.S. officials in Washington, a senior U.S. official said Monday.
Hezbollah spokesmen in Lebanon said they were checking whether Daqduq was a member of the movement. The spokesmen would not make any other comment and declined to be identified further.
A spokesman for Sadr described the accusations against Daqduq and Khazali as "the lies of the occupation forces."
"The Mahdi Army is self-financed from inside the country, and has no political, financial or military relations with Iran," said Ahmed al-Shaibani. "The reason for arresting Khazali is because he was the second spokesman for Moqtada al-Sadr after me."
Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari said in a brief telephone interview that he had not seen the details of the American presentation and could not respond to the specific allegations. But he agreed that senior Iraqi officials have repeatedly "raised these concerns" about Iranian involvement in Iraq at the "highest levels" of the Iranian government.
Bergner, referring to recent talks between Iranian and U.S. officials, said, "There does not seem to be any follow-through on the commitments that Iran has made to work with Iraq in addressing the destabilizing security issues here in Iraq."
Bergner said that the Quds Force runs three camps "not too far from Tehran" where groups of 20 to 60 Iraqis are trained in the use of roadside bombs, rockets, sniping and other violent tactics, with the intent that they will return to Iraq to fight. These militiamen include fighters from the Mahdi Army, the militia run by Sadr, Bergner said. But he sought to distance Sadr -- who has increasingly advocated against violence that could injure Iraqis -- from these fighters.
"We believe that these are operating outside his control and that he shares the concern and the seriousness that they represent and is trying to find ways to bring an end to it," Bergner said.
Since Feb. 9, the U.S. military has captured or killed 27 people it believes are members of the so-called special groups, Bergner said.
General Describes Aid To Shiite Militiamen
By Joshua Partlow
Washington Post Foreign Service
Tuesday, July 3, 2007; A08
BAGHDAD, July 2 -- An American general said on Monday that Iraqi Shiite militiamen are being trained by Iranian security forces in cooperation with Hezbollah, the Lebanese Shiite movement, offering the most specific accusations to date of Iranian involvement in specific attacks against U.S. forces.
Brig. Gen. Kevin J. Bergner, a U.S. military spokesman, asserted that Iran's elite al-Quds Force, a wing of the Revolutionary Guard, was providing armor-piercing weapons to extremist groups in Iraq, funneling them up to $3 million a month and training Iraqi militiamen at three camps near Tehran.
"The Iranian Quds Force is using Lebanese Hezbollah essentially as a proxy, as a surrogate in Iraq," Bergner said. "Our intelligence reveals that senior leadership in Iran is aware of this activity."
Officials at the Iranian Embassy in Baghdad could not be reached for comment on Monday, but in response to previous assertions of this kind they have denied Iran is in any way responsible for violence in Iraq. Similar denials have been issued by Hezbollah.
The accusations against Iran occurred on a day when Iraqi health officials said U.S. airstrikes had caused civilian casualties in the southern city of Diwaniyah.
Early Monday, about 25 mortar shells struck inside the perimeter of Camp Echo, a base for Polish troops in Diwaniyah, injuring three coalition soldiers, the U.S. military said. Two U.S. F-16 fighter jets then bombed the suspected launch sites of the mortar and rocket attack.
The airstrikes killed at least 10 people and wounded 35, according to Hussein al-Jarrah, director of Diwaniyah General Hospital. In a statement about the incident, the U.S. military made no mention of civilian casualties, but said the bombing took place along a street "where insurgents persistently use urban areas from which to attack, in order to use civilians as human shields."
Angered by the violence, residents staged a protest near a government building and some threw rocks. Gunfire broke out, killing one of the demonstrators, police said. Two policemen were injured.
Also Monday, the U.S. military said a third American soldier had been charged in the deaths of three civilians near Iskandariyah. Sgt. Evan Vela, of Phoenix, Idaho, was charged Sunday with premeditated murder, wrongfully placing a weapon by the remains of a dead Iraqi, making a false statement and obstruction of justice.
Two other soldiers from the same unit -- Staff Sgt. Michael A. Hensley of Candler, N.C., and Spec. Jorge G. Sandoval Jr. of Laredo, Tex. -- have also been charged in the case. The alleged crimes took place over the past three months, the U.S. military said.
On Monday, the U.S. military also announced the deaths of five American soldiers and a Marine. One soldier was killed and two others were wounded by a bomb that exploded near their vehicle in Salahuddin province on Monday. The day before, a joint U.S.-Iraqi patrol was hit by a roadside bomb and gunfire in western Baghdad, killing one soldier and injuring two Iraqi policemen. Another soldier was killed by gunmen in southern Baghdad. Two other soldiers and the Marine died in Anbar province in western Iraq.
In what U.S. military officials called a "deliberate ambush," insurgents early Monday opened fire with heavy machine guns on two U.S. Kiowa light attack helicopters south of Baghdad, downing one of the aircraft. The two pilots crash-landed the damaged copter, suffering only minor injuries, and were rescued by an Apache combat helicopter called to the scene.
Bergner's briefing for reporters in Baghdad emphasized a Jan. 20 attack on a provincial government complex in the southern city of Karbala, during which gunmen wearing U.S. military-style uniforms and driving sport-utility vehicles entered the compound, killed an American serviceman and abducted four others, later killing them.
In March, a U.S. raid in Basra captured Qais Khazali, who admitted to authorizing the Karbala attack, Bergner said. Bergner asserted that Khazali, a former spokesman for Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr, worked closely with the Iranian Quds Force -- in particular a man known as Haji Yusif, deputy commander for the al-Quds Force Department of External Special Operations -- to develop a network of Shiite fighters in Iraq.
During the March raid, U.S. forces also captured Ali Musa Daqduq, who initially pretended that he was deaf and mute but later admitted to U.S. forces that he had been working with Hezbollah since 1983, Bergner said. Daqduq allegedly commanded a Hezbollah special operations group, provided security for the movement's leader, Hasan Nasrallah, and in May 2006 went to Iran to work with the Quds Force to train Iraqi Shiite militiamen organized into units that Bergner referred to as "special groups."
"Both Ali Musa Daqduq and Qais Khazali state that senior leadership within the Quds Force knew of and supported planning for the eventual Karbala attack that killed five coalition soldiers," Bergner said.
During his four trips into Iraq before his capture, Daqduq "monitored and reported on the training and arming of special groups in mortars and rockets, manufacturing and employment of improvised explosive devices and kidnapping operations," Bergner said. "Most significantly, he was tasked to organize the special groups in ways that mirrored how Hezbollah was organized in Lebanon."
A videotape of Daqduq detailing the training program he ran in Iran and his activities in Iraq is circulating among U.S. officials in Washington, a senior U.S. official said Monday.
Hezbollah spokesmen in Lebanon said they were checking whether Daqduq was a member of the movement. The spokesmen would not make any other comment and declined to be identified further.
A spokesman for Sadr described the accusations against Daqduq and Khazali as "the lies of the occupation forces."
"The Mahdi Army is self-financed from inside the country, and has no political, financial or military relations with Iran," said Ahmed al-Shaibani. "The reason for arresting Khazali is because he was the second spokesman for Moqtada al-Sadr after me."
Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari said in a brief telephone interview that he had not seen the details of the American presentation and could not respond to the specific allegations. But he agreed that senior Iraqi officials have repeatedly "raised these concerns" about Iranian involvement in Iraq at the "highest levels" of the Iranian government.
Bergner, referring to recent talks between Iranian and U.S. officials, said, "There does not seem to be any follow-through on the commitments that Iran has made to work with Iraq in addressing the destabilizing security issues here in Iraq."
Bergner said that the Quds Force runs three camps "not too far from Tehran" where groups of 20 to 60 Iraqis are trained in the use of roadside bombs, rockets, sniping and other violent tactics, with the intent that they will return to Iraq to fight. These militiamen include fighters from the Mahdi Army, the militia run by Sadr, Bergner said. But he sought to distance Sadr -- who has increasingly advocated against violence that could injure Iraqis -- from these fighters.
"We believe that these are operating outside his control and that he shares the concern and the seriousness that they represent and is trying to find ways to bring an end to it," Bergner said.
Since Feb. 9, the U.S. military has captured or killed 27 people it believes are members of the so-called special groups, Bergner said.
Attempts Seen As Model for New Attacks On U.S. Soil
By Karen DeYoung
Washington Post Staff Writer
Tuesday, July 3, 2007; A01
The next terrorist assault on the United States is likely to come through relatively unsophisticated, near-simultaneous attacks -- similar to those attempted in Britain over the weekend -- designed more to provoke widespread fear and panic than to cause major losses of life, U.S. intelligence and counterterrorism officials believe.
Such attacks require minimal expertise and training and are difficult to prevent. Although British investigators have not claimed al-Qaeda involvement in the latest incidents, officials here said they may constitute a "hybrid" phenomenon, in which al-Qaeda inspires and guides local groups from afar but establishes no visible operational or logistical links.
The connection, several officials said, is made through a growing network of al-Qaeda intermediaries and affiliates who are far removed from the organization's leadership.
"What is a direct link?" asked one counterterrorism official. "Is it couriers? Messengers?" U.S. officials "from very senior folks" on down, he said, are watching as the British work to reconstruct the attacks and trace their origin.
In an internal memo titled "Staying on Target," CIA Director Michael V. Hayden told agency employees yesterday that "events in Great Britain since last Friday serve as a reminder -- if we ever needed one -- that this remains a dangerous world and that our work in defending America is as important as ever."
The incidents in England and Scotland, counterterrorism officials said, coincide with recent U.S. intelligence indicating stepped-up movement of money and people from al-Qaeda camps in the ungoverned tribal areas of Pakistan, near the Afghan border. Several senior U.S. military officials were sharply critical yesterday of what they saw as the Pakistani government's unwillingness to move forcefully against the camps and the U.S. administration's failure to press Pakistan harder to curtail what one called a terrorist "growth industry."
Al-Qaeda's "presence in the tribal areas has not been this secure since before 9/11," one senior U.S. military intelligence official wrote in an e-mail.
Hayden's memo appeared designed to rally his troops in the face of the morale-deadening criticism directed at the intelligence community in recent years. Accused of incompetence for failing to warn of the September 2001 attacks and for providing faulty intelligence on Iraq, it is also charged with overzealous anti-terrorism efforts that see al-Qaeda operatives under every bed.
"Even as we deal with the current threat," Hayden's memo said, "it is hard not to notice the growing debates on both sides of the Atlantic about certain aspects of the war on terrorism: Guantanamo, habeas corpus, detentions, renditions, electronic surveillance, etc. For us, though, the choices are pretty clear: We will use all of our lawful authorities to defend America and her friends.
"Some say elements of the current debate reflect the thinking of a pre-9/11 world," the short memo concluded. "Don't worry about that. Keep your eye on our objective. For all of us at CIA, today's date is clear: It's always September 12th."
After the events in Britain, U.S. officials have tried to strike a balance between insisting that "we do not currently have any specific threat information that is credible about a particular attack in the United States," as Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff said yesterday, and asking Americans to keep a careful watch on their surroundings.
Although the Department of Homeland Security did not raise the threat level, Chertoff and other officials said that security and surveillance have been increased in several ways, including the placement of more U.S. marshals on flights to Britain and other European destinations.
Officials said the weekend's events had only heightened existing concerns. "It's not just what happened in England and Scotland that has us watching," another counterterrorism official said. "We have had some concerns for some time."
On Jan. 22, the Holland Tunnel in New York was evacuated for several hours after a suspicious package was spotted after an accident. Hazardous-materials teams were brought in, and the package was blown up by a robot before the tunnel was reopened.
In Georgetown on Saturday night, some restaurants and nightclubs were evacuated after firefighters spotted an abandoned backpack on a sidewalk. And on Sunday afternoon, police set up checkpoints on the access route into Baltimore-Washington International Thurgood Marshall Airport, stopping some cars and trucks for inspection.
A senior administration official acknowledged that recent arrests of groups charged with plotting terrorist attacks in Miami and at Fort Dix, N.J., and John F. Kennedy International Airport, as well as the arrest of a man charged with planning to detonate an explosive device in an Illinois shopping mall, have "come under a great deal of criticism for not being serious."
But the official saw some vindication for U.S. law enforcement in the British plots. "Remember that the FBI and the law enforcement community have done important work in nipping these cells in the bud so that we don't get to the stage of cars pouring into an airport terminal," the official said.
Saying that the British incidents "certainly appeared to be al-Qaeda-inspired," the official said they were more of a "reminder" of an ongoing threat in this country than an indication that similar attacks are imminent here.
Bruce Hoffman, a counterterrorism expert at Georgetown University, said he considered al-Qaeda involvement likely in the British incidents and disagreed with those who labeled the attacks amateurish. "They didn't work, but I think of all the al-Qaeda plots we've seen, their sophistication is in their simplicity. They used available materials. Where they tripped up is in the detonation of the devices. That's a trickier business."
The alleged perpetrators under arrest in Britain -- two of them physicians -- pose a challenge for both British and U.S. intelligence officials. The doctors' names did not appear on any U.S. list of people with suspected terrorist ties, U.S. officials said.
Al-Qaeda has made a "strategic investment" in Britain in recent years, Hoffman said, creating ties to an infrastructure of individuals and groups that are difficult to fit into an intelligence profile.
By drawing from a large reservoir of potential operatives, Hoffman said, al-Qaeda is attempting to "break any attempt at profiles, and also to demonstrate the diversity of their movement."
By Karen DeYoung
Washington Post Staff Writer
Tuesday, July 3, 2007; A01
The next terrorist assault on the United States is likely to come through relatively unsophisticated, near-simultaneous attacks -- similar to those attempted in Britain over the weekend -- designed more to provoke widespread fear and panic than to cause major losses of life, U.S. intelligence and counterterrorism officials believe.
Such attacks require minimal expertise and training and are difficult to prevent. Although British investigators have not claimed al-Qaeda involvement in the latest incidents, officials here said they may constitute a "hybrid" phenomenon, in which al-Qaeda inspires and guides local groups from afar but establishes no visible operational or logistical links.
The connection, several officials said, is made through a growing network of al-Qaeda intermediaries and affiliates who are far removed from the organization's leadership.
"What is a direct link?" asked one counterterrorism official. "Is it couriers? Messengers?" U.S. officials "from very senior folks" on down, he said, are watching as the British work to reconstruct the attacks and trace their origin.
In an internal memo titled "Staying on Target," CIA Director Michael V. Hayden told agency employees yesterday that "events in Great Britain since last Friday serve as a reminder -- if we ever needed one -- that this remains a dangerous world and that our work in defending America is as important as ever."
The incidents in England and Scotland, counterterrorism officials said, coincide with recent U.S. intelligence indicating stepped-up movement of money and people from al-Qaeda camps in the ungoverned tribal areas of Pakistan, near the Afghan border. Several senior U.S. military officials were sharply critical yesterday of what they saw as the Pakistani government's unwillingness to move forcefully against the camps and the U.S. administration's failure to press Pakistan harder to curtail what one called a terrorist "growth industry."
Al-Qaeda's "presence in the tribal areas has not been this secure since before 9/11," one senior U.S. military intelligence official wrote in an e-mail.
Hayden's memo appeared designed to rally his troops in the face of the morale-deadening criticism directed at the intelligence community in recent years. Accused of incompetence for failing to warn of the September 2001 attacks and for providing faulty intelligence on Iraq, it is also charged with overzealous anti-terrorism efforts that see al-Qaeda operatives under every bed.
"Even as we deal with the current threat," Hayden's memo said, "it is hard not to notice the growing debates on both sides of the Atlantic about certain aspects of the war on terrorism: Guantanamo, habeas corpus, detentions, renditions, electronic surveillance, etc. For us, though, the choices are pretty clear: We will use all of our lawful authorities to defend America and her friends.
"Some say elements of the current debate reflect the thinking of a pre-9/11 world," the short memo concluded. "Don't worry about that. Keep your eye on our objective. For all of us at CIA, today's date is clear: It's always September 12th."
After the events in Britain, U.S. officials have tried to strike a balance between insisting that "we do not currently have any specific threat information that is credible about a particular attack in the United States," as Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff said yesterday, and asking Americans to keep a careful watch on their surroundings.
Although the Department of Homeland Security did not raise the threat level, Chertoff and other officials said that security and surveillance have been increased in several ways, including the placement of more U.S. marshals on flights to Britain and other European destinations.
Officials said the weekend's events had only heightened existing concerns. "It's not just what happened in England and Scotland that has us watching," another counterterrorism official said. "We have had some concerns for some time."
On Jan. 22, the Holland Tunnel in New York was evacuated for several hours after a suspicious package was spotted after an accident. Hazardous-materials teams were brought in, and the package was blown up by a robot before the tunnel was reopened.
In Georgetown on Saturday night, some restaurants and nightclubs were evacuated after firefighters spotted an abandoned backpack on a sidewalk. And on Sunday afternoon, police set up checkpoints on the access route into Baltimore-Washington International Thurgood Marshall Airport, stopping some cars and trucks for inspection.
A senior administration official acknowledged that recent arrests of groups charged with plotting terrorist attacks in Miami and at Fort Dix, N.J., and John F. Kennedy International Airport, as well as the arrest of a man charged with planning to detonate an explosive device in an Illinois shopping mall, have "come under a great deal of criticism for not being serious."
But the official saw some vindication for U.S. law enforcement in the British plots. "Remember that the FBI and the law enforcement community have done important work in nipping these cells in the bud so that we don't get to the stage of cars pouring into an airport terminal," the official said.
Saying that the British incidents "certainly appeared to be al-Qaeda-inspired," the official said they were more of a "reminder" of an ongoing threat in this country than an indication that similar attacks are imminent here.
Bruce Hoffman, a counterterrorism expert at Georgetown University, said he considered al-Qaeda involvement likely in the British incidents and disagreed with those who labeled the attacks amateurish. "They didn't work, but I think of all the al-Qaeda plots we've seen, their sophistication is in their simplicity. They used available materials. Where they tripped up is in the detonation of the devices. That's a trickier business."
The alleged perpetrators under arrest in Britain -- two of them physicians -- pose a challenge for both British and U.S. intelligence officials. The doctors' names did not appear on any U.S. list of people with suspected terrorist ties, U.S. officials said.
Al-Qaeda has made a "strategic investment" in Britain in recent years, Hoffman said, creating ties to an infrastructure of individuals and groups that are difficult to fit into an intelligence profile.
By drawing from a large reservoir of potential operatives, Hoffman said, al-Qaeda is attempting to "break any attempt at profiles, and also to demonstrate the diversity of their movement."
A Treaty the Senate Should Sink
By Jack Goldsmith and Jeremy Rabkin
Monday, July 2, 2007; A19
The Bush administration is urging the Senate to consent this summer to the Convention on the Law of the Sea, the complex and sprawling treaty that governs shipping, navigation, mining, fishing and other ocean activities. This is a major departure from the administration's usual stance toward international organizations that have the capacity to restrain U.S. sovereignty. And it comes in a surprising context, since the convention has disturbing implications for our fight against terrorists.
Deputy Secretary of State John D. Negroponte and Deputy Defense Secretary Gordon England maintain that the convention will enhance U.S. security. They argued in the Washington Times last month that to meet the "complex array of global and transnational security challenges," the United States must have "unimpeded maritime mobility -- the ability of our forces to respond any time, anywhere, if so required."
This is true, but ratifying the convention won't bring this benefit. Instead it would put America's naval counterterrorism efforts under the control of foreign judges. Suppose the United States seizes a vessel it suspects of shipping dual-use items that might be utilized to build weapons of mass destruction or other tools of terrorism. It's not a wild supposition. Under the Proliferation Security Initiative, the United States has since 2003 secured proliferation-related high-seas interdiction agreements with countries such as Belize and Panama, which provide registration for much international shipping. If the United States ratifies the Convention on the Law of the Sea, the legality of such seizures will, depending on the circumstances, be left to the decision of one of two international tribunals.
The first is the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, based in Hamburg. Some members of the Hamburg tribunal come from countries naturally suspicious of American power, such as China and Russia. Others are not allied with the United States. Even judges from Europe and South America do not always see things the way U.S. military authorities do.
The second institution is a five-person international arbitration panel. The United States and the flag state of the seized ship would have input into the selection of some of these arbitrators. But the U.N. secretary general or the president of the Hamburg tribunal would select the crucial fifth arbitrator when, as would typically be the case, the state parties cannot agree. They must choose from a list of "experts" to which every state party to the convention -- not just China and Russia but other unfriendly nations such as Cuba and Burma -- can contribute.
At minimum, these tribunals would pose awkward questions to the United States about the evidence behind a seizure, how we gathered it and who vouches for the information. At worst they would follow the recent example of the International Court of Justice and use a legal dispute to score points against American "unilateralism" and "arrogance" for a global audience keen to humble the United States. In every case, a majority of non-American judges would decide whether the U.S. Navy can seize a ship that it believes is carrying terrorist operatives or supplies for terrorists.
It's true that the convention exempts "military activities" from the tribunals' jurisdiction, but it does not define the term. The executive branch, worried about this ambiguity, has proposed a condition to ratification that would allow the United States to define the exemption for itself. But this condition amounts to a "reservation" disallowed by the treaty. International tribunals would still have the last word on the validity of the U.S. condition and the resulting scope of permissible U.S. naval actions.
Supporters note that many of the treaty's "freedom of the seas" provisions favor U.S. interests. But the United States already receives the benefits of these provisions because, as Negroponte and England acknowledged, they are "already widely accepted in practice." They maintain that ratifying the convention would nonetheless provide "welcome legal certainty." In recent years, however, the United States has not received much legal certainty from international tribunals dominated by non-American judges, and what it has received has not been very welcome. There is little reason to expect different results from these tribunals.
President Bush invokes a different rationale for ratifying the convention, arguing that it would "give the United States a seat at the table when the rights that are vital to our interests are debated and interpreted." What this really means is that American views of the law of the sea, even on issues related to national security, could be outvoted by a majority in an international forum. How can this make us safer?
Jack Goldsmith teaches law at Harvard and was an assistant attorney general from 2003 to 2004. Jeremy Rabkin teaches law at George Mason University.
By Jack Goldsmith and Jeremy Rabkin
Monday, July 2, 2007; A19
The Bush administration is urging the Senate to consent this summer to the Convention on the Law of the Sea, the complex and sprawling treaty that governs shipping, navigation, mining, fishing and other ocean activities. This is a major departure from the administration's usual stance toward international organizations that have the capacity to restrain U.S. sovereignty. And it comes in a surprising context, since the convention has disturbing implications for our fight against terrorists.
Deputy Secretary of State John D. Negroponte and Deputy Defense Secretary Gordon England maintain that the convention will enhance U.S. security. They argued in the Washington Times last month that to meet the "complex array of global and transnational security challenges," the United States must have "unimpeded maritime mobility -- the ability of our forces to respond any time, anywhere, if so required."
This is true, but ratifying the convention won't bring this benefit. Instead it would put America's naval counterterrorism efforts under the control of foreign judges. Suppose the United States seizes a vessel it suspects of shipping dual-use items that might be utilized to build weapons of mass destruction or other tools of terrorism. It's not a wild supposition. Under the Proliferation Security Initiative, the United States has since 2003 secured proliferation-related high-seas interdiction agreements with countries such as Belize and Panama, which provide registration for much international shipping. If the United States ratifies the Convention on the Law of the Sea, the legality of such seizures will, depending on the circumstances, be left to the decision of one of two international tribunals.
The first is the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, based in Hamburg. Some members of the Hamburg tribunal come from countries naturally suspicious of American power, such as China and Russia. Others are not allied with the United States. Even judges from Europe and South America do not always see things the way U.S. military authorities do.
The second institution is a five-person international arbitration panel. The United States and the flag state of the seized ship would have input into the selection of some of these arbitrators. But the U.N. secretary general or the president of the Hamburg tribunal would select the crucial fifth arbitrator when, as would typically be the case, the state parties cannot agree. They must choose from a list of "experts" to which every state party to the convention -- not just China and Russia but other unfriendly nations such as Cuba and Burma -- can contribute.
At minimum, these tribunals would pose awkward questions to the United States about the evidence behind a seizure, how we gathered it and who vouches for the information. At worst they would follow the recent example of the International Court of Justice and use a legal dispute to score points against American "unilateralism" and "arrogance" for a global audience keen to humble the United States. In every case, a majority of non-American judges would decide whether the U.S. Navy can seize a ship that it believes is carrying terrorist operatives or supplies for terrorists.
It's true that the convention exempts "military activities" from the tribunals' jurisdiction, but it does not define the term. The executive branch, worried about this ambiguity, has proposed a condition to ratification that would allow the United States to define the exemption for itself. But this condition amounts to a "reservation" disallowed by the treaty. International tribunals would still have the last word on the validity of the U.S. condition and the resulting scope of permissible U.S. naval actions.
Supporters note that many of the treaty's "freedom of the seas" provisions favor U.S. interests. But the United States already receives the benefits of these provisions because, as Negroponte and England acknowledged, they are "already widely accepted in practice." They maintain that ratifying the convention would nonetheless provide "welcome legal certainty." In recent years, however, the United States has not received much legal certainty from international tribunals dominated by non-American judges, and what it has received has not been very welcome. There is little reason to expect different results from these tribunals.
President Bush invokes a different rationale for ratifying the convention, arguing that it would "give the United States a seat at the table when the rights that are vital to our interests are debated and interpreted." What this really means is that American views of the law of the sea, even on issues related to national security, could be outvoted by a majority in an international forum. How can this make us safer?
Jack Goldsmith teaches law at Harvard and was an assistant attorney general from 2003 to 2004. Jeremy Rabkin teaches law at George Mason University.
Impunity for al-Qaeda
The Implications of a Bad Ruling on 'Unlawful Enemy Combatants'
By David B. Rivkin Jr. and Lee A. Casey
Monday, July 2, 2007; A19
The federal appeals court in Richmond should quickly grant the Justice Department's request that it reconsider last month's decision in the case of Al-Marri v. Wright-- a decision that denied the existence of the legal category "unlawful enemy combatant" in America's conflict with al-Qaeda. (This question is not, it should be noted, at issue in the Guantanamo detainee cases that the Supreme Court has just agreed to hear in the fall.)
The reasoning in the Al-Marri case was deeply flawed, and if widely adopted it would undermine a fundamental purpose of the laws of war: avoiding impunity for war crimes. The ruling not only weakened America's national security but opened the possibility that no body of law applies to conflicts between non-state actors -- which would make it impossible, for example, to prosecute the Hamas gunmen who recently murdered Fatah fighters and wantonly killed Palestinian civilians in Gaza.
The case involved the detention of Ali Saleh Kahlah al-Marri, a man the United States believes to be an al-Qaeda agent and has held since 2003 as an enemy combatant. Two of three 4th Circuit judges concluded that because al-Qaeda is not a state, Marri must be treated as a civilian criminal defendant. They claimed this position was supported by the Supreme Court's statement in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld that the war in Afghanistan is only an internal conflict -- and further claimed that the legal classification of enemy combatant, as opposed to civilian, does not exist in such conflicts.
Their sole authority for this conclusion was a 2005 statement by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), a persistent critic of America's war on terror, that "[i]n non-international armed conflict combatant status does not exist." Ironically, for years the ICRC tried to achieve some type of combatant status for non-state participants in internal conflicts, fearing that most countries would treat them far more harshly as civilian criminal defendants. Moreover, its 2005 assertion that combatant status does not exist in internal conflicts -- especially as construed in A l-Marri-- is inconsistent with its own earlier (and more authoritative) commentary on the Geneva Conventions.
In 1960 the ICRC addressed Geneva's "Common Article 3" on internal armed conflicts and acknowledged that "the conflicts referred to in Article 3 are [generally] armed conflicts, with armed forces on either side engaged in hostilities -- conflicts, in short, which are in many respects similar to an international war, but take place within the confines of a single country." "Armed forces" and "hostilities" are legal terms that imply -- indeed, require -- recognition that the category of enemy combatant exists in internal armed conflicts.
The court made an equally serious error in suggesting that the United States can be at war with al-Qaeda only when that group is affiliated with a foreign government. Although nations rarely invoke the laws of war with regard to non-state actors, the legal basis of such conflicts is well established. The Supreme Court has held that the United States could be at "war" with non-state entities such as Indian tribes. It also recognized during the Civil War -- another conflict between the United States and a non-state -- that whether the United States is at war, and with whom, is a question reserved to the political branches, in particular to the president. Under the Al-Marri reasoning, everyone fighting for the South during the Civil War was a civilian because none was "affiliated with recognized nation states."
To distinguish A l-Marri from its earlier decision involving alleged al-Qaeda operative Jose Padilla, who was an enemy combatant, the court asserted that Padilla fought alongside the Taliban -- and characterized the Taliban as the "de facto" government of Afghanistan. This is a type of diplomatic recognition that the United States (and the international community generally) denied to that barbaric militia. The Constitution, of course, gives the president the right to grant or withhold such recognition. More important, under the 4th Circuit's rationale, the United States is not now engaged in a legally cognizable armed conflict with al-Qaeda -- with its Taliban patrons on the run, al-Qaeda has no governmental affiliation, except the self-styled "Islamic State of Iraq."
The implications are profound. Application of the laws of war governs the detention of enemy combatants but also creates the legal justification for the initial use of armed force. Only if the laws of war apply can the United States lawfully take the offensive against al-Qaeda, seeking out and attacking with deadly force its operatives in Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere. Congress's post-Sept. 11 authorization for the use of military force properly invoked this legal regime. Moreover, if the laws of war do not apply to conflicts involving non-state actors, there is no legal regime governing conflicts between groups in areas -- such as Gaza -- where there is no recognized state authority. This is true impunity.
By substituting its will for that of Congress and the president, the court's decision would strip the initiative from U.S. forces and transform the war on terror into a reactive policing function -- exactly the posture America was in on the morning of Sept. 11, 2001. As Justice Robert Jackson wrote long ago, for all its obvious virtues the Constitution is not a suicide pact. The court should quickly overturn this decision so that Jackson's words will continue to be true.
The writers are Washington lawyers who served in the Justice Department during the administrations of Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush.
The Implications of a Bad Ruling on 'Unlawful Enemy Combatants'
By David B. Rivkin Jr. and Lee A. Casey
Monday, July 2, 2007; A19
The federal appeals court in Richmond should quickly grant the Justice Department's request that it reconsider last month's decision in the case of Al-Marri v. Wright-- a decision that denied the existence of the legal category "unlawful enemy combatant" in America's conflict with al-Qaeda. (This question is not, it should be noted, at issue in the Guantanamo detainee cases that the Supreme Court has just agreed to hear in the fall.)
The reasoning in the Al-Marri case was deeply flawed, and if widely adopted it would undermine a fundamental purpose of the laws of war: avoiding impunity for war crimes. The ruling not only weakened America's national security but opened the possibility that no body of law applies to conflicts between non-state actors -- which would make it impossible, for example, to prosecute the Hamas gunmen who recently murdered Fatah fighters and wantonly killed Palestinian civilians in Gaza.
The case involved the detention of Ali Saleh Kahlah al-Marri, a man the United States believes to be an al-Qaeda agent and has held since 2003 as an enemy combatant. Two of three 4th Circuit judges concluded that because al-Qaeda is not a state, Marri must be treated as a civilian criminal defendant. They claimed this position was supported by the Supreme Court's statement in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld that the war in Afghanistan is only an internal conflict -- and further claimed that the legal classification of enemy combatant, as opposed to civilian, does not exist in such conflicts.
Their sole authority for this conclusion was a 2005 statement by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), a persistent critic of America's war on terror, that "[i]n non-international armed conflict combatant status does not exist." Ironically, for years the ICRC tried to achieve some type of combatant status for non-state participants in internal conflicts, fearing that most countries would treat them far more harshly as civilian criminal defendants. Moreover, its 2005 assertion that combatant status does not exist in internal conflicts -- especially as construed in A l-Marri-- is inconsistent with its own earlier (and more authoritative) commentary on the Geneva Conventions.
In 1960 the ICRC addressed Geneva's "Common Article 3" on internal armed conflicts and acknowledged that "the conflicts referred to in Article 3 are [generally] armed conflicts, with armed forces on either side engaged in hostilities -- conflicts, in short, which are in many respects similar to an international war, but take place within the confines of a single country." "Armed forces" and "hostilities" are legal terms that imply -- indeed, require -- recognition that the category of enemy combatant exists in internal armed conflicts.
The court made an equally serious error in suggesting that the United States can be at war with al-Qaeda only when that group is affiliated with a foreign government. Although nations rarely invoke the laws of war with regard to non-state actors, the legal basis of such conflicts is well established. The Supreme Court has held that the United States could be at "war" with non-state entities such as Indian tribes. It also recognized during the Civil War -- another conflict between the United States and a non-state -- that whether the United States is at war, and with whom, is a question reserved to the political branches, in particular to the president. Under the Al-Marri reasoning, everyone fighting for the South during the Civil War was a civilian because none was "affiliated with recognized nation states."
To distinguish A l-Marri from its earlier decision involving alleged al-Qaeda operative Jose Padilla, who was an enemy combatant, the court asserted that Padilla fought alongside the Taliban -- and characterized the Taliban as the "de facto" government of Afghanistan. This is a type of diplomatic recognition that the United States (and the international community generally) denied to that barbaric militia. The Constitution, of course, gives the president the right to grant or withhold such recognition. More important, under the 4th Circuit's rationale, the United States is not now engaged in a legally cognizable armed conflict with al-Qaeda -- with its Taliban patrons on the run, al-Qaeda has no governmental affiliation, except the self-styled "Islamic State of Iraq."
The implications are profound. Application of the laws of war governs the detention of enemy combatants but also creates the legal justification for the initial use of armed force. Only if the laws of war apply can the United States lawfully take the offensive against al-Qaeda, seeking out and attacking with deadly force its operatives in Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere. Congress's post-Sept. 11 authorization for the use of military force properly invoked this legal regime. Moreover, if the laws of war do not apply to conflicts involving non-state actors, there is no legal regime governing conflicts between groups in areas -- such as Gaza -- where there is no recognized state authority. This is true impunity.
By substituting its will for that of Congress and the president, the court's decision would strip the initiative from U.S. forces and transform the war on terror into a reactive policing function -- exactly the posture America was in on the morning of Sept. 11, 2001. As Justice Robert Jackson wrote long ago, for all its obvious virtues the Constitution is not a suicide pact. The court should quickly overturn this decision so that Jackson's words will continue to be true.
The writers are Washington lawyers who served in the Justice Department during the administrations of Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush.
A President Besieged and Isolated, Yet at Ease
Bush, Grasping for Answers and Fixated on Iraq, Remains Resolute
By Peter Baker
Washington Post Staff Writer
Monday, July 2, 2007; A01
At the nadir of his presidency, George W. Bush is looking for answers. One at a time or in small groups, he summons leading authors, historians, philosophers and theologians to the White House to join him in the search.
Over sodas and sparkling water, he asks his questions: What is the nature of good and evil in the post-Sept. 11 world? What lessons does history have for a president facing the turmoil I'm facing? How will history judge what we've done? Why does the rest of the world seem to hate America? Or is it just me they hate?
These are the questions of a president who has endured the most drastic political collapse in a generation. Not generally known for intellectual curiosity, Bush is seeking out those who are, engaging in a philosophical exploration of the currents of history that have swept up his administration. For all the setbacks, he remains unflinching, rarely expressing doubt in his direction, yet trying to understand how he got off course.
These sessions, usually held in the Oval Office or the elegant living areas of the executive mansion, are never listed on the president's public schedule and remain largely unknown even to many on his staff. To some of those invited to talk, Bush seems alone, isolated by events beyond his control, with trusted advisers taking their leave and erstwhile friends turning on him.
"You think about prime ministers and presidents being surrounded by cabinet officials and aides and so forth," said Alistair Horne, a British historian who met with Bush recently. "But at the end of the day, they're alone. They're lonely. And that's what occurred to me as I was at the White House. It must be quite difficult for him to get out and about."
Friends worry about that as well. Burdened by an unrelenting war, challenged by an opposition Congress, defeated just last week on immigration, his last major domestic priority, Bush remains largely locked inside the fortress of 1600 Pennsylvania Ave. in the seventh year of a presidency turned sour. He still travels, making speeches to friendly audiences and attending summit meetings, such as this weekend's Kennebunkport talks with President Vladimir Putin of Russia. But he rarely goes out to dinner, and he no longer plays golf, except occasionally chipping at Camp David, where, as at his Texas ranch, he can find refuge.
"I don't know how he copes with it," said Donald Burnham Ensenat, a friend for 43 years who just stepped down as State Department protocol officer. Rep. K. Michael Conaway (R-Tex.), another longtime friend who once worked for Bush, said he looks worn down. "It's a marked difference in his physical appearance," Conaway said. "It's an incredibly heavy load. When you ask men and women to take risks, to send them into war knowing they might not come home, that's got to be an incredible burden to have on your shoulders."
Bush is fixated on Iraq, according to friends and advisers. One former aide went to see him recently to discuss various matters, only to find Bush turning the conversation back to Iraq again and again. He recognizes that his presidency hinges on whether Iraq can be turned around in 18 months. "Nothing matters except the war," said one person close to Bush. "That's all that matters. The whole thing rides on that."
And yet Bush does not come across like a man lamenting his plight. In public and in private, according to intimates, he exhibits an inexorable upbeat energy that defies the political storms. Even when he convenes philosophical discussions with scholars, he avoids second-guessing his actions. He still acts as if he were master of the universe, even if the rest of Washington no longer sees him that way.
"You don't get any feeling of somebody crouching down in the bunker," said Irwin M. Stelzer, a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute who was part of one group of scholars who met with Bush. "This is either extraordinary self-confidence or out of touch with reality. I can't tell you which."
A Parade of Setbacks
The reality has been daunting by any account. No modern president has experienced such a sustained rejection by the American public. Bush's approval rating slipped below 50 percent in Washington Post-ABC News polls in January 2005 and has not topped that level in the 30 months since. The last president mired under 50 percent so long was Harry S. Truman. Even Richard M. Nixon did not fall below 50 percent until April 1973, 16 months before he resigned.
The polls reflect the events of Bush's second term, an unyielding sequence of bad news. Social Security. Hurricane Katrina. Harriet E. Miers. Dubai Ports World. Vice President Cheney's hunting accident. Jack Abramoff, Tom DeLay and Mark Foley. The midterm elections. I. Lewis "Scooter" Libby, Alberto R. Gonzales and Paul D. Wolfowitz. Immigration. And overshadowing it all, the Iraq war, now longer than the U.S. fight in World War II.
Since winning reelection 2 1/2 years ago, Bush has had few days of good news, and what few he has had rarely lasted. Purple-fingered Iraqis went to the polls to establish a democracy but elected a dysfunctional government riven by sectarian strife. U.S. forces hunted down Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the al-Qaeda leader in Iraq, but the violence only worsened. Saddam Hussein was convicted, but his execution was marred by videotaped taunting. Perhaps the only unalloyed major second-term victory for Bush has been the confirmation of two Supreme Court justices who have begun to move the court to the right.
Other presidents have been crushed by the pressure. Lyndon B. Johnson was tormented by Vietnam War protesters outside his window shouting, "Hey, hey, LBJ, how many kids did you kill today?" Nixon swam in self-pity during Watergate, talking to paintings and once asking Henry Kissinger to pray with him. Bill Clinton fumed against enemies and nursed deep grievances during his impeachment battle.
But if Bush vents like that, no one is talking. Kissinger, who advises Bush, said the president has never asked him to kneel down with him in the Oval Office. "I find him serene," Kissinger said. "I know President Johnson was railing against his fate. That's not the case with Bush. He feels he's doing what he needs to do, and he seems to me at peace with himself."
Bush has virtually given up on winning converts while in office and instead is counting on vindication after he is dead. "He almost has . . . a sense of fatalism," said Rep. Peter T. King (R-N.Y.), who recently spent a day traveling with Bush. "All he can do is do his best, and 100 years from now people will decide if he was right or wrong. It doesn't seem to be a false, macho pride or living in your own world. I find him to be amazingly calm."
To an extent, Bush walls himself off from criticism. He does read newspapers, contrary to public impression, but watches little television news and does not linger in the media echo chamber. "He does a very good job of keeping out the extreme things in his life," Conaway, the congressman, said. "He doesn't watch Leno and Letterman. He doesn't spend a lot of time exposing himself to that sort of stuff. He has a terrific knack of not looking through the rearview mirror."
Rep. Jack Kingston (R-Ga.), who attended a legislative meeting with Bush last month, said his impervious nature works both ways. "The things that make him unpopular also help him deal with all the pressure," Kingston said. "He's stubborn. He's loyal to his philosophy."
Reproached by His Own
The fabled loyalty of the Bush team, though, has frayed far more than might be apparent to him. The fight over whether Gonzales should remain attorney general has exposed a deep fault line. Bush remains convinced that his old friend did nothing wrong ethically in firing U.S. attorneys, and senior adviser Karl Rove angrily rejects what he sees as a Democratic witch hunt, according to White House officials. Yet beyond the inner circle, it is hard to find a current or former administration official who thinks Gonzales should stay.
"I don't understand for the life of me why Al Gonzales is still there," said one former top aide, who, like others, would speak only on the condition of anonymity. "It's not about him. It's about the office and who's able to lead the department." The ex-aide said that every time he runs into former Cabinet secretaries, "universally the first thing out of their mouths" is bafflement that Gonzales remains.
Some aides see it as Bush refusing to accept reality. "The president thinks cutting and running on his friends shows weakness," said an exasperated senior official. "Change shows weakness. Doing what everyone knows has to be done shows weakness." Another former aide said that no matter how many people Bush consults, he heeds only two or three.
Beyond Gonzales, the discontent with the Bush presidency is broader and deeper among Republican lawmakers, some of whom seethe with anger. "Our members just wish this thing would be over," said a senior House Republican who met with Bush recently. "People are tired of him." Bush's circle remains sealed tight, the lawmaker said. "There's nobody there who can stand up to him and tell him, 'Mr. President, you've got to do this. You're wrong on this.' There's no adult supervision. It's like he's oblivious. Maybe that's a defense mechanism."
Aides said they do challenge Bush. White House Chief of Staff Joshua B. Bolten had what one colleague called "a lot of hard discussions" with the president after the November midterm elections to shock him into recognizing that his approach to Iraq had failed. Bolten set up meetings so Bush could hear from critics of his policy and sent him written material to emphasize the need for change, the colleague said. That led to the decision to send more troops.
Even if he tries to avoid the media surround sound, Bush cannot help running into criticism. A group of moderate House Republicans bluntly told him during a recent White House meeting that he had become a drag on the party. And when the president invited conservative radio host Laura Ingraham for a bike ride last month, she upbraided him for his position on immigration.
Bush's unpopularity appears to impose limits on where he goes. He turned down an invitation from the Washington Nationals to throw out the first pitch on Opening Day, pleading a busy schedule. The former baseball team owner instead hosted an invitation-only ceremony for a college football team in the East Room, where no one would boo. When commencement season rolled around, he stayed away from major universities, delivering addresses at a community college in Florida and a small religious school in Pennsylvania run by a former aide. And even then he was met by student and faculty protests.
Seeking History's Lessons
Amid the tumult, the president has sought refuge in history. He read three books last year on George Washington, read about the Algerian war of independence and the exploitation of Congo, and lately has been digging into "Troublesome Young Men," Lynne Olson's account of Conservative backbenchers who thrust Winston Churchill to power. Bush idolizes Churchill and keeps a bust of him in the Oval Office.
After reading Andrew Roberts's "A History of the English-Speaking Peoples Since 1900," Bush brought in the author and a dozen other scholars to talk about the lessons. "What can I learn from history?" Bush asked Roberts, according to Stelzer, the Hudson Institute scholar, who participated.
Stelzer said Bush seemed smarter than he expected. The conversation ranged from history to religion and touched on sensitive topics for a president wrestling with his legacy. "He asked me, 'Do you think our unpopularity abroad is a result of my personality?' And he laughed," Stelzer recalled. "I said, 'In part.' And he laughed again."
Much of the discussion focused on the nature of good and evil, a perennial theme for Bush, who casts the struggle against Islamic extremists in black-and-white terms. Michael Novak, a theologian who participated, said it was clear that Bush weathers his difficulties because he sees himself as doing the Lord's work.
"His faith is very strong," said Novak, a scholar at the American Enterprise Institute. "Faith is not enough by itself because there are a lot of people who have faith but weak hearts. But his faith is very strong. He seeks guidance, like every other president does, in prayer. And that means trying to be sure he's doing the right thing. And if you've got that set, all the criticism, it doesn't faze you very much. You're answering to God."
Horne, the British historian, found himself with Bush on another occasion after Kissinger gave the president "A Savage War of Peace," Horne's book on the French defeat in Algeria in the mid-20th century. Bush invited Horne to visit. They talked about the parallels and differences between Algeria and Iraq as Bush sought insight he could apply to his own situation.
Horne said he is not a Bush supporter but was nonetheless struck by the president's tranquility. "He was very friendly, very relaxed," Horne said. "My God, he looked well. He looked like he came off a cruise in the Caribbean. He looked like he hadn't a care in the world. It was amazing."
Loyalists Lost
As Bush heads toward the twilight of his presidency, the White House feels increasingly empty. One after another, aides who have stuck with him are heading out the door. Andrew H. Card Jr., his chief of staff for more than five years, stepped down last year. And now counselor Dan Bartlett, an aide for 14 years, is leaving.
Card and Bartlett were the aides who spent the most time at Bush's side. Bolten, Card's replacement, and Ed Gillespie, Bartlett's successor, each decided not to devote as much time to "body duty," leaving the president without their constant presence. Others who have left have publicly castigated the president. Bush was particularly hurt, friends said, when reelection strategist Matthew Dowd disavowed him.
Bush seeks solace in his oldest friends from Texas and Yale University, hosting an annual summer picnic and a Christmas party. He invites friends to the White House or the ranch in Crawford. But those experiences are strangely impersonal. "It can be kind of clinical," said a friend who spoke only on the condition of anonymity. "You're in there and in that event it's all very controlled -- you come in for drinks at 7, you have dinner at 7:30 and by 9 you're back at your hotel."
Bush rarely leaves the White House for social outings in Washington, though lately he has tried to get out more, attending dinners last month at the homes of two old friends, attorney Jim Langdon and budget aide Clay Johnson III. Bush avoids politics in such moments. He reaches out for signs of normalcy, asking about business or mutual friends. "He wants to know if we've caught any fish," said Robert McCleskey, a friend since grade school.
Bush also deals with stress through discipline, routine and exercise. On a typical day, he wakes at 5 a.m., arrives at the Oval Office at 6:30, then leaves at 4:30 p.m. for a 60-minute workout. He returns to work for a while before retiring to the residence, where he turns in at 9:30. On weekends, he favors two-hour biking sessions at a Secret Service facility in Beltsville with companions such as Card or Alexander Ellis IV, a young cousin.
Friends say this does not make him ignorant of his troubles. "There isn't any doubt that he is totally and completely aware of all the existing circumstances around him," said a close friend. "There's not anything that he's not aware of -- how he's perceived, how his people are perceived, the problems his people have. He is the furthest thing from oblivious. . . . Somewhere in the back of his mind there's a pretty complete autopsy."
Yet Bush can seem disengaged. When he flew to New York to visit a Harlem school and promote his education program, he brought along New York congressmen on Air Force One, including Democrat Charles B. Rangel, chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee. The White House was in the midst of tough negotiations with Rangel over trade pacts. But Bush did not try to cut a deal with Rangel, chatting instead about baseball. "He talked a lot about the Rangers," Rangel said. "I didn't know what the hell he was talking about."
Still, that trip demonstrated that Bush cannot escape his burdens. King, the GOP congressman, introduced him backstage to a soldier injured in one eye. Bush teared up and asked the young man to take off his dark glasses so he could see the wound, King recalled. "Human instinct is when someone has a serious injury to look the other way," King said. "He actually asked him to take them off. He actually touched the eye a little. It was almost as if he felt he had to confront it."
As they headed back to Washington a few hours later, with the televisions aboard Air Force One tuned to the New York Mets game, King mused that Bush must be feeling the weight of his office.
"My wife loves you, but she doesn't know how you don't wake up every morning and say, 'I've had it. I'm out of here,' " King told him.
"She thinks that?" Bush replied. "Get her on the phone."
King dialed but got voice mail. Bush left a message: "I'm doing okay. Don't worry about me."
Bush, Grasping for Answers and Fixated on Iraq, Remains Resolute
By Peter Baker
Washington Post Staff Writer
Monday, July 2, 2007; A01
At the nadir of his presidency, George W. Bush is looking for answers. One at a time or in small groups, he summons leading authors, historians, philosophers and theologians to the White House to join him in the search.
Over sodas and sparkling water, he asks his questions: What is the nature of good and evil in the post-Sept. 11 world? What lessons does history have for a president facing the turmoil I'm facing? How will history judge what we've done? Why does the rest of the world seem to hate America? Or is it just me they hate?
These are the questions of a president who has endured the most drastic political collapse in a generation. Not generally known for intellectual curiosity, Bush is seeking out those who are, engaging in a philosophical exploration of the currents of history that have swept up his administration. For all the setbacks, he remains unflinching, rarely expressing doubt in his direction, yet trying to understand how he got off course.
These sessions, usually held in the Oval Office or the elegant living areas of the executive mansion, are never listed on the president's public schedule and remain largely unknown even to many on his staff. To some of those invited to talk, Bush seems alone, isolated by events beyond his control, with trusted advisers taking their leave and erstwhile friends turning on him.
"You think about prime ministers and presidents being surrounded by cabinet officials and aides and so forth," said Alistair Horne, a British historian who met with Bush recently. "But at the end of the day, they're alone. They're lonely. And that's what occurred to me as I was at the White House. It must be quite difficult for him to get out and about."
Friends worry about that as well. Burdened by an unrelenting war, challenged by an opposition Congress, defeated just last week on immigration, his last major domestic priority, Bush remains largely locked inside the fortress of 1600 Pennsylvania Ave. in the seventh year of a presidency turned sour. He still travels, making speeches to friendly audiences and attending summit meetings, such as this weekend's Kennebunkport talks with President Vladimir Putin of Russia. But he rarely goes out to dinner, and he no longer plays golf, except occasionally chipping at Camp David, where, as at his Texas ranch, he can find refuge.
"I don't know how he copes with it," said Donald Burnham Ensenat, a friend for 43 years who just stepped down as State Department protocol officer. Rep. K. Michael Conaway (R-Tex.), another longtime friend who once worked for Bush, said he looks worn down. "It's a marked difference in his physical appearance," Conaway said. "It's an incredibly heavy load. When you ask men and women to take risks, to send them into war knowing they might not come home, that's got to be an incredible burden to have on your shoulders."
Bush is fixated on Iraq, according to friends and advisers. One former aide went to see him recently to discuss various matters, only to find Bush turning the conversation back to Iraq again and again. He recognizes that his presidency hinges on whether Iraq can be turned around in 18 months. "Nothing matters except the war," said one person close to Bush. "That's all that matters. The whole thing rides on that."
And yet Bush does not come across like a man lamenting his plight. In public and in private, according to intimates, he exhibits an inexorable upbeat energy that defies the political storms. Even when he convenes philosophical discussions with scholars, he avoids second-guessing his actions. He still acts as if he were master of the universe, even if the rest of Washington no longer sees him that way.
"You don't get any feeling of somebody crouching down in the bunker," said Irwin M. Stelzer, a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute who was part of one group of scholars who met with Bush. "This is either extraordinary self-confidence or out of touch with reality. I can't tell you which."
A Parade of Setbacks
The reality has been daunting by any account. No modern president has experienced such a sustained rejection by the American public. Bush's approval rating slipped below 50 percent in Washington Post-ABC News polls in January 2005 and has not topped that level in the 30 months since. The last president mired under 50 percent so long was Harry S. Truman. Even Richard M. Nixon did not fall below 50 percent until April 1973, 16 months before he resigned.
The polls reflect the events of Bush's second term, an unyielding sequence of bad news. Social Security. Hurricane Katrina. Harriet E. Miers. Dubai Ports World. Vice President Cheney's hunting accident. Jack Abramoff, Tom DeLay and Mark Foley. The midterm elections. I. Lewis "Scooter" Libby, Alberto R. Gonzales and Paul D. Wolfowitz. Immigration. And overshadowing it all, the Iraq war, now longer than the U.S. fight in World War II.
Since winning reelection 2 1/2 years ago, Bush has had few days of good news, and what few he has had rarely lasted. Purple-fingered Iraqis went to the polls to establish a democracy but elected a dysfunctional government riven by sectarian strife. U.S. forces hunted down Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the al-Qaeda leader in Iraq, but the violence only worsened. Saddam Hussein was convicted, but his execution was marred by videotaped taunting. Perhaps the only unalloyed major second-term victory for Bush has been the confirmation of two Supreme Court justices who have begun to move the court to the right.
Other presidents have been crushed by the pressure. Lyndon B. Johnson was tormented by Vietnam War protesters outside his window shouting, "Hey, hey, LBJ, how many kids did you kill today?" Nixon swam in self-pity during Watergate, talking to paintings and once asking Henry Kissinger to pray with him. Bill Clinton fumed against enemies and nursed deep grievances during his impeachment battle.
But if Bush vents like that, no one is talking. Kissinger, who advises Bush, said the president has never asked him to kneel down with him in the Oval Office. "I find him serene," Kissinger said. "I know President Johnson was railing against his fate. That's not the case with Bush. He feels he's doing what he needs to do, and he seems to me at peace with himself."
Bush has virtually given up on winning converts while in office and instead is counting on vindication after he is dead. "He almost has . . . a sense of fatalism," said Rep. Peter T. King (R-N.Y.), who recently spent a day traveling with Bush. "All he can do is do his best, and 100 years from now people will decide if he was right or wrong. It doesn't seem to be a false, macho pride or living in your own world. I find him to be amazingly calm."
To an extent, Bush walls himself off from criticism. He does read newspapers, contrary to public impression, but watches little television news and does not linger in the media echo chamber. "He does a very good job of keeping out the extreme things in his life," Conaway, the congressman, said. "He doesn't watch Leno and Letterman. He doesn't spend a lot of time exposing himself to that sort of stuff. He has a terrific knack of not looking through the rearview mirror."
Rep. Jack Kingston (R-Ga.), who attended a legislative meeting with Bush last month, said his impervious nature works both ways. "The things that make him unpopular also help him deal with all the pressure," Kingston said. "He's stubborn. He's loyal to his philosophy."
Reproached by His Own
The fabled loyalty of the Bush team, though, has frayed far more than might be apparent to him. The fight over whether Gonzales should remain attorney general has exposed a deep fault line. Bush remains convinced that his old friend did nothing wrong ethically in firing U.S. attorneys, and senior adviser Karl Rove angrily rejects what he sees as a Democratic witch hunt, according to White House officials. Yet beyond the inner circle, it is hard to find a current or former administration official who thinks Gonzales should stay.
"I don't understand for the life of me why Al Gonzales is still there," said one former top aide, who, like others, would speak only on the condition of anonymity. "It's not about him. It's about the office and who's able to lead the department." The ex-aide said that every time he runs into former Cabinet secretaries, "universally the first thing out of their mouths" is bafflement that Gonzales remains.
Some aides see it as Bush refusing to accept reality. "The president thinks cutting and running on his friends shows weakness," said an exasperated senior official. "Change shows weakness. Doing what everyone knows has to be done shows weakness." Another former aide said that no matter how many people Bush consults, he heeds only two or three.
Beyond Gonzales, the discontent with the Bush presidency is broader and deeper among Republican lawmakers, some of whom seethe with anger. "Our members just wish this thing would be over," said a senior House Republican who met with Bush recently. "People are tired of him." Bush's circle remains sealed tight, the lawmaker said. "There's nobody there who can stand up to him and tell him, 'Mr. President, you've got to do this. You're wrong on this.' There's no adult supervision. It's like he's oblivious. Maybe that's a defense mechanism."
Aides said they do challenge Bush. White House Chief of Staff Joshua B. Bolten had what one colleague called "a lot of hard discussions" with the president after the November midterm elections to shock him into recognizing that his approach to Iraq had failed. Bolten set up meetings so Bush could hear from critics of his policy and sent him written material to emphasize the need for change, the colleague said. That led to the decision to send more troops.
Even if he tries to avoid the media surround sound, Bush cannot help running into criticism. A group of moderate House Republicans bluntly told him during a recent White House meeting that he had become a drag on the party. And when the president invited conservative radio host Laura Ingraham for a bike ride last month, she upbraided him for his position on immigration.
Bush's unpopularity appears to impose limits on where he goes. He turned down an invitation from the Washington Nationals to throw out the first pitch on Opening Day, pleading a busy schedule. The former baseball team owner instead hosted an invitation-only ceremony for a college football team in the East Room, where no one would boo. When commencement season rolled around, he stayed away from major universities, delivering addresses at a community college in Florida and a small religious school in Pennsylvania run by a former aide. And even then he was met by student and faculty protests.
Seeking History's Lessons
Amid the tumult, the president has sought refuge in history. He read three books last year on George Washington, read about the Algerian war of independence and the exploitation of Congo, and lately has been digging into "Troublesome Young Men," Lynne Olson's account of Conservative backbenchers who thrust Winston Churchill to power. Bush idolizes Churchill and keeps a bust of him in the Oval Office.
After reading Andrew Roberts's "A History of the English-Speaking Peoples Since 1900," Bush brought in the author and a dozen other scholars to talk about the lessons. "What can I learn from history?" Bush asked Roberts, according to Stelzer, the Hudson Institute scholar, who participated.
Stelzer said Bush seemed smarter than he expected. The conversation ranged from history to religion and touched on sensitive topics for a president wrestling with his legacy. "He asked me, 'Do you think our unpopularity abroad is a result of my personality?' And he laughed," Stelzer recalled. "I said, 'In part.' And he laughed again."
Much of the discussion focused on the nature of good and evil, a perennial theme for Bush, who casts the struggle against Islamic extremists in black-and-white terms. Michael Novak, a theologian who participated, said it was clear that Bush weathers his difficulties because he sees himself as doing the Lord's work.
"His faith is very strong," said Novak, a scholar at the American Enterprise Institute. "Faith is not enough by itself because there are a lot of people who have faith but weak hearts. But his faith is very strong. He seeks guidance, like every other president does, in prayer. And that means trying to be sure he's doing the right thing. And if you've got that set, all the criticism, it doesn't faze you very much. You're answering to God."
Horne, the British historian, found himself with Bush on another occasion after Kissinger gave the president "A Savage War of Peace," Horne's book on the French defeat in Algeria in the mid-20th century. Bush invited Horne to visit. They talked about the parallels and differences between Algeria and Iraq as Bush sought insight he could apply to his own situation.
Horne said he is not a Bush supporter but was nonetheless struck by the president's tranquility. "He was very friendly, very relaxed," Horne said. "My God, he looked well. He looked like he came off a cruise in the Caribbean. He looked like he hadn't a care in the world. It was amazing."
Loyalists Lost
As Bush heads toward the twilight of his presidency, the White House feels increasingly empty. One after another, aides who have stuck with him are heading out the door. Andrew H. Card Jr., his chief of staff for more than five years, stepped down last year. And now counselor Dan Bartlett, an aide for 14 years, is leaving.
Card and Bartlett were the aides who spent the most time at Bush's side. Bolten, Card's replacement, and Ed Gillespie, Bartlett's successor, each decided not to devote as much time to "body duty," leaving the president without their constant presence. Others who have left have publicly castigated the president. Bush was particularly hurt, friends said, when reelection strategist Matthew Dowd disavowed him.
Bush seeks solace in his oldest friends from Texas and Yale University, hosting an annual summer picnic and a Christmas party. He invites friends to the White House or the ranch in Crawford. But those experiences are strangely impersonal. "It can be kind of clinical," said a friend who spoke only on the condition of anonymity. "You're in there and in that event it's all very controlled -- you come in for drinks at 7, you have dinner at 7:30 and by 9 you're back at your hotel."
Bush rarely leaves the White House for social outings in Washington, though lately he has tried to get out more, attending dinners last month at the homes of two old friends, attorney Jim Langdon and budget aide Clay Johnson III. Bush avoids politics in such moments. He reaches out for signs of normalcy, asking about business or mutual friends. "He wants to know if we've caught any fish," said Robert McCleskey, a friend since grade school.
Bush also deals with stress through discipline, routine and exercise. On a typical day, he wakes at 5 a.m., arrives at the Oval Office at 6:30, then leaves at 4:30 p.m. for a 60-minute workout. He returns to work for a while before retiring to the residence, where he turns in at 9:30. On weekends, he favors two-hour biking sessions at a Secret Service facility in Beltsville with companions such as Card or Alexander Ellis IV, a young cousin.
Friends say this does not make him ignorant of his troubles. "There isn't any doubt that he is totally and completely aware of all the existing circumstances around him," said a close friend. "There's not anything that he's not aware of -- how he's perceived, how his people are perceived, the problems his people have. He is the furthest thing from oblivious. . . . Somewhere in the back of his mind there's a pretty complete autopsy."
Yet Bush can seem disengaged. When he flew to New York to visit a Harlem school and promote his education program, he brought along New York congressmen on Air Force One, including Democrat Charles B. Rangel, chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee. The White House was in the midst of tough negotiations with Rangel over trade pacts. But Bush did not try to cut a deal with Rangel, chatting instead about baseball. "He talked a lot about the Rangers," Rangel said. "I didn't know what the hell he was talking about."
Still, that trip demonstrated that Bush cannot escape his burdens. King, the GOP congressman, introduced him backstage to a soldier injured in one eye. Bush teared up and asked the young man to take off his dark glasses so he could see the wound, King recalled. "Human instinct is when someone has a serious injury to look the other way," King said. "He actually asked him to take them off. He actually touched the eye a little. It was almost as if he felt he had to confront it."
As they headed back to Washington a few hours later, with the televisions aboard Air Force One tuned to the New York Mets game, King mused that Bush must be feeling the weight of his office.
"My wife loves you, but she doesn't know how you don't wake up every morning and say, 'I've had it. I'm out of here,' " King told him.
"She thinks that?" Bush replied. "Get her on the phone."
King dialed but got voice mail. Bush left a message: "I'm doing okay. Don't worry about me."
OPEC Official Looks West for Investment
By GUY CHAZAN
June 6, 2007; Page A5
wsj.com
LONDON -- In an unusual admission, OPEC's new secretary-general said oil-producing countries may have to attract more foreign investment to meet world oil needs. But his call is at odds with the rising barriers faced by Western oil companies hoping to tap the cartel's vast reserves.
Abdalla el-Badri said in an interview that members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, which supplies about 40% of global petroleum output, need to invest as much as $500 billion by 2020 to satisfy rising global demand for crude. He acknowledged some of that must come from foreign sources, like Western oil majors, and not just from state-run national oil producers.
"I'd like to see further cooperation between national oil companies and international oil companies, particularly in exploration and enhanced oil recovery," said Mr. Badri, a former Libyan oil minister who took over the senior position at OPEC in January.
Such cooperation could run into toughened barriers between many cartel members and the West's oil giants, despite the latter group's keen interest in developing new reserves.
Many barriers are longstanding. Oil-production assets within the borders of many OPEC members, especially big Persian Gulf producers such as Saudi Arabia, have been off-limits to foreign companies for years. OPEC nations that actively encourage foreign investment, such as Angola and Nigeria, are in the minority.
But even those that have traditionally put out the welcome mat for Western oil majors have toughened terms recently as high world prices for crude triggered a rise in resource nationalism. In February, Western companies were forced to hand over operating control of major projects in Venezuela to state oil monopoly Petróleos de Venezuela SA, known as PDVSA. Algeria, meanwhile, imposed a tax on what it considers excess profits and restricted the role of foreign oil companies in production projects.
As an example of cooperation, Mr. Badri cited a $900 million natural-gas exploration deal struck last month between the Libyan government of Col. Moammar Gadhafi and British energy giant BP PLC. Libya has seen a sharp uptick in interest from Western oil companies since 2003, when it abandoned its weapons of mass destruction programs, prompting the U.S. and Europe to ease sanctions.
But in some of its licensing rounds, Libya has imposed terms that are so tough that some private companies have wondered how they could ever make a profit.
Mr. Badri heads the OPEC secretariat, an administrative and research body. Supply decisions are made by oil ministers of member nations who periodically meet at the OPEC conference, which coordinates the group's policies.
For decades, oil-rich nations were incapable of fully exploiting their resources without Western help. But with oil prices so high, state oil companies no longer have to rely on foreign capital and are making massive investments to boost production.
However, not all of them have the technology to find and develop new reserves, and many lack the expertise of Western oil majors in unconventional techniques, such as enhanced oil recovery and deep drilling.
Meanwhile, some national oil companies have been criticized for low levels of exploration and investment. Iran has seen its production capacity fall in recent years -- a result, analysts say, of underinvestment in new upstream projects.
Mr. Badri said OPEC would need investment of between $230 billion and $500 billion by 2020 to achieve a target of nine million barrels per day of additional production. OPEC currently produces a little more than 30 million barrels a day, the equivalent of 40% of global output.
He said international oil companies have the "technology, the know-how, [and] the financial back-up to expedite any discovery they find, to bring that discovery to market as fast as possible."
By GUY CHAZAN
June 6, 2007; Page A5
wsj.com
LONDON -- In an unusual admission, OPEC's new secretary-general said oil-producing countries may have to attract more foreign investment to meet world oil needs. But his call is at odds with the rising barriers faced by Western oil companies hoping to tap the cartel's vast reserves.
Abdalla el-Badri said in an interview that members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, which supplies about 40% of global petroleum output, need to invest as much as $500 billion by 2020 to satisfy rising global demand for crude. He acknowledged some of that must come from foreign sources, like Western oil majors, and not just from state-run national oil producers.
"I'd like to see further cooperation between national oil companies and international oil companies, particularly in exploration and enhanced oil recovery," said Mr. Badri, a former Libyan oil minister who took over the senior position at OPEC in January.
Such cooperation could run into toughened barriers between many cartel members and the West's oil giants, despite the latter group's keen interest in developing new reserves.
Many barriers are longstanding. Oil-production assets within the borders of many OPEC members, especially big Persian Gulf producers such as Saudi Arabia, have been off-limits to foreign companies for years. OPEC nations that actively encourage foreign investment, such as Angola and Nigeria, are in the minority.
But even those that have traditionally put out the welcome mat for Western oil majors have toughened terms recently as high world prices for crude triggered a rise in resource nationalism. In February, Western companies were forced to hand over operating control of major projects in Venezuela to state oil monopoly Petróleos de Venezuela SA, known as PDVSA. Algeria, meanwhile, imposed a tax on what it considers excess profits and restricted the role of foreign oil companies in production projects.
As an example of cooperation, Mr. Badri cited a $900 million natural-gas exploration deal struck last month between the Libyan government of Col. Moammar Gadhafi and British energy giant BP PLC. Libya has seen a sharp uptick in interest from Western oil companies since 2003, when it abandoned its weapons of mass destruction programs, prompting the U.S. and Europe to ease sanctions.
But in some of its licensing rounds, Libya has imposed terms that are so tough that some private companies have wondered how they could ever make a profit.
Mr. Badri heads the OPEC secretariat, an administrative and research body. Supply decisions are made by oil ministers of member nations who periodically meet at the OPEC conference, which coordinates the group's policies.
For decades, oil-rich nations were incapable of fully exploiting their resources without Western help. But with oil prices so high, state oil companies no longer have to rely on foreign capital and are making massive investments to boost production.
However, not all of them have the technology to find and develop new reserves, and many lack the expertise of Western oil majors in unconventional techniques, such as enhanced oil recovery and deep drilling.
Meanwhile, some national oil companies have been criticized for low levels of exploration and investment. Iran has seen its production capacity fall in recent years -- a result, analysts say, of underinvestment in new upstream projects.
Mr. Badri said OPEC would need investment of between $230 billion and $500 billion by 2020 to achieve a target of nine million barrels per day of additional production. OPEC currently produces a little more than 30 million barrels a day, the equivalent of 40% of global output.
He said international oil companies have the "technology, the know-how, [and] the financial back-up to expedite any discovery they find, to bring that discovery to market as fast as possible."
Buffett May Boost Burlington Northern Stake to 25% (Update4)
By Angela Greiling Keane and Miles Weiss
Sept. 4 (Bloomberg) -- Warren Buffett's Berkshire Hathaway Inc. may raise its stake in Burlington Northern Santa Fe Corp. to at least 25 percent on speculation that railroads will haul more freight.
Burlington Northern, the second-largest U.S. rail carrier, said in an Aug. 31 filing that Berkshire disclosed the stock- purchase plan by letter last week. The Fort Worth, Texas-based railroad increased sales each quarter since the start of 2003, even as trucking companies were hindered by higher diesel fuel prices and highway congestion.
Buffett, 77, seeks bargains on out-of-favor stocks and companies. He transformed a failing textile manufacturer into a holding company with a $184 billion market value and interests in dozens of industries. Omaha, Nebraska-based Berkshire revealed its initial holding in Burlington Northern in April.
Berkshire is now the railroad's largest shareholder, with a 15 percent stake, about equal to Buffett's ``bellwether investments in American Express, Coca-Cola, Procter & Gamble and Wells Fargo,'' Banc of America Securities analyst Marisa Moss in New York wrote today in a note to investors.
Under U.S. antitrust regulations, investors such as Berkshire are required to notify a company and get regulatory approval before reaching ownership levels set by the Hart-Scott- Rodino Act of 1976.
Ownership Threshold
``They get the authorization now and they have up to a year after they get the clearance to cross that threshold,'' said John Taladay, an antitrust specialist at the law firm Howrey LLP in Washington.
Berkshire spokeswoman Jackie Wilson said no one was available to comment. Burlington Northern spokeswoman Mary Jo Keating said ``this action would give Berkshire Hathaway clearance to own just under 50 percent of the company's shares.''
Berkshire had a ``good-faith intention'' to add to its holdings of 52.13 million Burlington Northern shares by purchasing another $597.9 million worth of stock, according to the Aug. 31 filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. That day, Berkshire bought 845,000 shares for $67.5 million, raising its stake to 52.98 million shares.
Future Purchases
To reach the ``25 percent threshold'' cited in the filing, Berkshire would need to buy another 35.4 million shares, currently valued at $2.9 billion. Such purchases would depend on ``market conditions,'' according to the notice provided to Burlington Northern.
Berkshire said in a filing late today it acquired options on Aug. 30 and Aug. 31 entitling it to purchase almost 7.5 million additional shares on Oct. 3.
Shares of Burlington Northern climbed $1.75, or 2.2 percent, to $82.90 at 4 p.m. in New York Stock Exchange composite trading. Berkshire Hathaway rose $910 to $119,300.
The Standard & Poor's 500 Railroads Index, which consists of Burlington Northern and the other three large U.S. carriers, has gained 15 percent this year, compared with a 7.7 percent increase for the S&P 400 Trucking Index.
``We still believe that the railroads have a competitive advantage relative to the trucking industry,'' Banc of America's Moss wrote in her note today, citing a fuel-efficiency advantage for railroads and a shortage of U.S. truck drivers.
Retail diesel fuel has increased 9.3 percent this year, to an average of $2.93 a gallon as of yesterday, according to the American Automobile Association.
Barriers to Competition
Investors also may be attracted to railroads in part because it would be hard for new competitors to get land and environmental clearances to challenge an existing carrier, said Michael McBride, an attorney who represents railroad customers for the law firm LeBoeuf, Lamb Greene & MacRae LLP in Washington.
Railroads ``had been an industry with excess capacity and it turned into an industry with constrained capacity,'' McBride said. ``That has given the railroads additional market power that they didn't have.''
Berkshire would have to file for clearance again if it wants to raise its stake to 50 percent or more of shares outstanding, Taladay said.
During August, Berkshire generally bought Burlington Northern shares when the stock dipped to $80 or less. The exception was on Aug. 3, when Berkshire purchased 1.13 million shares at $80.40 each, according to regulatory filings.
Since Berkshire's original filing showing Burlington Northern holdings, Buffett has said he also bought shares of Union Pacific Corp. and Norfolk Southern Corp., the largest and fourth-largest U.S. railroads. Berkshire omitted information on Union Pacific and Norfolk Southern in an Aug. 14 U.S. regulatory filing, invoking confidential treatment.
By Angela Greiling Keane and Miles Weiss
Sept. 4 (Bloomberg) -- Warren Buffett's Berkshire Hathaway Inc. may raise its stake in Burlington Northern Santa Fe Corp. to at least 25 percent on speculation that railroads will haul more freight.
Burlington Northern, the second-largest U.S. rail carrier, said in an Aug. 31 filing that Berkshire disclosed the stock- purchase plan by letter last week. The Fort Worth, Texas-based railroad increased sales each quarter since the start of 2003, even as trucking companies were hindered by higher diesel fuel prices and highway congestion.
Buffett, 77, seeks bargains on out-of-favor stocks and companies. He transformed a failing textile manufacturer into a holding company with a $184 billion market value and interests in dozens of industries. Omaha, Nebraska-based Berkshire revealed its initial holding in Burlington Northern in April.
Berkshire is now the railroad's largest shareholder, with a 15 percent stake, about equal to Buffett's ``bellwether investments in American Express, Coca-Cola, Procter & Gamble and Wells Fargo,'' Banc of America Securities analyst Marisa Moss in New York wrote today in a note to investors.
Under U.S. antitrust regulations, investors such as Berkshire are required to notify a company and get regulatory approval before reaching ownership levels set by the Hart-Scott- Rodino Act of 1976.
Ownership Threshold
``They get the authorization now and they have up to a year after they get the clearance to cross that threshold,'' said John Taladay, an antitrust specialist at the law firm Howrey LLP in Washington.
Berkshire spokeswoman Jackie Wilson said no one was available to comment. Burlington Northern spokeswoman Mary Jo Keating said ``this action would give Berkshire Hathaway clearance to own just under 50 percent of the company's shares.''
Berkshire had a ``good-faith intention'' to add to its holdings of 52.13 million Burlington Northern shares by purchasing another $597.9 million worth of stock, according to the Aug. 31 filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. That day, Berkshire bought 845,000 shares for $67.5 million, raising its stake to 52.98 million shares.
Future Purchases
To reach the ``25 percent threshold'' cited in the filing, Berkshire would need to buy another 35.4 million shares, currently valued at $2.9 billion. Such purchases would depend on ``market conditions,'' according to the notice provided to Burlington Northern.
Berkshire said in a filing late today it acquired options on Aug. 30 and Aug. 31 entitling it to purchase almost 7.5 million additional shares on Oct. 3.
Shares of Burlington Northern climbed $1.75, or 2.2 percent, to $82.90 at 4 p.m. in New York Stock Exchange composite trading. Berkshire Hathaway rose $910 to $119,300.
The Standard & Poor's 500 Railroads Index, which consists of Burlington Northern and the other three large U.S. carriers, has gained 15 percent this year, compared with a 7.7 percent increase for the S&P 400 Trucking Index.
``We still believe that the railroads have a competitive advantage relative to the trucking industry,'' Banc of America's Moss wrote in her note today, citing a fuel-efficiency advantage for railroads and a shortage of U.S. truck drivers.
Retail diesel fuel has increased 9.3 percent this year, to an average of $2.93 a gallon as of yesterday, according to the American Automobile Association.
Barriers to Competition
Investors also may be attracted to railroads in part because it would be hard for new competitors to get land and environmental clearances to challenge an existing carrier, said Michael McBride, an attorney who represents railroad customers for the law firm LeBoeuf, Lamb Greene & MacRae LLP in Washington.
Railroads ``had been an industry with excess capacity and it turned into an industry with constrained capacity,'' McBride said. ``That has given the railroads additional market power that they didn't have.''
Berkshire would have to file for clearance again if it wants to raise its stake to 50 percent or more of shares outstanding, Taladay said.
During August, Berkshire generally bought Burlington Northern shares when the stock dipped to $80 or less. The exception was on Aug. 3, when Berkshire purchased 1.13 million shares at $80.40 each, according to regulatory filings.
Since Berkshire's original filing showing Burlington Northern holdings, Buffett has said he also bought shares of Union Pacific Corp. and Norfolk Southern Corp., the largest and fourth-largest U.S. railroads. Berkshire omitted information on Union Pacific and Norfolk Southern in an Aug. 14 U.S. regulatory filing, invoking confidential treatment.
Chavez Economy Unravels as Venezuela Currency Weakens (Update1)
By Alex Kennedy and Matthew Walter
Sept. 3 (Bloomberg) -- Hugo Chavez's economy is starting to unravel in the currency market.
While Venezuela earns record proceeds from oil exports, consumers face shortages of meat, flour and cooking oil. Annual inflation has risen to 16 percent, the highest in Latin America, as President Chavez tripled government spending in four years. Exxon Mobil Corp. and ConocoPhillips are pulling out after Chavez demanded they cede control of joint venture projects.
The currency, the bolivar, has tumbled 28 percent this year to 4,750 per dollar on the black market, the only place it trades freely because of government controls on foreign exchange. That's less than half the official rate of 2,150 set in 2005. Chavez may have to devalue the bolivar to reduce the gap and increase oil proceeds that make up half the state's revenue.
``This has been the worst managed oil boom in Venezuela's history,'' said Ricardo Hausmann, a former government planning minister who now teaches economics at Harvard University in Cambridge, Massachusetts. ``A devaluation is a foregone conclusion. The only question is when.''
Chavez will devalue the bolivar 14 percent in the first quarter of 2008 after he introduces a new currency on Jan. 1 that will lop three zeros off all denominations, according to JPMorgan Chase & Co., the third-largest U.S. bank, and Merrill Lynch & Co., the biggest brokerage firm.
The new currency, to be called the strong bolivar, will have an exchange rate of 2.15 per dollar, the equivalent of today's rate, Finance Minister Rodrigo Cabezas said last week. Analysts forecast the official rate will decline 13 percent by the end of 2008, according to the median of nine estimates in a Bloomberg survey.
Healthcare, Housing
``We're not going to devalue no matter how much they pressure us,'' Cabezas told reporters in Caracas on Aug. 31. ``The so-called parallel market doesn't dictate our fiscal, exchange or monetary policies.''
Chavez, an ally of Cuban President Fidel Castro who calls capitalism ``evil,'' weakened the currency 11 percent in 2005. He imposed restrictions on foreign exchange in 2003 to halt capital flight that has driven down the bolivar more than 70 percent since he took office in 1999.
A devaluation would give the government more bolivars from its oil export tax receipts, helping fund Chavez's policies to provide free healthcare, housing and discounted food to millions of Venezuelans. The government says social programs helped cut the poverty rate to 34 percent in the first half of 2006 from 49 percent eight years earlier.
Oil, which has risen 155 percent in the past five years, accounts for about 90 percent of Venezuela's exports. The country is the fifth-biggest member in the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries.
Trips to Curacao
As the gap between the official exchange rate and the black market rate has increased, so has the incentive to exploit rules, such as a regulation that allows people to spend $5,000 a year on their credit cards while traveling abroad.
Some Venezuelans travel to nearby Curacao, where they buy $5,000 of casino poker chips with their credit cards, exchange the chips for cash and then sell the dollars in the black market back in Caracas.
``People are invoking their right to circumvent what are very, very stiff controls,'' said Alberto Ramos, senior Latin America economist at Goldman Sachs Group Inc. in New York.
The foreign exchange regulations are part of the controls that Chavez, 53, has created in his ``march to socialism.'' The government sets retail prices on hundreds of consumer products and fixes both the maximum rate at which banks can lend and the minimum interest they can pay depositors.
Chavez, who is seeking to end presidential term limits, has taken $17 billion of foreign reserves from the central bank and expropriated dozens of farms that he deemed underutilized.
Exxon, ConocoPhillips
He nationalized Venezuela's biggest private electric and telephone utilities and took majority stakes in oil projects owned by Exxon, the world's largest producer, and ConocoPhillips, the third-biggest in the U.S. Foreign direct investment was a negative $881 million in the first half as foreign companies pulled out money.
Chavez terminated the broadcast license of the country's most-watched television network in May, sparking weeks of student protests. He has threatened to take over cement makers, hospitals, banks, supermarkets and butcher shops, saying they weren't obeying price controls.
``It's like our director of marketing, our director of sales, our director of manufacturing is President Chavez,'' said Edgar Contreras, who runs international operations at Molinos Nacionales CA, a Caracas-based food manufacturer that employs 1,500 people. ``We can't go on like this.''
`Fantasy Prices'
Contreras called the government-set prices on many products ``fantasy prices'' that are below production costs. Items including milk, chicken, coffee and flour have disappeared from store shelves in Caracas at times this year because companies refused to sell at a loss.
The government has responded by giving importers more dollars at the official exchange rate. Imports soared 43 percent in the first half to a record $20 billion after tripling in the previous three years.
The country's current account surplus fell almost in half to $8.8 billion in the first half even as near-record high oil prices buoyed exports. Crude oil for October delivery rose 4.2 percent last week to $74.04 a barrel on the New York Mercantile Exchange.
``The growth in imports is so out of whack that it's choking off the local sector,'' said Teodoro Petkoff, a former government planning minister who now publishes opposition tabloid Tal Cual in Caracas. ``The engine of growth isn't the real economy. It's the government.''
`House of Cards'
While the rise in government spending fueled economic growth of 9 percent in the first half, output in five of 16 manufacturing industries shrank from January to May, according to the central bank.
Harvard's Hausmann said the growth in public spending has been so rapid that the government needs oil prices to keep rising to hold its deficit in check. He estimates the public sector deficit will equal about 5 percent of gross domestic product this year. The Finance Ministry forecasts the public sector will post a balanced budget this year, Public Credit Director Luis Davila said last month.
``For the macroeconomic house of cards not to come crashing down, the price of oil has to go up at double digit growth rates,'' Hausmann said. ``If oil stays at $70, they're going to hit the wall.''
By Alex Kennedy and Matthew Walter
Sept. 3 (Bloomberg) -- Hugo Chavez's economy is starting to unravel in the currency market.
While Venezuela earns record proceeds from oil exports, consumers face shortages of meat, flour and cooking oil. Annual inflation has risen to 16 percent, the highest in Latin America, as President Chavez tripled government spending in four years. Exxon Mobil Corp. and ConocoPhillips are pulling out after Chavez demanded they cede control of joint venture projects.
The currency, the bolivar, has tumbled 28 percent this year to 4,750 per dollar on the black market, the only place it trades freely because of government controls on foreign exchange. That's less than half the official rate of 2,150 set in 2005. Chavez may have to devalue the bolivar to reduce the gap and increase oil proceeds that make up half the state's revenue.
``This has been the worst managed oil boom in Venezuela's history,'' said Ricardo Hausmann, a former government planning minister who now teaches economics at Harvard University in Cambridge, Massachusetts. ``A devaluation is a foregone conclusion. The only question is when.''
Chavez will devalue the bolivar 14 percent in the first quarter of 2008 after he introduces a new currency on Jan. 1 that will lop three zeros off all denominations, according to JPMorgan Chase & Co., the third-largest U.S. bank, and Merrill Lynch & Co., the biggest brokerage firm.
The new currency, to be called the strong bolivar, will have an exchange rate of 2.15 per dollar, the equivalent of today's rate, Finance Minister Rodrigo Cabezas said last week. Analysts forecast the official rate will decline 13 percent by the end of 2008, according to the median of nine estimates in a Bloomberg survey.
Healthcare, Housing
``We're not going to devalue no matter how much they pressure us,'' Cabezas told reporters in Caracas on Aug. 31. ``The so-called parallel market doesn't dictate our fiscal, exchange or monetary policies.''
Chavez, an ally of Cuban President Fidel Castro who calls capitalism ``evil,'' weakened the currency 11 percent in 2005. He imposed restrictions on foreign exchange in 2003 to halt capital flight that has driven down the bolivar more than 70 percent since he took office in 1999.
A devaluation would give the government more bolivars from its oil export tax receipts, helping fund Chavez's policies to provide free healthcare, housing and discounted food to millions of Venezuelans. The government says social programs helped cut the poverty rate to 34 percent in the first half of 2006 from 49 percent eight years earlier.
Oil, which has risen 155 percent in the past five years, accounts for about 90 percent of Venezuela's exports. The country is the fifth-biggest member in the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries.
Trips to Curacao
As the gap between the official exchange rate and the black market rate has increased, so has the incentive to exploit rules, such as a regulation that allows people to spend $5,000 a year on their credit cards while traveling abroad.
Some Venezuelans travel to nearby Curacao, where they buy $5,000 of casino poker chips with their credit cards, exchange the chips for cash and then sell the dollars in the black market back in Caracas.
``People are invoking their right to circumvent what are very, very stiff controls,'' said Alberto Ramos, senior Latin America economist at Goldman Sachs Group Inc. in New York.
The foreign exchange regulations are part of the controls that Chavez, 53, has created in his ``march to socialism.'' The government sets retail prices on hundreds of consumer products and fixes both the maximum rate at which banks can lend and the minimum interest they can pay depositors.
Chavez, who is seeking to end presidential term limits, has taken $17 billion of foreign reserves from the central bank and expropriated dozens of farms that he deemed underutilized.
Exxon, ConocoPhillips
He nationalized Venezuela's biggest private electric and telephone utilities and took majority stakes in oil projects owned by Exxon, the world's largest producer, and ConocoPhillips, the third-biggest in the U.S. Foreign direct investment was a negative $881 million in the first half as foreign companies pulled out money.
Chavez terminated the broadcast license of the country's most-watched television network in May, sparking weeks of student protests. He has threatened to take over cement makers, hospitals, banks, supermarkets and butcher shops, saying they weren't obeying price controls.
``It's like our director of marketing, our director of sales, our director of manufacturing is President Chavez,'' said Edgar Contreras, who runs international operations at Molinos Nacionales CA, a Caracas-based food manufacturer that employs 1,500 people. ``We can't go on like this.''
`Fantasy Prices'
Contreras called the government-set prices on many products ``fantasy prices'' that are below production costs. Items including milk, chicken, coffee and flour have disappeared from store shelves in Caracas at times this year because companies refused to sell at a loss.
The government has responded by giving importers more dollars at the official exchange rate. Imports soared 43 percent in the first half to a record $20 billion after tripling in the previous three years.
The country's current account surplus fell almost in half to $8.8 billion in the first half even as near-record high oil prices buoyed exports. Crude oil for October delivery rose 4.2 percent last week to $74.04 a barrel on the New York Mercantile Exchange.
``The growth in imports is so out of whack that it's choking off the local sector,'' said Teodoro Petkoff, a former government planning minister who now publishes opposition tabloid Tal Cual in Caracas. ``The engine of growth isn't the real economy. It's the government.''
`House of Cards'
While the rise in government spending fueled economic growth of 9 percent in the first half, output in five of 16 manufacturing industries shrank from January to May, according to the central bank.
Harvard's Hausmann said the growth in public spending has been so rapid that the government needs oil prices to keep rising to hold its deficit in check. He estimates the public sector deficit will equal about 5 percent of gross domestic product this year. The Finance Ministry forecasts the public sector will post a balanced budget this year, Public Credit Director Luis Davila said last month.
``For the macroeconomic house of cards not to come crashing down, the price of oil has to go up at double digit growth rates,'' Hausmann said. ``If oil stays at $70, they're going to hit the wall.''
Suez, GDF May Announce Merger of Energy Units Today (Update1)
By Tara Patel and Gregory Viscusi
Sept. 3 (Bloomberg) -- Suez SA and Gaz de France SA may announce an agreement to merge their energy units as soon as today, creating Europe's second-biggest utility after more than 18 months of negotiations.
The Gaz de France board agreed at a meeting yesterday to the transaction with Paris-based Suez, the world's second- largest water company, said Maurice Marion, a spokesman for the Confederation Generale du Travail union. The Suez board also approved the accord, Agence France-Presse reported, citing an unidentified participant at the meeting.
The final push for the deal came from President Nicolas Sarkozy, who said Aug. 30 he favored a merger of both companies' energy divisions. The merger will be carried out with a one-for- one share swap and the disposal of most of Suez's water and waste business, people familiar with the talks have said. ``All the elements of an accord are on the table,'' French Finance Minister Christine Lagarde said yesterday in a Europe 1 radio interview.
``Sarkozy can claim credit for creating a French energy champion,'' Renaud Berenguier, head of hedge fund advisory and trading at Aurel Leven in Paris, said in a note. The Suez environment unit may be worth about 20 billion euros ($27 billion), he said.
Suez runs power stations, distributes gas and electricity and pumps water and manages waste.
Suez Environment
Under the plan, Suez would sell or distribute shares of Suez Environment, said the people, who declined to be identified because the talks are confidential. The energy operations of Suez would then be merged with state-controlled Gaz de France, the operator of Europe's biggest natural gas network.
On leaving Suez headquarters in Paris after the meeting, Suez board member and Areva SA Chief Executive Officer Anne Lauvergeon said, ``I will let Suez tell you the good news.'' She declined further comment. Journal du Dimanche said yesterday the accord will be announced today.
Lagarde said the French government will retain a ``blocking minority stake'' in the new company. She declined to give details on how Suez's water and trash units would be handled, or about the government's exact stake. ``It will create a great global company that focuses all their strengths in the energy industry,'' she said.
The original merger plan, now valued at about 59.5 billion euros ($81 billion), has been mired in political and valuation concerns since it was put forward in February 2006 to ward off a possible bid for Suez from Italy's Enel SpA. With the new plan, Suez Chief Executive Officer Gerard Mestrallet is bowing to pressure from Sarkozy.
Stumbling Block
``Suez's environment unit had always been the stumbling block,'' Berenguier said on Aug. 31. ``Mestrallet wanted to keep it, but Sarkozy always talked about a pure energy group.''
The two companies will make an announcement on ``whether to merge or not'' on Sept. 3, Claude Gueant, the secretary general of the French presidency, told Agence France-Presse Sept. 1.
Suez shares Aug. 31 rose 1.8 percent to 41.74 euros, valuing the Paris-based company at 54.1 billion euros. Gaz de France jumped 4 percent to 36.80 euros, the biggest one-day gain since May 7, valuing it at 36.2 billion euros.
Spinning off Suez's water and trash unit would bring the size of the two companies closer together, and avoid overly diluting the stake of the government, which holds 80 percent of Gaz de France.
French Government
Selling off two-thirds of the water and waste unit would allow the French government to retain about 38 percent of the newly merged entity and even more through its indirect holdings such as the Caisse des Depots and Consignations, the state-owned bank that now owns a 2.8 percent stake in Suez, Berenguier estimated.
The merger of Suez and Gaz de France, both based in Paris, would create a utility second only to Electricite de France SA in Europe. Bankers are now ironing out the details, the people said.
Under terms being discussed, Suez would cut its stake in its Suez Environment unit to as little as 35 percent, leaving the group with a blocking minority in the event of a hostile bid, a person involved in the talks said Aug. 31.
Terms announced last year included a one-for-one stock swap and a 1 euro dividend to Suez shareholders to make up for the difference in their market values, which then widened.
The gap would also have diluted the state's stake in the merged company, which can't go below 34 percent by law.
Union's Opposition
The CGT union, France's largest, said Sept. 1 that it opposes the merger because it would remove the state's control over Gaz de France. Sarkozy met union members to discuss the merger.
Suez CEO Mestrallet had resisted selling the waste and water units, which account for about a third of operations.
Veolia Environnement SA, JC Decaux SA and Vinci SA as well as Eurazeo SA and Wendel are companies that could be interested in buying into Suez Environment, analysts said.
Veolia CEO Henri Proglio on Aug. 30 said he would be interested in the international waste and water activities of Suez Environment if they came up for sale.
Under the previous plan, Mestrallet was to head the combined group with Gaz de France CEO Officer Jean-Francois Cirelli second-in-command. That remains the plan now, Journal du Dimanche said yesterday, without saying where it got the information.
Gueant said the merger does amount to a privatization of Gaz de France, something that successive French governments have promised not to do.
``Yes, it's a privatization but one where the state remains by far the largest shareholder,'' Gueant said on a political talk show on LCI television.
By Tara Patel and Gregory Viscusi
Sept. 3 (Bloomberg) -- Suez SA and Gaz de France SA may announce an agreement to merge their energy units as soon as today, creating Europe's second-biggest utility after more than 18 months of negotiations.
The Gaz de France board agreed at a meeting yesterday to the transaction with Paris-based Suez, the world's second- largest water company, said Maurice Marion, a spokesman for the Confederation Generale du Travail union. The Suez board also approved the accord, Agence France-Presse reported, citing an unidentified participant at the meeting.
The final push for the deal came from President Nicolas Sarkozy, who said Aug. 30 he favored a merger of both companies' energy divisions. The merger will be carried out with a one-for- one share swap and the disposal of most of Suez's water and waste business, people familiar with the talks have said. ``All the elements of an accord are on the table,'' French Finance Minister Christine Lagarde said yesterday in a Europe 1 radio interview.
``Sarkozy can claim credit for creating a French energy champion,'' Renaud Berenguier, head of hedge fund advisory and trading at Aurel Leven in Paris, said in a note. The Suez environment unit may be worth about 20 billion euros ($27 billion), he said.
Suez runs power stations, distributes gas and electricity and pumps water and manages waste.
Suez Environment
Under the plan, Suez would sell or distribute shares of Suez Environment, said the people, who declined to be identified because the talks are confidential. The energy operations of Suez would then be merged with state-controlled Gaz de France, the operator of Europe's biggest natural gas network.
On leaving Suez headquarters in Paris after the meeting, Suez board member and Areva SA Chief Executive Officer Anne Lauvergeon said, ``I will let Suez tell you the good news.'' She declined further comment. Journal du Dimanche said yesterday the accord will be announced today.
Lagarde said the French government will retain a ``blocking minority stake'' in the new company. She declined to give details on how Suez's water and trash units would be handled, or about the government's exact stake. ``It will create a great global company that focuses all their strengths in the energy industry,'' she said.
The original merger plan, now valued at about 59.5 billion euros ($81 billion), has been mired in political and valuation concerns since it was put forward in February 2006 to ward off a possible bid for Suez from Italy's Enel SpA. With the new plan, Suez Chief Executive Officer Gerard Mestrallet is bowing to pressure from Sarkozy.
Stumbling Block
``Suez's environment unit had always been the stumbling block,'' Berenguier said on Aug. 31. ``Mestrallet wanted to keep it, but Sarkozy always talked about a pure energy group.''
The two companies will make an announcement on ``whether to merge or not'' on Sept. 3, Claude Gueant, the secretary general of the French presidency, told Agence France-Presse Sept. 1.
Suez shares Aug. 31 rose 1.8 percent to 41.74 euros, valuing the Paris-based company at 54.1 billion euros. Gaz de France jumped 4 percent to 36.80 euros, the biggest one-day gain since May 7, valuing it at 36.2 billion euros.
Spinning off Suez's water and trash unit would bring the size of the two companies closer together, and avoid overly diluting the stake of the government, which holds 80 percent of Gaz de France.
French Government
Selling off two-thirds of the water and waste unit would allow the French government to retain about 38 percent of the newly merged entity and even more through its indirect holdings such as the Caisse des Depots and Consignations, the state-owned bank that now owns a 2.8 percent stake in Suez, Berenguier estimated.
The merger of Suez and Gaz de France, both based in Paris, would create a utility second only to Electricite de France SA in Europe. Bankers are now ironing out the details, the people said.
Under terms being discussed, Suez would cut its stake in its Suez Environment unit to as little as 35 percent, leaving the group with a blocking minority in the event of a hostile bid, a person involved in the talks said Aug. 31.
Terms announced last year included a one-for-one stock swap and a 1 euro dividend to Suez shareholders to make up for the difference in their market values, which then widened.
The gap would also have diluted the state's stake in the merged company, which can't go below 34 percent by law.
Union's Opposition
The CGT union, France's largest, said Sept. 1 that it opposes the merger because it would remove the state's control over Gaz de France. Sarkozy met union members to discuss the merger.
Suez CEO Mestrallet had resisted selling the waste and water units, which account for about a third of operations.
Veolia Environnement SA, JC Decaux SA and Vinci SA as well as Eurazeo SA and Wendel are companies that could be interested in buying into Suez Environment, analysts said.
Veolia CEO Henri Proglio on Aug. 30 said he would be interested in the international waste and water activities of Suez Environment if they came up for sale.
Under the previous plan, Mestrallet was to head the combined group with Gaz de France CEO Officer Jean-Francois Cirelli second-in-command. That remains the plan now, Journal du Dimanche said yesterday, without saying where it got the information.
Gueant said the merger does amount to a privatization of Gaz de France, something that successive French governments have promised not to do.
``Yes, it's a privatization but one where the state remains by far the largest shareholder,'' Gueant said on a political talk show on LCI television.